Update Your California Release Provisions to Include Amended Section 1542 Language
April 02, 2019 —
Amy L. Pierce & William S. Hale, P.E. - Gravel2Gavel Construction & Real Estate BlogMost companies have been involved in a situation where they want to end their relationship with another company, or with an employee, and to permanently terminate their mutual obligations (e.g., a settlement agreement resolving end-of-project litigation). In 1992, a California Court of Appeals, in Winet v. Price, confirmed that upholding general releases is “in harmony… with a beneficial principle of contract law: that general releases can be so constructed as to be completely enforceable.”
In California, agreements with a release of claims (or s general release) include what is often referred to as a California Civil Code § 1542 waiver for the purpose of ensuring that the releasing party is consciously releasing both known and unknown claims that may be later discovered. Such a waiver provision generally confirms that the Releasing Party acknowledges that it understands and waives the provisions of Section 1542, followed by the quoted text of Section 1542 (typically in all capital letters).
Reprinted courtesy of
Amy L. Pierce, Pillsbury and
William S. Hale, Pillsbury
Ms. Pierce may be contacted at amy.pierce@pillsburylaw.com
Mr. Hale may be contacted at william.hale@pillsburylaw.com
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Construction Litigation Roundup: “Ursinus is Cleared!”
March 11, 2024 —
Daniel Lund III - LexologyUrsinus University in Pennsylvania – a “private, nonprofit liberal arts college” – funded a construction project for a new building utilizing monies loaned by the Montgomery County Health and Higher Education Authority, a public economic development authority “formed by the Board of County Commissioners… authorized to issue bonds relative to projects for eligible educational institution such as Ursinus.”
Loans up to the amount of $23,000,000 became available to the University, and construction proceeded using the loans as construction funds. At issue: whether a project was to be considered publicly funded project such that prevailing wage rates were required to be paid. IBEW filed a related grievance with the Pennsylvania Department of Labor and Industry’s Bureau of Labor Law Compliance, which was refused by the Bureau, on the basis that because work was “financed completely by loans from the Authority, which Ursinus was required to repay in their entirety, the Project was ultimately funded through private sources and exempt from coverage under the [Pennsylvania Prevailing Wage Act].” A grievance to the Prevailing Wage Appeals Board ensued, and the Board took a different position.
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Daniel Lund III, PhelpsMr. Lund may be contacted at
daniel.lund@phelps.com
Recording “Un-Neighborly” Documents
April 03, 2019 —
Bob Henry - Snell & Wilmer Real Estate Litigation BlogIn September 2018, in Baumgartner v. Timmins, 245 Ariz. 334, 429 P.3d 567, the Arizona Court of Appeals provided further clarification on what constitutes an “encumbrance” on a property for purposes of Arizona’s statutory scheme prohibiting the recording of “false documents.” The statute, A.R.S. § 33-420, prohibits the recording of documents that a person knows to be forged, are groundless, or that contain material misstatements (or false claims). A person who claims an “interest in, or a lien or encumbrance against” real property who records such documents can be held liable for $5,000 or treble the actual damages caused by the recording (whichever is greater), A.R.S. § 33-420(A), and perhaps even be found guilty of a class 1 misdemeanor, A.R.S. § 33-420(E).
At issue in Baumgartner were neighbors fighting about CC&Rs—a typical neighborhood fight. In 2015, some of the neighbors filed suit against the Timminses for violating the CC&Rs. The Timminses did not contest the lawsuit, resulting in a default judgment. In what the Court of Appeals characterized as a lawsuit filed by the Timminses “in apparent response to the [first] lawsuit and resulting default judgment,” the Timminses created, signed, and recorded affidavits contending that the Plaintiffs in the original lawsuit were themselves “in violation of several provisions of the CC&Rs.” The Plaintiffs then filed suit again against the Timminses, this time contending that the Timminses had violated A.R.S. § 33-420 by recording the affidavits because the affidavits, the Plaintiffs contended, created encumbrances on their properties. The Apache County Superior Court agreed, and issued a final judgment nullifying the recorded documents and awarding the Timminses damages, along with their attorneys’ fees and costs.
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Bob Henry, Snell & WilmerMr. Henry may be contacted at
bhenry@swlaw.com
Washington Trial Court Narrows Definition of First Party Claimant, Clarifies Available Causes of Action in Commercial Property Loss Context
January 04, 2021 —
Kathleen A. Nelson & Jonathan R. Missen - Lewis BrisboisThe law in the State of Washington, albeit clear on issues regarding first party claimants, was recently challenged in the matter of Eye Associates Northwest, P.C. v. Sedgwick et. al. However, despite this challenge of first impression, the court limited the application of the term “first party claimant” (a term of art akin to “insured”) based upon the wording of a loss payee clause, as well as taking into consideration and harmonizing the wording of the leases, other provisions in the policy regarding tenant improvements, and the simple fact that Eye Associates was not named in the policy whatsoever.
In Eye Associates, the plaintiff leased office space in a high-rise medical office building, insured by three separate insurance companies. A water loss caused damage to the plaintiff’s leased space, and the plaintiff brought suit against the owner of the building, its insurers, the property manager, a third-party administrator (TPA), and two individual adjusters assigned to inspect and adjust the water loss claim.
Reprinted courtesy of
Kathleen A. Nelson, Lewis Brisbois and
Jonathan R. Missen, Lewis Brisbois
Ms. Nelson may be contacted at Kathleen.Nelson@lewisbrisbois.com
Mr. Missen may be contacted at Jonathan.Missen@lewisbrisbois.com
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A Tort, By Any Other Name, is Just a Tort: Massachusetts Court Bars Contract Claims That Sound in Negligence
March 20, 2023 —
Gus Sara - The Subrogation StrategistIn University of Massachusetts Building Authority v. Adams Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 2023 Mass. App. Unpub. LEXIS 28, 102 Mass. App. Ct. 1107, the Appeals Court of Massachusetts (Appeals Court) considered whether the lower court properly held that the plaintiff’s breach of contract and indemnification claims were time-barred by the statute of repose because they sounded in tort. The Appeals Court held that while the six-year statute of repose only applies to tort claims, they can also bar claims for breach of contract and indemnification if they sound in tort. The Appeals Court affirmed the lower court’s ruling, finding that the plaintiff’s breach of contract and indemnification claims were just negligence claims disguised as non-tort claims.
In 2013 and 2014, the University of Massachusetts (UMass) retained various contractors to renovate the dining hall for one of its campus buildings, which included the installation of new ductwork for the kitchen’s exhaust system. The dining hall opened for service in September 2014. In the Spring of 2018, it was discovered that the ductwork for the kitchen had collapsed. Further investigation revealed other deficiencies with the exhaust system. On December 1, 2020, UMass filed a lawsuit against various contractors, asserting negligence, breach of contract, and indemnification. The breach of contract claims alleged breach of express warranties.
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Gus Sara, White and WilliamsMr. Sara may be contacted at
sarag@whiteandwilliams.com
Settlement Reached in Bridge Failure Lawsuit
December 11, 2013 —
CDJ STAFFOfficials claimed the failure of a bridge in Afton Township, Illinois was because trucks owned by Welded Construction used the bridge despite exceeding the bridge’s weight limit of 36.5 tons. The firm argued that they should be responsible for the depreciated cost of the bridge, not its replacement cost. Welded Construction had been using the bridge to get to the site of an oil pipeline construction project for Enbridge Energy.
Replacement of the bridge was initially estimated at $933,000, but that was in advance of any design work. Enbridge Energy settled the case at $900,000, which should cover most or all of the cost of repair or replacement. Some federal funds may also be available for repairing or constructing a new bridge.
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St. Mary & St. John Coptic Orthodox Church v. SBS Insurance Services, Inc.
January 18, 2021 —
Michael Velladao - Lewis BrisboisIn St. Mary & St. John Coptic Orthodox Church v. SBS Insurance Services, Inc., ----Cal.App.5th--- (November 23, 2020), the California First District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's entry of judgment in favor of SBC Insurance Services ("SBC") regarding a claim for water damage sustained by a residence owned by St. Mary & John Coptic Church ("St. Mary") under property coverage afforded by a policy issued by Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Company ("Philadelphia"). The policy was procured by SBC on behalf of St. Mary. Philadelphia denied coverage of the claim based on the vacancy exclusion in its policy, but entered into a settlement and loan receipt agreement, whereby St. Mary gave Philadelphia the right to control litigation in St. Mary’s name against SBC or third parties who might be liable for the loss in exchange for a loan of money to repair and remediate the damage sustained by the residence. The loan was to be repaid out of any recovery made against SBC or third parties. After a bench trial, the trial court found in favor of SBC and held that the vacancy exclusion was ambiguous. Essentially, the exclusion did not apply to the time period prior to the time St. Mary purchased the residence, such that the 60-day vacancy requirement could not be satisfied. The trial court reasoned that since St. Mary did not have an insurable interest in the property before it purchased the property, the 60-day requirement did not include the period before such residence was purchased and St. Mary held an insurable interest.
The parties’ dispute arose of out of the Pope of the Coptic Church requesting St. Mary to purchase a home to be used as his papal residence in the Western United States. St. Mary also intended to use the home as a residence for visiting bishops. The home was purchased on May 28, 2015. As part of the purchase, SBC placed the home under St. Mary’s commercial policy, rather than purchasing a separate homeowner’s policy for the residence. Subsequently, the home sustained water damage due to a broken pipe. The water damage was discovered on July 24, 2015, 57 days after the inception of the Philadelphia policy and the loss. St. Mary tendered the property loss to Philadelphia, which denied coverage of the claim based on the reasoning that the home had been vacant for 60 consecutive days prior to the loss. Subsequently, St. Mary filed suit against SBC after securing the loan receipt agreement with Philadelphia based on the argument that the vacancy exclusion barred coverage of the claim and SBC breached its duty of care by not securing the proper coverage of the home. The trial court entered judgment in favor of SBC finding that the vacancy exclusion did not apply to bar coverage of the loss, such that SBC did not breach its duty of care owed to St. Mary as its broker.
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Michael Velladao, Lewis BrisboisMr. Velladao may be contacted at
Michael.Velladao@lewisbrisbois.com
California Appellate Court Holds “Minimal Causal Connection” Satisfies Causation Requirement in All Risk Policies
July 20, 2020 —
Scott P. DeVries & Michael S. Levine - Hunton Andrews KurthOn May 26, 2020, a California Court of Appeals (4th District) issued its decision in Mosley et al. v. Pacific Specialty Ins. Co. The case arose in the context of a marijuana-growing tenant who rerouted a home’s electrical system and caused an electrical fire. The issue was whether the homeowner’s policy covered the loss. The trial court granted the insurer’s motion for summary judgment and, in a divided decision, the Court of Appeals reversed in part.
The policy excluded losses “resulting from any manufacturing, production or operation, engaged in … the growing of plants.” The parties agreed that the fire resulted from the rewiring of the electrical system, but disagreed on “whether that means the damage” “result[ed] from” “the growing of plants.” The Court held that “resulting from” “broadly links a factual situation with the event creating liability, and connotes only a minimal causal connection or incidental relationship.” In doing so, it equated the terms “results from” and “arising from.” Concluding that a “common sense” approach was to be used, it found a “minimal causal connection” to be present. This expansive standard could be beneficial to policyholders in arguing the causal connection between COVID-19 and ensuing business interruption losses; specifically, that the pandemic, a covered event, is the underlying and proximate cause of the insureds’ physical loss and/or damage and the insured’s resulting business interruption loss, and that intervening events, whether they be orders of civil authority, prevention of ingress/egress or otherwise, would not sever the chain of causation.
Reprinted courtesy of
Scott P. DeVries, Hunton Andrews Kurth and
Michael S. Levine, Hunton Andrews Kurth
Mr. DeVries may be contacted at sdevries@HuntonAK.com
Mr. Levine may be contacted at mlevine@HuntonAK.com
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