SEATTLE WASHINGTON BUILDING EXPERT
DIRECTORY AND CAPABILITIES

Attorney's Erroneous Conclusion that Limitations Period Had Not Expired Was Not Grounds For Relief Under C.C.P. § 473(b)

February 27, 2019 — David W. Evans & Stephen J. Squillario
In Jackson v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, Inc. (2/8/19 No. A150833), the First District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s denial of a motion for relief from a voluntary dismissal, without prejudice, filed by the plaintiff based on the erroneous conclusion of an attorney who she had consulted (but who had not yet appeared as counsel in her case) that the applicable statute of limitations had not yet expired. In reality, the limitations period had expired on the same date plaintiff had filed her complaint in propria persona. The plaintiff later retained the attorney on a limited basis to present the motion for relief pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 473(b) based on the attorney’s affidavit of fault. Therein, the attorney testified that he had advised the plaintiff to dismiss her action voluntarily based on a misinterpretation of the applicable limitations period, which the attorney characterized as having been based on his “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect.” Section 473 provides two distinct provisions for relief from default or dismissal – one is discretionary, while the other is mandatory. Discretionary relief is available in the case of an attorney’s mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. In contrast, mandatory relief is available where the resulting dismissal was caused by an attorney’s mistake, whether or not excusable. In denying the plaintiff’s motion, the trial court reasoned that the plaintiff could not rely upon Section 473(b) because (1) the attorney did not represent the plaintiff at the time and (2) this provision did not apply to the voluntary dismissal of an action without prejudice. Reprinted courtesy of David W. Evans, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and Stephen J. Squillario, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP Mr. Evans may be contacted at devans@hbblaw.com Mr. Squillario may be contacted at ssquillario@hbblaw.com Read the court decision
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EPA Fines Ivory Homes for Storm Water Pollution

June 26, 2014 — Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFF
“Utah’s largest home builder [Ivory Homes] has agreed to a $250,000 fine and to take several steps…to comply with Clean Water Act requirements to control pollution associated with storm-water runoff from construction sites,” reported The Salt Lake Tribune. David Broadbent, Ivory Homes’ chief operating officer, stated in an email to The Salt Lake Tribune: “We are proud of our environmental record, particularly our storm-water compliance record. We are the first and the only home builder in Utah to implement a robust, companywide program to safeguard against sediment from entering Utah waters as a result of home-building activities.” Furthermore, Broadbent declared that the “inspections that led to the violations notices” did not yield any evidence that their “home-building practices resulted in any sediment discharge in any amount, let alone harm, to Utah waters.” Read the court decision
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Just When You Thought General Contractors Were Necessary Parties. . .

November 30, 2020 — Christopher G. Hill - Construction Law Musings
Did you think that a subcontractor had to name a general contractor in a mechanic’s lien suit? I did. Did you think that nothing about this changed in the case where a Virginia mechanic’s lien was “bonded off” pursuant to Va. Code Section 43-71? I did. Well, a recent Virginia Supreme Court case, Synchronized Construction Services Inc. v. Prav Lodging LLC, seems to at least create some doubt as to whether the a general contractor is a “necessary” party to a lawsuit by a subcontractor in the case where a bond is posted for release of a mechanic’s lien. In Prav Lodging, the facts were a bit unusual. The day after the mechanic’s lien was recorded by Synchronized Construction Services, Inc. (“Synchronized”) the construction manager, Paris Development Group, the construction manager and de facto general contractor, went out of business. Despite this fact, and after the lien was bonded off, Synchronized sued to enforce the lien and for breach of contract against Paris. The wrinkle here is that Synchronized was unable to serve several defendants, among them Paris, within one year of filing suit as required by Virginia statute. In the Circuit Court, the financing bank moved to dismiss the suit for failure to serve necessary parties. The Circuit Court dismissed the breach of contract count but refused to dismiss the mechanic’s lien count on this basis. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of The Law Office of Christopher G. Hill
Mr. Hill may be contacted at chrisghill@constructionlawva.com

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Oregon agreement to procure insurance, anti-indemnity statute, and self-insured retention

March 05, 2011 — CDCoverage.com

In Continental Casualty Ins. Co. v. Zurich American Ins. Co., No. 09-35484 (9th Cir. Oct. 28, 2010), general contractor TCR was sued by an employee of subcontractor Safeway for bodily injuries suffered while working on the project. In the subcontract, Safeway agreed to procure primary insurance providing coverage for TCR for liability arising out of Safeway’s negligence. Safeway’s CGL policy included a self-insured retention that had to be satisfied before the insurer had a duty to defend. TCR filed suit against Safeway alleging that

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That’s not the way we’ve always done it! (Why you should update your office practices)

April 15, 2014 — Melissa Dewey Brumback – Construction Law in North Carolina
Anyone recognize the photo to the left [Photo of Pay Phone]? If you are of the Millennial generation, this is a quaint thing called a public pay phone. They used to be everywhere. Imagine, not having a cell phone to keep you in constant contact with Big Brother…………. [the good old days]. As you may be able to tell from the fact that the receiver is hanging down, this phone has seen better days. What does this have to do with construction? Everything. Just because something is done one way– even for years, or decades– doesn’t mean it should stay that way. Just as you learn new technical skills and change your designs, you should also update and modernize your office practices. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Melissa Dewey Brumback, Construction Law in North Carolina
Ms. Brumback may be contacted at mbrumback@rl-law.com

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New Jersey Courts Sign "Death Knell" for 1979 Weedo Decision

October 21, 2015 — Jesse Howard Witt – Acerbic Witt
A new blog post from Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton discusses two recent decisions limiting the holding of Weedo v. Stone-E-Brick, Inc., 405 A.2d 788 (N.J. 1979), a New Jersey case that has generated decades of commentary and debate, in my own writing as well as that of many others (at least 1880 citations, according to the blog). Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Jesse Howard Witt, Acerbic Witt
Mr. Witt welcomes comments at www.wittlawfirm.net

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California Appeals Court Remands Fine in Late Completion Case

November 18, 2011 — CDJ STAFF

The California Court of Appeals in Stanislaus County has reversed the decision of the lower court in Greg Opinski Construction Inc. v. City of Oakdale. The earlier court had awarded the city of judgment of $54,000 for late completion, $3,266 for repair of construction defects and interest, and $97,775 in attorneys’ fees. The late completion of the project was due to actions by the City of Oakdale, however, the court rejected Opinski’s argument that the California Supreme Court decision in Kiewit did not allow this, as his contract with the city established a procedure for claiming extensions.

The appeals court noted that the Kiewit decision has been “criticized as an unwarranted interference in the power of contracting parties to shift the risk of delays caused by one party onto the other party by forcing the second party to give the first notice of any intention to claim an extension of time based on delays caused by first.” They cited Sweet, a professor at Boalt Hall, UC Berkeley’s law school, that Kiewit “gutted” the “provision that conditions the contractor’s right to claim an extension of time for delays beyond his control.”

Further changes in California law in response to the Kiewit decision lead to the current situation which the court characterized as “if the contractor wished to claim it needed an extension of time because of delays caused by the city, the contractor was required to obtain a written change order by mutual consent or submit a claim in writing requesting a formal decision by the engineer.”

Opinski also argued that the lower court misinterpreted the contract. The Appeals court replied that “Opinski is mistaken.” He cited parts of the contract regarding the increase of time, but the court rejected these, noting that “an inability to agree is not the same as an express rejection.”

The court also rejects Opinski’s appeal that “the evidence the project was complete earlier than September 30, 2005, is weightier than the evidence to the contrary,” which they describe as “not a winning appellate argument.” The court points out that the role of an appeals court is not to reweigh the evidence, but to determine “whether the record contains substantial evidence in support of the judgment.”

The court did side with Opinski on one question of the escrow account. They rejected most of his arguments, repeating the line “Opinski is mistaken” several times. They decided that he was mistaken on the timing of the setoff decision and on whether the city was the prevailing party. However, the appeals court did find that Opinski was not liable for interest on the judgment.

The appeals court rejected the awarding of prejudgment interest to the city as the funds from which the judgment was drawn was held in an escrow account. The court noted that the city had access to the funds and could “access the funds when it determined that Opinski had breached the contract.” The appeals court noted that the judgment exhausted the escrow balance and remanded the case to the lower court to determine the amount own to Opinski.

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Allegations of Actual Property Damage Necessary to Invoke Duty to Defend

January 17, 2013 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii

The Fifth Circuit held that under Texas law, conclusory allegations of property damage in the underlying complaint did not trigger the insurer's duty to defend. PPI Tech. Serv., L.P. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 24571 (5th Cir. Nov. 29, 2012).

Royal Production Company was the lessor and operator of three leases for oil exploration. Royal retained the insured, PPI, as its agent to assist in well-planning and oversee the drilling of wells on the leases.

A well was drilled on one of the three leased areas, but in resulted in a dry hole. It was later discovered that the well had been drilled on the wrong lease. Royal sued PPI for negligence, claiming that PPI caused the drilling rig to be towed to the wrong location, resulting in a dry hole and "property damage." 

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Reprinted courtesy of Tred Eyerly
Tred Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com

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