SEATTLE WASHINGTON BUILDING EXPERT
DIRECTORY AND CAPABILITIES

Waive It Goodbye: Despite Evidence to the Contrary, Delaware Upholds an AIA Waiver of Subrogation Clause

April 19, 2022 — Lian Skaf - The Subrogation Strategist
Subrogation professionals have always been looking for ways to defeat onerous waiver of subrogation provisions in contracts signed by insureds. However, even when contracts are unsigned, if there is intent when the contract is made – usually long before a loss occurs – a waiver of subrogation can doom what otherwise may have been a strong case. The Superior Court of Delaware considered such a scenario to determine whether a waiver of subrogation provision applied to a multimillion-dollar subrogation case. In State of Delaware Insurance Coverage Office and Factory Mutual Insurance Co., both as subrogee of the University of Delaware v. DiSabatino Construction Co., Schlosser & Associates Mechanical Contractors, Inc. and V.E. Guerrazzi, Inc., C.A. No. N19C-08-080, 2022 Del. Super. LEXIS 108 (March 17, 2022), the court granted the defendants’ motions for summary judgment, holding that the plaintiffs’ claims were barred by a waiver of subrogation provision in the underlying contract. Thus, the court held that the plaintiffs could not pursue the defendants in their suit to recover damages as a result of a fire. The court specifically denied the plaintiffs’ argument that since the contract was not signed and another “short form” version was later used the waiver of subrogation provision should not apply. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Lian Skaf, White and Williams LLP
Mr. Skaf may be contacted at skafl@whiteandwilliams.com

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Sometimes You Get Away with Default (but don’t count on it)

July 27, 2020 — Christopher G. Hill - Construction Law Musings
As an almost universal rule here in Virginia, failing to show up for court or respond to a lawsuit is a bad idea. Consequences include default judgment against you without the right to defend or make your case. Courts simply enter judgment and the consequences of that judgment will follow. However, and as is often the case around here, there are small exceptions where the courts of Virginia allow the defaulting party off the hook. Sullivan Mechanical Contractors, Inc. v. KBE Building Corporation is just such a case. In Sullivan Mechanical, the Federal District Court for the Western District of Virginia was faced with a Motion to Vacate Default Judgment from KBE. The facts are laid out in the opinion, but basically come down to the usual subcontractor not paid by the general contractor and general contractor has reasons for non-payment. Subcontractor, Sullivan Mechanical, sued KBE and KBE failed to respond in a timely manner. One day after the deadline for response had passed, Sullivan moved for entry of default and the clerk entered the default that same day. KBE moved to vacate the default a mere 6 days after entry of default. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of The Law Office of Christopher G. Hill
Mr. Hill may be contacted at chrisghill@constructionlawva.com

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No Escape: California Court of Appeals Gives a Primary CGL Insurer’s “Other Insurance” Clause Two Thumbs Down

December 02, 2015 — Yas Omidi – California Construction Law Blog
“No Escape” is a 2015 action movie starring Pierce Brosnan and Owen Wilson (that’s right, Owen Wilson) and which the folks at rogerebert.com described as “a dreadful…would-be thriller” and “low-grade trash.” It’s also, in short, the California Court of Appeal’s answer to a primary insurer’s recent bid to escape its duty to defend pursuant to an “other insurance” clause in a CGL policy in Underwriters of Interest Subscribing to Policy No. A15274001 v. ProBuilders Specialty Ins. Co., Case No. D066615, California Court of Appeals for the Fourth District (October 23, 2015). Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Yas Omidi, California Construction Law Blog
Ms. Omidi may be contacted at yomidi@wendel.com

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Exclusion Does Not Bar Coverage for Injury To Subcontractor's Employee

April 28, 2014 — Tred R. Eyerly – Insurance Law Hawaii
The Third Circuit reversed the district court and held that the additional insured was covered for injury to the subcontractor's employee despite an employee's exclusion in the policy. ArcelorMittal Plate, LLC v. Joule Technical Serv, Inc., 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 2905 (3d Cir. Feb. 18, 2014). ArcelorMittal Plate, LLC (AMP) owned a steel production facility. AMP contracted with Joule, an industrial staffing and engineering firm, for regular performance of maintenance and repair work at its plant. Joule was obligated to provide a CGL policy adding AMP as an additional insured "for all claims including, but not limited to, claims by Joule's employees." Joule added AMP as an additional insured to its policy with Liberty Surplus Ins. Corp. The policy had an "employee exclusion" which stated, “This insurance does not apply to bodily injury to (1) an employee of the insured arising out of and in the course of (a) employment by the insured or (b) performing duties related to the conduct of the insured's business.” Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
Mr. Eyerly may be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com

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Massachusetts Business Court Addresses Defense Cost Allocation and Non-Cumulation Provisions in Long-Tail Context

March 06, 2022 — Eric B. Hermanson & Austin D. Moody - White and Williams
A business court in Massachusetts has weighed in on two key issues affecting allocation of insurance coverage for long-tail liabilities in Massachusetts. Specifically, in Crosby Valve LLC et al. v. OneBeacon America Insurance Company, et al.,[1] involving asbestos bodily injury claims, Judge Kenneth Salinger of the Suffolk County Business Litigation Session addressed:

• whether defense costs in long-tail cases were subject to the same pro rata allocation scheme the Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) adopted to govern successively triggered insurers' indemnity obligations in Boston Gas Company v. Century Indemnity Company;[2] and
• whether “non-cumulation” provisions, like those addressed by the New York Court of Appeals in Matter of Viking Pump,[3] were consistent with this pro rata allocation methodology.

As to the first issue — i.e., allocation of defense costs — Judge Salinger declined to follow Boston Gas, and found the SJC’s holding in that case was limited to an insurers’ indemnity obligations. The SJC in Boston Gas had focused on the language of the policy insuring agreement, saying “[t]his policy applies to ... property damage ... which occurs anywhere during the policy period.” The SJC had also pointed to the policy definition of “occurrence” as “an accident, including injurious exposure to conditions, which results, during the policy period, in property damage neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured.”[4] Reprinted courtesy of Eric B. Hermanson, White and Williams LLP and Austin D. Moody, White and Williams Mr. Hermanson may be contacted at hermansone@whiteandwilliams.com Mr. Moody may be contacted at moodya@whiteandwilliams.com Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of

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A Chicago Skyscraper Cements the Legacy of a Visionary Postmodern Architect

December 31, 2024 — Mark Byrnes - Bloomberg
A handsome and eclectic stretch of buildings along Michigan Avenue known as “Chicago’s Front Door” offers a view that reflects the city’s status as a destination for serious architecture. Louis Sullivan and Dankmar Adler’s Auditorium Building, where a young Frank Lloyd Wright designed interiors, is right there on Grant Park; so is Daniel Burnham’s Railway Exchange, where he drew up the 1909 Plan of Chicago. Now a glass-and-aluminum apartment tower anchors the southern end of this scene, filling in a rare gap within this landmarked streetwall and putting a bow on the career of another heroic figure in Chicago’s architectural history: Helmut Jahn. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Mark Byrnes, Bloomberg

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Nonparty Discovery in California Arbitration: How to Get What You Want

January 08, 2019 — Leilani L. Jones - Payne & Fears
Opting for arbitration requires attorneys to balance efficiency and procedural protections. The implications of arbitration are something clients certainly have to carefully consider both when drafting arbitration provisions, and after initiating a demand. While arbitration can in many respects streamline the civil discovery process, one of the largest roadblocks for cases in California arbitrations is “streamlining” discovery from nonparties. This article explores the challenges presented by third party discovery in arbitration, and proposes strategies for obtaining such discovery efficiently and expeditiously. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Leilani L. Jones, Payne & Fears
Ms. Jones may be contacted at llj@paynefears.com

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Illinois Court Assesses Factual Nature of Term “Reside” in Determining Duty to Defend

October 30, 2023 — James M. Eastham - Traub Lieberman
In State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Guevara, 2023 IL App (1st) 221425-U, P2, the Illinois First District Court of Appeals addressed an insurance carrier’s duty to defend under a homeowners insurance policy. The underlying suit stemmed from an alleged injury suffered at a residence located in Berwyn, Illinois and owned by named insured Luz Melina Guevara, a defendant in the suit. After Guevara tendered the suit, State Farm filed a complaint for declaratory judgment seeking a declaration that it had no duty to defend or indemnify Guevara because Guevara did not “reside” at the insured premises. The policy defined the "insured location" as the "residence premises," and residence premises was defined as "the one, two, three or four-family dwelling, other structures, and grounds or that part of any other building; where you reside and which is shown in the Declarations." In response to the underlying lawsuit, Guevara had filed an answer and affirmative defenses in which Guevara denied the allegation that "At all relevant times, [Guevara] resided in Berwyn, Cook County, Illinois." Guevara admitted that she owned the Berwyn property but denied that she "resided in, maintained and controlled the property". The declaratory judgment complaint alleged (among other things) that, based on admissions by Guevara in her answer, the Berwyn residence was not an "insured location" under the State Farm policy. State Farm moved for summary judgment at the trial court level on this ground and summary judgment was granted in State Farm’s favor. An appeal ensued wherein the parties disagreed as to whether there is a genuine issue of material fact that, under the language of the policy, State Farm had no duty to defend because the Berwyn property was not an "insured location" because she did not "reside" there. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of James M. Eastham, Traub Lieberman
Mr. Eastham may be contacted at jeastham@tlsslaw.com

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