With Wildfires at a Peak, “Firetech” Is Joining Smart City Lineups
October 21, 2024 —
James P. Bobotek - Gravel2Gavel Construction & Real Estate Law BlogThe
threat of extreme wildfires has doubled in the past 20 years, with almost 20,000 fires blazing across the United States in 2024 alone. These high-intensity fires can be deadly, expensive, and create lingering health and environmental consequences. While we are used to seeing firefighters on the frontlines, researchers hope that next-generation smart technology, augmented by artificial intelligence (AI), will also play a key role in battling these conflagrations. Many municipalities, particularly those near wildfire-prone forests, are beginning to incorporate fire-focused advances (or “firetech”) into their smart city ecosystems.
“Smart cities” are urban centers enhanced by utilities, emergency services,
traffic signals and more that are linked through information and communications technology. Though the concept can spark cybersecurity-related concerns, many locales are gradually implementing many different kinds of smart tech. Following the 2023 wildfire that devastated Maui, for example, Hawaii installed a network of
cloud-based fire and wind sensors that use AI to detect wildfires in real time. Smart tools like these can aid in predicting and discovering fires, streamlining emergency alert protocols, calculating vital analytics and improving firefighter safety. The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) is
actively studying these innovations, particularly in terms of environmental (smart buildings or robotics), operational (communications) and personnel (PPE sensors or biometrics). Below are a few of the key technologies to watch in this emerging field:
- Smart Sensors. A total of 80 sensors (64 wildfire sensors and 16 wind sensors) were placed throughout Hawaii starting in March of 2024. Attached to existing utility poles, they detect heat in the air, and then engage AI and smart learning to distinguish smoke particles and gases produced by fires from those commonly found in Hawaii’s atmosphere—such as volcanic ash and ocean salt. Positioned in “strings,” the sensors “talk” to each other and send text messages to officials when they find a problem.
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James P. Bobotek, PillsburyMr. Bobotek may be contacted at
james.bobotek@pillsburylaw.com
Life After McMillin: Do Negligence and Strict Liability Causes of Action for Construction Defects Still Exist?
January 24, 2018 —
Thomas Balestreri and Amanda Crawley - Balestreri, Potocki, & HolmesThe ruling is in but the battle will likely continue over the practical application of SB 800. On January 18, 2018 the California Supreme Court issued its decision in
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __, holding that the statutory prelitigation scheme in The Right to Repair Act (“the Act”) that provides for notice and an opportunity for the Builder to repair defects applies to all claims for construction defects in residential construction sold on or after January 1, 2003, regardless whether the claim is founded on a violation of the Act’s performance standards or a common law claim for negligence or strict liability. (
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __.) With this holding, has the Court ruled that common law causes of action for construction defect still survive? If so, what will they look like and what standards will be applied?
The short answer is that it appears that common law causes of action still survive, at least for now, but it is not clear from this decision what they will look like and what standards will apply.
Portions of the decision seem to suggest that the Act is the sole and exclusive remedy for construction defect claims: “…even in some areas where the common law had supplied a remedy for construction defects resulting in property damage but not personal injury, the text and legislative history [of the statute] reflect a
clear and unequivocal intent to supplant common law negligence and strict product liability actions under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 6].) (Italics added for emphasis) However, at the end of the decision, the Court seems to be saying that there may still be a place for common law claims for negligence and strict liability alongside the Act but that these causes of action may be subject to the performance standards in the Act.
The
McMillin case went up to the Supreme Court on a procedural issue: whether a common law action alleging construction defects resulting in both economic loss and property damage is subject to the Act’s prelitigation notice and cure procedures. The Van Tassels had dismissed their claims under the Act opting to proceed solely on their common law claims including negligence and strict liability. McMillin sought a stay to force the Van Tassels to comply with the Act’s prelitigation procedures. The Supreme Court held that the Van Tassels must comply with the statutory procedures and affirmed the stay issued by the trial court. But the question remained: now that the Van Tassels were left only with common law claims, how would they proceed under the Act?
To understand how the Court dealt with this question, one must first understand how the Court dealt with the narrow procedural question presented by the case. The Court provides a very detailed, clear explanation of the reasons why it felt the Legislature intended for all construction defect claims involving residential construction must comply with the prelitigation requirements of the Act. In summing up its conclusions the Court makes three definitive holdings.
First, for claims involving economic loss only—the kind of claims involved in
Aas—the Court holds that the Legislature intended to supersede
Aas and provide a statutory basis for recovery. (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 10].) In other words, the Court clearly agrees that the Act was meant to allow recovery of damages based solely on economic damages. No surprise there. Second, the Court held for personal injuries, the Legislature made no changes to existing law that provides common law remedies for the injured party. (Id.) Nobody has ever contested that. Finally, the Court held that for construction defect claims involving property damage and not just economic loss “the Legislature replaced the common law
methods of recovery with the new statutory scheme.” (
Id.,) (Italics added for emphasis.)
In other words, the Court is not saying that negligence and strict liability are not permitted causes of action. The Court is merely stating that these causes of action must comply with the Act’s statutory scheme just as the same as a claim for economic loss. Here the Court is focusing on the procedure that must be followed. “The Act, in effect, provides that construction defect claims not involving personal injury will be treated the same procedurally going forward whether or not the underlying claims gave rise to any property damage.” (
Id.)
Having laid out its fundamental premise, the Court then deals with Plaintiff’s arguments regarding the intent of the Legislature and makes light work of them all. In the process, the Court disapproves
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Brookfield Crystal Cove LLC (2013) 219 Cal. App. 4th 98, and
Burch v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal. App. 4th 1411, to the extent they are inconsistent with the views expressed in the
McMillin opinion.
This is where the decision gets interesting. The Court reminds us that the Van Tassels had dismissed their statutory causes of action for violation of the performance standards under Section 896. One would think at that point that Plaintiffs had to be wondering if they had any claims left given that the Court had ruled that the Act was the sole means of recovery for construction defects. Not so fast. The Court points out that the complaint still rests on allegations of defective construction and that the suit remains an “ ‘action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, the residential construction’ of the plaintiffs’ homes (§896)
and McMillin’s liability under the Van Tassels’ negligence and strict liability claims depends on the extent to which it [McMillin] violated the standards of sections 896 and 897.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Emphasis added.) WHAT DID THE COURT JUST SAY? Did the Court just say that a plaintiff could bring a common law cause of action for negligence or strict liability based on a violation of the performance standards under Section 896? What exactly would that claim look like? What would be the elements of such a cause of action?
To answer these questions, the Court states in the very next paragraph, which also happens to be the last paragraph in the decision: “In holding that claims seeking recovery for construction defect damages are subject to the Act’s prelitigation procedures regardless of how they are pleaded,
we have no occasion to address the extent to which a party might rely upon common law principles in pursuing liability under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Italics added for emphasis) Is the Court answering “No” to the questions posed above? Probably not. It is simply following the age old rule that an appellate court will
not rule on an issue that is not specifically presented by an appeal, leaving that question for another day.
All we know for sure from
McMillin is that every claim for construction defects falling within the scope of the Act must follow the prelitigation procedure. There are no hall passes for negligence and strict liability. The larger question posed by the last two paragraphs in the decision, is whether the law recognizes a cause of action for negligence and strict liability for construction defects based on the standards in Section 896. The answer will have to be worked out by judges and trial attorneys in courtrooms across the State! The parameters of this hybrid cause of action that the Court seems to have posited will need more careful consideration than can be offered on first reading of
McMillin v. Superior Court.
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North Carolina Exclusion j(6) “That Particular Part”
February 10, 2012 —
CDCoverage.comIn Alliance Mutual Insurance Co. v. Dove, 714 S.E.2d 782 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011), claimant Murphy-Brown hired insured Dove to repair a broken elevator belt in a grain elevator in Murphy-Brown’s feed mill. The elevator was inside a metal duct and, to access the broken belt, Dove had to cut out a section of the duct. After replacing the belt, Dove welded the metal section back to the duct. Immediately after Dove completed the welding, dust inside the duct ignited, causing an explosion in the elevator, resulting in property damage to the elevator and other property. Murphy-Brown sued Dove for negligence seeking damages for the repair and replacement of the elevator, repair and replacement of the other property, increased grain handling costs during the repairs, and loss of use.
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Reprinted courtesy of CDCoverage.com
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Oregon Supreme Court Confirms Broad Duty to Defend
November 21, 2017 —
Theresa A. Guertin - Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C. BlogOriginally published by CDJ on January 13, 2017
The Supreme Court of Oregon issued a decision at the end of last year which perfectly illustrates the lengths to which a court may go to grant a contractor’s claim for defense from its insurer in a construction defect suit. In West Hills Development Co. v. Chartis Claims, Inc.,1 the Court held that a subcontractor’s insurer had a duty to defend a general contractor as an additional insured because the allegations of a homeowner’s association’s complaint could be interpreted to fall within the ambit of coverage provided under the policy—despite the fact that the policy only provided ongoing operations coverage, and despite the fact that the subcontractor was never mentioned in the complaint. The decision is favorable to policyholders but also provides an important lesson: that contractors may avoid additional insured disputes if those contractors have solid contractual insurance requirements for both ongoing and completed operations risks.
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Theresa A. Guertin, Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.Ms. Guertin may be contacted at
tag@sdvlaw.com
Generally, What Constitutes A Trade Secret Is A Question of Fact
February 01, 2021 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesIn construction, contractors maintain competitiveness by compiling, combining, utilizing, or developing proprietary and unique systems. The systems can be from a cost standpoint (determining general conditions or general requirement costs and percentages including percentages for insurance) or can be with respect to certain construction assembly or delegated design components. Such proprietary and unique systems are trade secrets to the contractors and efforts are taken to identify such information as confidential when proposing on a project. Contractors would not want such systems disclosed to others because it would dilute and impact what they believe is valuable and makes them competitive in the marketplace.
Florida’s Uniform Trade Secret Act (“FUTSA”) creates a statutory cause of action for the misappropriation of trade secrets. (FUTSA is set forth in Florida Statute s. 688.001 en seq.) FUTSA displaces or “preempts all claims [such as common law claims] based on misappropriation of trade secrets.” Alphamed Pharmaceuticals Corp. v. Arriva Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 391 F.Supp.2d 1148, 1167 (S.D.Fla. 2005). See also Fla. Stat. s. 688.008.
Florida Statute s. 688.002 (found here) defines the terms “trade secret” and “misappropriation.”
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David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
New Case Law Alert: Licensed General Contractors Cannot Sue Owners to Recover Funds for Work Performed by An Unlicensed Subcontractor
May 30, 2022 —
Michele A. Ellison & Samantha R. Riggen - Gibbs GidenThe opinion in Kim v. TWA Construction, Inc. (2022 Cal. App. LEXIS 412) issued by the Court of Appeal of California Sixth Appellate District, on May 13, 2022, makes it clear that a properly licensed general contractor cannot bring an action for compensation from an owner for work performed by an unlicensed subcontractor.
California licensing law has long made explicit that an unlicensed contractor cannot bring or maintain any action to collect or recover compensation for work that contractor performed unless they were duly licensed at all times during the performance of that work. This new ruling extends the scope of this restriction to licensed contractors who hired unlicensed subcontractors.
The Underlying Dispute
The case involved a dispute between property owners and their former general contractor and its principal (collectively “TWA”). The property owners hired TWA to construct a home, and during the early stages of the project, TWA hired an unlicensed subcontractor to perform tree trimming services and to remove a large eucalyptus tree. The subcontractor partially removed the eucalyptus tree, but was stopped by a neighbor, and it was discovered that the tree was partly located on the neighbor’s property. The neighbor brought suit against the property owners, and eventually TWA, for the damage. The property owners subsequently filed a cross-complaint against TWA, and TWA in turn filed a cross-complaint against the property owners.
Reprinted courtesy of
Michele A. Ellison, Gibbs Giden and
Samantha R. Riggen, Gibbs Giden
Ms. Ellison may be contacted at mellison@gibbsgiden.com
Ms. Riggen may be contacted at sriggen@gibbsgiden.com
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Trial Court's Award of Contractual Fees to Public Adjuster Overturned
June 03, 2019 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiA judgment awarding the public adjuster his compensation for work performed under contract was remanded for further proceedings by the Hawaii Intermediate Court of Appeals. Joslin v Ota Camp-Makibaka Ass'n, 2019 Haw. App. LEXIS 155 (Haw. Ct. App. April 5, 2019).
A fire destroyed the homeowners' residence on September 19, 2013. The property was subject to the bylaws of the Association of Apartment Owners of Ota Camp. The Association had a policy with Alterra Excess & Surplus Insurance Company and submitted a claim for all units damaged in the fire. The Association's adjuster came the following day to inspect the site.
Separately, Robert Joslin, public adjuster, entered a contract with the homeowners to adjust their claim in exchange for twelve-percent of any insurance proceeds obtained. Over the next several months Joslin pursued insurance proceeds from Alterra on behalf of the homeowners. On December 18, 2013, Joslin filed a complaint with the Insurance Division arguing that Alterra had failed to timely make payments on the claim.
On February 10, 2014, Alterra's third party administrator, Engle Martin & Associates, sent a check to Joslin for $231,940 made out to the Association, the homeowners and Joslin.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak HastertMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Real Estate & Construction News Round-Up (07/13/22)
August 07, 2022 —
Pillsbury's Construction & Real Estate Law Team - Gravel2Gavel Construction & Real Estate Law BlogThe Biden administration will use infrastructure funds to upgrade 85 airports across the U.S., The Affordable New York tax provision expires, homebuyers in China refuse to pay mortgages, and more.
- Hines, a Houston-based real estate giant, set a target of its 1,530 properties in 28 countries being net-zero operational carbon by 2040. (John Egan, Innovation Map)
- The Biden administration announced it will spend roughly $1 billion from the infrastructure package to upgrade 85 airports across the country, including terminals and other facilities. (Jeff Mordock, The Washington Post)
- The Affordable New York tax provision, which offered a property tax exemption for housing projects that include a percentage earmarked for lower-income renters, expired in June, creating an unsettled future for the city’s multifamily development. (Rebecca Picciotto, The Wall Street Journal)
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