Illinois Court Determines Duty to Defend Construction Defect Claims
March 22, 2021 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiGiven the underlying allegations of damage to personal property, the court determined the insurer had a duty to defend. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London v. Metropolitan Builders, Inc., 2019 Ill. App. LEXIS 979 (Ill. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2019).
Metropolitan was hired as the general contractor for construction, renovation and demolition at contiguous properties - the 1907 Property, 1909 Property, and 1911 Property. During construction activities, the structures on the 1907 Property and 1909 Property collapsed. The existing structures on the properties were later deemed unsafe and were demolished by the city of Chicago.
AIG insured the owner of the buildings and paid over $1.8 million for repairs and associated expenses arising from the collapse. AIG then invoked its rights of subrogation against Metropolitan by filing suit. Metropolitan tendered the suit to its insurer, Lloyd's, who denied coverage and filed for a declaratory judgment. The trial court found the underlying complaint alleged property damage, but not an occurrence. Summary judgment was awarded to Lloyd's.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak HastertMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
California Bid Protests: Responsiveness and Materiality
January 06, 2016 —
Garret Murai – California Construction Law BlogIt can be a rough and tumble world out there. And in the case of public works construction in California, this includes bid disputes.
California’s competitive bidding laws require that a public works contract be awarded to the “lowest responsible bidder.” However, as we’ve mentioned before, there are two requirements which must be satisfied for a bidder to be determined to be the lowest responsible bidder: (1) the awarded bidder’s bid must be “responsive”; and (2) the awarded bidder must be “responsible.”
In a case decided this past month, DeSilva Gates Construction v. Department of Transportation, Case No. C074521 (December 14, 2015), the California Court of Appeals for the Third District addressed the first of these two requirements, whether two bids on $34 million highway widening project were responsive, which in turn involves a two-step process: (1) whether the bids were responsive or not; and (2) if not, whether the variance in the bids were “material” or “immaterial.”
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Garret Murai, Wendel Rosen Black & Dean LLPMr. Murai may be contacted at
gmurai@wendel.com
How to Build a Coronavirus Hospital in Ten Days
April 20, 2020 —
Elaine Lee - Gravel2Gavel Construction & Real Estate Law BlogIf the coronavirus pandemic continues to spread in the United States as it has in other countries, drastic expansions of hospital and quarantine facility capacity are likely to be necessary. In the hard-hit Seattle area, several temporary facilities are already under construction, including a 200-bed temporary quarantine and isolation center built on a soccer field. China’s response to the initial outbreak in the city of Wuhan demonstrates how rapidly authorities can add capacity in an emergency.
As thousands of citizens became ill with COVID-19, China built two hospitals in Wuhan over the span of just days. Time-lapse videos such as this one show how remarkably quickly the hospitals were built. Construction on the Huoshenshan Hospital (shown in the prior linked video) began on January 23 and finished eight days later. A second hospital, Leishenshan Hospital, began construction on January 25 and finished 12 days later. Square footage information on both hospitals has been inconsistently reported, but Huoshenshan Hospital has a capacity for 1,000 beds, while Leishenshan Hospital has a capacity for 1,600 beds.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Elaine Lee, PillsburyMs. Lee may be contacted at
elaine.lee@pillsburylaw.com
Best Practices: Commercial Lockouts in Arizona
April 10, 2023 —
Patrick Tighe - Snell & Wilmer Real Estate Litigation BlogIf a tenant defaults under a commercial lease, Arizona law permits the landlord to re-take possession of the premises by locking out the defaulting tenant. However, if the landlord’s lockout is wrongful, the landlord may be liable for the damages the tenant sustains because of the wrongful lockout. To minimize such liability, here are some general best practices to follow when locking out a defaulting tenant:
- Do Not Breach the Peace. It is vital when performing a lockout to not breach the peace. What constitutes a “breach of the peace” depends on the particular circumstances at hand. For example, if a tenant arrives during the lockout and becomes angry or threatens violence, the landlord should stop performing the lockout and return at a later time. As a general rule of thumb, it is best to perform lockouts in the early morning hours or in the late evening hours when the landlord is less likely to encounter the tenant.
- Provide A Notice of Default. Many commercial leases require the landlord to provide a notice of default before the landlord can lock out a defaulting tenant. Check, double check, and triple check that the landlord followed the lease’s notice of default provisions correctly, including that the landlord sent the notices to all required parties in accordance with the time requirements set forth in the lease.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Patrick Tighe, Snell & WilmerMr. Tighe may be contacted at
ptighe@swlaw.com
KB Home Names New President of its D.C. Metro Division
November 05, 2014 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFThe Washington Business Journal reported that Jon Adler has been named president of Los Angeles-based KB Home's D.C. Metro division. Adler "most recently a partner with The Georgelas Group in McLean, and served as president and CEO of its Bryton Homes division. Prior to that, he held executive roles at Reston-based NVR Inc."
KB Home, since 1957, "has built more than half of a million homes," according to the Washington Business Journal. "It currently builds in 10 states."
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
How Does Weather Impact a Foundation?
December 27, 2021 —
Brent Pearson - Construction ExecutiveWhen it comes to commercial properties, it pays to be prepared. However, there are few things as unpredictable as the weather. With there being several weeks left in hurricane season, the weather can have quite an impact on the foundations of different properties. Whether it’s a new home or a century-old commercial property, preserving the integrity and safety of the structure is paramount. For those in construction looking to learn more about how the weather can sway a foundation, below are several examples along with tips on prevention.
Rain, Rain Go Away!
Hurricanes are known for bringing strong winds and plenty of rain. This can spell disaster for buildings with weak foundations. Torrential downpours can cause wet and weak soil. Too much rain—whether generated by hurricanes or frequent storms—can negatively impact the foundations of commercial properties and homes as well. It can also cause the soil to weaken, which can lead to a foundation sinking into the ground. For those that may have crawl spaces underneath their properties, heavy rains may cause water to seep under and into it. Water will sit in the crawl space, and it could take days or even weeks to dry out, causing moisture and possible mold damage.
Reprinted courtesy of
Brent Pearson, Construction Executive, a publication of Associated Builders and Contractors. All rights reserved.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
“Source of Duty,” Tort, and Contract, Oh My!
September 06, 2023 —
Christopher G. Hill - Construction Law MusingsHere at Construction Law Musings, I have discussed the general rule in Virginia that
tort and contract do not mix. I have also discussed a
few narrow exceptions. A Virginia Supreme Court case from October of 2019 lays out both sides of this issue in one glorious opinion.
In
Tingler v. Graystone Homes, Inc., a summary of the facts and lawsuit(s) are as follows: Water leaks developed after the home was built. Graystone’s post-construction efforts to repair the leaks and remediate mold were unsuccessful. The Tinglers and their children abandoned the home after developing mold-related medical problems. The Tinglers and their children sued Graystone in tort for personal injury, property damage, and economic loss. In other litigation that will not be discussed in this post, but that is described in the opinion linked above, Belle Meade sued Graystone in contract for property damage and economic losses. George and Crystal Tingler filed a separate complaint alleging the same contract claims.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
The Law Office of Christopher G. HillMr. Hill may be contacted at
chrisghill@constructionlawva.com
Life After McMillin: Do Negligence and Strict Liability Causes of Action for Construction Defects Still Exist?
January 24, 2018 —
Thomas Balestreri and Amanda Crawley - Balestreri, Potocki, & HolmesThe ruling is in but the battle will likely continue over the practical application of SB 800. On January 18, 2018 the California Supreme Court issued its decision in
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __, holding that the statutory prelitigation scheme in The Right to Repair Act (“the Act”) that provides for notice and an opportunity for the Builder to repair defects applies to all claims for construction defects in residential construction sold on or after January 1, 2003, regardless whether the claim is founded on a violation of the Act’s performance standards or a common law claim for negligence or strict liability. (
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __.) With this holding, has the Court ruled that common law causes of action for construction defect still survive? If so, what will they look like and what standards will be applied?
The short answer is that it appears that common law causes of action still survive, at least for now, but it is not clear from this decision what they will look like and what standards will apply.
Portions of the decision seem to suggest that the Act is the sole and exclusive remedy for construction defect claims: “…even in some areas where the common law had supplied a remedy for construction defects resulting in property damage but not personal injury, the text and legislative history [of the statute] reflect a
clear and unequivocal intent to supplant common law negligence and strict product liability actions under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 6].) (Italics added for emphasis) However, at the end of the decision, the Court seems to be saying that there may still be a place for common law claims for negligence and strict liability alongside the Act but that these causes of action may be subject to the performance standards in the Act.
The
McMillin case went up to the Supreme Court on a procedural issue: whether a common law action alleging construction defects resulting in both economic loss and property damage is subject to the Act’s prelitigation notice and cure procedures. The Van Tassels had dismissed their claims under the Act opting to proceed solely on their common law claims including negligence and strict liability. McMillin sought a stay to force the Van Tassels to comply with the Act’s prelitigation procedures. The Supreme Court held that the Van Tassels must comply with the statutory procedures and affirmed the stay issued by the trial court. But the question remained: now that the Van Tassels were left only with common law claims, how would they proceed under the Act?
To understand how the Court dealt with this question, one must first understand how the Court dealt with the narrow procedural question presented by the case. The Court provides a very detailed, clear explanation of the reasons why it felt the Legislature intended for all construction defect claims involving residential construction must comply with the prelitigation requirements of the Act. In summing up its conclusions the Court makes three definitive holdings.
First, for claims involving economic loss only—the kind of claims involved in
Aas—the Court holds that the Legislature intended to supersede
Aas and provide a statutory basis for recovery. (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 10].) In other words, the Court clearly agrees that the Act was meant to allow recovery of damages based solely on economic damages. No surprise there. Second, the Court held for personal injuries, the Legislature made no changes to existing law that provides common law remedies for the injured party. (Id.) Nobody has ever contested that. Finally, the Court held that for construction defect claims involving property damage and not just economic loss “the Legislature replaced the common law
methods of recovery with the new statutory scheme.” (
Id.,) (Italics added for emphasis.)
In other words, the Court is not saying that negligence and strict liability are not permitted causes of action. The Court is merely stating that these causes of action must comply with the Act’s statutory scheme just as the same as a claim for economic loss. Here the Court is focusing on the procedure that must be followed. “The Act, in effect, provides that construction defect claims not involving personal injury will be treated the same procedurally going forward whether or not the underlying claims gave rise to any property damage.” (
Id.)
Having laid out its fundamental premise, the Court then deals with Plaintiff’s arguments regarding the intent of the Legislature and makes light work of them all. In the process, the Court disapproves
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Brookfield Crystal Cove LLC (2013) 219 Cal. App. 4th 98, and
Burch v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal. App. 4th 1411, to the extent they are inconsistent with the views expressed in the
McMillin opinion.
This is where the decision gets interesting. The Court reminds us that the Van Tassels had dismissed their statutory causes of action for violation of the performance standards under Section 896. One would think at that point that Plaintiffs had to be wondering if they had any claims left given that the Court had ruled that the Act was the sole means of recovery for construction defects. Not so fast. The Court points out that the complaint still rests on allegations of defective construction and that the suit remains an “ ‘action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, the residential construction’ of the plaintiffs’ homes (§896)
and McMillin’s liability under the Van Tassels’ negligence and strict liability claims depends on the extent to which it [McMillin] violated the standards of sections 896 and 897.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Emphasis added.) WHAT DID THE COURT JUST SAY? Did the Court just say that a plaintiff could bring a common law cause of action for negligence or strict liability based on a violation of the performance standards under Section 896? What exactly would that claim look like? What would be the elements of such a cause of action?
To answer these questions, the Court states in the very next paragraph, which also happens to be the last paragraph in the decision: “In holding that claims seeking recovery for construction defect damages are subject to the Act’s prelitigation procedures regardless of how they are pleaded,
we have no occasion to address the extent to which a party might rely upon common law principles in pursuing liability under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Italics added for emphasis) Is the Court answering “No” to the questions posed above? Probably not. It is simply following the age old rule that an appellate court will
not rule on an issue that is not specifically presented by an appeal, leaving that question for another day.
All we know for sure from
McMillin is that every claim for construction defects falling within the scope of the Act must follow the prelitigation procedure. There are no hall passes for negligence and strict liability. The larger question posed by the last two paragraphs in the decision, is whether the law recognizes a cause of action for negligence and strict liability for construction defects based on the standards in Section 896. The answer will have to be worked out by judges and trial attorneys in courtrooms across the State! The parameters of this hybrid cause of action that the Court seems to have posited will need more careful consideration than can be offered on first reading of
McMillin v. Superior Court.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Balestreri, Potocki, & Holmes
