Determining Duty to Defend in Wisconsin Does Not Include Extrinsic Evidence
September 22, 2016 —
Tred R. Eyerly – Insurance Law HawaiiThe policyholder's attempt to extend the duty to defend analysis beyond the complaint's allegations and the four-corners of the policy failed before the Wisconsin Supreme Court. Water Well Solutions Service Group Inc. v. Consolidated Ins. Co., 2016 Wisc. LEXIS 163 (Wis. Sup. Ct. June 30, 2016).
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law HawaiiMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
A Homeowner’s Subsequent Action is Barred as a Matter of Law by way of a Prior “Right to Repair Act” Claim Resolved by Cash Settlement for Waiver of all Known or Unknown Claims
February 26, 2015 —
Richard H. Glucksman, Esq., Jon A. Turigliatto, Esq., and David A. Napper, Esq. – Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger BulletinDavid Belasco v. Gary Loren Wells et al. (2015) B254525
OVERVIEW
In a decision published on February 17, 2015, the Second District Court of Appeal made clear that settlement agreements containing waivers of unknown claims in connection with a construction of a property, absent fraud or misrepresentation, will be upheld. In brief, the homeowner plaintiff had made a claim against the builder pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure Section 896 (“Right to Repair”) and settled for a cash payment and obtained a Release of all Claims including for all known and unknown claims. The court held that homeowner’s subsequent construction defect claim was barred pursuant to the terms and conditions of the earlier release.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff and Appellant, David Belasco ("Belasco"), purchased a newly construction home in Manhattan Beach from builder Gary Loren Wells ("Wells"). Two years after purchasing the property, Belasco filed a Complaint for construction defects, which eventually resulted in settlement between the parties. The settlement agreement included a California Civil Code Section 1524 waiver of all known or unknown claims with the word "claims" defined in part as “any and all known and unknown construction defects." Six years later in 2012, Belasco filed a Complaint alleging a claim, amongst others, that the defective and leaky roof breached the statutory warranty on new construction under California Civil Code section 896 ("Right to Repair Act").
Relying on San Diego Hospice v. County of San Diego (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1048, Wells and Wells' surety, American Contractors Indemnity Company (collectively "Wells"), filed a motion for summary judgment contending that the 2012 action was barred by the settlement of Belasco’s prior Complaint against Wells for construction defects to his home. When the trial court ruled in favor of Wells, Belasco appealed. Belasco, a patent attorney, made the following contentions:(1) the general release and section 1542 wavier in the settlement agreement for patent construction defects is not a "reasonable release" of a subsequent claim for latent construction defects within the meaning of section 929 and the “Right to Repair” Act; (2) a reasonable release can only apply to a "particular violation" and not to a latest defect under the language of section945.5, subdivision (f), and the settlement was too vague to be valid because it does not reference a "particular violation;" (3) section 932 of the California Civil Code specifically authorizes an action on "[s]subsequently discovered claims of unmet standards;" (4) public policy prohibits use of a general release and section 1542 waiver to bar a subsequent claim for latent residential construction defects; and (5) a genuine issue of material fact exists concerning Belasco's fraud and negligence claims that would have voided the settlement pursuant to section 1668.
Pursuant to the "Right to Repair Act" Section 929 subsection (a), a builder can make a cash offer in lieu of a repair and the homeowner is free to accept or reject such offer. Section 929subsection (b) goes on to state that
"[t]he builder may obtain a reasonable release in exchange for the cash payment. The builder may negotiate the terms and conditions of any reasonable release in terms of scope and consideration in conjunction with a cash payment under this chapter."
The Second District Court of Appeal ruled that the prior cash settlement, with a release and section 1524 wavier, was a "reasonable release" under the language of California Civil Code Section 929.
On multiple occasions, the Court noted that Belasco is an attorney and was represented by an attorney during the negotiation of the settlement agreement. By executing the agreement with express language regarding what claims were to be release, Belasco released Wells of "any and all claims" due to "any and all known and unknown construction defects." The Court reasoned that because Belasco is an attorney in his own right, he should have understood the import of the Section 1542 waiver and had the opportunity to reject or revise the settlement agreement prior to binding himself to it. The Court further found that the agreement "could not have been more clear" regarding the waiver of all unknown and known construction defect claims and therefore was not vague. Belasco's additional contentions were found to be without merit because Belasco availed himself of the statutory remedy of a cash settlement in lieu of repairs and voluntarily entered into a negotiated settlement agreement. Lastly, Belasco failed to present any evidence regarding his misrepresentation claim.
When a homeowner files a "Right to Repair Act" claim, often it seems that only two options exist: either repair the alleged defects or go to court. However, Belasco is a reminder to builders that the "Right to Repair Act" does offer an avenue for settlement. The Second District Court of Appeal presented a clear, unqualified opinion regarding the validity and enforceability of settlement agreements releasing all known or unknown construction defects in a single family home case. The Court will hold parties to the settlements they agree to. This is especially so when one of the parties is an attorney and provides deposition testimony expressly acknowledging that he understood the scope of the agreement. Attorneys for builders should always include a waiver of all known and unknown claims, which pursuant to Belasco and San Diego Hospice, will ensure that any future claims at the property will be effectively barred by the terms of the settlement agreement.
Reprinted courtesy of Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger attorneys
Richard H. Glucksman,
Jon A. Turigliatto and
David A. Napper
Mr. Glucksman may be contacted at rglucksman@cgdrblaw.com
Mr. Turigliatto may be contacted at jturigliatto@cgdrblaw.com
Mr. Napper may be contacted at dnapper@cgdrblaw.com
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Does the New Jersey Right-To-Repair Law Omit Too Many Construction Defects?
January 06, 2012 —
CDJ STAFFA post on the blog of Liberty Building Forensics Group find fault with the New Jersey Home Warranty and Builders’ Registration Act for not being stringent enough. The poster notes the coverage given under the bill. In the first year, builders are responsible to remedy faulty workmanship and materials and major structural defects. While other protections expire in the first or second year, there is a ten year coverage of major construction defects.
The blogger finds fault with the exclusion New Jersey law places on these claims, arguing that “due to the stringent definition of ‘major construction defects,” the warranty affords no coverage unless the house is practically collapsing.” The bill excludes leaks, cracks, and mold, and further limits claims if the homeowner has failed to inform the builder or insurer of defects, failure to maintain the home, and alterations made by the homeowner.
The intent of the New Jersey law is given as “requiring that newly constructed homes conform to certain construction and quality standards as well as to provide buyers of new homes with insurance-backed warranty protection in the event such standards are not met.” It’s argued in the piece that it instead serves to “strip homeowners of any meaningful means of recovery for discovered construction defects.”
Read the full story…
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Vaccine Mandate Confusion Continues – CMS Vaccine Mandate Restored in Some (But Not All) US States
January 03, 2022 —
David S. Harvey, Jr. & Sarah Hock - Lewis BrisboisTampa, Fla. (December 16, 2021) - As has been widely publicized, the Biden Administration has attempted to impose various forms of vaccine mandates under a variety laws and programs. At the same time, we have seen a flurry of opposition to these efforts ranging from new state laws (for example, in Florida) to court challenges seeking to enjoin the effort.
One of the federal mandates was issued by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) and is applicable to staff at Medicare- and Medicaid-certified healthcare providers. Initially, fourteen states sued in opposition to the CMS mandate and were able to obtain a nationwide injunction issued by a federal district judge in Louisiana. That injunction was appealed to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, which has now issued a decision that awards points to both sides.
The Fifth Circuit ruled the injunction only applies to the 14 states that participated in the Louisiana lawsuit and not nationwide. Those states are Alabama, Arizona, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Montana, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Utah, and West Virginia. This opinion has the potential to revive the CMS vaccine mandate in just over half of U.S. states. We can anticipate new suits will be filed as to other states, with the outcome still uncertain. It is unknown at this point whether the United States Supreme Court will agree to review the issues when such review is sought in the near future.
Reprinted courtesy of
David S. Harvey, Jr., Lewis Brisbois and
Sarah Hock, Lewis Brisbois
Mr. Harvey may be contacted at David.Harvey@lewisbrisbois.com
Ms. Hock may be contacted at Sarah.Hock@lewisbrisbois.com
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Recent Environmental Cases: Something in the Water, in the Air and in the Woods
July 22, 2019 —
Anthony B. Cavender - Gravel2GavelState of Texas, et al. v. US EPA. The revised regulatory definition of “Waters of the U.S.” continues to generate litigation in the federal courts. On May 28, 2019, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas held that the 2015 rulemaking proceedings used by EPA and the U.S. Army Corp of Engineers to redefine this important component of the Clean Water Act were flawed in that the notice and comment provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) were violated because insufficient notice was provided by these agencies that “adjacent” waters newly subject to the regulatory jurisdiction of these agencies, can be determined on the basis of specific distances, which was a change in the agencies’ thinking, and insufficient notice of this change was provided to the public. In addition, the final rule “also violated the APA by preventing interested parties from commenting on the scientific studies that served as the technical basis” for the rule. However, the court did not vacate the new rule, but remanded the matter to the “appropriate administrative agencies” to give them an opportunity to fix this problem.
State of Oklahoma, ex rel. Mike Hunter, Attorney General of Oklahoma v. US EPA and the United States Army Corps of Engineers. A day later, on May 29, 2019, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma rejected arguments that the new redefinition should be preliminarily enjoined.While this case was filed in 2015, intervening litigation in the federal courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, caused a substantial delay in the disposition of this case. The court, noting that the tests for granting such an injunction against the federal government are fairly exacting, held that the plaintiffs, the State of Oklahoma and a number of industry groups and associations, failed to convince the court that the harm they would suffer if the rules remained effective would be irreparable. Presumably, this case will be going to trial in the near future.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Anthony B. Cavender, PillsburyMr. Cavender may be contacted at
anthony.cavender@pillsburylaw.com
Construction and Contract Issues Blamed for Problems at Anchorage Port
August 27, 2013 —
CDJ STAFFA third-party audit of the construction at the Port of Anchorage has found fault with the design provided by the engineers. In response, PND, the engineering firm involved, has claimed that it was not their design, but faulty construction of it that lead to an interruption in the construction project.
Separately, the Office of the Inspector General has called into question how MARAD, the agency which oversaw the port construction, handled the planning and contracts for the project.
Control of the project has been taken over by the Municipality of Anchorage, and they have called into question PND’s open cell sheet pile design and PND’s design of the dock infrastructure. Simpson, Gumpertz and Heger reviewed the design, comparing it to a design provided by CH2M Hill, and found that the PND design was inadequate. A contract was subsequently awarded to CH2M Hill.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Appeal of an Attorney Disqualification Order Results in Partial Automatic Stay of Trial Court Proceedings
October 11, 2017 —
Howard M. Garfield & Renata L. Hoddinott - Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLPIn URS Corporation v. Atkinson/Walsh Joint Venture (No. G055271 filed September 26, 2017), Division Three of the Fourth Appellate District dealt with, for the first time, the question of whether an appeal of an attorney disqualification order results in an automatic stay of the trial proceedings and, if so, how far the automatic stay extends.
The underlying action involved a construction dispute between a contractor and subcontractor. During the pendency of that action, one party’s counsel filed a motion to disqualify another party’s counsel based on an alleged misuse of mediation-privilege protected documents. The trial court granted the disqualification motion and the disqualified counsel promptly filed a notice of appeal. The trial court then denied an application to stay proceedings pending the appeal, rejecting the assertion that the appeal automatically stayed the underlying proceedings.
Reprinted courtesy of
Howard M. Garfield, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and
Renata L. Hoddinott, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
Mr. Garfield may be contacted at hgarfield@hbblaw.com
Ms. Hoddinott may be contacted at rhoddinott@hbblaw.com
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Replacement of Gym Floor Due to Sloppy Paint Job is Not Resulting Loss
January 02, 2024 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiThe court granted the insurer's motion for summary judgment finding damage to the gym floor due to a poor paint job was not a resulting loss. Bob Robinson Commercial Flooring, Inc. v. RLI Ins,. Co., 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 196105 (D. Ark. Nov. 1, 2023).
Bob Robinson Commercial Flooring (BRCF) submitted a bid to the general contractor, Nabholz Construction Corporation, to install a vinyl athletic floor and striping at a middle school. The job also included the painting of a "Wildcat" logo the main gym floor. Therefore, BRCF's job was to install floors with proper painting and striping. Robert Liles and Robert Lines Parking Lot Services was the subcontractor hired to do the painting and striping. BRCF did not supervise or inspect Liles' work while it was ongoing.
Nabholz informed BRCF that there were problems with the floor painting, including crooked lines, incorrect markings, misplacement of the three point lines for the basketball surface, drips, smudges, etc. The gym floor was eventually rejected due to the nature of the vinyl flooring, once primer and paint were applied, the paint could not be removed and repainted. BRCF had to hire a new subcontractor to remove the flooring, install new flooring and then paint new lines. The cost for removal and replacement was $134,188.95.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak HastertMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
