Housing to Top Capital Spending in Next U.S. Growth Leg: Economy
September 24, 2014 —
Shobhana Chandra – BloombergBruce Hottle’s $10,000 computer systems upgrade in February at his Pennsylvania concrete plant may be his last investment for another two years.
More than 1,100 miles south in suburban Miami, Maggie Cruz-Ledon and her husband have set a 2015 deadline to buy a house, upping their budget in the process.
Hottle’s and Cruz-Ledon’s plans represent a sneak peek into the next leg of the expansion. Housing and business capital spending, two areas closely tied to swings in the world’s largest economy, are poised to diverge as home construction gives growth more of a boost in the long run while investment in new plants and equipment shows less promise, according to economists at Goldman Sachs Group Inc. and Morgan Stanley.
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Shobhana Chandra, BloombergMs. Chandra may be contacted
schandra1@bloomberg.net
Contractor Prevailing Against Subcontractor On Common Law Indemnity Claim
June 29, 2020 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesCommon law indemnity is not an easy claim to prove as the one seeking common law indemnity MUST be without fault:
Indemnity is a right which inures to one who discharges a duty owed by him, but which, as between himself and another, should have been discharged by the other and is allowable only where the whole fault is in the one against whom indemnity is sought. It shifts the entire loss from one who, although without active negligence or fault, has been obligated to pay, because of some vicarious, constructive, derivative, or technical liability, to another who should bear the costs because it was the latter’s wrongdoing for which the former is held liable.
Brother’s Painting & Pressure Cleaning Corp. v. Curry-Dixon Construction, LLC, 45 Fla. L. Weekly D259b (Fla. 3d DCA 2020) quoting Houdaille Industries, Inc. v. Edwards, 374 So.2d 490, 492-93 (Fla. 1979).
Not only must the one seeking common law indemnity be without fault, but there also needs to be a special relationship between the parties (indemnitee and common law indemnitor) for common law indemnification to exist. Brother’s Painting & Pressure Cleaning Corp., supra (citation omitted). A special relationship has been found to exist between a general contractor and its subcontractors. Id. at n.2.
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David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
Does the Miller Act Trump Subcontract Dispute Provisions?
May 16, 2018 —
Christopher M. Horton - Smith CurrieAll general contractors performing public building or public works contracts with the federal government must be familiar with the Miller Act. It is a requirement for doing business with the federal government. Pursuant to the Miller Act, a general contractor entering into a public building or public works contract with the federal government must furnish a payment bond in an amount equal to the contract price, unless the contracting officer determines that it is impractical to obtain a bond in that amount and specifies an alternative bond amount.
Miller Act payment bonds guarantee payment to certain subcontractors and suppliers supplying labor and materials to contractors or subcontractors engaged in the construction. As a result, subcontractors have an avenue of relief should they not get paid for work done on the project. Specifically, subcontractors have a right to bring an action against the surety within 90-days after the date on which the person did or performed the last labor or furnished or supplied the last of material for which the claim is made. Any such action must be brought no later than one year after the date on which the person did or performed the last labor or furnished or supplied the last of material. 40 United States Code § 3133.
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Christopher M. Horton, Smith CurrieMr. Horton may be contacted at
cmhorton@smithcurrie.com
Seller Cannot Compel Arbitration for Its Role in Construction Defect Case<
March 01, 2012 —
CDJ STAFFThe buyer of a leaky home in Venice, California cannot be compelled to arbitration with the seller in a construction defect lawsuit, according to a decision in Lindemann v. Hume, which was heard in the California Court of Appeals. Lindemann was the trustee of the Schlei Trust which bought the home and then sued the seller and the builder for construction defects.
The initial owner was the Hancock Park Trust, a real estate trust for Nicholas Cage. Richard Hume was the trustee. In 2002, Cage agreed to buy the home which was being built by the Lee Group. Cage transferred the agreement to the Hancock Park Trust. Hancock had Richard Nazarin, a general contractor, conduct a pre-closing walk through. They also engaged an inspector. Before escrow closed, the Lee Group agreed to provide a ten-year warranty “to remedy and repair any and all damage resulting from water infiltration, intrusion, or flooding due to the fact that the door on the second and third floors of the residence at the Property were not originally installed at least one-half inch (1/2”) to one inch (1”) above the adjacent outside patio tile/floor on each of the second and third floors.”
Cage moved in and experienced water intrusion and flooding. The Lee Group was unable to fix the problems. Hume listed the home for sale. The Kamienowiczs went as far as escrow before backing out of the purchase over concerns about water, after the seller’s agent disclosed “a problem with the drainage system that is currently being addressed by the Lee Group.”
The house was subsequently bought by the Schlei Trust. The purchase agreement included an arbitration clause which included an agreement that “any dispute or claim in Law or equity arising between them out of this Agreement or any resulting transaction, which is not settled through mediation, shall be decided by neutral, binding arbitration.” The warranty the Lee Group had given to Hancock was transferred to the Schlei trust and Mr. Schlei moved into the home in May 2003.
Lindemann enquired as to whether the work done would prevent future flooding. Nazarin sent Schlei a letter that said that measures had been taken “to prevent that situation from recurring.” In February, 2004, there was flooding and water intrusion. Lindemann filed a lawsuit against the Lee Group and then added the Hancock Park defendants.
The Hancock Park defendants invoked the arbitration clause, arguing that Lindemann’s claims “were only tangentially related to her construction defect causes of action against the Lee Group.” On June 9, 2010, the trial court rejected this claim, ruling that there was a possibility of conflicting rulings on common issues of law. “With respect to both the developer defendants and the seller defendants, the threshold issue is whether there was a problem with the construction of the property in the first instance. If there was no problem with the construction of the property, then there was nothing to fail to disclose.” Later in the ruling, the trial court noted that “the jury could find there was no construction defect on the property, while the arbitration finds there was a construction defect, the sellers knew about it, and the sellers failed to disclose it.” The appeals court noted that while Hancock Park had disclosed the drainage problems to the Kamienowiczs, no such disclosure was made to Sclei.
The appeals court described Hancock Park’s argument that there is no risk of inconsistent rulings as “without merit.” The appeals court said that the issue “is not whether inconsistent rulings are inevitable but whether they are possible if arbitration is ordered.” Further, the court noted that “the Hancock Park defendants and the Lee Group have filed cross-complaints for indemnification against each other, further increasing the risk of inconsistent rulings.”
The court found for Lindemann, awarding her costs.
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Nevada Insureds Can Rely on Extrinsic Facts to Show that An Insurer Owes a Duty to Defend
November 15, 2021 —
Sarah J. Odia & Scott S. Thomas - Payne & FearsOn Oct. 28, 2021, the Nevada Supreme Court in Zurich American Insurance Company v.. Ironshore Specialty Insurance Company, 137 Nev. Adv. Op. 66, held that an insured can rely on extrinsic facts to show that an insurer has a duty to defend the insured, as long as the facts were available to the insurer at the time the insured tendered the claim. The court also held that an insured has the burden of proving that an exception to an exclusion in an insurance policy applies to create a duty to defend.
In Zurich, Ironshore refused to defend to its insured against multiple property damage claims arising out of construction defects, claiming that its policies’ continuing and progressive damage exclusions barred coverage. The underlying lawsuits made no specific allegations describing when or how the property damage occurred. Ironshore claimed that the property damage had occurred due to faulty work that predated the commencement of its policies. Two different federal trial courts came to conflicting conclusions in the underlying cases. One held that Ironshore had a duty to defend because Ironshore failed to show that an exception to the exclusion did not apply. The second granted summary judgment in favor of Ironshore holding that the insured failed to meet its burden of proving that an exception to the exclusion applied.
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Sarah J. Odia, Payne & Fears and
Scott S. Thomas, Payne & Fears
Ms. Odia may be contacted at sjo@paynefears.com
Mr. Thomas may be contacted at sst@paynefears.com
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New Index Tracking Mortgages for New Homes
June 18, 2014 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFThe National Association of Home Builders’ Eye on Housing reported that the Mortage Bankers Association (MBA) completed their Builder Application Survey (BAS), which demonstrated that “mortgage applications for new home purchases decreased by a not seasonally adjusted monthly rate of 8.4% in May 2014. However, on a 12-month basis, mortgage applications for new home purchases in May 2014 were 4.9% higher than their level in May 2013.”
According to Eye on Housing, “This is the fifth consecutive month of year-over-year increases in mortgage applications for new home purchases.”
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Updates to Residential Landlord Tenant Law
October 18, 2021 —
Lawrence S. Glosser - Ahlers, Cressman & SleightOver the past several months, there have been major updates to the residential landlord tenant laws in Washington State and Seattle. There are also some remaining moratoria or eviction restrictions in Washington and Seattle. The following is a general overview of the changes.
Eviction Moratoria:
Washington State
Governor Inslee’s state-wide eviction moratorium technically ended on June 30, 2021. However, in late June 2021, Governor Inslee announced a “bridge” proclamation between the eviction moratorium and the housing stability programs put in place by the Washington State Legislature. The bridge is effective July 1 through September 30. The goal of the bridge period was to protect tenants from evictions for non-payment of rent to allow local governments to set up distribution programs for funds. More than $650 million of federal relief dollars allocated to assist renters was predicted to be available beginning in July. This is in addition to the $500 million previously released by the Department of Commerce to local governments for rental assistance and will help more than 80,000 landlords and renters. However, insofar as many localities have not established distribution protocols, the bridge period was instituted to allow time for those programs to be set up in various parts of the state.
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Lawrence S. Glosser, Ahlers, Cressman & SleightMr. Glosser may be contacted at
larry.glosser@acslawyers.com
Florida Appeals Court Rules in Favor of Homeowners Unaware of Construction Defects and Lack of Permits
December 09, 2011 —
CDJ STAFFThe Florida Court of Appeals has ruled that a homeowner is not liable for defects in unpermitted alterations, reversing a lower court’s decision in Jensen v. Bailey. The Jensens sold their house to the Baileys. During the sale, the Jensens filled out a property disclosure statement, checking “no” to a question about “any improvement or additions to the property, whether by your or by others that have been constructed in violation of building codes or without necessary permits.”
After moving in, the Baileys discovered several problems with the home. One involved a defective sewer connection leading to repeated backups. The Baileys also found problems with remodeling the Jensens had done in the kitchen, master bath, and bedroom. The remodeling work was not done with required permits nor was it up to code.
The court noted that an earlier case, Johnson v. Davis, established four criteria: “the seller of a home must have knowledge of a defect in the property; the defect must materially affect the value of the property; the defect must not be readily observable and must be unknown to the buyer; and the buyer must establish that the seller failed to disclose the defect to the buyer.” The court found that the first of these criteria was crucial to determining the case.
In the Johnson ruling, the then Chief Justice dissented, fearing that the courts “would ultimately construe Johnson’s requirement of actual knowledge to permit a finding of liability based on constructive knowledge,” quoting Justice Boyd, “a rule of constructive knowledge will develop based on the reasoning that if the seller did not know of the defect, he should have known about it before attempting to sell the property.” The Appeals Court concluded that the lower court hit this point in ruling on Jensen v. Bailey.
Citing other Florida cases, the court noted that the Johnson rule does require “proof of the seller’s actual knowledge of the defect.” The court cited a case in which it was concluded that the seller “should have known” that there was circumstantial evidence was that the seller did know about the defects, as the seller had been involved in the construction of the home.
In the case of the Jensens, the lower court concluded that they did not know that the work was defective, nor did they know that they were obligated to obtain permits for it. The Appeals Court found this one fact sufficient to reverse the decision and remand the case to the lower court for a final judgment in favor of the Jensens.
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