Best Practices: Commercial Lockouts in Arizona
April 15, 2024 —
Patrick Tighe - Snell & Wilmer Real Estate Litigation BlogIf a tenant defaults under a commercial lease, Arizona law permits the landlord to re-take possession of the premises by locking out the defaulting tenant. However, if the landlord’s lockout is wrongful, the landlord may be liable for the damages the tenant sustains because of the wrongful lockout. To minimize such liability, here are some general best practices to follow when locking out a defaulting tenant:
- Do Not Breach the Peace. It is vital when performing a lockout to not breach the peace. What constitutes a “breach of the peace” depends on the particular circumstances at hand. For example, if a tenant arrives during the lockout and becomes angry or threatens violence, the landlord should stop performing the lockout and return at a later time. As a general rule of thumb, it is best to perform lockouts in the early morning hours or in the late evening hours when the landlord is less likely to encounter the tenant.
- Provide A Notice of Default. Many commercial leases require the landlord to provide a notice of default before the landlord can lock out a defaulting tenant. Check, double check, and triple check that the landlord followed the lease’s notice of default provisions correctly, including that the landlord sent the notices to all required parties in accordance with the time requirements set forth in the lease.
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Patrick Tighe, Snell & WilmerMr. Tighe may be contacted at
ptighe@swlaw.com
Future Army Corps Rulings on Streams and Wetlands: Changes and Delays Ahead
November 06, 2023 —
Mark Sudol - Engineering News-RecordNew regulations published by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers dramatically reduce federal protections of previously regulated streams and wetlands. This change will lead to further controversy and litigation as the legal terms are applied to physical features on the ground leading to conflicting interpretations by the regulated public, environmentalists and federal agencies.
Reprinted courtesy of
Mark Sudol, Engineering News-Record
ENR may be contacted at enr@enr.com
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Homebuilders Opposed to Potential Change to Interest on Construction Defect Expenses
January 22, 2013 —
CDJ STAFFIn 2008, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded that in calculating interest on the expense of repairing construction defects would start at the time that the defect was repaired. In 2009, the Colorado State Legislature introduced a bill that would have made homeowners eligible for interest back to the purchase date of their homes. The Colorado Springs Business Journal notes that the Colorado Springs Housing and Building Association is concerned that the legislature might take up the issue again, in which case, the HBA would oppose it.
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When an Insurer Proceeds as Subrogee, Defendants Should Not Assert Counterclaims Against the Insured/Subrogor
June 14, 2021 —
Gus Sara - The Subrogation StrategistIn a subrogation action, one party is substituted to the rights and remedies of another with respect to a lawful claim. The substituted party (the subrogee) is legally able to pursue any right or seek any remedy that would be available to the subrogor regarding that claim. But can a defendant in a subrogation action assert any claim against the subrogee that it would have against the subrogor? In Federated Mut. Inc. Co. v. Kosciusko County, No. 3:20-CV-960, 2021 U.S. Dist. Lexis 88735, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana considered whether a defendant could assert counterclaims against the insureds/subrogors in an action filed in the name of their subrogee. The court held that since the insurerds/subrogors were not a party to the action and the defendant could assert the substance of its counterclaim as a defense, the defendant could not file counterclaims against the insureds/subrogors in the insurer’s subrogation action.
Kosciusko County arose from a motor vehicle accident involving a semi-tractor trailer owned by Bellman Oil Company, Inc. (Bellman) and B & B Transport, Inc. (B & B). The accident occurred on a highway in Kosciusko County in October of 2019. The accident caused the semi-tractor trailer containing ethanol fuel to roll over four times and burst into flames. Federated Mutual Insurance Company (FMIC) insured Bellman and B & B for the semi-tractor trailer and issued payments as a result of the accident.
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Gus Sara, White and WilliamsMr. Sara may be contacted at
sarag@whiteandwilliams.com
Partner Lisa M. Rolle and Associate Vito John Marzano Obtain Dismissal of Third-Party Indemnification Claims
December 22, 2019 —
Lisa M. Rolle & Vito John Marzano - Traub Lieberman PerspectivesOn June 1, 2019, Traub Lieberman partner Lisa M. Rolle and associate Vito John Marzano successfully secured dismissal of all third-party claims on behalf of a corporate entity and its principal in a third-party action in the New York State Supreme Court, County of Bronx. The underlying action concerned a trip and fall that occurred on a public sidewalk located in the Bronx. Plaintiff commenced suit against the corporation property owner and its principal. Defendants/third-party plaintiffs commenced the third-party action seeking contractual and common-law indemnification against three third-party defendants, the corporate tenant, another corporate entity that was not a party to the lease and its principal. Traub Lieberman represented the latter two third-party defendants.
On behalf of the corporate entity that was not a party to the lease, Traub Lieberman moved for dismissal on the basis that the lease constitutes documentary evidence establishing as a matter of law that the non-tenant corporation cannot be held liable to third-party plaintiffs. On behalf of the principal, Traub Lieberman sought dismissal for failure to state a cause of action because the principal was shielded from liability by virtue of having incorporated his business, and the complaint did not allege a claim for piercing the corporate veil.
In opposition, third-party plaintiffs sought to amplify their pleadings by alleging that a de facto merger had occurred between the non-tenant corporation and the tenant corporation. Third-party plaintiffs further argued that the corporate principal executed a guaranty to the lease, thus accepting liability on behalf of the tenant corporation.
Reprinted courtesy of
Lisa M. Rolle, Traub Lieberman and
Vito John Marzano, Traub Lieberman
Ms. Rolle may be contacted at lrolle@tlsslaw.com
Mr. Marzano may be contacted at vmarzano@tlsslaw.com
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Limiting Plaintiffs’ Claims to a Cause of Action for Violation of SB-800
November 18, 2011 —
Samir R. Patel, Esq., Lorber, Greenfield, & Polito, LLPThere has been a fair share of publicity about the SB-800 amendments to the Civil Code (Civil Code section 896, et seq.) that codified construction defect litigation in 2002. Most of the publicity is geared toward the pre-litigation standards allowing a builder the right to repair before litigation is commenced by a homeowner. Less focus and attention has been given to the fact that violation of the SB-800 performance standards is being used by plaintiff’s counsel as an additional tool in the plaintiff’s pleading tool box against builders. Closer scrutiny to SB-800 reveals that those provisions should in fact act as a limitation to the pleading tools available to plaintiffs and an additional tool for builders in the defense of cases governed by SB-800.
The typical construction defect complaint contains the boiler plate versions of numerous causes of action. These causes of action include Strict Liability, Negligence, Negligence Per Se, Breach of Contract, Breach of Contract – Third-Party Beneficiary, Breach of Express Warranties, Breach of Implied Warranties, among others. The wide array of causes of action leave a defendant “pinned to the wall” because they require a complex defense on a multitude of contract and tort related causes of action. Furthermore, the statutes of limitations as to these claims widely differ depending upon if the particular defect is considered latent or patent. The truth of the matter remains, no matter what the circumstances, if a construction defect matter ultimately goes to trial, it is inevitable that plaintiffs will obtain a judgment on at least one of these causes of action.
On its own, the Strict Liability cause of action can be a thorn in a defendant’s side. A builder is obviously placing a product into the stream of commerce and strict liability is a tough standard to defend against, particularly when it concerns intricate homes comprised of multiple components that originally sold for hundreds of thousands of dollars. A Negligence cause of action can also be difficult to defend because the duty of care for a builder is what a “reasonable” builder would have done under the circumstances. An interpretation of this duty of care can easily sway a jury that will almost always consist of sympathetic homeowners. A Negligence Per Se cause of action can also leave a defendant vulnerable to accusations that a builder violated the Uniform Building Code or a multitude of other obscure municipal construction-related code provisions during the construction of the home. Lastly, the Breach of Contract cause of action leaves a builder relying on dense and intricate purchase and sale agreements with dozens of addenda which leave the skeptical jurors turned off by what they view as one-side, boilerplate provisions. Ultimately, when a matter is about to go to trial, the complexity of these complaints can benefit a plaintiff and increase a plaintiff’s bargaining power against a defendant who is attempting to avoid a potentially large judgment.
Enter the SB-800 statutes. The SB-800 statutes apply to all homes sold after January 1, 2003. Civil Code section 938 specifically states that “[t]his title applies only to new residential units where the purchase agreements with the buyer was signed by the seller on or after January 1, 2003.” (Civil Code §, 938.) As time progresses, more residential construction defect cases will exclusively fall under the purview of SB-800. Slowly but surely more SB-800 governed litigation is being filed, and its exclusive application is looming on the horizon.
On its surface, this “right to repair” regime has left builders with a lot to be desired despite the fact that it is supposed to allow the builder the opportunity to cure any deficiencies in their product before litigation can be filed by potential plaintiffs. However, the application of the time line for repair has shown to be impractical for anything but the most minor problems involving only small numbers of residential units. Moreover, the fact that the fruits of the builder’s investigation into the claimed defects in the pre-litigation context can freely be used as evidence against it in litigation makes builders proceed with trepidation in responding with a repair. For these reasons, more SB-800 litigation can be expected to result due to the shortcomings of the pre-litigation procedures, and savvy defense counsel should anticipate the issues to be dealt with in presenting the defense of such cases at trial.
This fact should not necessarily be met with fear or disdain. Within the SB-800 statutes, the legislature made it clear that they were creating a new cause of action for construction defect claims, but it further made it clear that this cause of action is a plaintiff’s exclusive remedy. The legislature giveth, but at the same time, the legislature taketh away. Throughout numerous provisions within the SB-800 statutes, the Civil Code states that claims for construction defects as to residential construction are exclusively governed by the Civil Code, and that the Civil Code governs any and all litigation arising under breaches of these provisions. Civil Code section 896 specifically states:
In any action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, the residential construction … the claimant’s claims or causes of action shall be limited to violation of, the following standards, except as specifically set forth in this title. (Civil Code §, 896.)
Civil Code section 896 then provides approximately fifty-plus standards by which a construction defect claim is assessed under that provision. Civil Code section 896 covers everything from plumbing to windows, and from foundations to decks, and in several instances expressly dictates statutes of limitations as to specific areas of construction that severely truncate the 10-year latent damage limitations period. As for any construction deficiencies that are not enumerated within Civil Code section 896, Civil Code section 897 explicitly defines the intent of the standards and provides a method to assess deficiencies that are not addressed in Civil Code section 896. Civil Code section 897 states:
Intent of Standards
The standards set forth in this chapter are intended to address every function or component of a structure. To the extent that a function or component of a structure is not addressed by these standards, it shall be actionable if it causes damage. (Civil Code §, 897.)
Therefore, Civil Code section 897 acts as a catch-all by which defects that are not covered within Civil Code section 896 can be evaluated on a damage standard mirroring the Aas case (damages must be present and actual). The result of sections 896 and 897 being read in combination is a comprehensive, all-inclusive set of performance standards by which any defect raised by Plaintiffs can be evaluated and resolved under a single SB-800 based cause of action.
Civil Code section 943 makes clear that a cause of action for violation of SB-800 performance standards is a plaintiff’s sole remedy for a residential construction defect action. Specifically, Civil Code section 943 states:
Except as provided in this title, no other cause of action for a claim covered by this title or for damages recoverable under 944 is allowed. In addition to the rights under this title, this title does not apply to any action by a claimant to enforce a contract or express contractual provision, or any action for fraud, personal injury, or violation of a statute. (Civil Code §, 943.)
Civil Code section 944 provides the method for computing damages within a construction defect action, as follows:
If a claim for damages is made under this title, the homeowner is only entitled to damages for the reasonable value of repairing any violation of the standards set forth in this title, [and] the reasonable cost of repairing any damages caused by the repair efforts… . (Civil Code §, 944.)
A cursory review of these statutes yields the conclusion that the legislature was attempting to create an exclusive cause of action that trumps all other causes of action where SB-800 applies. The remedy available to plaintiffs is limited to that allowed by the Civil Code. As noted above, “[n]o other cause of action for a claim covered by this title…is allowed.” (Civil Code §, 943.) Therefore, Civil Code sections 896, 897, 943, and 944 specifically prohibit the contract-based and tort-based causes of action typically pled by plaintiffs.
Plaintiff’s counsel has seized upon the language of section 943 to advance the argument that SB-800 still allows a plaintiff to advance typical contract and tort based causes of action. On the surface, this argument may seem compelling, but a minimum of scrutiny of the express language of section 943 dispels this notion. Section 943 says that it provides rights “[i]n addition” to those under the SB-800 Civil Code provisions. Clearly, the language in section 943 is intended to expressly underscore the fact that a plaintiff is not precluded from seeking relief in addition to that allowed under SB-800 for damages not arising from a breach of the SB-800 standards or for damages in addition to those recoverable under Section 944. This language does not provide an unfettered license to bring a Strict Liability, Negligence or other cause of action against a builder where SB-800 applies.
In fact, this language only keeps the door open for plaintiffs to pursue such causes of action not arising from a breach of the SB-800 standards should there be such supporting allegations. For example, if a plaintiff alleges that a builder breached an “express contractual provision” related to the timing of the completion of the home and close of escrow, and the contract specifies damages in this regard, a plaintiff may have a viable separate cause of action for Breach of Contract for recovery of those damages precisely because that is not an issue expressly dealt with in SB-800 in the performance standards under sections 896 and 897, or in the damage recovery terms under 944. As it stands, the vast majority of complaints are seeking redress for violation of the same primary right; that is, defects specifically outlined in Section 896 and 897 or which result in damages as stated in Section 944.
So, how does a builder defend against a complaint that contains multiple causes of action regarding construction defects for a home sold after January 1, 2003? There are numerous ways to approach this. First and foremost, these superfluous and improper causes of action can be attacked by demurrer seeking dismissal of all causes of action other than the cause of action alleging violation of SB-800. If the the time period within which to file a demurrer has passed already, a motion for judgment on the pleadings can be utilized to attack the improper causes of action in the same way as a demurrer can be used for this purpose.
The limitation to a demurrer or motion for judgment on the pleadings is that the judge is restricted to viewing only the four corners of the pleading when making a ruling. It is typical for plaintiffs’ counsel to cleverly (or one might even say, disingenuously) leave the complaint purposely vague to avoid a successful defense attack on the pleadings by not including the original date the residence was sold. In that instance, a motion for summary adjudication can be used to attack a plaintiff’s complaint. By simply providing evidence that the homes were originally sold after January 1, 2003, the improper causes of action should be subject to dismissal by summary adjudication. If the plaintiff is a subsequent purchaser, the builder still has recourse to enforce the pleading limitations under SB-800. Civil Code section 945 states that “[t]he provisions, standards, rights, and obligations set forth in this title are binding upon all original purchasers and their successors-in-interest.” (Civil Code §, 945.)
Attacking a plaintiff’s complaint to eliminate multiple causes of action can have numerous benefits. The practical result is that a plaintiff will only have one viable cause of action. The advantage is that the SB-800 performance standards include the defined performance standards and shortened statutes of limitations periods with regard to specific issues. Furthermore, as to defects which are not specifically provided for in Civil Code section 896, Civil Code section 897 requires a proof of actual damages. Therefore, a plaintiff must provide evidence of current damages and not simply conditions that may potentially cause damage in the future.
The Appellate Courts have yet to directly address and interpret these SB-800 provisions. The time for that is undoubtedly drawing near. For now, however, plaintiffs will have to find ways to accurately plead construction defect claims within the confines of one cause of action for breach of the performance standards enumerated within the Civil Code.
Printed courtesy of Lorber, Greenfield & Polito, LLP. Mr. Patel can be contacted at spatel@lorberlaw.com and Mr. Verbick at tverbick@lorberlaw.com.
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Texas Federal Court Delivers Another Big Win for Policyholders on CGL Coverage for Construction-Defect Claims and “Rip-and-Tear” Damages
March 14, 2022 —
Blake A. Dillion, Jared De Jong & Scott S. Thomas - Payne & FearsInsurers regularly argue that commercial general liability (“CGL”) policies are not performance bonds and therefore there is no coverage for claims seeking damages for defective or faulty workmanship. Insurers also argue there is no coverage for so-called “tear-out” or “rip-and-tear” damages, where fixing property damage requires replacing defective work that has not itself been damaged. Fortunately, in a newly decided case, a Texas federal district court rejected both arguments by an insurer. Amerisure Mutual Insurance Company v. McMillin Texas Homes, LLC, No. SA-20-CV-01332-XR, 2022 WL 686727 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 8, 2022).
As with most construction-defect claims, this case involved homeowner claims against a residential developer, McMillin Texas Homes (“McMillin”). After the homes were completed, homeowners complained about defects in the artificial stucco exterior finish and filed suit. McMillin tendered to its insurer, Amerisure Mutual Insurance Company (“Amerisure”). Amerisure then sued McMillin for declaratory relief, arguing that it had no duty to defend or indemnify the homeowner claims. McMillin filed a counterclaim alleging Amerisure breached its policies by refusing to defend or indemnify McMillin.
Reprinted courtesy of
Blake A. Dillion, Payne & Fears,
Jared De Jong, Payne & Fears and
Scott S. Thomas, Payne & Fears
Mr. Dillion may be contacted at bad@paynefears.com
Mr. De Jong may be contacted at jdj@paynefears.com
Mr. Thomas may be contacted at sst@paynefears.com
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Leftover Equipment and Materials When a Contractor Is Abruptly Terminated
November 06, 2023 —
Brian Perlberg - ConsensusDocsTermination for cause is costly and adversarial and has been covered in this
article. But can a terminating party use equipment and tools left behind on the worksite (i.e., a crane)? The answer depends on what is in your contract.
Under
ConsensusDocs, a constructor must give its permission to use any equipment or supplies left at the worksite, such as a crane.
[i] Moreover, the owner must indemnify the constructor for using their equipment. This makes sense because even if a constructor were appropriately terminated for cause, using their equipment and materials they no longer possess or control unfairly creates additional liability exposure. At a minimum, the owner should take on the risk of using the equipment and materials since they benefit from such use.
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Brian Perlberg, ConsensusDocs CoalitionMr. Perlberg may be contacted at
bperlberg@ConsensusDocs.org
