Illinois Court Assesses Factual Nature of Term “Reside” in Determining Duty to Defend
October 30, 2023 —
James M. Eastham - Traub LiebermanIn State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Guevara, 2023 IL App (1st) 221425-U, P2, the Illinois First District Court of Appeals addressed an insurance carrier’s duty to defend under a homeowners insurance policy. The underlying suit stemmed from an alleged injury suffered at a residence located in Berwyn, Illinois and owned by named insured Luz Melina Guevara, a defendant in the suit. After Guevara tendered the suit, State Farm filed a complaint for declaratory judgment seeking a declaration that it had no duty to defend or indemnify Guevara because Guevara did not “reside” at the insured premises.
The policy defined the "insured location" as the "residence premises," and residence premises was defined as "the one, two, three or four-family dwelling, other structures, and grounds or that part of any other building; where you reside and which is shown in the Declarations." In response to the underlying lawsuit, Guevara had filed an answer and affirmative defenses in which Guevara denied the allegation that "At all relevant times, [Guevara] resided in Berwyn, Cook County, Illinois." Guevara admitted that she owned the Berwyn property but denied that she "resided in, maintained and controlled the property". The declaratory judgment complaint alleged (among other things) that, based on admissions by Guevara in her answer, the Berwyn residence was not an "insured location" under the State Farm policy. State Farm moved for summary judgment at the trial court level on this ground and summary judgment was granted in State Farm’s favor. An appeal ensued wherein the parties disagreed as to whether there is a genuine issue of material fact that, under the language of the policy, State Farm had no duty to defend because the Berwyn property was not an "insured location" because she did not "reside" there.
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James M. Eastham, Traub LiebermanMr. Eastham may be contacted at
jeastham@tlsslaw.com
Apartment Boom in Denver a Shortcut Around Condo Construction Defect Suits?
September 24, 2013 —
CDJ STAFFFor every condo currently being built in Denver, there are 40 apartment units. And there are some who think that this is being done to evade construction defect lawsuits. At issue is the statute of limitations for construction defects. Under Colorado law, condominium buyers have six years after the completion of constrution to sue for construction defects, unless the defect isn’t discovered until the fifth or six year, in which case they are given until the eighth year. But what if someone built an apartment building, rented out the units for six years, and then converted the whole thing to condominiums?
Some think that the construction defect clock would be reset. Amie Mayhew, the CEO of the Colorado Association of Home Builders noted that if this is the case, “you’d be back at square one.” But Doug Benson, a construction defect attorney, thinks that if a builder did this, and didn’t make any further construction, no one would be able to sue for construction defects, even if the condo owners found them. Mr. Benson, who represents homeowners, said that “they’re apartment homes and that’s just to avoid liability.”
Mike Gifford, the president of the Associated General Contractors of Colorado, noted that insurance companies were already wary of apartment complexes, fearing that they would be turned into condos. Whatever the cause, Denver seems to have a shortage of condos. But, they’re going to have a lot of apartments available.
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Florida Legislative Change Extends Completed Operations Tail for Condominium Projects
December 10, 2024 —
Holly A. Rice - Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.The Florida Legislature recently passed House Bill 1021 which amended Florida Statute § 718.124. The July 1, 2024 amendment changes Florida’s statute of repose (“SOR”) trigger date for condominium projects. Now, the SOR trigger for existing condominium projects will be governed by Florida Statute §718.124, not Florida Statute § 95.11. Most critically, Florida Statute § 718.124 changes the trigger events for when the “clock” starts running and impacts how long the SOR runs. Notably, Florida Statute § 718.124 already governed the trigger event for the statute of limitations (“SOR”) for condominium projects.
One important overarching takeaway for contractors to carefully assess is that the change in the “trigger” event may result in the SOR concluding at a later date than originally planned – affecting time on the risk and, critically, the availability of insurance. The standard approach of using a static 10-year completed operations tail on a condominium construction insurance program may now be insufficient in certain circumstances.
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Holly A. Rice, Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.Ms. Rice may be contacted at
HRice@sdvlaw.com
Punchlist: The News We Didn’t Quite Get To – May 2016
May 12, 2016 —
Garret Murai – California Construction Law BlogIf you’re a solar contractor make sure you don’t get burned. The California Contractors State License Board (“CSLB”) is taking a closer look at solar contractors as the industry grows in the Golden State. Only contractors holding a Class “A” Engineering, Class “B” General Contractor, or Class C-46 Solar license can perform solar construction and installation.
The CSLB has clarified that C-39 Roofing contractors can install installation as part of an overall roofing job. The CSLB considers such insulation work as “incidental and supplemental” under Section 831 of the California Code of Regulations and does not require a separate C-2 Insulation and Acoustical contractor license.
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Garret Murai, Wendel Rosen Black & Dean LLPMr. Murai may be contacted at
gmurai@wendel.com
Overruling Henkel, California Supreme Court Validates Assignment of Policies
October 02, 2015 —
Tred R. Eyerly – Insurance Law HawaiiIn a major ruling, the California Supreme Court applied a statutory provision to overrule its prior decision in Henkel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indemn. Co., 29 Cal. 4th 934 (2003) and ruled that liability policies can be assigned despite non-assignment provisions. See Fluor Corp. v. Superior Court, 2015 Cal. LEXIS 5631 (Cal. Aug. 20, 2015). The Hawaii Supreme Court relied on Henkel when it also found anti-consent provisions valid. See Del Monte Fresh Fresh Produce (Hawaii), Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 117 Haw. 357, 183 P.3d 734 (2007) [see posts here and here].
For decades, Fluor Corporation performed engineering, procurement, and construction (EPC) operations through various corporate entities and subsidiaries. Beginning in 1971, Hartford issued up to 11 CGL policies to Fluor from 1971 to 1986. Each policy contained a consent-to-assignment clause reading: "Assignment of interest under the policy shall not bind the Company until its consent is endorsed hereon."
Beginning in the mid-1980s, Fluor Corporation was sued in numerous lawsuits claiming personal injury from asbestos exposure. Fluor Corporation tendered the early lawsuits to Hartford, which accepted the defense. Fluor Corporation subsequently went through a reverse spinoff under which a newly formed subsidiary, Fluor 2, took over the continuation of the company's EPC businesses. The original Fluor transferred all of its EPC-related assets and liabilities to Fluor-2, making Fluor-2 the parent of the EPC subsidiaries. The transaction did not except any insurance rights from the transfer of "any and all" assets.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law HawaiiMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Microsoft Said to Weigh Multibillion-Dollar Headquarters Revamp
September 17, 2015 —
Dina Bass & Hui-Yong Yu - BloombergMicrosoft Corp. is considering a multibillion-dollar revamp of its headquarters campus in suburban Seattle, seeking to foster more collaboration among employees and attract young engineers, according to people with knowledge of the plans.
The software giant has hired architecture firm Skidmore, Owings & Merrill LLP as part of the effort at its Redmond, Washington, offices, said the people, who asked not to be named because the plans aren’t public. Skidmore Owings designed Dubai’s Burj Khalifa, the world’s tallest building, and is helping Microsoft with a makeover of its much smaller campus in Mountain View, California.
Microsoft hasn’t yet decided whether to move forward with the Redmond overhaul, said one of the people familiar with the matter.
Reprinted courtesy of
Dina Bass, Bloomberg and
Hui-Yong Yu, Bloomberg
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Illinois Supreme Court Limits Reach of Implied Warranty Claims Against Contractors
April 10, 2019 —
Thomas Cronin - Gordon & Rees Construction Law BlogIn a recent decision, the Illinois Supreme Court held that a purchaser of a newly constructed home could not assert a claim for breach of the implied warranty of habitability against a subcontractor where the subcontractor had no contractual relationship with the purchaser. Sienna Court Condo. Ass’n v. Champion Aluminum Corp., 2018 IL 122022, ¶ 1. The decision overruled Minton v. The Richards Group of Chicago, which held that a purchaser who “has no recourse to the builder-vendor and has sustained loss due to the faulty and latent defect in their new home caused by the subcontractor” could assert a claim of a breach of the warranty of habitability against the subcontractor. 116 Ill. App. 3d 852, 855 (1983).
In Sienna Court Condo. Ass’n, the plaintiff alleged that the condo building had several latent defects which made individual units and common areas unfit for habitation. 2008 IL 122022 at ¶ 3. The Court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that privity should not be a factor in determining whether a claim for a breach of the warranty of habitability can be asserted. Id. at ¶ 19. The Court also rejected the plaintiff’s argument that claims for a breach warranty of habitability should not be governed by contract law but should instead be governed by tort law analogous to application of strict liability. Id.
The Court reasoned that the economic loss rule, as articulated in Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. National Tank Co., 91 Ill. 2d 69, 91 (1982), refuted the plaintiff’s argument that the implied warranty of habitability should be covered by tort law. 2008 IL 122022 at ¶ 20. Under the economic loss rule, a plaintiff “cannot recover for solely economic loss under the tort theories of strict liability, negligence, and innocent misrepresentation.” National Tank Co., 91 Ill. 2d at 91. The Court explained that the rule prevented plaintiffs from turning a contractual claim into a tort claim. 2008 IL 122022 at ¶ 21. The Court further noted that contractual privity is required for a claim of economic loss, and an economic loss claim is not limited to strict liability claims. Id. Because the plaintiff’s claim was solely for an economic loss, it was a contractual claim in nature; therefore, the Court concluded that “the implied warranty of habitability cannot be characterized as a tort.” Id. at ¶ 22.
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Thomas Cronin, Gordon & Rees Scully MansukhaniMr. Cronin may be contacted at
tcronin@grsm.com
Washington Supreme Court Finds Agent’s Representations in Certificate of Insurance Bind Insurance Company to Additional Insured Coverage
February 03, 2020 —
Jason Taylor - Traub LiebermanIn T-Mobile USA Inc. v. Selective Ins. Co. of Am., 450 P.3d 150 (Wash. 2019) the Washington Supreme Court addressed whether an insurance company is bound by its agent’s written representation—made in a certificate of insurance—that a particular corporation is an additional insured under a given policy. The question arose in a case where: (1) the Ninth Circuit had already ruled that the agent acted with apparent authority, but (2) the agent’s representation turned out to be inconsistent with the policy and (3) the certificate of insurance included additional text broadly disclaiming the certificate’s ability to “amend, extend or alter the coverage afforded by” the policy. According to the Court, under Washington law the answer is yes: an insurance company is bound by the representation of its agent in those circumstances. Otherwise, the Court reasoned, an insurance company’s representations would be meaningless and it could mislead without consequence.
At the heart of this case were two T-Mobiles entities: T-Mobile USA and T-Mobile Northeast (“T-Mobile NE”), which were distinct legal entities. T-Mobile NE engaged a contractor to construct a cell phone tower on a rooftop in New York City. The contract between T-Mobile NE and the contractor required the contractor to obtain a general liability insurance policy, to annually provide T-Mobile NE “with certificates of insurance evidencing [that policy’s] coverage,” and to name T-Mobile NE as an additional insured under the policy. T-Mobile USA was not a party to the contract, but was nonetheless aware of it and approved the contract as to form.
The contractor obtained the required insurance policy from Selective. The policy provided that a third party would automatically become an “additional insured” under the policy if the contractor and the third party entered into their own contract that required the contractor to add the third party to its insurance policy as an additional insured. Because T-Mobile USA did not have a contract with the contractor, it did not automatically become an additional insured under the policy. Nevertheless, over the course of several years, Selective’s agent issued a series of certificates of insurance to “T-Mobile USA Inc., its Subsidiaries and Affiliates” that stated that those entities were “included as an additional insured [under the policy] with respect to” certain areas of coverage. The agent signed those certificates as Selective’s “Authorized Representative.”
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Jason Taylor, Traub LiebermanMr. Taylor may be contacted at
jtaylor@tlsslaw.com
