Asserting Non-Disclosure Claim Involving Residential Real Property and Whether Facts Are “Readily Observable”
September 29, 2021 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesUnder Florida law, there is a claim dealing with the purchase and sale of residential real property known as a Johnson v. Davis or a non-disclosure claim: “[W]here the seller of a home knows of facts materially affecting the value of the property which are not readily observable and are not known to the buyer, the seller is under a duty to disclose them to the buyer.” Lorber v. Passick, 46 Fla.L.Weekly D1952a (Fla. 4th DCA 2021). A seller’s duty to disclose extends to a seller’s real estate agent/broker. Id.
A non-disclosure claim is asserted by the buyer of residential real property when the buyer discovers defects or damages with the real property that he believes materially affects the value of the property. While there may be the sentiment these are easy claims to prove, they are not.
Remember, a non-disclosure claim deals with facts that materially affect the value of residential real property and are NOT readily observable. The use of the language “readily observable” has been found to mean:
“[I]nformation [that] is within the diligent attention of any buyer. To exercise diligent attention…a buyer would be required to investigate any information furnished by the seller that a reasonable person in the buyer’s position would investigate and take reasonable steps to ascertain the material facts relating to the property and to discovery them—if, of course, they are reasonably ascertainable.”
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David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
Arizona Court of Appeals Decision in $8.475 Million Construction Defect Class Action Suit
May 09, 2011 —
CDJ STAFFIn the case of Leflet v. Fire (Ariz. App., 2011), which involved an $8.475 million settlement in a construction defect class action suit, the question put forth to the Appeals court was “whether an insured and an insurer can join in a Morris agreement that avoids the primary insurer’s obligation to pay policy limits and passes liability in excess of those limits on to other insurers.” The Appeals court provided several reasons for their decision to affirm the validity of the settlement agreement as to the Non-Participatory Insurers (NPIs) and to vacate and remand the attorney fee awards.
First, the Appeals court stated, “The settlement agreement is not a compliant Morris agreement and provides no basis for claims against the NPIs.” They conclude, “Appellants attempt to avoid the doctrinal underpinnings of Morris by arguing that ‘the cooperation clause did not prohibit Hancock from assigning its rights to anyone, including Appellants.’ This narrow reading of the cooperation clause ignores the fact that Hancock did not merely assign its rights — it assigned its rights after stipulating to an $8.475 million judgment that neither it nor its Direct Insurers could ever be liable to pay. Neither Morris nor any other case defines such conduct as actual ‘cooperation’—rather, Morris simply defines limited circumstances in which an insured is relieved of its duty to cooperate. Because Morris agreements are fraught with risk of abuse, a settlement that mimics Morris in form but does not find support in the legal and economic realities that gave rise to that decision is both unenforceable and offensive to the policy’s cooperation clause.”
The Appeals court further concluded that “even if the agreement had qualified under Morris, plaintiffs did not provide the required notice to the NPIs.” The court continued, “Because an insurer who defends under a reservation of rights is always aware of the possibility of a Morris agreement, the mere threat of Morris in the course of settlement negotiations does not constitute sufficient notice. Instead, the insurer must be made aware that it may waive its reservation of rights and provide an unqualified defense, or defend solely on coverage and reasonableness grounds against the judgment resulting from the Morris agreement. The NPIs were not given the protections of this choice before the agreement was entered, and therefore can face no liability for the resulting stipulated judgment.”
Next, the Appeals court declared that “the trial court abused its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees under A.R.S § 12-341.” The Appeals court reasoned, “In this case, the NPIs prevailed in their attack on the settlement. But the litigation did not test the merits of their coverage defenses or the reasonableness of the settlement amount. And Plaintiffs never sued the NPIs, either in their own right or as the assignees of Hancock. Rather, the NPIs intervened to test the conceptual validity of the settlement agreement (to which they were not parties) before such an action could commence. In these circumstances, though it might be appropriate to offset a fee award against some future recovery by the Plaintiff Leflet v. Fire (Ariz. App., 2011) class, the purposes of A.R.S. § 12-341.01 would not be served by an award of fees against them jointly and severally. We therefore conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding fees against Plaintiffs ‘jointly and severally.’”
The Appeals court made the following conclusion: “we affirm the judgment of the trial court concerning the validity of the settlement agreement as to the NPIs. We vacate and remand the award of attorney’s fees. In our discretion, we decline to award the NPIs the attorney’s fees they have requested on appeal pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-341.01(A).”
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Lenders and Post-Foreclosure Purchasers Have Standing to Make Construction Defect Claims for After-Discovered Conditions
August 12, 2013 —
W. Berkeley Mann, Jr. - Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswelll, LLCThe Colorado Court of Appeals has decided a case which answers a question long in need of an answer: do banks/lenders have standing to assert construction defect claims when they receive title to a newly-constructed home following a foreclosure sale or deed-in-lieu of foreclosure? The decision was released on August 1, 2013, in the case of Mid Valley Real Estate Solutions V, LLC v. Hepworth-Pawlack Geotechnical, Inc., Steve Pawlak, Daniel Hadin, and S K Peightal Engineers, Ltd. (Colorado Court of Appeals No. 13CA0519).
The background facts of the case are typical of a Colorado residential construction defect case generally. A developer contracted for an analytical soil engineering report from a geotechnical engineering firm (H-P) which made a foundation recommendation. The developer’s general contractor then retained an engineering firm (SPKE) to provide engineering services, including a foundation design. The general contractor built the foundation in accordance with the H-P and SPKE criteria and plans.
The house was not sold by the developer and went into default on the construction loan. These events resulted in a deed-in-lieu of foreclosure to a bank-controlled entity which purchased the house for re-sale. Shortly after receiving the developer’s deed, the bank-related entity discovered defects in the foundation that resulted in a construction defect suit against the two design firms and related individuals.
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W. Berkeley Mann, Jr.W. Berkeley Mann, Jr. can be contacted at
mann@hhmrlaw.com
“A No-Lose Proposition?”
October 07, 2024 —
Daniel Lund III - LexologyA Miller Act payment bond surety and its principal general contractor both sued in federal court in New Orleans by a project subcontractor sought to compel arbitration the claims against both contractor and surety based on an indisputably enforceable arbitration clause in the subcontract. This was urged to avoid separate actions against the contractor (arbitration) and its surety (litigation), even though the surety was not a party to the subcontract and, therefore, not a party to the arbitration clause.
In the face of the lack of an express agreement to arbitrate, the contractor and contractor argued that “no federal statute or policy prohibits all of Plaintiff’s claims from proceeding to arbitration….” Additionally, those parties urged that the surety should be allowed to affirmatively compel arbitration because the surety “would otherwise have the ability to assert the right to compel arbitration as a defense….”
The New Orleans federal district court was unpersuaded:
“[D]istrict courts within this circuit have recognized that ‘Miller Act claims by a subcontractor for unpaid labor and materials are separate and distinct from those for general breach of contract… [and] arbitration and Miller Act suits, are not, per se, inconsistent with one another.’…[A]bsent express contractual intent to subject Miller Act claims to arbitration, the court [will] not force the parties to arbitrate claims against nonparties to the contract at issue…. [C]laims against a surety, which was a non-signatory to the contract, would not be subject to arbitration without any contractual basis to do so.”
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Daniel Lund III, PhelpsMr. Lund may be contacted at
daniel.lund@phelps.com
Home Prices Rose in Fewer U.S. Markets in Fourth Quarter
February 12, 2014 —
Prashant Gopal – BloombergPrices for single-family homes rose in 73 percent of U.S. cities in the fourth quarter, fewer than in the previous three months, as surging values in the past two years started to reduce affordability.
The median transaction price for an existing home climbed from a year earlier in 119 of 164 metropolitan areas measured, the National Association of Realtors said in a report today. In the third quarter, 88 percent of markets had increases.
While tight inventories and improving employment are bolstering the housing recovery, home-price gains are poised to decelerate as an increase in mortgage rates from record lows cuts into affordability. Values have been rising faster than incomes, particularly in the West, the Realtors group said.
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Prashant Gopal, BloombergMr. Gopal may be contacted at
pgopal2@bloomberg.net
Legislative Update: Bid Protest Law Changes to Benefit Contractors
November 24, 2019 —
Brett M. Hill - Ahlers Cressman & Sleight PLLCA new statute became effective July 28, 2019 that benefits contractors who have bid protests in Washington. A bid protest is the only way for disappointed bidders to challenge irregularities in the public bidding process on public works projects. Bid protests ensure the integrity of the public bidding system and are the contractor’s only remedy if its bid is improperly rejected or the winning bidder has errors in its bid that render it nonresponsive.
Under the old law, a contractor was required to submit their bid protest within 2 days after the bid opening. The problem was that a contractor often does not know the basis to protest an award without seeing the other bids to determine whether the winning bid was responsive. Many owners provide copies of the bids if requested at the bid opening, but some contractors found that owners were refusing to provide copies of the other bids until after the 2-day protest period expired.
The new law, which passed this last Legislative session[1], states that a contractor has two days after the bid opening to either submit a written protest or request copies of the competing bids. If the contractor requests copies of the competing bids from the owner, the contractor then has until 2 days after the competing bids are provided by the owner before the contractor is required to submit its bid protest.
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Brett M. Hill, Ahlers Cressman Sleight PLLCMr. Hill may be contacted at
brett.hill@acslawyers.com
New Mexico Adopts Right to Repair Act
April 25, 2023 —
William L. Doerler - The Subrogation StrategistOn April 7, 2023, New Mexico’s governor, Michelle Lujan Grisham, signed into law New Mexico’s Right to Repair Act (Act), 2023 N.M. SB 50. The Act’s effective date is July 1, 2023. The Act applies to construction defects in dwellings, i.e., newly constructed single family housing units designed for residential use. The Act applies to not only newly constructed housing units but also to systems and other components and improvements that are part of the housing unit at the time of construction.
Pursuant to the Act, except for construction defect claims that involve an immediate threat to the life or safety of persons occupying the dwelling, that render the dwelling uninhabitable or in which the seller, after notice, refused to make a repair pursuant to any applicable express warranty, a purchaser must comply with the provisions of the Act before filing a complaint or pursing an alternative dispute mechanism related to a construction defect in the dwelling. A seller who receives a notice complying with the provisions of the Act must give notice to all construction professionals who may be responsible for the defect.
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William L. Doerler, White and Williams LLPMr. Doerler may be contacted at
doerlerw@whiteandwilliams.com
First Circuit: No Coverage, No Duty to Investigate Alleged Loss Prior to Policy Period
May 18, 2020 —
Eric B. Hermanson & Austin D. Moody - White and WilliamsOn April 1, 2020, the First Circuit, applying Massachusetts law, issued a potentially useful decision addressing the Montrose “known loss” language in ISO Form CGL policies. In Clarendon National Insurance Company v. Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Company,[1] the court applied this language to allow denial of defense for claims of recurring water infiltration that began before the insurer’s policy period, and it found an insurer had no duty to investigate whether the course of property damage might have been interrupted, or whether other property damage might have occurred during the policy period, so as to trigger coverage during a later policy.
In the underlying dispute, a condominium owner (Doherty) asserted negligence claims against her association’s property management company (Lundgren) stemming from alleged water infiltration into her condominium. The complaint said leaks developed in 2004 in the roof above Doherty’s unit, and repairs were not made in a timely or appropriate manner. The following year, the complaint said, a Lundgren employee notified Doherty that the threshold leading to her condominium's deck was rotting. In February 2006, Doherty discovered a mushroom and water infiltration on the threshold and notified Lundgren. At that time, Lundgren asked its maintenance and repair contractor (CBD) to replace the rotting threshold. According to the complaint, CBD did not do this repair in a timely manner and left debris exposed in Doherty’s bedroom.
In March 2006, the complaint said, a mold testing company hired by Lundgren found hazardous mold in Doherty's unit, caused by water intrusions and chronic dampness. Lundgren’s attempts at remediation were ineffectual. In September 2008, Doherty's doctor ordered her to leave the condominium and not to return until the leaks were repaired and mold was eliminated.
Reprinted courtesy of
Eric B. Hermanson, White and Williams and
Austin D. Moody, White and Williams
Mr. Hermanson may be contacted at hermansone@whiteandwilliams.com
Mr. Moody may be contacted at moodya@whiteandwilliams.com
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