Claims Made Insurance Policies
November 04, 2019 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal Updates“Claims-made policies are common in the professional liability insurance market. They “differ from traditional ‘occurrence’-based policies primarily based upon the scope of the risk against which they insure.” With claims-made policies, coverage is provided only where the act giving rise to coverage “is discovered and brought to the attention of the insurance company during the period of the policy.” In contrast, coverage is provided under an occurrence-based policy if the act giving rise to coverage “occurred during the period of the policy, regardless of the date a claim is actually made against the insured.” “The essence, then, of a claims-made policy is notice to the carrier within the policy period.”
Crowely Maritime Corp. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA, 2019 WL 3294003 (11thCir. 2019)
The recent Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeal opinion in Crowely Maritime Corp. discussed the distinction between a claims-made insurance policy and an occurrence-based insurance policy. Professional liability policies are generally claims-made policies whereas commercial general liability policies are generally occurrence-based policies. While this opinion does not involve a construction matter, the case did concern the definition of a “claim” in a claims-made policy and whether such claim was timely reported to the insurer within the discovery period / extended reporting period.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
Federal Court Holds that Demolition Exclusion Does Not Apply and Carrier Has Duty to Defend Additional Insureds
September 02, 2024 —
Craig Rokuson - Traub LiebermanIn the recent case of
Travelers Indem. Co. v. Trisura Specialty Ins. Co., 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101953 (S.D.N.Y. June 7, 2024), the court had occasion to consider the classic additional insured fact pattern of a construction accident. Travelers insured the general contractor and provided a defense to the general contractor as well as its wholly owned subsidiary. Trisura insured the subcontractor, who employed the injured worker. Travelers brought suit, alleging that Trisura is obligated to defend and indemnify the general contractor, its subsidiary, the owner of the building (The City of New York), and the tenant.
Trisura denied any obligation to provide coverage due to the application of the “Demolition Exclusion” to the Trisura policy, which provides, in part, that there is no coverage for injury or damage arising out of the demolition of any building or structure which has original ground height in excess of three stories. The accident occurred during the interior demolition of the fifth floor of the building. The court held that the Demolition Exclusion applies only when there is a complete tearing down, razing, or destruction of an entire building. As the accident occurred during interior demolition, the exclusion did not apply.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Craig Rokuson, Traub LiebermanMr. Rokuson may be contacted at
crokuson@tlsslaw.com
OSHA/VOSH Roundup
August 31, 2020 —
Christopher G. Hill - Construction Law MusingsIn an unusual flurry of occupational safety related activity, the Virginia courts decided two cases in the last week relating to either the review of occupational safety regulations themselves or their enforcement.
In Nat’l College of Business & Technology Inc. v. Davenport (.pdf), the Virginia Court of Appeals considered what constitutes a “serious” violation of the exposure to asbestos Virginia Occupational Safety & Health (VOSH) regulations. The facts found by the Salem, Virginia Circuit Court were that employees of the petitioner college were exposed to asbestos insulation when they were required to enter a boiler room to retrieve paper files. However, no evidence was presented regarding the length of time or level of exposure at the Circuit Court level. Despite the lack of evidence regarding the level or extent of exposure, the Circuit Court upheld the VOSH citation for exposure and the level of violation at a “serious” level with the attendant penalty.
The Virginia Court of Appeals disagreed with the second finding. The appellate court determined that the lack of evidence regarding the level of exposure (whether length or extent) made the serious level violation an error. The Court stated that merely presenting evidence that asbestos is a carcinogen is not enough given the number of carcinogenic materials in existence and then remanded the case back to Circuit Court to reconsider the penalty level.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
The Law Office of Christopher G. HillMr. Hill may be contacted at
chrisghill@constructionlawva.com
Duuers: Better Proposals with Less Work
July 21, 2018 —
Aarni Heiskanen - AEC BusinessSmall contractors, consultants, and design professionals have a love–hate relationship with responding to RFPs. Duuers, a Finnish startup, wants to turn this struggle into an inspiring experience.
“We followed a day in the life of a hand-picked group of entrepreneurs,” says Paula Viinamäki, co-founder of Duuers. “We were flies on the wall, observing how small business owners wrestle with their daily tasks. Proposal-writing seemed to be an especially painful and time-consuming, yet vital, job.”
Defining the Scope through Experiments
After discovering this poorly supported but essential job that had to be done, Viinamäki and Jussi Paanajärvi, the other co-founder of Duuers, realized that they might be onto something. Consequently, they decided to start working on a prototype app for proposal-writing in the spring of 2017.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Aarni Heiskanen, AEC BusinessMr. Heiskanen may be contacted at
aec-business@aepartners.fi
Damron Agreement Questioned in Colorado Casualty Insurance v Safety Control Company, et al.
February 10, 2012 —
CDJ STAFFSafety Control and EMC appealed the judgment in Colorado Casualty Insurance Company versus Safety Control Company, Inc., et al. (Ariz. App., 2012). The Superior Court in Maricopa County addressed “the validity and effect of a Damron agreement a contractor and its excess insurer entered into that assigned their rights to sue the primary insurer.” Judge Johnsen stated, “We hold the agreement is enforceable but remand for a determination of whether the stipulated judgment falls within the primary insurer’s policy.”
The Opinion provides some facts and procedural history regarding the claim. “The Arizona Department of Transportation (“ADOT”) hired DBA Construction Company (“DBA”) to perform a road-improvement project on the Loop 101 freeway. Safety Control Company, Inc. was one of DBA’s subcontractors. As required by the subcontract, Safety Control purchased from Employer’s Mutual Casualty Company (“EMC”) a certificate of insurance identifying DBA as an additional insured on a policy providing primary coverage for liability arising out of Safety Control’s work.”
A collision occurred on site, injuring Hugo Roman. Roman then sued ADT and DBA for damages. “Colorado Casualty tendered DBA’s defense to the subcontractors, including Safety Control. Safety Control and EMC rejected the tender. Roman eventually settled his claims against DBA and ADOT. DBA and ADOT stipulated with Roman for entry of judgment of $750,000; Roman received $75,000 from DBA (paid by Colorado Casualty) and $20,000 from ADOT, and agreed not to execute on the stipulated judgment. Finally, DBA, ADOT and Colorado Casualty assigned to Roman their rights against the subcontractors and other insurers.”
Colorado Casualty attempted to recover what “it had paid to defend DBA and ADOT and settle with Roman. However, Roman intervened, and argued that “Colorado Casualty had assigned its subrogation rights to him as part of the settlement agreement.” The suit was not dismissed, but the Superior Court allowed Roman to intervene. “Roman then filed a counterclaim against Colorado Casualty and a cross-claim against the subcontractors.”
All claims were settled against all of the defendants except Safety Control and EMC. “The superior court ruled on summary judgment that EMC breached a duty to defend DBA and that as a result, ‘DBA was entitled to settle with Roman without EMC’s consent as long as the settlement was not collusive or fraudulent.’ After more briefing, the court held the stipulated judgment was neither collusive nor procured by fraud and that EMC therefore was liable to Roman on the stipulated judgment and for his attorney’s fees. The court also held Safety Control breached its subcontract with DBA by failing to procure completed-operations insurance coverage and would be liable for damages to the extent that EMC did not satisfy what remained (after the other settlements) of the stipulated judgment and awards of attorney’s fees.” Safety Control and EMC appealed the judgment.
Four reasons were given for the decision of the ruling. First, “the disagreement between Roman and Colorado Casualty does not preclude them from pursuing their claims against EMC and Safety Control.” Second, “the settlement agreement is not otherwise invalid.” Third, “issues of fact remain about whether the judgment falls within the EMC policy.” Finally, “Safety Control breached the subcontract by failing to procure ‘Completed Operations’ coverage for DBA.”
In conclusion, the Superior Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded . “Although, as stated above, we have affirmed several rulings of the superior court, we reverse the judgment against EMC and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion to determine whether the stipulated judgment was a liability that arose out of Safety Control’s operations. In addition, we affirm the superior court’s declaratory judgment against Safety Control but remand so that the court may clarify the circumstances under which Safety Control may be liable for damages and may conduct whatever further proceedings it deems appropriate to ascertain the amount of those damages. We decline all parties’ requests for attorney’s fees pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-341.01 without prejudice to a request for fees incurred in this appeal to be filed by the prevailing party on remand before the superior court.”
Read the court’s decision…
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
SCOTUS, Having Received Views of Solicitor General, Will Decide Whether CWA Regulates Indirect Discharge of Pollutants Into Navigable Water Via Groundwater
April 17, 2019 —
Anthony B. Cavender - Gravel2GavelPrior to deciding whether to review an important February 1, 2018, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decision involving the jurisdictional reach of the Clean Water Act (CWA), Hawai’i Wildlife Fund, et al., v. County of Maui, the Supreme Court asked the Solicitor General for the views of the U.S. on the holdings of this case and the April 12, 2018 U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit decision, Upstate Forever, et al., v. Kinder Morgan Energy Partners, L.P., et al.
On February 19, the Supreme Court confirmed that certiorari was granted to Question 1 presented by the Petition,
Whether the CWA requires a permit when pollutants originate from a point source but are conveyed to navigable waters by a nonpoint source, such as groundwater. (33 U.S.C. § 1362 (12)
In County of Maui , the Ninth Circuit held that indirect discharges to navigable waters through groundwater may be subject to the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) CWA the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permitting authority, and in Kinder Morgan, the Fourth Circuit held that such an indirect discharge may be subject to regulation under the CWA when there is a direct hydrological connection between the discharge into groundwater and the direct discharge into navigable, surface waters.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Anthony B. Cavender, PillsburyMr. Cavender may be contacted at
anthony.cavender@pillsburylaw.com
Restrictions On Out-Of-State Real Estate Brokers Being Challenged In Nevada
April 10, 2019 —
Aaron D. Lovaas - Newmeyer & Dillion LLPFor years, the Nevada Real Estate Division (“NRED”) and its sub-entity, the Nevada Real Estate Commission (“NREC”), have been tasked with administering the licensing procedures applicable to real estate professionals in Nevada, as well as enforcement of the regulations governing business practices, advertising, commissions, license maintenance, and a host of other dayto-day parameters within which the profession operates. Within the past five years, however, the NREC has tasked itself with the publicly stated goal of “protecting” Nevada real estate licensees and the commissions they earn from out-of-state real estate professionals seeking to do business in the Silver State. While efforts to preserve local real estate opportunities for local brokers might seem sound, an international brokerage firm is challenging the foundation of that structure. If they win, the outcome could have huge implications on the real estate industry in Nevada. Businesses, here’s a breakdown of the existing structure and what the challenge is all about.
The Existing Regulatory Structure
Through amending their own regulations, the NRED and NREC have created a regulatory structure that:
- Prohibits any non-Nevada licensed real estate broker from representing any seller (Nevada based or non-Nevada based) of any Nevada real estate;
- Prohibits any non-Nevada licensed real estate broker from representing any Nevada resident in the purchase of Nevada real estate; and
- Allows non-Nevada licensed real estate brokers to represent non-Nevada purchasers of Nevada real estate only if the out-of-state broker formally affiliates (and therefore shares commissions with) a resident Nevada-licensed broker.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Aaron D. Lovaas, Newmeyer & Dillion LLPMr. Lovaas may be contacted at
aaron.lovaas@ndlf.com
Why Biden’s Infrastructure Plan Is a Green Jobs Plan
April 26, 2021 —
Gernot Wagner - Bloomberg“Once you put capital money to work, jobs are created.”
These are not the words of President Joe Biden, announcing his administration’s infrastructure plan in Pittsburgh on Wednesday. Nor were they the words of Transportation Secretary Pete Buttigieg, standing on a train platform to announce expanded service, or of any of the administration’s economists charged with touting the virtues of the $2.25 trillion spending plan.
It was Michael Morris, then-CEO of Ohio utility American Electric Power, who uttered them on an investor call a decade ago. AEP was fighting an Environmental Protection Agency proposal to reduce mercury and other pollutants from power plants, citing the expense of creating jobs to install new scrubbers on smokestacks or build cleaner plants. Morris, taking his fiduciary responsibility to the utility’s investors seriously, argued these new roles would come at a cost to AEP and were, thus, bad. What he did not question, and correctly so, was whether more investments would indeed create more jobs.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Gernot Wagner, Bloomberg
