Lewis Brisbois Appellate Team Scores Major Victory in Bad Faith Insurance Action
May 24, 2021 —
Raul Martinez & Elise Klein - Lewis Brisbois NewsroomAppellate Partner Raul L. Martinez and Los Angeles Partners Elise D. Klein and Celia Moutes-Lee recently secured a major win in an appeal of a bad faith insurance action. In Wexler v. California Fair Plan Association (Apr. 14, 2021, B303100) __Cal.App.5th__, Division Eight of the Second Appellate District (Los Angeles), the court held that the plaintiff, the daughter of insurance policy holders, had no standing to pursue bad faith allegations against her parents’ insurer for smoke damage to her personal possessions.
The daughter’s parents owned a home in the mountains where there was a heightened risk of fires. The parents insured their home with a California FAIR Plan Association (FAIR Plan) owner-occupied dwelling policy (the FAIR Plan Policy). The FAIR Plan Policy only insured the dwelling and its contents against damage from fire, lightning, and internal explosion with limited coverage for smoke damage. The FAIR Plan Policy also expressly disclaimed coverage for individuals not specifically named in the policy. Furthermore, the plaintiff’s name did not appear in any of her parents’ insurance documents.
Reprinted courtesy of
Raul Martinez, Lewis Brisbois and
Elise Klein, Lewis Brisbois
Mr. Martinez may be contacted at Raul.Martinez@lewisbrisbois.com
Ms. Klein may be contacted at Elise.Klein@lewisbrisbois.com
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Contractor’s Claim for Interest on Subcontractor’s Defective Work Claim Gains Mixed Results
April 27, 2020 —
John J. Gazzola, Associate, Pepper Hamilton LLP - ConsensusDocsThis case concerns calculation of a damages award to a general contractor, Skanska USA Building, Inc., on its claim for breach of contract against its masonry subcontractor, J.D. Long Masonry, Inc., arising from Long’s faulty construction of a masonry façade at a medical research facility in Baltimore. When the façade collapsed and Long failed to repair it, Skanska hired a replacement subcontractor, C.A. Lindman, to remediate Long’s defective work and filed suit against Long to recover the resulting damages. After the court granted Skanska’s motion for summary judgment as to liability, Skanska moved for summary judgment on the issue of damages, relying on the indemnification provision of the subcontract to seek compensatory damages, pre- and post-judgment interest, and litigation fees. In the subcontract, Long agreed to indemnify and hold Skanska harmless from all claims, losses, costs and expenses, including attorneys’ fees, arising before or after completion of Long’s work, caused by, arising out of, resulting from, or occurring in connection with Long’s performance of the work or breach of the subcontract.
The court first applied the terms of this provision to award Skanska compensatory damages, holding that Skanska was, as a matter of law, entitled to recover the amount of the Lindman subcontract and general conditions incurred to supervise remediation of Long’s work. The court, however, denied Skanska’s claim for pre-judgment interest on the entirety of these damages. Skanska asserted that it was entitled to pre-judgment interest on the full award, calculated from the date on which it first paid Lindman. The court disagreed, explaining that, under Maryland law, a claimant is entitled to an award of pre-judgment interest as of right only when the amount due is certain, definite and liquidated by a specific date prior to judgment. The court reasoned that, because much of the Lindman subcontract value was composed of later-executed change orders, an award of pre-judgment interest could not be uniformly calculated back to the date of Skanska’s first payment to Lindman. And moreover, because Skanska continued to withhold sums due to Lindman pending resolution of certain issues, awarding Skanska pre-judgment interest on amounts it had not yet paid would result in a “windfall” to Skanska because there was no “use of income” loss to be compensated.
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John J. Gazzola, Pepper Hamilton LLPMr. Gazzola may be contacted at
gazzolaj@pepperlaw.com
A Recap of the Supreme Court’s 2019 Summer Slate
September 16, 2019 —
Anthony B. Cavender - Gravel2GavelAs usual, the last month of the Supreme Court’s term generated significant rulings on all manner of cases, possibly presaging the new directions the Court will be taking in administrative and regulatory law. Here’s a brief roundup:
An Offshore Dispute, Resolve – Parker Drilling Management v. Newton
On June 10, 2019, the Court held, in a unanimous ruling, that, under federal law, California wage and hour laws do not apply to offshore operations conducted on the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS). Newton, the plaintiff, worked on drilling platforms off the coast of California, and alleged that he was not paid for his “standby time” which is contrary to California law if not federal law. He filed a class action in state court, which was removed to federal court, where it was dismissed on the basis of a 1969 decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which held that state law applies on the OCS only to the extent that it is necessary to use state law to fill a significant gap or void in federal law, and this is not the case here. On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, that court disagreed with the Fifth Circuit, and ruled that state law is applicable on the OCS whenever it applies to the matter at hand. The Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Justice Thomas, conceded that “this is a close question of statutory interpretation,” but in the end the Court agreed with the argument that if there was not a gap to fill, that ended the dispute over which law applies on the Outer continental Shelf. This ruling, recognizing the preeminent role that federal law plays on the OCS, may affect the resolution of other offshore disputes affecting other federal statutes.
Preemption Prevention – Virginia Uranium, Inc. v. Warren. et al.
On June 17, 2019 the Court decided important cases involving federal preemption and First Amendment issues. In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that the Atomic Energy Act does not preempt a Virginia law that “flatly prohibits uranium mining in Virginia”—or more precisely—mining on non-federal land in Virginia. Virginia Uranium planned to mine raw uranium from a site near Coles, Virginia, but acknowledging that Virginia law forbade such an operation, challenged the state law on federal preemption grounds, arguing that the Atomic Energy Act, as implemented by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, preempts the ability of the state to regulate this activity. However, the majority, in an opinion written by Justice Gorsuch, notes that the “best reading of the AEA does not require us to hold the state law before us preempted,” and that the1983 precedent that Virginia Uranium cites, Pacific Gas & Electric Company v. State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission, can easily be distinguished. Justice Gorsuch rejected arguments that the intent of the Virginia legislators in passing the state law should be consulted, that the Court’s ruling should normally be governed by the exact text of the statute at hand. However, both the concurring and dissenting opinions suggest that the what the legislators intended to do is important in a preemption context.
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Anthony B. Cavender, PillsburyMr. Cavender may be contacted at
anthony.cavender@pillsburylaw.com
Limiting Plaintiffs’ Claims to a Cause of Action for Violation of SB-800
November 18, 2011 —
Samir R. Patel, Esq., Lorber, Greenfield, & Polito, LLPThere has been a fair share of publicity about the SB-800 amendments to the Civil Code (Civil Code section 896, et seq.) that codified construction defect litigation in 2002. Most of the publicity is geared toward the pre-litigation standards allowing a builder the right to repair before litigation is commenced by a homeowner. Less focus and attention has been given to the fact that violation of the SB-800 performance standards is being used by plaintiff’s counsel as an additional tool in the plaintiff’s pleading tool box against builders. Closer scrutiny to SB-800 reveals that those provisions should in fact act as a limitation to the pleading tools available to plaintiffs and an additional tool for builders in the defense of cases governed by SB-800.
The typical construction defect complaint contains the boiler plate versions of numerous causes of action. These causes of action include Strict Liability, Negligence, Negligence Per Se, Breach of Contract, Breach of Contract – Third-Party Beneficiary, Breach of Express Warranties, Breach of Implied Warranties, among others. The wide array of causes of action leave a defendant “pinned to the wall” because they require a complex defense on a multitude of contract and tort related causes of action. Furthermore, the statutes of limitations as to these claims widely differ depending upon if the particular defect is considered latent or patent. The truth of the matter remains, no matter what the circumstances, if a construction defect matter ultimately goes to trial, it is inevitable that plaintiffs will obtain a judgment on at least one of these causes of action.
On its own, the Strict Liability cause of action can be a thorn in a defendant’s side. A builder is obviously placing a product into the stream of commerce and strict liability is a tough standard to defend against, particularly when it concerns intricate homes comprised of multiple components that originally sold for hundreds of thousands of dollars. A Negligence cause of action can also be difficult to defend because the duty of care for a builder is what a “reasonable” builder would have done under the circumstances. An interpretation of this duty of care can easily sway a jury that will almost always consist of sympathetic homeowners. A Negligence Per Se cause of action can also leave a defendant vulnerable to accusations that a builder violated the Uniform Building Code or a multitude of other obscure municipal construction-related code provisions during the construction of the home. Lastly, the Breach of Contract cause of action leaves a builder relying on dense and intricate purchase and sale agreements with dozens of addenda which leave the skeptical jurors turned off by what they view as one-side, boilerplate provisions. Ultimately, when a matter is about to go to trial, the complexity of these complaints can benefit a plaintiff and increase a plaintiff’s bargaining power against a defendant who is attempting to avoid a potentially large judgment.
Enter the SB-800 statutes. The SB-800 statutes apply to all homes sold after January 1, 2003. Civil Code section 938 specifically states that “[t]his title applies only to new residential units where the purchase agreements with the buyer was signed by the seller on or after January 1, 2003.” (Civil Code §, 938.) As time progresses, more residential construction defect cases will exclusively fall under the purview of SB-800. Slowly but surely more SB-800 governed litigation is being filed, and its exclusive application is looming on the horizon.
On its surface, this “right to repair” regime has left builders with a lot to be desired despite the fact that it is supposed to allow the builder the opportunity to cure any deficiencies in their product before litigation can be filed by potential plaintiffs. However, the application of the time line for repair has shown to be impractical for anything but the most minor problems involving only small numbers of residential units. Moreover, the fact that the fruits of the builder’s investigation into the claimed defects in the pre-litigation context can freely be used as evidence against it in litigation makes builders proceed with trepidation in responding with a repair. For these reasons, more SB-800 litigation can be expected to result due to the shortcomings of the pre-litigation procedures, and savvy defense counsel should anticipate the issues to be dealt with in presenting the defense of such cases at trial.
This fact should not necessarily be met with fear or disdain. Within the SB-800 statutes, the legislature made it clear that they were creating a new cause of action for construction defect claims, but it further made it clear that this cause of action is a plaintiff’s exclusive remedy. The legislature giveth, but at the same time, the legislature taketh away. Throughout numerous provisions within the SB-800 statutes, the Civil Code states that claims for construction defects as to residential construction are exclusively governed by the Civil Code, and that the Civil Code governs any and all litigation arising under breaches of these provisions. Civil Code section 896 specifically states:
In any action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, the residential construction … the claimant’s claims or causes of action shall be limited to violation of, the following standards, except as specifically set forth in this title. (Civil Code §, 896.)
Civil Code section 896 then provides approximately fifty-plus standards by which a construction defect claim is assessed under that provision. Civil Code section 896 covers everything from plumbing to windows, and from foundations to decks, and in several instances expressly dictates statutes of limitations as to specific areas of construction that severely truncate the 10-year latent damage limitations period. As for any construction deficiencies that are not enumerated within Civil Code section 896, Civil Code section 897 explicitly defines the intent of the standards and provides a method to assess deficiencies that are not addressed in Civil Code section 896. Civil Code section 897 states:
Intent of Standards
The standards set forth in this chapter are intended to address every function or component of a structure. To the extent that a function or component of a structure is not addressed by these standards, it shall be actionable if it causes damage. (Civil Code §, 897.)
Therefore, Civil Code section 897 acts as a catch-all by which defects that are not covered within Civil Code section 896 can be evaluated on a damage standard mirroring the Aas case (damages must be present and actual). The result of sections 896 and 897 being read in combination is a comprehensive, all-inclusive set of performance standards by which any defect raised by Plaintiffs can be evaluated and resolved under a single SB-800 based cause of action.
Civil Code section 943 makes clear that a cause of action for violation of SB-800 performance standards is a plaintiff’s sole remedy for a residential construction defect action. Specifically, Civil Code section 943 states:
Except as provided in this title, no other cause of action for a claim covered by this title or for damages recoverable under 944 is allowed. In addition to the rights under this title, this title does not apply to any action by a claimant to enforce a contract or express contractual provision, or any action for fraud, personal injury, or violation of a statute. (Civil Code §, 943.)
Civil Code section 944 provides the method for computing damages within a construction defect action, as follows:
If a claim for damages is made under this title, the homeowner is only entitled to damages for the reasonable value of repairing any violation of the standards set forth in this title, [and] the reasonable cost of repairing any damages caused by the repair efforts… . (Civil Code §, 944.)
A cursory review of these statutes yields the conclusion that the legislature was attempting to create an exclusive cause of action that trumps all other causes of action where SB-800 applies. The remedy available to plaintiffs is limited to that allowed by the Civil Code. As noted above, “[n]o other cause of action for a claim covered by this title…is allowed.” (Civil Code §, 943.) Therefore, Civil Code sections 896, 897, 943, and 944 specifically prohibit the contract-based and tort-based causes of action typically pled by plaintiffs.
Plaintiff’s counsel has seized upon the language of section 943 to advance the argument that SB-800 still allows a plaintiff to advance typical contract and tort based causes of action. On the surface, this argument may seem compelling, but a minimum of scrutiny of the express language of section 943 dispels this notion. Section 943 says that it provides rights “[i]n addition” to those under the SB-800 Civil Code provisions. Clearly, the language in section 943 is intended to expressly underscore the fact that a plaintiff is not precluded from seeking relief in addition to that allowed under SB-800 for damages not arising from a breach of the SB-800 standards or for damages in addition to those recoverable under Section 944. This language does not provide an unfettered license to bring a Strict Liability, Negligence or other cause of action against a builder where SB-800 applies.
In fact, this language only keeps the door open for plaintiffs to pursue such causes of action not arising from a breach of the SB-800 standards should there be such supporting allegations. For example, if a plaintiff alleges that a builder breached an “express contractual provision” related to the timing of the completion of the home and close of escrow, and the contract specifies damages in this regard, a plaintiff may have a viable separate cause of action for Breach of Contract for recovery of those damages precisely because that is not an issue expressly dealt with in SB-800 in the performance standards under sections 896 and 897, or in the damage recovery terms under 944. As it stands, the vast majority of complaints are seeking redress for violation of the same primary right; that is, defects specifically outlined in Section 896 and 897 or which result in damages as stated in Section 944.
So, how does a builder defend against a complaint that contains multiple causes of action regarding construction defects for a home sold after January 1, 2003? There are numerous ways to approach this. First and foremost, these superfluous and improper causes of action can be attacked by demurrer seeking dismissal of all causes of action other than the cause of action alleging violation of SB-800. If the the time period within which to file a demurrer has passed already, a motion for judgment on the pleadings can be utilized to attack the improper causes of action in the same way as a demurrer can be used for this purpose.
The limitation to a demurrer or motion for judgment on the pleadings is that the judge is restricted to viewing only the four corners of the pleading when making a ruling. It is typical for plaintiffs’ counsel to cleverly (or one might even say, disingenuously) leave the complaint purposely vague to avoid a successful defense attack on the pleadings by not including the original date the residence was sold. In that instance, a motion for summary adjudication can be used to attack a plaintiff’s complaint. By simply providing evidence that the homes were originally sold after January 1, 2003, the improper causes of action should be subject to dismissal by summary adjudication. If the plaintiff is a subsequent purchaser, the builder still has recourse to enforce the pleading limitations under SB-800. Civil Code section 945 states that “[t]he provisions, standards, rights, and obligations set forth in this title are binding upon all original purchasers and their successors-in-interest.” (Civil Code §, 945.)
Attacking a plaintiff’s complaint to eliminate multiple causes of action can have numerous benefits. The practical result is that a plaintiff will only have one viable cause of action. The advantage is that the SB-800 performance standards include the defined performance standards and shortened statutes of limitations periods with regard to specific issues. Furthermore, as to defects which are not specifically provided for in Civil Code section 896, Civil Code section 897 requires a proof of actual damages. Therefore, a plaintiff must provide evidence of current damages and not simply conditions that may potentially cause damage in the future.
The Appellate Courts have yet to directly address and interpret these SB-800 provisions. The time for that is undoubtedly drawing near. For now, however, plaintiffs will have to find ways to accurately plead construction defect claims within the confines of one cause of action for breach of the performance standards enumerated within the Civil Code.
Printed courtesy of Lorber, Greenfield & Polito, LLP. Mr. Patel can be contacted at spatel@lorberlaw.com and Mr. Verbick at tverbick@lorberlaw.com.
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Seller Cannot Compel Arbitration for Its Role in Construction Defect Case<
March 01, 2012 —
CDJ STAFFThe buyer of a leaky home in Venice, California cannot be compelled to arbitration with the seller in a construction defect lawsuit, according to a decision in Lindemann v. Hume, which was heard in the California Court of Appeals. Lindemann was the trustee of the Schlei Trust which bought the home and then sued the seller and the builder for construction defects.
The initial owner was the Hancock Park Trust, a real estate trust for Nicholas Cage. Richard Hume was the trustee. In 2002, Cage agreed to buy the home which was being built by the Lee Group. Cage transferred the agreement to the Hancock Park Trust. Hancock had Richard Nazarin, a general contractor, conduct a pre-closing walk through. They also engaged an inspector. Before escrow closed, the Lee Group agreed to provide a ten-year warranty “to remedy and repair any and all damage resulting from water infiltration, intrusion, or flooding due to the fact that the door on the second and third floors of the residence at the Property were not originally installed at least one-half inch (1/2”) to one inch (1”) above the adjacent outside patio tile/floor on each of the second and third floors.”
Cage moved in and experienced water intrusion and flooding. The Lee Group was unable to fix the problems. Hume listed the home for sale. The Kamienowiczs went as far as escrow before backing out of the purchase over concerns about water, after the seller’s agent disclosed “a problem with the drainage system that is currently being addressed by the Lee Group.”
The house was subsequently bought by the Schlei Trust. The purchase agreement included an arbitration clause which included an agreement that “any dispute or claim in Law or equity arising between them out of this Agreement or any resulting transaction, which is not settled through mediation, shall be decided by neutral, binding arbitration.” The warranty the Lee Group had given to Hancock was transferred to the Schlei trust and Mr. Schlei moved into the home in May 2003.
Lindemann enquired as to whether the work done would prevent future flooding. Nazarin sent Schlei a letter that said that measures had been taken “to prevent that situation from recurring.” In February, 2004, there was flooding and water intrusion. Lindemann filed a lawsuit against the Lee Group and then added the Hancock Park defendants.
The Hancock Park defendants invoked the arbitration clause, arguing that Lindemann’s claims “were only tangentially related to her construction defect causes of action against the Lee Group.” On June 9, 2010, the trial court rejected this claim, ruling that there was a possibility of conflicting rulings on common issues of law. “With respect to both the developer defendants and the seller defendants, the threshold issue is whether there was a problem with the construction of the property in the first instance. If there was no problem with the construction of the property, then there was nothing to fail to disclose.” Later in the ruling, the trial court noted that “the jury could find there was no construction defect on the property, while the arbitration finds there was a construction defect, the sellers knew about it, and the sellers failed to disclose it.” The appeals court noted that while Hancock Park had disclosed the drainage problems to the Kamienowiczs, no such disclosure was made to Sclei.
The appeals court described Hancock Park’s argument that there is no risk of inconsistent rulings as “without merit.” The appeals court said that the issue “is not whether inconsistent rulings are inevitable but whether they are possible if arbitration is ordered.” Further, the court noted that “the Hancock Park defendants and the Lee Group have filed cross-complaints for indemnification against each other, further increasing the risk of inconsistent rulings.”
The court found for Lindemann, awarding her costs.
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Everybody Is Going to End Up Paying for Texas' Climate Crisis
March 29, 2021 —
David R Baker & Mark Chediak - BloombergFallout from last month’s deadly deep freeze in Texas has quietly spread to people living hundreds of miles away. Minnesota utilities have warned that monthly heating bills could spike by $400, after the crisis jacked up natural gas prices across the country. Xcel Energy’s Colorado customers could face a $7.50 per month surcharge for the next two years.
This is a subtle demonstration of the way Americans already share the collective financial burden of climate change, even if we don’t realize it. The national bill for global warming is here, and it’s rising.
Perhaps it’s easier to see this dynamic playing out beyond February’s Texas cold snap. That disaster left dozens dead, stranded millions in dark homes, and sent a shockwave of higher gas prices across the nation. But since there remains scientific uncertainty over the role of global warming, let’s examine two other calamities for which the climate link is clearer: wildfires and tropical storms.
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David R Baker & Mark Chediak, Bloomberg
Decline in Home Construction Brings Down Homebuilder Stocks
December 11, 2013 —
CDJ STAFFThe main gains in October construction were in commercial construction. The stock market has reacted to the slow-down by selling off homebuilder stocks, leading to a drop in their price. Deutsche Bank did not expect this to be the long term situation in U.S. homebuilding. The bank expects that the dip in residential construction “should reverse course given the ongoing improvement in permits for new construction.”
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Interpreting Insurance Coverage and Exclusions: When Sudden means Sudden and EIFS means Faulty
June 15, 2020 —
Ben Volpe - Colorado Construction Litigation BlogEIFS, or Exterior Insulation and Finish System, is an integrated exterior insulation and synthetic stucco system, praised for its energy efficiency.[1] However, EIFS has come to be well known in the construction defect world as placing homes at risk due to a lack of a built-in moisture management system. Before long, insurance companies recognized the risk and began explicitly excluding coverage for EIFS-related damage. However, EIFS exclusions have not always been so clearly set forth in some policies, causing insurance coverage litigation.
Recently, a Greenwood Village couple, Mark and Susan Mock, lost this fight.
Built in 1994, the Mocks’ home was constructed with an EIFS system. The Mocks carried a homeowner’s insurance policy through Allstate, which covered “sudden and accidental loss” to property, but excluded coverage for “planning, construction or maintenance” issues. Such “planning, construction or maintenance” exclusions included “faulty, inadequate or defective designs.”
A few months after a hailstorm, the Mocks discovered moisture-related damage to their home’s EIFS system. They reported the damage to Allstate, but Allstate would not cover it, reasoning that the damage to the EIFS system was excluded as a design and/or construction failure, and thus not covered as a “sudden and accidental” loss. The experts who evaluated the damage concluded it was the result of inherent flaws in the EIFS systems common in the 1994 timeframe, which involved long term moisture intrusion behind the cladding and no means for the water to escape.
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Benjamin Volpe, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLCMr. Volpe may be contacted at
volpe@hhmrlaw.com
