Texas exclusions j(5) and j(6).
April 27, 2011 —
CDCoverage.comIn Evanston Ins. Co. v. D&L Masonry of Lubbock, Inc., No. 07-10-00358-CV (Tex. Ct. App. April 18, 2011), insured masonry subcontractor D&L sued its CGL insurer Evanston to recover costs incurred by D&L for the replacement of window frames damaged by D&L while performing masonry work adjacent to the window frames. The trial court granted summary judgment for D&L.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of CDCoverage.com
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Spearin Doctrine 100 Years Old and Still Thriving in the Design-Build Delivery World
January 09, 2019 —
John P. Ahlers - Ahlers Cressman & Sleight PLLCThe Supreme Court’s ruling in United States v. Spearin, [1] also referred to as the Spearin doctrine, is a landmark construction decision.[2] The Spearin doctrine provides that the Owner impliedly warrants the information, plans and specifications which an Owner provides to a General Contractor. If a Contractor is bound to build according to plans and specifications prepared by the Owner, the Contractor will not be responsible for the consequences of defects in the plans and specifications.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
John P. Ahlers, Ahlers Cressman & Sleight PLLCMr. Ahlers may be contacted at
john.ahlers@acslawyers.com
Anatomy of a Construction Dispute- An Alternative
February 05, 2015 —
Christopher G. Hill – Construction Law MusingsOver the past three weeks, I’ve discussed three “stages” of a construction dispute from the claim, to how to increase the pressure for payment, to the litigation. While these three steps are all too often necessary tools in your construction collection arsenal, they are expensive and time consuming. No well run construction business can or should budget for litigation. The better practice would be to engage a construction attorney early in the process and avoid the dispute altogether if possible. Unfortunately, even the best of planning can lead to the need to hire a construction lawyer for the less pleasant task of assisting you in getting paid.
This post is about an alternative to the scorched earth of stage 3 of the process that can and should be at least considered either before or after the complaint or demand for arbitration has been filed. I am of course speaking about voluntary mediation. Why did I emphasize “voluntary?” Because to me mandatory mediation (as required in many construction contracts) is a bit like forced volunteerism, it is something that the parties will go through to “check a box” but will not have their hearts in it. Remember, by the time the mandatory mediation clause kicks in, the parties are likely at an impasse in their construction dispute and are ready to fight. Being forced to mediate, especially from the party seeking payment, can (and in my experience often does) make the parties just go through the motions at best and be hostile to the process at worst. Neither of these attitudes are conducive to resolving a dispute.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Christopher G. Hill, Law Office of Christopher G. Hill, PCMr. Hill may be contacted at
chrisghill@constructionlawva.com
Insurer Must Defend Construction Defect Claims
October 07, 2016 —
Tred R. Eyerly – Insurance Law HawaiiThe federal district court found that under New York law, the insurer had a duty to defend construction defect claims where damage to property other than the insured's work product was possible. Am.Home Assur. Co. v. Allan Window Techs., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101118 (S.D. N. Y. Aug 2, 2016).
Kent Avenue Property ("Kent") sued Allan Window Technologies, Ltd. ("Allan"), alleging that Allan entered a written contract for the design, manufacture, assembly and installation of the window wall systems for a residential condominium building. Pursuant to the contract, Allan agreed to correct all work rejected as defective and to bear all costs for correcting the work. According to the complaint, the window wall systems and vent windows installed by Allan were not water-tight or air-tight, and therefore did not meet the air and water penetration requirements of the contract.The contract had an indemnification provision under which Allan agreed to indemnify, defend and hold harmless Kent from all losses, claims, lawsuits, etc. arising out of damage or injury to property at the project site. Kent sued for: (1) breach of contract; (2) breach of warranty, and (3) contractual indemnity.
American Home agreed to defend Allan under a full reservation of rights. American Home then sued for a declaratory judgment to establish it had no duty to defend or indemnify.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law HawaiiMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Circuit Court Lacks Appellate Jurisdiction Over Order Compelling Appraisal
August 21, 2023 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiThe Eleventh Circuit determined it lacked appellate jurisdiction over an order issued by the district court compelling an appraisal. Breakwater Commons Association, Inc. v. Empire Indem. Ins. Co., 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 14459 (11th Cir. June 9, 2023).
Following Hurricane Irma, Breakwater Commons Association filed a claim with Empire Indemnity Insurance Company for property damage. Empire agreed to cover some of the damage to buildings, but a dispute arose over the amount of loss. Breakwater sought to invoke the appraisal provision in the policy. Empire refused to engage in an appraisal. Breakwater sued, and filed a motion to compel appraisal and to stay the proceedings pending the completion of the appraisal process.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak HastertMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
“Source of Duty,” Tort, and Contract, Oh My!
September 06, 2023 —
Christopher G. Hill - Construction Law MusingsHere at Construction Law Musings, I have discussed the general rule in Virginia that
tort and contract do not mix. I have also discussed a
few narrow exceptions. A Virginia Supreme Court case from October of 2019 lays out both sides of this issue in one glorious opinion.
In
Tingler v. Graystone Homes, Inc., a summary of the facts and lawsuit(s) are as follows: Water leaks developed after the home was built. Graystone’s post-construction efforts to repair the leaks and remediate mold were unsuccessful. The Tinglers and their children abandoned the home after developing mold-related medical problems. The Tinglers and their children sued Graystone in tort for personal injury, property damage, and economic loss. In other litigation that will not be discussed in this post, but that is described in the opinion linked above, Belle Meade sued Graystone in contract for property damage and economic losses. George and Crystal Tingler filed a separate complaint alleging the same contract claims.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
The Law Office of Christopher G. HillMr. Hill may be contacted at
chrisghill@constructionlawva.com
CGL, Builders Risk Coverage and Exclusions When Construction Defects Cause Property Damage
May 17, 2021 —
Jeffrey Cavignac - Construction ExecutiveDirect damage to property under construction caused by faulty or defective work or defective materials has been a coverage issue for decades. Two specific policies, the Commercial General Liability for the contractors building the structure and the Builders Risk Policy on the project both are sources of potential coverage.
A CGL policy protects the named insured (the contractor in this case) from third party liability arising out of the insured’s operations that results in either bodily injury or property damage. Damage to property caused by poor workmanship or defective materials would qualify as property damage. To understand how the CGL policy might respond to claims such as these, it is necessary to evaluate several exclusions in the CGL policy.
CGL policies cover “property damage,” defined as physical injury to tangible property, including loss of use of such property, and loss of use of tangible property that has not been physically injured.
Reprinted courtesy of
Jeffrey Cavignac, Construction Executive, a publication of Associated Builders and Contractors. All rights reserved.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Life After McMillin: Do Negligence and Strict Liability Causes of Action for Construction Defects Still Exist?
January 24, 2018 —
Thomas Balestreri and Amanda Crawley - Balestreri, Potocki, & HolmesThe ruling is in but the battle will likely continue over the practical application of SB 800. On January 18, 2018 the California Supreme Court issued its decision in
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __, holding that the statutory prelitigation scheme in The Right to Repair Act (“the Act”) that provides for notice and an opportunity for the Builder to repair defects applies to all claims for construction defects in residential construction sold on or after January 1, 2003, regardless whether the claim is founded on a violation of the Act’s performance standards or a common law claim for negligence or strict liability. (
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __.) With this holding, has the Court ruled that common law causes of action for construction defect still survive? If so, what will they look like and what standards will be applied?
The short answer is that it appears that common law causes of action still survive, at least for now, but it is not clear from this decision what they will look like and what standards will apply.
Portions of the decision seem to suggest that the Act is the sole and exclusive remedy for construction defect claims: “…even in some areas where the common law had supplied a remedy for construction defects resulting in property damage but not personal injury, the text and legislative history [of the statute] reflect a
clear and unequivocal intent to supplant common law negligence and strict product liability actions under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 6].) (Italics added for emphasis) However, at the end of the decision, the Court seems to be saying that there may still be a place for common law claims for negligence and strict liability alongside the Act but that these causes of action may be subject to the performance standards in the Act.
The
McMillin case went up to the Supreme Court on a procedural issue: whether a common law action alleging construction defects resulting in both economic loss and property damage is subject to the Act’s prelitigation notice and cure procedures. The Van Tassels had dismissed their claims under the Act opting to proceed solely on their common law claims including negligence and strict liability. McMillin sought a stay to force the Van Tassels to comply with the Act’s prelitigation procedures. The Supreme Court held that the Van Tassels must comply with the statutory procedures and affirmed the stay issued by the trial court. But the question remained: now that the Van Tassels were left only with common law claims, how would they proceed under the Act?
To understand how the Court dealt with this question, one must first understand how the Court dealt with the narrow procedural question presented by the case. The Court provides a very detailed, clear explanation of the reasons why it felt the Legislature intended for all construction defect claims involving residential construction must comply with the prelitigation requirements of the Act. In summing up its conclusions the Court makes three definitive holdings.
First, for claims involving economic loss only—the kind of claims involved in
Aas—the Court holds that the Legislature intended to supersede
Aas and provide a statutory basis for recovery. (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 10].) In other words, the Court clearly agrees that the Act was meant to allow recovery of damages based solely on economic damages. No surprise there. Second, the Court held for personal injuries, the Legislature made no changes to existing law that provides common law remedies for the injured party. (Id.) Nobody has ever contested that. Finally, the Court held that for construction defect claims involving property damage and not just economic loss “the Legislature replaced the common law
methods of recovery with the new statutory scheme.” (
Id.,) (Italics added for emphasis.)
In other words, the Court is not saying that negligence and strict liability are not permitted causes of action. The Court is merely stating that these causes of action must comply with the Act’s statutory scheme just as the same as a claim for economic loss. Here the Court is focusing on the procedure that must be followed. “The Act, in effect, provides that construction defect claims not involving personal injury will be treated the same procedurally going forward whether or not the underlying claims gave rise to any property damage.” (
Id.)
Having laid out its fundamental premise, the Court then deals with Plaintiff’s arguments regarding the intent of the Legislature and makes light work of them all. In the process, the Court disapproves
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Brookfield Crystal Cove LLC (2013) 219 Cal. App. 4th 98, and
Burch v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal. App. 4th 1411, to the extent they are inconsistent with the views expressed in the
McMillin opinion.
This is where the decision gets interesting. The Court reminds us that the Van Tassels had dismissed their statutory causes of action for violation of the performance standards under Section 896. One would think at that point that Plaintiffs had to be wondering if they had any claims left given that the Court had ruled that the Act was the sole means of recovery for construction defects. Not so fast. The Court points out that the complaint still rests on allegations of defective construction and that the suit remains an “ ‘action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, the residential construction’ of the plaintiffs’ homes (§896)
and McMillin’s liability under the Van Tassels’ negligence and strict liability claims depends on the extent to which it [McMillin] violated the standards of sections 896 and 897.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Emphasis added.) WHAT DID THE COURT JUST SAY? Did the Court just say that a plaintiff could bring a common law cause of action for negligence or strict liability based on a violation of the performance standards under Section 896? What exactly would that claim look like? What would be the elements of such a cause of action?
To answer these questions, the Court states in the very next paragraph, which also happens to be the last paragraph in the decision: “In holding that claims seeking recovery for construction defect damages are subject to the Act’s prelitigation procedures regardless of how they are pleaded,
we have no occasion to address the extent to which a party might rely upon common law principles in pursuing liability under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Italics added for emphasis) Is the Court answering “No” to the questions posed above? Probably not. It is simply following the age old rule that an appellate court will
not rule on an issue that is not specifically presented by an appeal, leaving that question for another day.
All we know for sure from
McMillin is that every claim for construction defects falling within the scope of the Act must follow the prelitigation procedure. There are no hall passes for negligence and strict liability. The larger question posed by the last two paragraphs in the decision, is whether the law recognizes a cause of action for negligence and strict liability for construction defects based on the standards in Section 896. The answer will have to be worked out by judges and trial attorneys in courtrooms across the State! The parameters of this hybrid cause of action that the Court seems to have posited will need more careful consideration than can be offered on first reading of
McMillin v. Superior Court.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Balestreri, Potocki, & Holmes
