Word of the Day: “Contractor”
September 16, 2024 —
Garret Murai - California Construction Law BlogWhat’s in a word? When it comes to insurance policies, a word, can potentially mean millions of dollars.
In
California Specialty Insulation, Inc. v. Allied World Surplus Lines Insurance Company, 102 Cal.App.5th 1 (2024), an insured and its insurer battled it out over the word “contractor,” and whether an exclusion from coverage of bodily injury to any employee or temporary worker “of any contractor or subcontractor,” excluded a personal injury claim brought by an employee of a general contractor against a subcontractor.
The California Specialty Contractor Case
In 2017, Air Control Systems, Inc. (“Air Control”) was contracted to perform improvements at a building in Los Angeles, California. Air Control in turn subcontracted with California Specialty Insulation, Inc. (“CSI”) to install duct insulation on the project.
During construction, an employee of Air Control was injured when he fell 16 to 20 feet from a ladder that was struck by a scissor lift driven by an employee of CSI. Approximately two years later the Air Control employee filed a personal injury lawsuit against CSI.
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Garret Murai, Nomos LLPMr. Murai may be contacted at
gmurai@nomosllp.com
Damron Agreement Questioned in Colorado Casualty Insurance v Safety Control Company, et al.
February 10, 2012 —
CDJ STAFFSafety Control and EMC appealed the judgment in Colorado Casualty Insurance Company versus Safety Control Company, Inc., et al. (Ariz. App., 2012). The Superior Court in Maricopa County addressed “the validity and effect of a Damron agreement a contractor and its excess insurer entered into that assigned their rights to sue the primary insurer.” Judge Johnsen stated, “We hold the agreement is enforceable but remand for a determination of whether the stipulated judgment falls within the primary insurer’s policy.”
The Opinion provides some facts and procedural history regarding the claim. “The Arizona Department of Transportation (“ADOT”) hired DBA Construction Company (“DBA”) to perform a road-improvement project on the Loop 101 freeway. Safety Control Company, Inc. was one of DBA’s subcontractors. As required by the subcontract, Safety Control purchased from Employer’s Mutual Casualty Company (“EMC”) a certificate of insurance identifying DBA as an additional insured on a policy providing primary coverage for liability arising out of Safety Control’s work.”
A collision occurred on site, injuring Hugo Roman. Roman then sued ADT and DBA for damages. “Colorado Casualty tendered DBA’s defense to the subcontractors, including Safety Control. Safety Control and EMC rejected the tender. Roman eventually settled his claims against DBA and ADOT. DBA and ADOT stipulated with Roman for entry of judgment of $750,000; Roman received $75,000 from DBA (paid by Colorado Casualty) and $20,000 from ADOT, and agreed not to execute on the stipulated judgment. Finally, DBA, ADOT and Colorado Casualty assigned to Roman their rights against the subcontractors and other insurers.”
Colorado Casualty attempted to recover what “it had paid to defend DBA and ADOT and settle with Roman. However, Roman intervened, and argued that “Colorado Casualty had assigned its subrogation rights to him as part of the settlement agreement.” The suit was not dismissed, but the Superior Court allowed Roman to intervene. “Roman then filed a counterclaim against Colorado Casualty and a cross-claim against the subcontractors.”
All claims were settled against all of the defendants except Safety Control and EMC. “The superior court ruled on summary judgment that EMC breached a duty to defend DBA and that as a result, ‘DBA was entitled to settle with Roman without EMC’s consent as long as the settlement was not collusive or fraudulent.’ After more briefing, the court held the stipulated judgment was neither collusive nor procured by fraud and that EMC therefore was liable to Roman on the stipulated judgment and for his attorney’s fees. The court also held Safety Control breached its subcontract with DBA by failing to procure completed-operations insurance coverage and would be liable for damages to the extent that EMC did not satisfy what remained (after the other settlements) of the stipulated judgment and awards of attorney’s fees.” Safety Control and EMC appealed the judgment.
Four reasons were given for the decision of the ruling. First, “the disagreement between Roman and Colorado Casualty does not preclude them from pursuing their claims against EMC and Safety Control.” Second, “the settlement agreement is not otherwise invalid.” Third, “issues of fact remain about whether the judgment falls within the EMC policy.” Finally, “Safety Control breached the subcontract by failing to procure ‘Completed Operations’ coverage for DBA.”
In conclusion, the Superior Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded . “Although, as stated above, we have affirmed several rulings of the superior court, we reverse the judgment against EMC and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion to determine whether the stipulated judgment was a liability that arose out of Safety Control’s operations. In addition, we affirm the superior court’s declaratory judgment against Safety Control but remand so that the court may clarify the circumstances under which Safety Control may be liable for damages and may conduct whatever further proceedings it deems appropriate to ascertain the amount of those damages. We decline all parties’ requests for attorney’s fees pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-341.01 without prejudice to a request for fees incurred in this appeal to be filed by the prevailing party on remand before the superior court.”
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DoD Testing New Roofing System that Saves Energy and Water
October 08, 2014 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFBuilder reported that the Department of Defense (DoD) is hosting a new “dynamic roofing system, installed at the Security Forces Building at Goodfellow Air Force Base in San Angelo, Texas,” which “uses a combination of technologies that heat and cool air and water, produce electricity, and collect rainwater.” If the project is successful, it “could be replicated at thousands of DoD buildings throughout the country in the near future.”
Builder described the process: “A retrofitted metal roof is installed over the existing roof, which creates a cavity between the existing and new roofs. Within that cavity insulation, solar thermal heating systems and cooling of air and water for the building can be installed. The roofing, insulation, hydronic solar thermal systems, engineered air pathways, and photovoltaic cells are designed to work symbiotically.”
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Supreme Court Rejects “Wholly Groundless” Exception to Question of Arbitrability
February 06, 2019 —
Justin Fortescue - White and Williams LLPIn newly appointed Supreme Court Justice Brett Kavanaugh’s first opinion, the United States Supreme Court held that the “wholly groundless” exception to arbitrability, which some federal courts had relied on as justification to decide questions of arbitrability over the express terms of a contract, was inconsistent with the Federal Arbitration Act and Supreme Court precedent. Based on this decision, where a contract delegates the question of arbitrability to an arbitrator, courts must respect the parties’ contract and refer the question to the arbitrator. Schein v. Archer & White, 586 U.S. __ (2019).
In Schein, Archer & White brought a lawsuit against Henry Schein alleging violations of federal and state antitrust laws and seeking both monetary damages and injunctive relief. The relevant contract between the parties contained an arbitration provision that provided:
“Any dispute arising under or related to this Agreement (except for actions seeking injunctive relief . . .) shall be resolved by binding arbitration in accordance with the arbitration rules of the American Arbitration Association.”
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Justin Fortescue, White and Williams LLPMr. Fortescue may be contacted at
fortescuej@whiteandwilliams.com
When Your “Private” Project Suddenly Turns into a “Public” Project. Hint: It Doesn’t Necessary Turn on Public Financing or Construction
September 28, 2017 —
Garret Murai - California Construction Law BlogIn 1931, during the Great Depression, the federal government enacted the Davis-Bacon Act to help workers on federal construction projects. The Davis-Bacon Act, also known as the federal prevailing wage law, sets minimum wages that must be paid to workers on federal construction projects based on local “prevailing” wages. The law was designed to help curb the displacement of families by employers who were recruiting lower-wage workers from outside local areas. Many states, including California, adopted “Little Davis-Bacon” laws applying similar requirements on state and local construction projects.
California’s current prevailing wage law requires that contractors on state and local public works projects pay their employees the general prevailing rate of per diem wages based on the classification or type of work performed by the employee in the locality where the project is located, as well as to hire apprentices enrolled in state-approved apprentice programs and to make monetary contributions for apprenticeship training.
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Garret Murai, Wendel Rosen Black & Dean LLPMr. Murai may be contacted at
gmurai@wendel.com
Why You Make A Better Wall Than A Window: Why Policyholders Can Rest Assured That Insurers Should Pay Legal Bills for Claims with Potential Coverage
March 14, 2018 —
Alan Packer and Graham Mills - Newmeyer & Dillion, LLPUnfortunately, policyholders, such as manufacturers and contractors, routinely face the unnecessary challenge of how to access all of the insurance coverage which they have purchased. Frequently, the most pressing need is to get the insurance company to pay the legal bills when the policyholders have been sued. The recent Iowa federal district court opinion in
Pella Corporation v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company should help a policyholder in a dispute to require its insurance company to pay those legal bills sooner rather than later by highlighting that the duty to defend arises from the potential for coverage, and the insurer may not force the policyholder to prove the damage to obtain a defense.
In
Pella, a window manufacturer purchased several years of insurance coverage from Liberty Mutual. Similar to many companies, Pella had many “layers” of insurance coverage in any given year. These layers collectively function like a tower. The general idea is that each layer provides a certain amount of coverage after the insurance policy below it had paid its money. The Liberty Mutual insurance policies provided excess coverage.
After the
Pella window manufacturer made and sold its windows, it was sued in numerous lawsuits alleging that its windows were defective and that those defective windows caused a wide variety of damage to the structures in which they were installed. The window manufacturer tendered those lawsuits to its insurance companies in its tower of coverage, asking that the insurance companies pay its legal bills incurred in its defense. As to Liberty Mutual, the window manufacturer argued that the Liberty Mutual insurance policies were triggered, and so obligated to reimburse it, if a window was installed during the years that those policies provided coverage or if there was a mere allegation that a window was installed during the years that those policies provided coverage. Liberty Mutual opposed, arguing that the date of installation of the windows was insufficient to trigger the policies, and that the manufacturer was required to demonstrate the date that damage actually occurred to trigger a defense.
The key issue before the
Pella Court in this decision was a simple one: which insurance policies, if any, issued by Liberty Mutual had an obligation to pay the window manufacturer’s legal bills? The answer to that question is critical and financially significant. Getting an insurance company to honor its obligations and start paying the legal bills as soon as possible is very important for a policyholder because of the cost of defending oneself in a lawsuit; often the key reason why an insurance policy is even purchased is to provide the policyholder with the right to call upon the insurance company’s financial resources to defend it should it be sued.
In a ruling that will be welcomed by policyholders, the
Pella Court held that Liberty Mutual’s multiple insurance policies were triggered, and so obligated to pay for the window manufacturer’s defense, if one of two events occurred during the years in which those insurance policies provided coverage: (1) a window was actually installed during a year when the insurance policy provided coverage or (2) the window was alleged to be installed in the year that the insurance policy provided coverage. The Court agreed with the policyholder that once the windows were installed, property damage was alleged and “may
potentially have occurred” from that point on, thus the policies on the risk from that point forward. The practical effect of this ruling meant that Liberty Mutual had to reimburse the window manufacturer for the defense fees and costs that it had paid.
While
Pella was decided under Iowa law, the principles upon which it relied are similar to those applied under California law. Importantly, both California and Iowa law hold that an insurance company must provide a defense in response to a claim that is, or could be, covered by the insurance policy. The mere potential that the claim might be covered is enough for the insurance company to be obligated to pay for policyholder’s legal fees and costs.
Establishing that an insurance company must pay legal fees and costs as soon as possible allows a policyholder to save its own money. Why should a policyholder pay legal bills when it purchased an insurance policy as protection to ensure that it did not have to pay those bills? The answer is that a policyholder should not and, under
Pella, the policyholder does not have to. Rather, the insurance company must start paying for that defense from a very early date. Pella confirms for policyholders the position that their insurance companies should pay legal bills earlier rather than later.
Alan Packer is a partner in the Walnut Creek office for Newmeyer & Dillion, LLP, representing homebuilders, property owners, and business clients on a broad range of legal matters, including risk management, insurance matters, wrap consultation and documentation, efforts to counter solicitation of homeowners, subcontract documentation, as well as complex litigation matters. Alan can be reached at alan.packer@ndlf.com.
Graham Mills is a partner in the Walnut Creek offce of Newmeyer & Dillion, LLP, representing clients in the area of complex insurance law with an emphasis on insurance recovery, construction litigation, real estate litigation, and business litigation. He regularly examines and analyzes a wide variety of insurance policies. Graham can be reached at graham.mills@ndlf.com.
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A Court-Side Seat: “Inholdings” Upheld, a Pecos Bill Come Due and Agency Actions Abound
January 25, 2021 —
Anthony B. Cavender - Gravel2GavelHere are some significant environmental and regulatory rulings and administrative actions from December 2020.
THE U.S. SUPREME COURT
Texas v. New Mexico
On December 14, 2020, the U.S. Supreme Court decided a water rights controversy involving sharing the water of the Pecos River. The 1949 Pecos River Compact provides for the equitable apportionment of the use of the Pecos River’s water by New Mexico and Texas, and a “River Master’s Manual,” approved by the Court in 1988, implements the Compact. These are very dry areas, and access to this water is very important. In 2014, a rare tropical storm drenched the Pecos River Basin, and Texas asked New Mexico to temporarily store the water that would otherwise flow into Texas. A few months later, New Mexico released the water to Texas, but the quantity was reduced because some of the water held by New Mexico had evaporated. The River Master awarded a delivery credit to New Mexico, and after Texas objected, Texas “in response” filed the Original Jurisdiction of the Court, suing New Mexico and seeking a review of the River Master’s determination. The Court held for New Mexico, deciding that this dispute was subject to and resolved by the Manual. This case is important because it highlights the high value the states place on the equitable apportionment of water that flows through different states.
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Anthony B. Cavender, PillsburyMr. Cavender may be contacted at
anthony.cavender@pillsburylaw.com
Constructive Notice Established as Obstacle to Relation Back Doctrine
March 01, 2021 —
Nicholas B. Brummel & Lawrence S. Zucker II - Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLPIn Organizacion Comunidad de Alviso v. City of San Jose, the Sixth Appellate District held that the relation back doctrine was inapplicable where a plaintiff received constructive notice of a defendant’s identity months prior to the last date where filing was permitted pursuant to an applicable statute of limitations.
In Organizacion Comunidad de Alviso, Mark Espinoza, an Organizacion Comunidad de Alviso (OCA/Plaintiff) representative, asked the City of San Jose (“the city”) to place him on the public notice list for a proposed rezoning project. He also twice specifically requested a copy of the notice of determination (NOD) documenting the city’s certification of an environmental impact report (EIR) and approval of the project. Despite Espinoza diligently requesting all notices for the project, the city, in violation of the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), failed to send Espinoza the legally operative second NOD for the project; the first NOD was provided to OCA, but named an incorrect party in interest.
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Nicholas B. Brummel, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and
Lawrence S. Zucker II, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
Mr. Brummel may be contacted at nbrummel@hbblaw.com
Mr. Zucker may be contacted at lzucker@hbblaw.com
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