Appeals Court Explains Punitive Damages Awards For Extreme Reprehensibility Or Unusually Small, Hard-To-Detect Or Hard-To-Measure Compensatory Damages
November 10, 2016 —
Christopher Kendrick & Valerie A. Moore – Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLPIn Nickerson v. Stonebridge Life Ins. Co. (No. B234271A, filed 11/3/16), (“Nickerson II”) a California appeals court outlined the requirements for complying with the single-digit multiplier annunciated as a Constitutional limitation on punitive damages by the United States Supreme Court in State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. v. Campbell (2003) 538 U.S. 408, for awards of punitive damages against insurers in cases of extreme reprehensibility or unusually small, hard-to-detect or hard-to-measure compensatory damages.
Reprinted courtesy of
Christopher Kendrick, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and
Valerie A. Moore, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
Mr. Kendrick may be contacted at ckendrick@hbblaw.com
Ms. Moore may be contacted at vmoore@hbblaw.com
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Settlement Ends Construction Defect Lawsuit for School
October 02, 2013 —
CDJ STAFFThe school district in the Chicago-area town of Lake Zurich has made last settlement in a construction defect lawsuit. The $80,000 settlement from Terra Group of Chicago brings the total settlement with the Community Unit School District 95 to about $1.9 million. Other firms included Bovis Lend Lease, Legat Architects, Larson Engineering, and Illinois Masonry Corporation.
The school district had contracted for work on several schools in the district. The buildings opened in 2004, with defect claims made in 2007. Defect claims included the failure of a retaining wall and need for reinforcement of stairwells. The settlement with Terra Group was made under the agreement that it was a compromise with no concession of liability.
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When is a Contract not a Contract?
January 21, 2019 —
Christopher G. Hill - Construction Law MusingsAs I’ve stated numerous times here at Musings, in Virginia the contract is king. The courts of Virginia will read a contract as written and where there is a contract (read as foreshadowing), the courts will assume the parties knew what they were doing and enforce it by its terms. However, there has to be a contract in the first place.
When can something look like a contract but still not be a contract? When there isn’t mutual assent according to the case of Knox Energy, LLC v. Gasco Drilling, Inc. In the Knox case, along with a ruling on discovery abuse that is a topic of other blogs, considered a jury instruction on mutual assent given by the district court in a case where Knox contended that it inadvertently sent an unexecuted drilling contract form to Gasco and then inadvertently executed it when Gasco returned it. While this would not normally cause this series of events to be a non-contract, Knox also contended that Gasco knew that Knox had no intention to enter into the drilling contract and that Gasco jumped at the deal.
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The Law Office of Christopher G. HillMr. Hill may be contacted at
chrisghill@constructionlawva.com
The Hidden Price of Outdated Damage Prevention Laws: Part I
November 21, 2018 —
Brigham A. McCown - Construction ExecutiveExcavators know that dialing 811 triggers a process that requires all utilities operating in the service area to find and mark the location of their underground facilities so that they are not damaged during the excavation process. In addition, marking the location of the utilities is intended to keep the public safe, for instance by preventing an excavator from striking a gas line.
But excavators also know that in most states, the laws and regulations that govern these procedures are weak and that enforcement is even weaker. It’s an unfortunate fact that excavators and the public – typically the least culpable parties – suffer the consequences of weak damage prevention laws and lack of strong enforcement regimes.
Reprinted courtesy of
Brigham A. McCown, a publication of Associated Builders and Contractors. All rights reserved.
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Why You Make A Better Wall Than A Window: Why Policyholders Can Rest Assured That Insurers Should Pay Legal Bills for Claims with Potential Coverage
March 14, 2018 —
Alan Packer and Graham Mills - Newmeyer & Dillion, LLPUnfortunately, policyholders, such as manufacturers and contractors, routinely face the unnecessary challenge of how to access all of the insurance coverage which they have purchased. Frequently, the most pressing need is to get the insurance company to pay the legal bills when the policyholders have been sued. The recent Iowa federal district court opinion in
Pella Corporation v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company should help a policyholder in a dispute to require its insurance company to pay those legal bills sooner rather than later by highlighting that the duty to defend arises from the potential for coverage, and the insurer may not force the policyholder to prove the damage to obtain a defense.
In
Pella, a window manufacturer purchased several years of insurance coverage from Liberty Mutual. Similar to many companies, Pella had many “layers” of insurance coverage in any given year. These layers collectively function like a tower. The general idea is that each layer provides a certain amount of coverage after the insurance policy below it had paid its money. The Liberty Mutual insurance policies provided excess coverage.
After the
Pella window manufacturer made and sold its windows, it was sued in numerous lawsuits alleging that its windows were defective and that those defective windows caused a wide variety of damage to the structures in which they were installed. The window manufacturer tendered those lawsuits to its insurance companies in its tower of coverage, asking that the insurance companies pay its legal bills incurred in its defense. As to Liberty Mutual, the window manufacturer argued that the Liberty Mutual insurance policies were triggered, and so obligated to reimburse it, if a window was installed during the years that those policies provided coverage or if there was a mere allegation that a window was installed during the years that those policies provided coverage. Liberty Mutual opposed, arguing that the date of installation of the windows was insufficient to trigger the policies, and that the manufacturer was required to demonstrate the date that damage actually occurred to trigger a defense.
The key issue before the
Pella Court in this decision was a simple one: which insurance policies, if any, issued by Liberty Mutual had an obligation to pay the window manufacturer’s legal bills? The answer to that question is critical and financially significant. Getting an insurance company to honor its obligations and start paying the legal bills as soon as possible is very important for a policyholder because of the cost of defending oneself in a lawsuit; often the key reason why an insurance policy is even purchased is to provide the policyholder with the right to call upon the insurance company’s financial resources to defend it should it be sued.
In a ruling that will be welcomed by policyholders, the
Pella Court held that Liberty Mutual’s multiple insurance policies were triggered, and so obligated to pay for the window manufacturer’s defense, if one of two events occurred during the years in which those insurance policies provided coverage: (1) a window was actually installed during a year when the insurance policy provided coverage or (2) the window was alleged to be installed in the year that the insurance policy provided coverage. The Court agreed with the policyholder that once the windows were installed, property damage was alleged and “may
potentially have occurred” from that point on, thus the policies on the risk from that point forward. The practical effect of this ruling meant that Liberty Mutual had to reimburse the window manufacturer for the defense fees and costs that it had paid.
While
Pella was decided under Iowa law, the principles upon which it relied are similar to those applied under California law. Importantly, both California and Iowa law hold that an insurance company must provide a defense in response to a claim that is, or could be, covered by the insurance policy. The mere potential that the claim might be covered is enough for the insurance company to be obligated to pay for policyholder’s legal fees and costs.
Establishing that an insurance company must pay legal fees and costs as soon as possible allows a policyholder to save its own money. Why should a policyholder pay legal bills when it purchased an insurance policy as protection to ensure that it did not have to pay those bills? The answer is that a policyholder should not and, under
Pella, the policyholder does not have to. Rather, the insurance company must start paying for that defense from a very early date. Pella confirms for policyholders the position that their insurance companies should pay legal bills earlier rather than later.
Alan Packer is a partner in the Walnut Creek office for Newmeyer & Dillion, LLP, representing homebuilders, property owners, and business clients on a broad range of legal matters, including risk management, insurance matters, wrap consultation and documentation, efforts to counter solicitation of homeowners, subcontract documentation, as well as complex litigation matters. Alan can be reached at alan.packer@ndlf.com.
Graham Mills is a partner in the Walnut Creek offce of Newmeyer & Dillion, LLP, representing clients in the area of complex insurance law with an emphasis on insurance recovery, construction litigation, real estate litigation, and business litigation. He regularly examines and analyzes a wide variety of insurance policies. Graham can be reached at graham.mills@ndlf.com.
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Supreme Court Addresses Newly Amended Statute of Repose for Construction Claims
June 26, 2023 —
David R. Cook Jr. - Autry, Hall & Cook, LLPWe have been following the protracted legal battle concerning
Southern States Chemical, Inc. v. Tampa Tank & Welding, Inc. This case had been litigated at the Supreme Court and resulted in legislation. In the latest round, the Supreme Court answered whether Georgia’s statute of repose for construction claims applies to claims arising or brought before the statute was amendment in 2020.
What is a Georgia’s statute of repose? Under the statute, “[n]o action to recover damages: (1) For any deficiency in the survey or plat, planning, design, specifications, supervision or observation of construction, or construction of an improvement to real property; (2) For injury to property, real or personal, arising out of any such deficiency; or (3) For injury to the person or for wrongful death arising out of any such deficiency shall be brought against any person performing or furnishing the survey or plat, design, planning, supervision or observation of construction, or construction of such an improvement more than eight years after substantial completion of such an improvement.”
The case began ten years ago when Southern States suited Tampa Tank and Corrosion Control for alleged defects in renovating a 24-foot tall, 130-foot wide storage tank. The tank renovation was completed in 2002, and in 2011, the tank was found to leak sulfuric acid.
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David R. Cook Jr., Autry, Hall & Cook, LLPMr. Cook may be contacted at
cook@ahclaw.com
Insurer Has Duty to Defend Additional Insured in Construction Defect Case
January 07, 2015 —
Tred R. Eyerly- Insurance Law HawaiiThe court denied the insurer's motion for summary judgment, holding that the insurer had a duty to defend the additional insured against claims for construction defects. Centex Homes v. Lexington Ins. Co., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 164472 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2014).
Centex contracted with Gateway Concrete, Inc. to install concrete foundations for a housing development. Gateway was required to purchase insurance with an endorsement naming Centex as an additional insured. Gateway obtained the policy from Lexington.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law HawaiiMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Appraisal Appropriate Despite Pending Coverage Issues
August 16, 2021 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiThe court granted the insured's motion for partial summary judgment, allowing an appraisal to go forward even with outstanding coverage issues in dispute. DC Plastic Products Corp. v. Westchester Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 2021 U,.S. Dist. LEXIS 95908 (D. N.J. May 19, 2021).
DC Plastic's property was damaged by Superstorm Sandy in October 2012. Claims submitted to Westchester resulted in a payment of $951,102.89 to DC Plastic. The parties disagreed on whether further payments were due. In 2017, DC Plastic sued Westchester for additional payments. DC Plastic moved to compel an appraisal for its claims, requesting that the court appoint an umpire for the appraisal process. Westchester cross-moved to dismiss the case in its entirety.
DC Plastic's complaint asked that the court appoint an umpire. The policy stated if the parties could not agree on the amount of loss, each party would select an appraiser, who would then agree upon an umpire. If they could not agree, either party could request the court to appoint the umpire. Therefore, the court was authorised to select the umpire here.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak HastertMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
