Seattle Washington Building Expert Directory

Addenda to Construction Contracts Can Be an Issue

March 30, 2016 — Christopher G. Hill – Construction Law Musings
We’ve all been there. Your client either has a well drafted standard subcontract (with any luck in consultation with an experienced construction attorney) that it presents to its subcontractors and suppliers or your client is presented with a construction contract that has some provisions that it would prefer were either different or gone altogether. In the first of these scenarios, your client often gets push back from a subcontractor to change certain provisions. Such a response is not necessarily a bad thing depending on the provisions that the potential subcontractor may have. The construction contract documents will govern the way that the project moves forward and will be strictly enforced in Virginia and elsewhere so some early give and take is not unusual or unwanted. In the second scenario, your client is likely to be reading a fairly one sided document. The General Contractor has drafted the contract and is “north” of your client in the payment chain. Like it or not, they will in most instances leave it to you and your attorney to root out the particularly egregious on sided terms and seek to negotiate them to some sort of equality. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Christopher G. Hill, Law Office of Christopher G. Hill, PC
Mr. Hill may be contacted at chrisghill@constructionlawva.com

Amid the Chaos, Trump Signs Executive Order Streamlining Environmental Permitting and Disbands Infrastructure Council

August 24, 2017 — Garret Murai - California Construction Law Blog
We’ve been trying to stay focused here at the California Construction Law Blog. But it’s been hard. This past week, a couple of new developments took place at the federal level on infrastructure, although if you blinked, you may have missed it. Executive Order on Environmental Permitting This past Tuesday, at a press conference quickly overshadowed by the President’s comments about the tragic events that took place in Charlottesville, President Trump announced that he had signed a new executive order aimed at streamlining the environmental permitting process for federally-funded projects. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Garret Murai, Wendel Rosen Black & Dean LLP
Mr. Murai may be contacted at gmurai@wendel.com

Arizona Court of Appeals Decision in $8.475 Million Construction Defect Class Action Suit

May 09, 2011 — CDJ STAFF

In the case of Leflet v. Fire (Ariz. App., 2011), which involved an $8.475 million settlement in a construction defect class action suit, the question put forth to the Appeals court was “whether an insured and an insurer can join in a Morris agreement that avoids the primary insurer’s obligation to pay policy limits and passes liability in excess of those limits on to other insurers.” The Appeals court provided several reasons for their decision to affirm the validity of the settlement agreement as to the Non-Participatory Insurers (NPIs) and to vacate and remand the attorney fee awards.

First, the Appeals court stated, “The settlement agreement is not a compliant Morris agreement and provides no basis for claims against the NPIs.” They conclude, “Appellants attempt to avoid the doctrinal underpinnings of Morris by arguing that ‘the cooperation clause did not prohibit Hancock from assigning its rights to anyone, including Appellants.’ This narrow reading of the cooperation clause ignores the fact that Hancock did not merely assign its rights — it assigned its rights after stipulating to an $8.475 million judgment that neither it nor its Direct Insurers could ever be liable to pay. Neither Morris nor any other case defines such conduct as actual ‘cooperation’—rather, Morris simply defines limited circumstances in which an insured is relieved of its duty to cooperate. Because Morris agreements are fraught with risk of abuse, a settlement that mimics Morris in form but does not find support in the legal and economic realities that gave rise to that decision is both unenforceable and offensive to the policy’s cooperation clause.”

The Appeals court further concluded that “even if the agreement had qualified under Morris, plaintiffs did not provide the required notice to the NPIs.” The court continued, “Because an insurer who defends under a reservation of rights is always aware of the possibility of a Morris agreement, the mere threat of Morris in the course of settlement negotiations does not constitute sufficient notice. Instead, the insurer must be made aware that it may waive its reservation of rights and provide an unqualified defense, or defend solely on coverage and reasonableness grounds against the judgment resulting from the Morris agreement. The NPIs were not given the protections of this choice before the agreement was entered, and therefore can face no liability for the resulting stipulated judgment.”

Next, the Appeals court declared that “the trial court abused its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees under A.R.S § 12-341.” The Appeals court reasoned, “In this case, the NPIs prevailed in their attack on the settlement. But the litigation did not test the merits of their coverage defenses or the reasonableness of the settlement amount. And Plaintiffs never sued the NPIs, either in their own right or as the assignees of Hancock. Rather, the NPIs intervened to test the conceptual validity of the settlement agreement (to which they were not parties) before such an action could commence. In these circumstances, though it might be appropriate to offset a fee award against some future recovery by the Plaintiff Leflet v. Fire (Ariz. App., 2011) class, the purposes of A.R.S. § 12-341.01 would not be served by an award of fees against them jointly and severally. We therefore conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding fees against Plaintiffs ‘jointly and severally.’”

The Appeals court made the following conclusion: “we affirm the judgment of the trial court concerning the validity of the settlement agreement as to the NPIs. We vacate and remand the award of attorney’s fees. In our discretion, we decline to award the NPIs the attorney’s fees they have requested on appeal pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-341.01(A).”

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Home Builders and Developers Beware: SC Supreme Court Beats Up Hybrid Arbitration Clauses Mercilessly

November 15, 2022 — Matthew Devries - Best Practices Construction Law
Today’s guest post is by one of my favorite construction lawyers and friends, Burr partner Ned Nicholson in our Columbia, SC office. Ned regularly represents clients in construction defect and compensation claims, manufacturer/dealer disputes, and insurance coverage lawsuits. He is also a South Carolina certified mediator. Ned can be reached at nnicholson@burr.com or (803) 799-9800. If you are a homebuilder, residential housing developer, construction industry insurer, or any one of the many participants in the industry providing affordable and decent housing for the citizens of South Carolina, you are already aware that South Carolina courts have for decades prioritized the promotion of consumer (i.e., home buyer) rights, usually at the expense of the providers of housing. There is nothing inherently wrong with that; the goal is laudable. But as in so many things, the implementation has been extremely costly for the residential construction industry as a savvy plaintiff’s bar has taken advantage of grey areas that are inevitably created in our judicial system. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Matthew Devries, Burr & Forman LLP
Mr. Devries may be contacted at mdevries@burr.com

Deference Given To Procuring Public Agency Regarding Material Deviation

April 10, 2019 — David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal Updates
Deference will be given to a procuring public agency in a bid protest, particularly when the issue involves whether a bid is non-responsive and constitutes a material deviation from the solicitation. You do not believe me? Perhaps you will after this holding in Biscayne Marine Partners, LLC v. City of Miami, Florida, 44 Fla.L.Weekly D467a (Fla. 3d DCA 2019): Consequently, no principle of law is clearly established…as to any obligation of the trial court (and, by analogy, an administrative hearing officer) [in a bid protest] to decide or to defer [whether a bid constitutes a material deviation from the solicitation]. If anything, the existing and clearly established principle of law inclines toward judicial deference in public agency competitive bidding disputes when the agency has exercised it discretion absent illegality, fraud, oppression or misconduct. I do not know about you, but that last underlined sentence is pretty strong language regarding judicial deference! In this case, Miami (the procuring public agency) issued a Request for Proposals (RFP) for the redevelopment and lease of waterfront property, for the operation of a marina, boatyard, restaurant, wet slips, and a dry storage facility on the property. Miami issued five addenda to the RFP. There were three bidders. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris
Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at dma@kirwinnorris.com

Bank of America’s Countrywide Ordered to Pay $1.3 Billion

July 30, 2014 — Patricia Hurtado – Bloomberg
Bank of America Corp.’s Countrywide unit was ordered to pay $1.3 billion in penalties for defective mortgage loans it sold to Fannie Mae (FNMA) and Freddie Mac in the run-up to the 2008 financial crisis, a little more than half of what the U.S. had requested. U.S. District Judge Jed Rakoff in Manhattan issued the civil penalty against the Charlotte, North Carolina-based bank today in the first mortgage-fraud case brought by the federal government to go to trial. Countrywide and Rebecca Mairone, a former executive with the mortgage lender, were found liable in October for selling thousands of bad loans to the two government-sponsored enterprises. Mairone was ordered today to pay $1 million. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Patricia Hurtado, Bloomberg
Ms. Hurtado may be contacted at pathurtado@bloomberg.net

Reconciling Prompt Payments and Withholding of Retention Payments

March 30, 2016 — Eric J. Rollins, Esq. – Newmeyer & Dillion, LLP
It is common in California for the owners of a project to make monthly payments to a contractor for work as it is completed, but withhold a certain percentage as a guarantee of future satisfactory performance. Contractors almost always pass these withholdings on to their subcontractors. Unsurprisingly, disputes can arise regarding when the withheld retentions must be paid. Civil Code section 8814, subdivision (a), states that a direct contractor must pay each subcontractor its share of a retention payment within ten days after receiving all or part of a retention payment. However, an exception exists -- a direct contractor may withhold from the retention paid to a subcontractor an amount not in excess of 150 percent of the estimated value of the disputed amount, whenever a “good faith dispute exists between the direct contractor and a subcontractor.” (See Cal. Civ. Code, § 8814, subd. (c).) The problem with the statute is that it offers no help in defining a “good faith dispute,” and the California courts have historically not provided much guidance either. Can a “good faith dispute” be any dispute between the contracting parties, e.g., a dispute regarding change orders, mismanagement, etc.? Or must the dispute relate specifically to the retention? Unfortunately for California litigants, the answer may depend on the appellate district in which the parties find themselves. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Eric J. Rollins, Esq., Newmeyer & Dillion, LLP
Mr. Rollins may be contacted at eric.rollins@ndlf.com

Privity Problems Continue for Additional Insureds in the Second Circuit

November 08, 2017 — Samantha M. Martino – Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.
On October 4, the Second Circuit held that Harleysville Insurance Company had no duty to defend or indemnify a project owner or general contractor as additional insureds under a sub-subcontractor’s commercial general liability (CGL) policy due to lack of direct contractual privity. 1 The underlying claim arose when an employee of The Kimmell Company, Inc. (Kimmell) was injured while repairing an HVAC system at a building owned by the University of Rochester Medical Center (UR). The injured employee sought damages for his injuries and fi led suit against (1) UR; (2) LeChase Construction Corp. (LeChase), the general contractor for the project; and (3) J.T. Mauro Co. Inc. (Mauro), a subcontractor hired by LeChase. Mauro hired Kimmell as a sub-subcontractor to perform HVAC services at the project. The Mauro-Kimmel contract required Kimmel to add Mauro, UR, and LeChase as additional insureds under Kimmell’s CGL policy. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Samantha M. Martino, Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.
Ms. Martino may be contacted at smm@sdvlaw.com

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