Life After McMillin: Do Negligence and Strict Liability Causes of Action for Construction Defects Still Exist?
January 24, 2018 —
Thomas Balestreri and Amanda Crawley - Balestreri, Potocki, & HolmesThe ruling is in but the battle will likely continue over the practical application of SB 800. On January 18, 2018 the California Supreme Court issued its decision in
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __, holding that the statutory prelitigation scheme in The Right to Repair Act (“the Act”) that provides for notice and an opportunity for the Builder to repair defects applies to all claims for construction defects in residential construction sold on or after January 1, 2003, regardless whether the claim is founded on a violation of the Act’s performance standards or a common law claim for negligence or strict liability. (
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __.) With this holding, has the Court ruled that common law causes of action for construction defect still survive? If so, what will they look like and what standards will be applied?
The short answer is that it appears that common law causes of action still survive, at least for now, but it is not clear from this decision what they will look like and what standards will apply.
Portions of the decision seem to suggest that the Act is the sole and exclusive remedy for construction defect claims: “…even in some areas where the common law had supplied a remedy for construction defects resulting in property damage but not personal injury, the text and legislative history [of the statute] reflect a
clear and unequivocal intent to supplant common law negligence and strict product liability actions under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 6].) (Italics added for emphasis) However, at the end of the decision, the Court seems to be saying that there may still be a place for common law claims for negligence and strict liability alongside the Act but that these causes of action may be subject to the performance standards in the Act.
The
McMillin case went up to the Supreme Court on a procedural issue: whether a common law action alleging construction defects resulting in both economic loss and property damage is subject to the Act’s prelitigation notice and cure procedures. The Van Tassels had dismissed their claims under the Act opting to proceed solely on their common law claims including negligence and strict liability. McMillin sought a stay to force the Van Tassels to comply with the Act’s prelitigation procedures. The Supreme Court held that the Van Tassels must comply with the statutory procedures and affirmed the stay issued by the trial court. But the question remained: now that the Van Tassels were left only with common law claims, how would they proceed under the Act?
To understand how the Court dealt with this question, one must first understand how the Court dealt with the narrow procedural question presented by the case. The Court provides a very detailed, clear explanation of the reasons why it felt the Legislature intended for all construction defect claims involving residential construction must comply with the prelitigation requirements of the Act. In summing up its conclusions the Court makes three definitive holdings.
First, for claims involving economic loss only—the kind of claims involved in
Aas—the Court holds that the Legislature intended to supersede
Aas and provide a statutory basis for recovery. (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 10].) In other words, the Court clearly agrees that the Act was meant to allow recovery of damages based solely on economic damages. No surprise there. Second, the Court held for personal injuries, the Legislature made no changes to existing law that provides common law remedies for the injured party. (Id.) Nobody has ever contested that. Finally, the Court held that for construction defect claims involving property damage and not just economic loss “the Legislature replaced the common law
methods of recovery with the new statutory scheme.” (
Id.,) (Italics added for emphasis.)
In other words, the Court is not saying that negligence and strict liability are not permitted causes of action. The Court is merely stating that these causes of action must comply with the Act’s statutory scheme just as the same as a claim for economic loss. Here the Court is focusing on the procedure that must be followed. “The Act, in effect, provides that construction defect claims not involving personal injury will be treated the same procedurally going forward whether or not the underlying claims gave rise to any property damage.” (
Id.)
Having laid out its fundamental premise, the Court then deals with Plaintiff’s arguments regarding the intent of the Legislature and makes light work of them all. In the process, the Court disapproves
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Brookfield Crystal Cove LLC (2013) 219 Cal. App. 4th 98, and
Burch v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal. App. 4th 1411, to the extent they are inconsistent with the views expressed in the
McMillin opinion.
This is where the decision gets interesting. The Court reminds us that the Van Tassels had dismissed their statutory causes of action for violation of the performance standards under Section 896. One would think at that point that Plaintiffs had to be wondering if they had any claims left given that the Court had ruled that the Act was the sole means of recovery for construction defects. Not so fast. The Court points out that the complaint still rests on allegations of defective construction and that the suit remains an “ ‘action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, the residential construction’ of the plaintiffs’ homes (§896)
and McMillin’s liability under the Van Tassels’ negligence and strict liability claims depends on the extent to which it [McMillin] violated the standards of sections 896 and 897.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Emphasis added.) WHAT DID THE COURT JUST SAY? Did the Court just say that a plaintiff could bring a common law cause of action for negligence or strict liability based on a violation of the performance standards under Section 896? What exactly would that claim look like? What would be the elements of such a cause of action?
To answer these questions, the Court states in the very next paragraph, which also happens to be the last paragraph in the decision: “In holding that claims seeking recovery for construction defect damages are subject to the Act’s prelitigation procedures regardless of how they are pleaded,
we have no occasion to address the extent to which a party might rely upon common law principles in pursuing liability under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Italics added for emphasis) Is the Court answering “No” to the questions posed above? Probably not. It is simply following the age old rule that an appellate court will
not rule on an issue that is not specifically presented by an appeal, leaving that question for another day.
All we know for sure from
McMillin is that every claim for construction defects falling within the scope of the Act must follow the prelitigation procedure. There are no hall passes for negligence and strict liability. The larger question posed by the last two paragraphs in the decision, is whether the law recognizes a cause of action for negligence and strict liability for construction defects based on the standards in Section 896. The answer will have to be worked out by judges and trial attorneys in courtrooms across the State! The parameters of this hybrid cause of action that the Court seems to have posited will need more careful consideration than can be offered on first reading of
McMillin v. Superior Court.
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Balestreri, Potocki, & Holmes
When Brad Pitt Tried to Save the Lower Ninth Ward
February 18, 2019 —
Rob Walker - BloombergIn the months that followed Hurricane Katrina in 2005, there was much discussion about how to rebuild the New Orleans neighborhoods devastated by flooding. Some even questioned whether certain areas should be rebuilt at all: The city’s population would likely be smaller; perhaps its footprint should be revised? The Lower Ninth Ward, for instance—a working-class black neighborhood ravaged when a floodwall failed—might be a lost cause, some said, because it was so severely damaged.
Neighborhood residents and activists pushed back, insisting the Lower Nine deserved rebuilding. One of the most high-profile efforts to do so came from an unlikely figure: Brad Pitt. In 2007 the actor founded the Make It Right Foundation, a nonprofit whose mission was to build affordable housing to help Lower Nine residents come home. Attracting designs from prize-winning architects and committing to the highest energy-efficiency standards, Make It Right pledged to build 150 residences. As Pitt later wrote, the organization aimed to make “a human success story of how we can build in the future, how we can build with equality, how we can build for families."
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Rob Walker, Bloomberg
A Duty to Design and Maintain Reasonably Safe Roadways Extends to All Persons. (WA)
February 25, 2014 —
Natasha Khachatourians – Scheer & Zehnder LLP Liability NewsletterCase: Lowman v. Wilbur, et al., 178 Wn.2d 165, 309 P.3d 3.87 (2013).
Issue: If a passenger’s injuries are in fact caused by the placement of a utility pole too close to a roadway, can the injuries be deemed too remote for purposes of legal causation? NO.
Facts: Plaintiff was a passenger in a vehicle that lost control and collided with a utility pole that was 4.47 feet from the edge of the roadway. The vehicle’s driver was under the influence of alcohol. Plaintiff sued the driver as well as the utility company and Skagit County for negligence. The trial court granted the utility company and Skagit County’s summary judgment motion, finding that the negligent placement of the utility pole was not a legal cause of plaintiff’s injuries.
The issue before the Supreme Court was whether a negligently placed utility pole could be the legal cause of a resulting injury.
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Natasha Khachatourians, Scheer & Zehnder LLP Ms. Khachatourians may be contacted at
natashak@scheerlaw.com
Stormy Skies Ahead? Important News Regarding a Hard Construction Insurance Market
August 13, 2019 —
Jason M. Adams - Gibbs GidenWord out of the construction insurance brokerage community is that the construction insurance industry has entered a hard market, seemingly overnight. Property (i.e. builder’s risk), liability and wrap-up markets are all reacting unfavorably, resulting in higher premiums and decreased availability of coverage options.
The prospect of a hard market has been looming for some time given massive weather driven property losses and historically low rates (among other factors). It appears the time is upon us.
Key takeaways for construction professionals are:
- Expect insurance premiums to go up, potentially significantly, at renewal time and/or when seeking a new project specific program (e.g., an OCIP, CCIP, etc.).
- Expect that the available coverage will get worse. Carriers may be unable to offer once standard coverage enhancements and/or may add new exclusions.
- If quotes have been offered consider locking them in now, before the underwriters are forced to increase the rates/restrict coverage, or pull the quotes entirely.
- With respect to wrap-ups and other project specific programs, consider requesting extensions now if the project is expected to go beyond the current policy term.
- As always, the risk management team (lawyer, broker, risk manager) should work together to carefully review contracts and coverage. This will become even more important if the carriers start to introduce new exclusions as a result of the hard market.
Hard markets come and go. The tough times are when true construction insurance professionals separate themselves from the pack and become the key to weathering the storm.
Jason M. Adams, Esq. is Senior Counsel at Gibbs Giden representing construction professionals (owners/developers, contractors, architects, etc.) in the areas of Construction Law, Insurance Law and Risk Management, Common Interest Community Law (HOA) and Business/Civil Litigation. Adams is also a licensed property and casualty insurance broker and certified Construction Risk & Insurance Specialist (CRIS). Gibbs Giden is nationally and locally recognized by U. S. News and Best Lawyers as among the “Best Law Firms” in both Construction Law and Construction Litigation. Chambers USA Directory of Leading Lawyers has consistently recognized Gibbs Giden as among California’s elite construction law firms. Mr. Adams can be reached at jadams@gibbsgiden.com. Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Traub Lieberman Attorneys Win Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings In Favor of Insurer
June 26, 2023 —
Jeremy S. Macklin & Danielle K. Kegley - Traub LiebermanTraub Lieberman Partner Jeremy Macklin and Associate Danielle Kegley obtained judgment on the pleadings in favor of Admiral Insurance Company (“Admiral”), in a matter brought before the Chancery Division of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois. In the underlying case, an injured employee sued various companies, and their agents, for injuries he sustained on a construction project. The insureds, one of the defendant companies and its employee, sought coverage for the underlying lawsuit under a professional liability policy issued to that company by Admiral. The policy at issue provided coverage for the company and its employees, for negligent acts or omissions committed in the rendering of “professional services,” defined as services “involving specialized training and skill while in the pursuit of” mechanical and process engineering.
After initially defending the insureds, Admiral filed a declaratory judgment action asking the Court to declare that the company has no duty to defend or indemnify the insureds in the underlying lawsuit and to allow Admiral to immediately withdraw its defense of the insureds. Admiral argued there is no coverage under the professional liability policy, as the underlying lawsuit does not contain allegations that the underlying plaintiff’s injuries arose from the rendering of or failure to render “professional services.” The insureds argued that since they were hired as mechanical and process engineers for the project, that any lawsuits against them must necessarily arise from their “professional services.” Further, the insureds asked the Court to disregard the express allegations in the underlying lawsuit concerning their role on the project as a general contractor.
Reprinted courtesy of
Jeremy S. Macklin, Traub Lieberman and
Danielle K. Kegley, Traub Lieberman
Mr. Macklin may be contacted at jmacklin@tlsslaw.com
Ms. Kegley may be contacted at dkegley@tlsslaw.com
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Georgia Court of Appeals Holds That Insurer Must Defend Oil Company Against Entire Lawsuit
October 07, 2019 —
Lawrence J. Bracken II, Michael S. Levine & Alexander D. Russo - Hunton Andrews KurthThe Georgia Court of Appeals recently affirmed a grant of summary judgment in favor of Mountain Express Oil Company on its breach of contract claim against liability insurer, Southern Trust Insurance Company. Empire Petroleum brought claims against Mountain Express for breach of contract, injunctive relief, and libel or slander, among others. Mountain Express sought a defense to that lawsuit under its insurance policy with Southern Trust. Southern Trust contended that the insurance policy did not cover Empire’s non-libel/slander claims, and therefore reimbursed Mountain Express for only a portion of its attorneys’ fees. After the Empire lawsuit settled, Mountain Express sued Southern Trust for breach of contract and bad faith for failing to pay the remaining defense costs, contending that Southern Trust had a duty to defend the entire lawsuit.
The Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to Mountain Express on its breach of contract claim. Citing policy language stating that “[the insurer] will have the right and duty to defend the insured against any ‘suit’ seeking those damages,” the court held that Southern Trust was obligated to defend the entire lawsuit. Specifically, in reaching that conclusion, the court noted that by agreeing to defend any “suit,” not any “claim,” Southern Trust obligated itself to defend the entire lawsuit if any claim could be covered under the policy. Accordingly, Southern Trust breached the policy when it only agreed to defend some of the claims against its insured.
Reprinted courtesy of
Lawrence J. Bracken II, Hunton Andrews Kurth,
Michael S. Levine, Hunton Andrews Kurth and Alexander D. Russo, Hunton Andrews Kurth
Mr. Bracken may be contacted at lbracken@HuntonAK.com
Mr. Levine may be contacted at mlevine@HuntonAK.com
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Insured Entitled to Defense After Posting Medical Records Online
September 17, 2014 —
Tred R. Eyerly – Insurance Law HawaiiThe insurer had a duty to defend the insured contractor's publication of medical records online, making them accessible to anyone. Travelers Indem. Co. of Am. v. Portal Heathcare Solutions, LLC, 2014 U.S. Dist. 110987 (E.D. Va. Aug. 7, 2014).
Portal specialized in safekeeping of medical records for hospitals, clinics, and other medical providers. Portal was sued in a class action suit filed in New York state court for failing to safeguard the confidential medical records of patients at Glen Falls Hospital. Two patients of Glen Falls conducted a Google search of their respective names, and found a direct link to their Glen Falls medical records.
Travelers provided policies to Portal in 2012 and 2013, obligating Travelers to cover damages because of injury arising from (1) the "electronic publication of material that . . . gives unreasonable publicity to a person's private life" (the 2012 policy) or (2) the "electronic publication of material that . . . disclosed information about a person's private life" (the 2013 policy).
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Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law HawaiiMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
COVID-19 Vaccine Considerations for Employers in the Construction Industry
July 11, 2021 —
Maggie Spell - ConsensusDocs1. Can employers in the construction industry require employees to receive a COVID-19 vaccine as a condition of employment?
In short, it depends. Back in December 2020, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) explained that, generally speaking (and under federal law), employers can require employees to receive the COVID-19 vaccine. However, there are a few caveats.
First, certain employees may need to be excused from a mandatory vaccination requirement as a reasonable accommodation unless it will present undue hardship. Under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), employers must provide reasonable accommodations to employees with a covered disability that prevents them from receiving the vaccine. (Fact sheets for the COVID-19 vaccines include examples of some of the underlying medical conditions that may result in an accommodation request.) And under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, employers are similarly required to provide reasonable accommodations to employees with sincerely held religious beliefs, practices, or observances that prevent them from getting the vaccine. Employers requiring the vaccination would be wise to consult with an experienced employment lawyer before denying an accommodation. Accommodation issues stemming from administration of the COVID-19 vaccine (and COVID-19 more generally) are likely to plague employers for a while, so getting ahead of this issue is key.
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Maggie Spell, Jones Walker LLPMs. Spell may be contacted at
mspell@joneswalker.com
