BERT HOWE
  • Nationwide: (800) 482-1822    
    condominium building expert Cambridge Massachusetts institutional building building expert Cambridge Massachusetts landscaping construction building expert Cambridge Massachusetts Medical building building expert Cambridge Massachusetts concrete tilt-up building expert Cambridge Massachusetts mid-rise construction building expert Cambridge Massachusetts industrial building building expert Cambridge Massachusetts multi family housing building expert Cambridge Massachusetts housing building expert Cambridge Massachusetts casino resort building expert Cambridge Massachusetts parking structure building expert Cambridge Massachusetts production housing building expert Cambridge Massachusetts hospital construction building expert Cambridge Massachusetts low-income housing building expert Cambridge Massachusetts custom homes building expert Cambridge Massachusetts structural steel construction building expert Cambridge Massachusetts Subterranean parking building expert Cambridge Massachusetts townhome construction building expert Cambridge Massachusetts retail construction building expert Cambridge Massachusetts condominiums building expert Cambridge Massachusetts custom home building expert Cambridge Massachusetts tract home building expert Cambridge Massachusetts
    Cambridge Massachusetts ada design expert witnessCambridge Massachusetts structural concrete expertCambridge Massachusetts architectural expert witnessCambridge Massachusetts architecture expert witnessCambridge Massachusetts construction project management expert witnessCambridge Massachusetts expert witness commercial buildingsCambridge Massachusetts defective construction expert
    Arrange No Cost Consultation
    Building Expert Builders Information
    Cambridge, Massachusetts

    Massachusetts Builders Right To Repair Current Law Summary:

    Current Law Summary: Case law precedent


    Building Expert Contractors Licensing
    Guidelines Cambridge Massachusetts

    No state license required for general contracting. Licensure required for plumbing and electrical trades. Companies selling home repair services must be registered with the state.


    Building Expert Contractors Building Industry
    Association Directory
    Builders Association of Central Massachusetts Inc
    Local # 2280
    51 Pullman Street
    Worcester, MA 01606

    Cambridge Massachusetts Building Expert 10/ 10

    Massachusetts Home Builders Association
    Local # 2200
    700 Congress St Suite 200
    Quincy, MA 02169

    Cambridge Massachusetts Building Expert 10/ 10

    Builders Association of Greater Boston
    Local # 2220
    700 Congress St. Suite 202
    Quincy, MA 02169

    Cambridge Massachusetts Building Expert 10/ 10

    North East Builders Assn of MA
    Local # 2255
    170 Main St Suite 205
    Tewksbury, MA 01876

    Cambridge Massachusetts Building Expert 10/ 10

    Home Builders and Remodelers Association of Western Mass
    Local # 2270
    240 Cadwell Dr
    Springfield, MA 01104

    Cambridge Massachusetts Building Expert 10/ 10

    Bristol-Norfolk Home Builders Association
    Local # 2211
    65 Neponset Ave Ste 3
    Foxboro, MA 02035

    Cambridge Massachusetts Building Expert 10/ 10

    Home Builders & Remodelers Association of Cape Cod
    Local # 2230
    9 New Venture Dr #7
    South Dennis, MA 02660

    Cambridge Massachusetts Building Expert 10/ 10


    Building Expert News and Information
    For Cambridge Massachusetts


    Atlanta Hawks Billionaire Owner Plans $5 Billion Downtown Transformation

    What You Should Know About Liquidated Damages and Liability Caps for Delay and Performance Liquidated Damages

    Get Smarter About Electric Construction Equipment

    Attorneys' Fee Clauses are Engraved Invitations to Sue

    Wood Wizardry in Oregon: Innovation Raises the Roof for PDX Terminal

    Ahlers & Cressman’s Top 10 Construction Industry Contract Provisions

    The Four Forces That Will Take on Concrete and Make Construction Smart

    The Golden State Commits to Going Green – Why Contractors Will be in High Demand to Build the State’s Infrastructure

    An Interesting Look at Mechanic’s Lien Priority and Necessary Parties

    NTSB Cites Design Errors in Fatal Bridge Collapse

    In Contracts, One Word Makes All the Difference

    Big Bertha Lawsuits—Hitachi Zosen Weighs In

    Court Finds Matching of Damaged Materials is Required by Policy

    Mediation Scheduled for Singer's Construction Defect Claims

    Structure of Champlain Towers North Appears Healthy

    Insurers' Motion to Knock Out Bad Faith, Negligent Misrepresentation Claims in Construction Defect Case Denied

    Make Prudent Decisions regarding your Hurricane Irma Property Damage Claims

    “Details Matter” is the Foundation in a Texas Construction Defect Suit

    Court Grants Partial Summary Judgment on Conversion Claim Against Insurer

    Virginia Decision Emphasizes Importance of Naming All Necessary Parties

    Details Matter: The Importance of Strictly Following Public Bid Statutes

    Construction Defects Are Not An Occurrence Under New York, New Jersey Law

    President Obama Vetoes Keystone Pipeline Bill

    Concrete Worker Wins Lawsuit and Settles with Other Defendant

    Another TV Fried as Georgia Leads U.S. in Lightning Costs

    Alleged Negligent Misrepresentation on Condition of Home is Not an Occurrence Causing Property Damage

    Why Being Climate ‘Positive’ Is the Buzzy New Goal of Green Building

    Brooklyn’s Hipster Economy Challenges Manhattan Supremacy

    Real Estate & Construction News Roundup (05/10/23) – Wobbling Real Estate, Booming (and Busting) Construction, and Eye-Watering Insurance Premiums

    Witt Named to 2017 Super Lawyers

    Policy Lanuage Expressly Prohibits Replacement of Undamaged Material to Match Damaged Material

    Lake Charles Tower’s Window Damage Perplexes Engineers

    Call to Conserve Power Raises Questions About Texas Grid Reliability

    The Importance of the Subcontractor Exception to the “Your Work” Exclusion

    Rebuilding the West: Construction Considerations After the Smoke Clears

    Chapman Glucksman Press Release

    General Contractors Have Expansive Common Law and Statutory Duties To Provide a Safe Workplace

    Hawaii Bill Preserves Insurance Coverage in Lava Zones

    Florida Law: Interplay of SIR and the Made-Whole Doctrine

    Construction Leads World Trade Center Area Vulnerable to Flooding

    One More Thing Moving From California to Texas: Wildfire Risk

    Court Finds No Coverage for Workplace “Prank” With Nail Gun

    It’s Time to Change the Way You Think About Case Complexity

    Massachusetts District Court Holds Contractors Are Not Additional Insureds on Developer’s Builder’s Risk Policy

    Arbitration Denied: Third Appellate District Holds Arbitration Clause Procedurally and Substantively Unconscionable

    Jury Finds Broker Liable for Policyholder’s Insufficient Business Interruption Limits

    Regions Where Residential Construction Should Boom in 2014

    The Condominium Warranty Against Structural Defects in the District of Columbia

    Will They Blow It Up?

    Florida Condo Collapse Victims Reach $1 Billion Settlement
    Corporate Profile

    CAMBRIDGE MASSACHUSETTS BUILDING EXPERT
    DIRECTORY AND CAPABILITIES

    The Cambridge, Massachusetts Building Expert Group is comprised from a number of credentialed construction professionals possessing extensive trial support experience relevant to construction defect and claims matters. Leveraging from more than 25 years experience, BHA provides construction related trial support and expert services to the nation's most recognized construction litigation practitioners, Fortune 500 builders, commercial general liability carriers, owners, construction practice groups, and a variety of state and local government agencies.

    Building Expert News & Info
    Cambridge, Massachusetts

    Event-Cancellation Insurance Issues During a Pandemic

    September 07, 2020 —
    As the effects of coronavirus continue, organizations and companies now are considering whether events in late 2020 and early 2021 can take place or need to be converted to virtual events. What insurance effects will those changes and cancellations have? Consideration of these important decisions requires a review of both event-cancellation insurance and a consideration of force majeure and other such issues. On the insurance front, years ago, many policyholders purchased event-cancellation insurance for events in 2020, 2021, and even as far out as 2024. Such policies, purchased before the middle of March 2020, generally contain explicit coverage “buy-backs” for losses from “communicable disease.” That is, the policyholders paid an extra, specifically identified premium to remove any exclusion for communicable disease from these policies. Typically, these policies do not use the word, “virus”, but rather use “communicable disease”; and exclude neither. Those policies typically cover a specified amount of net profit and include additional coverages for “Cost of Remedial Action”, “Future Marketing Expense”, etc., over and above that specified amount of coverage. Reprinted courtesy of Lorelie S. Masters, Hunton Andrews Kurth and Latosha M. Ellis, Hunton Andrews Kurth Ms. Masters may be contacted at lmasters@HuntonAK.com Ms. Ellis may be contacted at lellis@HuntonAK.com Read the court decision
    Read the full story...
    Reprinted courtesy of

    Risk-Shifting Tactics for Construction Contracts

    February 24, 2020 —
    Anyone who has worked in the construction industry is familiar with the financial risks involved. With thin margins, cash flow issues and the litany of potential claims and damages that can arise, contractors need to be able to manage that risk properly. There is the right way of going about it, and there's a wrong way. Unfortunately, the wrong way (which involves using leverage and shifting risk to other parties) is the more prevalent approach. There are different contractual tactics employed by owners and general contractors alike to shift financial risk to other parties. Why is construction so financially risky? There are a few different reasons there is so much risk involved. First and foremost, the construction payment chain itself is inherently risky. Owners and lenders release project funds and trust that the money will reach everyone on the job. But that can’t happen unless each link in the payment chain passes payment to the next. That's a lot of trust for an industry that's not particularly known for it. Another reason is how construction projects begin. Upfront payment is rare in this industry. This leads to floating the initial costs, extending credit and potentially borrowing money to do so. And those who typically bear this burden, lower-tier subs and suppliers, are the least equipped for that level of risk. Reprinted courtesy of Nate Budde, Construction Executive, a publication of Associated Builders and Contractors. All rights reserved. Read the court decision
    Read the full story...
    Reprinted courtesy of
    Mr. Budde may be contacted at nate@levelset.com

    Hawaii Building Codes to Stay in State Control

    March 01, 2012 —

    The Hawaii State Senate voted down Senate Bill 2692. Had it been passed, the State Building Code Council would have been abolished and building codes would have become the responsibility of county governments. The bill was opposed by the Insurance Institute for Business and Home Safety. Their director of code development, Wanda Edwards said that the bill “would have undermined key components that are essential to an effective state building code regime.”

    Read the full story…

    Read the court decision
    Read the full story...
    Reprinted courtesy of

    Insurer Must Defend Insured Against Construction Defect Claims

    November 14, 2018 —
    Finding various exclusions inapplicable, the Federal District Court ruled that the insurer owed a defense to the general contractor based upon Texas law. Mt. Hawley Ins. Co. v. Slay Engineering, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139363 (W.D. Texas Aug. 15, 2018). Huser Construction had a CGL policy issued by Mt. Hawley Insurance Company. Huser contracted to design and construct a municipal sports complex with the City of Jourdanton. The project consisted of four baseball fields, a softball field, parking lots and swimming pool. Huser subcontracted with Cody Pools, Inc. to design and build the swimming pool. Huser also subcontracted with Q-Haul, Inc. to perform earth work, grading and storm drainage work at the site. Read the court decision
    Read the full story...
    Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak Hastert
    Mr. Eyerly may be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com

    Indemnity Payment to Insured Satisfies SIR

    March 11, 2014 —
    In response to certified questions from the Eleventh Circuit, the Florida Supreme Court found that a contractual indemnity payment to the insured satisfied the policy's SIR requirement. Intervest Constr. of Jax v. Gen. Fid. Ins. Co., 2014 Fl. LEXIS 568 (Fla. Feb. 6, 2014). ICI Homes, Inc. a general contractor, hired Custom Cutting, Inc. to provide trim work, including installation of attic stairs in a residence ICI was building. Under the contract, Custom Cutting agreed to indemnify ICI for any damages resulting from Custom Cutting's negligence. The owner of the residence fell while using the attic stairs installed by Custom Cutting, injurying herself. The owner sued ICI, who sought indemnification from Custom Cutting. ICI's policy with General Fidelity had a $1 million SIR. The policy also had a transfer of rights clause granting the insurer some subrogation rights. The case was mediated. The parties agreed to a settlement of $1.6 million. Custom Cutting's insurer proposed paying $1 million to ICI to settle the indemnification claim. ICI, in turn, would pay that $1 million to the residence owner. A dispute arose over wither ICI or General Fidelity was responsible for paying the remaining $600,000. Read the court decision
    Read the full story...
    Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
    Mr. Eyerly may be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com

    Construction Defect Claim Survives Insurer's Summary Judgment Motion Due to Lack of Evidence

    December 23, 2024 —
    The court denied the insurer's motion for summary judgment on a construction defect claim due to lack of evidence. Statesboro Erectors, Inc. v. Owners Ins. Co., 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 176555 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 30, 2024). Griffco was the general contractor for a construction project. King Steel was hired as the "steel fabricator." King Steel subcontracted with Statesboro Erectors to complete certain construction work at the site. Statesboro agreed to the complete, proper and safe erection of the structural steel. A steel collapse occurred at the construction site. According to King Steel, the collapse "appeared to have occurred due to lack of temporary cables or bracing for steel columns." Because of the collapse, King Steel was required to supply additional materials to replace the structural damage caused by the collapse. Read the court decision
    Read the full story...
    Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak Hastert
    Mr. Eyerly may be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com

    The Ever-Growing Thicket Of California Civil Code Section 2782

    January 06, 2012 —

    California Civil Code section 2782 imposes limits on indemnity and defense provisions in construction contracts. Since the initial adoption of S.B. 8001 in 2002 (eff. January 1, 2003) section 27822 has been revised several times, and legislative history suggests that interest groups representing builders, developers and sub-contractors, as well as the insurance industry, have seen legislative action on these indemnity and defense issues as part of the overall response to the same economic pressures resulting from construction defect litigation that gave rise to S.B. 800. Amendments in 2005, 2007, 2008 and 2011 (each effective January 1 of the following year) have increasingly entangled the provisions of Section 2782 with various provisions of S.B. 800. The application of section 2782 to construction contracts, and in particular contracts between developer-builders and subcontractors, executed after January 1, 2006, will require a concurrent reading and understanding of S.B. 800, the application of which is itself still in flux.

    The time a construction contract was executed will likely determine which version of section 2782, read in connection with provisions of S.B.800, is applicable. Because of the nature of construction defect litigation, the determination of relative rights and liabilities of developer-builders vis-à-vis subcontractors under construction contracts does not become the subject of litigation, and legal and judicial interpretation, until years after the contracts were entered and work performed. As of the date this article is submitted, there has been no case law interpreting or applying any of the post S.B. 800 amendments, in part, and perhaps primarily, because litigation arising from construction contracts executed after January 1, 2006, has not yet reached the appellate courts.

    SECTION 2782 AT THE TIME S.B. 800 WAS ENACTED

    Section 2782 was originally enacted in 1967 and amended several times to the version in effect when S.B. 800 became law, at which time the section was relatively simple and straightforward. It then consisted of two subdivisions, which have essentially remained unchanged until the most recent amendment during the 2011 legislative session.

    Section 2782 (a) prohibited, and still prohibits, provisions in construction contracts that “purport to indemnify the promisee against liability for damages for death or bodily injury to persons, injury to property, or any other loss, damage or expense arising from the sole negligence or willful misconduct of the promise.” This provision essentially prohibits what had been referred to as so-called Type I or “specific” indemnity provisions. In such agreements, the indemnitor [the promisor, that is, the person or entity indemnifying] will indemnify the indemnitee [the promisee, that is, the person or entity being protected by the indemnity] for the indemnitee’s own negligence, whether active or passive, whether the indemnitee is solely negligent or concurrently negligent with the indemnitor. (See, MacDonald & Kruse, Inc. v. San Jose Steel Co. (1972) 29 Cal.App.3d 413, 419.)3 Section 2782 (a) has remained essentially intact since the enactment of S.B. 800. It still must be considered and applied to interpret a construction contract. Generally, it will apply to contracts not involving a public agency; the next part of section 2782 specifically governs such contracts.

    The second subdivision prohibits provisions in any construction contract with a public agency which purport to impose on the contractor, or relieve the public agency from, liability for the active negligence of the public agency. Subdivision (b) has been revised by the 2011 amendment, discussed below. If a construction contract with the public agency is for residential construction, the standards of S.B. 800 likely apply.4

    This was the extent of section 2782 on January 1, 2003, when S.B. 800 went into effect, and remained so until January 1, 2006. This version will govern interpretation and application of indemnity and defense provisions in construction contracts executed before January 1, 2006.5

    2005 AMENDMENT

    The first “post S.B. 800” change to Section 2782 was in enacted in 2005, effective January 1, 2006, and added two new sections. Subdivision (c) stated (in somewhat greater detail than paraphrased here) that for residential construction contracts, or amendments thereto, entered into after January 1, 2006, a subcontractor cannot be required to indemnify (including the cost to defend) a builder for construction defects that arise out of negligence or design defects of the builder or other independent contractors, or that do not arise out of the scope of the subcontractor=s scope of work. The term “residential construction” was defined by reference to S.B.800 generally, and the term “builder” was defined by reference to section 911 (a part of S.B. 800), for the first time expressly connecting provisions of section 2782 to S.B. 800. Contractual provisions not expressly prohibited were reserved to the agreement of the parties.

    What subdivision (c) took away was partially given back by subdivision (d). It stated that “subdivision (c) does not prohibit a subcontractor and builder from mutually agreeing to the timing or immediacy of the defense and provisions for reimbursement of defense fees and costs, so long as that agreement, upon final resolution of the claims, does not waive or modify the provisions of subdivision (c).”6 In addition, it stated that this subdivision (c) did not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under Presley Homes, Inc. v. American States Insurance Company (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 571, which holds that where an insurer has a duty to defend a developer pursuant to an additional insured endorsement obtained under a subcontractor’s policy, that duty generally applies to the entire action, even if the suit involves both covered and uncovered claims, or a single claim only partially covered by the policy. Finally, subdivision (d) stated that the amendment did not affect the builder’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800. Both of these latter provisions, relating to the Presley Homes case, and obligations under S.B. 800, have been carried forward essentially intact in subsequent amendments of section 2782.

    This version of section 2782 will be applicable to any contract between a builder as defined by section 911 (see fn. 4, above) and a subcontractor executed between January 1, 2006, and December 31, 2008. Thus, a general contractor, etc., who is not a builder is not subject to the provisions added by the 2005 amendment; this changed with the next amendment.

    It is not clear whether this version would apply to a contract entered before January 1, 2006, but amended after that date. Subdivision (c) applies to “all construction contracts, and amendments thereto, entered into after January 1, 2006, for residential construction.” It would seem that the clearest and most logical construction would apply it only to contracts originally made after January 1, 2006, and thereafter amended, but there has been no judicial determination of this issue.

    In addition, logically it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to construction contracts for residential construction between a builder and a subcontractor, entered between January 1, 2006, and December 31, 2008; however, legislative history relating to the 2008 amendment discussed below suggests a different result might occur.

    2007 AMENDMENT

    The second “post S.B. 800” amendment in 2007 (effective January 1, 2008), added subdivisions (e)(1) and (e)(2).

    Subdivision (e)(1) added general contractors and subcontractors not affiliated with the builder and imposed essentially the same restrictions on provisions to indemnify, including the cost to defend, them as had been imposed on the “builder” by the 2005 amendment. The amendment refers to section 911 (b), again part of S.B. 800, to define general contractors, etc., not affiliated with the builder.

    Subdivision (e)(1) essentially repeated the provisions of subdivision (d) permitting agreement to the timing and immediacy of the defense, the reference to the Presley Homes case, and the general contractor’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800.

    It appears this amendment was an attempt to harmonize the new restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions with S.B. 800. The 2005 amendment, whether by oversight or intent, covered only builders and not general contractors, although both classes are subject to the provisions of S.B. 800; the 2007 amendment added non-builder-affiliated general contractors.

    Again, logically, it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to construction contracts for residential construction between a general contractor or contractor not affiliated with a builder and a subcontractor, entered between January 1 and December 31, 2008; however, legislative history relating to the 2008 amendment discussed below suggests a different result might occur. The same potential uncertainty regarding applicability to a contract entered before January 1, 2008, but amended after that date, exists for this provision as for the prior amendment, discussed above.

    2008 AMENDMENT

    The third “post S.B. 800” amendment in 2008 (effective January 1, 2009), reorganized the language relating to prohibited indemnity provisions, added a reference to insurance in that same prohibition, extensively rewrote the provisions governing agreements relating to the timing or immediacy of defense, added language preserving equitable indemnity claims, and added language defining “construction defect” by reference to the standards set forth in S.B. 800.

    Subdivisions (a) and (b) remained unchanged.

    Subdivision (c) now made a combined reference to builders (again by reference to section 911), as well as general contractors or contractors not affiliated with the builder (again by reference to section 911 (b)), rather than dealing with the two groups in separate but nearly identical subdivisions as previously. It otherwise restated the same limitations that were previously set forth separately in subdivisions (c) and (e), as well as the reference to the Presley Homes case, and the general contractor’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800, but with one important addition. The word “insure” was added to the description of prohibited provisions, to-wit: “provisions? that purport to insure or indemnify, including the cost to defend, the builder, [etc.]? are unenforceable” to the extent they arise out of claims of the type previously described.

    It is unclear what impact the addition of this single word “insure” will have; and, it will have to be read in light of the preservation of the language that it shall not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under the holding of the Presley Homes case. Suppose a carrier had issued an additional insured endorsement under which it would otherwise be required to defend a builder or general contractor consistent with the Presley Homes rule: would this newly added single word (restricting the construction contract, to which the carrier is not a party) give the carrier a basis for denying coverage under the insurance contract? Or would the continued inclusion of the express language that it does not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under Presley Homes control? That is surely an issue that will have to be worked out by the courts.

    The new subdivision (d) addressed defense obligations. Again it permitted parties to agree to the timing and immediacy of the defense and provision for reimbursement of defense fees and costs, but imposed a very detailed scheme that appears to limit the extent of such agreement. A subcontractor owes no defense or indemnity obligation until the builder or general contractor provides a written tender of the claim, which has the same force and effect as notice of commencement of a legal proceeding. Upon that tender the subcontractor shall elect to follow one of two ways of performing: subdivision (d) (1) permits the subcontractor to defend with counsel of its choice and to control the defense, if the subcontractor gives written notice of this election within a reasonable time after receipt of the written tender and in no event later than 90 days following that receipt; subdivision (d) (2) provides an alternative by which the subcontractor pays a reasonable allocated share of the builder’s or general contractor’s defense fees and costs within 30 days of receipt of an invoice, subject to reallocation upon final resolution of the claim by settlement or judgment. Subdivision (e) sets forth remedies available to the builder or general contractor if a subcontractor fails to timely and adequately perform its obligations under either of the two alternatives in subdivision (d), including compensatory and consequential damages, reasonable attorneys’ fees in connection with the first alternative, and interest on defense and indemnity costs in connection with the second alternative. Subdivision (e) ends with provisions relating to reallocation of defense costs, and damages for failure to reallocate.

    Application of these requirements in actual litigation is likely to be cumbersome and potentially fraught with conflicts. If retained pursuant to subdivision (d) (1) does the attorney represent the builder, the subcontractor, or both? To whom does the attorney owe his or her fiduciary duty? Can an appropriate informed written consent be formulated, for example, under Rule 3-310 of the California Rules of Professional Conduct, or Rule 1.7, ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct? Could an attorney retained by a subcontractor blame the subcontractor if that is in the developer’s best interests? If multiple subcontractors elect to defend directly, how would the defense be coordinated among the potentially multiple attorneys so retained? Would an attorney retained by one subcontractor be able, or inclined, to blame another subcontractor who also chose to defend directly, in other words, what would prevent inconsistent defense positions amongst the various counsel retained by subcontractors for the developer? There may be solutions to such practical and professional considerations but it seems an ethical thicket awaits any attorney involved in such circumstances.

    Subdivision (e) and (f) preserve equitable indemnity claims for the builder, general contractor or subcontractor, the first in general, the second as against any supplier, design profession, or product manufacturer. Finally, the 2008 amendment added for the first time, in subdivision (h), language defining "construction defect" as used in section 2782 as a violation of standards set forth in S.B. 800.

    The inclusion of these last three subsections would seem to work against simplification of litigation. A builder or general contractor is likely to allege a claim for equitable indemnity against any and all subcontractors in addition to claims for contractual indemnity and defense (however limited by the other provisions of section 2782). Nothing in the section suggests the subcontractor should, or even can, somehow take on the representation of the builder, etc., in connection with a claim of equitable indemnity back against the subcontractor.

    And the limited definition of “construction defect” in subdivision (h) appears to raise an issue of the applicability of the limitations set forth in subdivision (c). Although there is a school of thought that section 941 limits residential construction defect claims only to breach of the performance standards under S.B. 800, it is still common for CD complaints to plead other legal theories, e.g., breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, etc., in addition to violation of S.B. 800 standards. With the addition of subdivision (h) it is arguable that the restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions spelled out in subdivisions (c) and (d), both of which relate to claims for residential construction defects, are applicable only to claims for violation of S.B. 800 standards, and not other residential construction defect claims. In other words, a developer might conceivably still be entitled to a broader scope of indemnity and concomitant defense for other types of claims, such as breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, etc., so long as the indemnity does not violate the limitation of subdivision (a) against Type I indemnity, which as noted above, has remained intact through these revisions.

    Finally, it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to contracts executed between builders, general contractors, etc., on the one hand and subcontractors on the other hand on and after January 1, 2009. And, as noted above in connection with the 2005 and 2007 amendments, logic would suggest that those versions would ordinarily apply to contracts executed during the time periods mentioned above. But, the Legislative Counsel’s Digest for the 2008 amendment as it finally was enacted into law includes the following statements:

    This bill would delete the provisions applicable to construction contracts entered into on or after January 1, 2008, that purport to indemnify the general contractor or contractor not affiliated with the builder. The bill would revise the provisions applicable to contracts entered into after January 1, 2006, to instead apply to contracts entered into after January 1, 2009, and to apply to agreements that purport to insure or indemnify the builder or the general contractor or contractor not affiliated with the builder, as described.

    Although it seems a startling result, this legislative history suggests an argument can be made that the 2008 amendment retroactively nullified the effect of the 2005 and 2007 amendments, so that contracts executed from January 1, 2006, as to builders or January 1, 2008, for general contractors, etc., through December 31, 2008, are still governed by the provisions of section 2782 as it was on the books prior to the first post-S.B. 800 amendment in 2005.

    2011 AMENDMENT

    Section 2782 has been amended yet again in the 2011 session of the California Legislature, effective January 1, 2012; however, the substantive changes affect certain contracts entered on or after January 1, 2013. All of the provisions contained in the 2008 amendment have been carried forward in the most recent amendment, although re-numbered: (c) became (d), etc., through (h) becoming (i). So, the law governing construction contracts entered into after January 1, 2009, for residential construction, as between a builder, or a general contractor, etc., not affiliated with a builder, and regarding insurance, indemnity or defense relating to claims for construction defects, remains the same as in the 2008 amendment.

    As noted above the substantive changes to section 2782 all affect contracts entered into on or after January 1, 2013. Subdivision (b) has been amended such that any provision in a contract with a public agency that purports to impose on any contractor, etc., or relieve the public agency from, liability for the active negligence of the public agency will be void and unenforceable. A new subdivision (c) has been added that imposes a similar restriction on construction contracts with the owner of privately owned real property to be improved and as to which the owner is not acting as a contractor or supplier of materials or equipment to the work. This new restriction in subdivision (c) does not apply to a homeowner performing a home improvement project on his or her own single family dwelling.

    The 2011 bill amending section 2782 also added a new section 2782.05, which will make void and unenforceable any provision in any construction contract (again, entered on or after January 1, 2013) that purports to insure or indemnify, including the cost to defend, a general contractor, construction manager, or other subcontractor, by a subcontractor for claims that arise out of the active negligence or willful misconduct of the general contractor, etc., or other independent contractors, etc., or to the extent the claims do not arise out of the scope of work of the subcontractor. However, the section also includes a long list of situations to which it does not apply, including all of those covered by section 2782 (residential construction subject to S.B. 800, public agency contracts subject to section 2782 (b), and direct contracts with private property owners subject to the new section 2782 (c)) as well as eight other categories. This apparently is intended to serve as a “catch-all” to extend a limitation on indemnity agreements to all construction contracts not previously swept into this widening legislative scheme, although the exact phrasing is slightly different.7

    The new section 2782.05 then permits a mutual agreement to the timing or immediacy of a defense under a scheme essentially identical to that imposed in the 2008 amendment to section 2782: defend with counsel of choice, and maintain control of the defense; or, pay a reasonable allocated share of defense fees and costs. The same logistical and ethical difficulties presented by the 2008 scheme discussed above would likely be present in cases that fall under the new section 2782.05.

    CONCLUSION

    The California Legislature has been revising section 2782 since shortly after the adoption of S.B. 800. Each revision has been more complicated than the last, and each has tied certain provisions of section 2782 more closely to S.B. 800. In particular, with regard to construction defect claims relating to residential dwellings which are subject to S.B. 800, the Legislature has apparently attempted to exercise more and more control over the scope of allowable indemnity and dictated a very narrow scheme to govern how the defense obligation arising from a contractual indemnity is to be implemented. It seems likely that any attempt to manage the defense of a construction defect case under the options that allow a subcontractor to defend directly and control the defense will create a logistical problem and an ethical difficulty for any attorney attempting to defend a developer at the behest and direction of a subcontractor. Finally, as set forth in the current version of section 2782 relating to contractual indemnity and defense of S.B. 800 type cases (subdivisions (c) through (h) in the 2008 version, now subdivisions (d) through (i) in the 2011 amendment), the Legislature has apparently narrowed the application to only claims of violation of S.B. 800 standards. This may have, in essence, removed the restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions as they relate to other theories pleaded against developers in construction defense cases, e.g., breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, and the like. It is not at all clear that the Legislature has accomplished what it set out do accomplish. Rather, the law may have come full circle back to where it began, except for one legal theory, i.e. violation of S.B. 800 standards, currently being used in residential construction defect cases. For any other legal theory the limitation of section 2782 (a) may be solely controlling.

    1. California Civil Code section 43.99, and sections 895 to 945.5.
    2. All statutory references in this article are to the California Civil Code unless otherwise specified.
    3. Type I or specific indemnity does not exactly match the scope of proscribed indemnity as described in section 2782 (a) but it is the closest. More recent case law in California has eschewed a mechanical application of the MacDonald & Kruse typology in favor of examining the precise text of the actual contract (See, e.g., St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Frontier Pacific Ins. Co. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1234, 1246, n. 6) but some recent cases still use the Type I, II and II classifications. And, an understanding of that “historical” typology is useful as an aid to evaluating and understanding express indemnity in general.
    4. The provisions of S.B. 800 other than the prelitigation procedures of sections 910 through 938 apply to general contractors, subcontractors, etc., pursuant to section 936. The prelitigation procedures generally involve a “builder,” which is specifically defined in section 911 (a) by reference to entities or individuals in the business of selling residential units to the public or of building, developing, or constructing residential units for public purchase. Pursuant to section 911 (b) the term builder does not include general contractors, etc., not affiliated with the builder. Thus, a general contractor who constructs residential housing pursuant to a contract with a public agency is still subject to claims for violation of the standards set forth in sections 896 and 897, resulting from its negligent act or omission or breach of contract, pursuant to section 936.
    5. As noted above, there has been no case law yet interpreting any of the “post S.B. 800” changes to Section 2782. One of the most important legal decisions relating to express indemnity and defense obligations and rights between developer-builders and sub-contractors was published after two of the amendments but based upon contracts executed and the language of section 2782 prior to January 1, 2006. (See, Crawford v. Weather Shield Mfg., Inc. (2008) 44 Cal.4th 541, 547, 566-67, fn. 14).
    6. Subcontractor dissatisfaction with the perceived inadequacy of protection afforded by this provision apparently became the impetus for a 2008 amendment to section 2782, discussed below, at least based upon the numerous (form) letters submitted to legislators in connection therewith.
    7. Section 2782 (a), where we started, and which has continued without change, prohibits indemnity for claims arising out of the sole negligence or willful misconduct of the promisee; sole negligence can be either active or passive. The various versions relating to residential construction prohibit indemnity for the negligence of the builder, etc., suggesting there is no express contractual indemnity for the negligence of the subcontractor if the builder, etc., is at all negligent. This is tempered a bit by the preservation of the right to equitable indemnity, which will now be found in section 2782 (g) and (h).

    Courtesy of Michael D. Worthing of Borton Petrini, LLP. Mr. Worthing can be contacted at mworthing@bortonpetrini.com.

    Read the court decision
    Read the full story...
    Reprinted courtesy of

    What is the Effect of an Untimely Challenge to the Timeliness of a Trustee’s Sale?

    April 13, 2017 —
    Ever wonder what happens if a person challenges the timeliness of a trustee’s sale after the sale already occurred? Waiver of the argument of course! And, in the case of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Waltner, the affirmance of an eviction judgment. In the Waltner case, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., as Trustee for WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-PR4 Trust (the “Bank”), purchased a residential property at a trustee’s sale in September 2015. The Bank gave the occupant of the house, Sarah Waltner (“Waltner”), notice to vacate the property, but she did not do so. Accordingly, the Bank filed a summary action to evict Waltner, which the trial court ultimately granted. After the trial court granted the Bank relief, Waltner filed a motion to dismiss and a motion to vacate the eviction judgment arguing, among other things, that the judgment was void because the Bank conducted the trustee’s sale after the statute of limitations expired. Both motions were denied, and Waltner appealed. Read the court decision
    Read the full story...
    Reprinted courtesy of Ben Reeves, Snell & Wilmer
    Mr. Reeves may be contacted at breeves@swlaw.com