Why’d You Have To Say That?
October 09, 2023 —
Daniel Lund III - LexologyA surety seeking collateral from indemnitors filed suit in federal court in Louisiana pursuant to a forum selection clause in the indemnity agreement between the parties.
The indemnitors were being called upon to provide collateral as a result of defaults on two Louisiana Department of Transportation projects. Seeking to move the dispute to Louisiana state court from federal court, the indemnitors filed a forum non conveniens motion.
Among the arguments of the indemnitors removing the case out of federal court was the doctrine of “direct-benefits” estoppel – a policy which “‘holds a non-signatory to a clause in a contract if it “knowingly exploits the agreement” containing the clause.’ In re Lloyd's Reg. N. Am., Inc., 780 F.3d 283, 291 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting Bridas S.A.P.I.C. v. Gov't of Turkmenistan, 345 F.3d 347, 361-62 (5th Cir. 2003)).”
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Daniel Lund III, PhelpsMr. Lund may be contacted at
daniel.lund@phelps.com
“But I didn’t know what I was signing….”
May 30, 2018 —
Bobby Kethcart - Snell & Wilmer Real Estate Litigation BlogIn real estate cases—which frequently involve long purchase agreements, loan documents, personal guarantees, deeds of trust, etc.—we’ve likely all had a client or opposing party who trots out the line that they didn’t know what they were signing, or they didn’t read or understand what they were signing, so the document shouldn’t be enforced according to its terms.
Most of us instinctively believe the claim is a loser: You signed the document, you’re bound by it.
But is this actually right?
Well, we did some digging. Here is the Arizona law on the subject:
Nationwide Resources Corp. v. Massabni, 134 Ariz. 557, 658 P.2d 210 (App. 1982):
“A mistake of only one of the parties to a contract in the expression of his agreement or as to the subject matter does not affect its binding force and ordinarily affords no ground for its avoidance, or for relief, even in equity.”
“A manifestation of acceptance to the offeror or his agent forms a contract regardless of the intent of the acceptor.”
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Bobby Kethcart, Snell & WilmerMr. Kethcart may be contacted at
rkethcart@swlaw.com
Court Rules on a Long List of Motions in Illinois National Insurance Co v Nordic PCL
May 10, 2012 —
CDJ STAFFThe case Illinois National Insurance Co. v Nordic PCL, et al. “involves a dispute about whether insurance benefits are available to a general contractor who built structures that allegedly have construction defects. Plaintiffs Illinois National Insurance Company (‘Illinois National’) and National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA (‘National Union’) (collectively, the ‘Insurers’), commenced this action for declaratory relief against Defendant Nordic PCL Construction, Inc., f/k/a Nordic Construction, Ltd. ("Nordic"), on August 23, 2011.”
The court was asked to rule on a long list of motions: “Counterclaim Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice in Support of Their (1) Motion to Dismiss the Counterclaim and (2) Motion to Strike Portions of the Counterclaim, ECF No. 16 (‘Request for Judicial Notice’); Counterclaim Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim Filed October 24, 2011, ECF No. 14 (‘Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim’); Counterclaim Defendants’ Motion to Strike Portions of the Counterclaim Filed October 24, 2011, ECF No. 15 (‘Motion to Strike’); Third-Party Defendant Marsh USA, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Stay Proceedings in Favor of Pending State Action, ECF No. 33 (‘Marsh’s Motion To Dismiss Or Stay’); Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff Nordic PCL Construction, Inc., f/k/a Nordic Construction Ltd.’s Substantive Joinder to Third-Party Defendant Marsh USA Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Stay Proceedings in Favor of Pending State Action, ECF No. 36 (‘Nordic’s Joinder’); and Third-Party Defendant Marsh USA, Inc.’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on Counts V and VI of Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff Nordic PCL Construction, Inc.’s Third-Party Complaint, ECF No. 29 (‘Marsh’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings’).”
In result, the court reached the following decisions: “The court GRANTS IN RELEVANT PART the Insurers’ Request for Judicial Notice to the extent it covers matters relevant to these motions; GRANTS IN PART the Insurers’ Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim, but gives Nordic leave to amend the Counterclaim in certain respects; DENIES the Insurers’ Motion to Strike; DENIES Marsh’s Motion To Dismiss Or Stay and Nordic’s Joinder; and GRANTS Marsh’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.”
The court provides a bit of background on the case: “This action arises out of alleged construction defects involving two projects on which Nordic acted as the general contractor. Nordic is a defendant in a pending state court action with respect to one of the projects and says it spent more than $400,000 on repairs with respect to the other project. Nordic tendered the defense of the pending state court action to the Insurers and sought reimbursement of the cost of repairs already performed. The Insurers responded by filing this action to determine their rights under the insurance policies issued to Nordic.”
Furthermore, the court presented a brief procedural history: “The Insurers commenced this declaratory action in this court on August 23, 2011. The Complaint asserts two claims, one seeking a declaration that the Insurers have no duty to provide a defense or indemnification regarding the Safeway Action, the other seeking such a declaration regarding the Moanalua Claims. Along with its Answer, Nordic filed a Counterclaim against the Insurers. The Counterclaim asserts breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, misrepresentations and omissions of material fact, and bad faith, and seeks declaratory relief against the Insurers.”
The procedural history continues: “Nordic also filed a Third-Party Complaint against Marsh, the broker that had procured the Policies from the Insurers for Nordic. Nordic alleges that it reasonably believed that the Policies would provide completed operations insurance coverage for the types of construction defects alleged in the Safeway Action and Moanalua Claims. The Third-Party Complaint asserts breach of contract, negligence, promissory estoppel, breach of fiduciary duties, implied indemnity, and contribution and equitable subrogation.”
In conclusion, “The court GRANTS IN RELEVANT PART the Insurers’ Request for Judicial Notice. With regard to the Insurers’ Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim, the court GRANTS the motion as to Count I (breach of contract), Count II (duty of good faith and fair dealing), Count III (fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation), the portion of Count IV (bad faith) premised on fraud, and Count IV (declaratory relief). The court DENIES the motion as to Count IV (bad faith) that is not premised on fraud. Except with respect to the "occurrence" issue, which the court disposes of here on the merits, and Count V, which concerns only a form of relief, Nordic is given leave to amend its Counterclaim within three weeks of the date of this order. The court DENIES the Insurers’ Motion to Strike, DENIES Marsh’s Motion to Dismiss or Stay and Nordic’s Joinder, and GRANTS Marsh’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings with respect to Counts V and VI of the Third-Party Complaint.”
Read the court’s decision…
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Mass. Gas Leak Follows NTSB Final Report, Call for Reforms
November 24, 2019 —
Johanna Knapschaefer - Engineering News-RecordA major natural-gas leak forced Lawrence, Mass., residents to evacuate their homes early on Sept. 27. National Grid cut power to more than 1,300 customers to avoid another disaster like last year’s natural-gas explosions and fires in Lawrence and two other towns north of Boston. The leak came just days after federal officials called for changes to national pipeline regulations as they released a final report on the causes of the Sept. 13, 2018, disaster.
Reprinted courtesy of
Johanna Knapschaefer, Engineering News-Record
ENR may be contacted at ENR.com@bnpmedia.com
Read the full story... Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Co-Housing Startups Fly in the Face of Old-School NYC Housing Law
December 18, 2022 —
Amelia Pollard & Diego Lasarte - BloombergA room in an eight-bedroom Bed-Stuy brownstone with “charming views.” A five-bedroom “modern Manhattan” home. In a housing market as hot as New York City’s, these units advertised on co-housing companies’ websites sound promising. According to the city’s housing regulations, however, neither is legal.
That hasn’t stopped companies from offering the rooms, as renters clamor for affordable living space. With the average studio apartment in Manhattan going for nearly $3,100 a month, newcomers to the city often find living with multiple roommates to be their best affordable-housing option. It’s a trend that startups have jumped on, and one some experts endorse as a way to quickly scale up affordable housing — even though municipal housing laws aren’t on board yet.
The reality is that in many cities, housing laws that limit the number of unrelated individuals in a dwelling are still in place. New York, for instance, doesn’t allow more than three unrelated people to live in the same unit. To be sure, New Yorkers often break that law, as expensive housing forces people to find roommates through friends or on sites like Craigslist. But multimillion-dollar companies breaking that law is new.
Reprinted courtesy of
Amelia Pollard, Bloomberg and
Diego Lasarte, Bloomberg Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
What are Section 8(f) Agreements?
July 02, 2018 —
Wally Zimolong – Supplemental Conditions Like many areas of federal labor law, there are different rules for construction industry employers. One major difference is in how employers become unionized. Typically, under Section 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act, a union becomes a collective bargaining agent of employees only after a majority of employees show support for union representation. In other words, the employees chose whether to be represented by a particular union. However, under Section 8(f) of the NLRA, construction industry employers can choose to become union without any showing of majority support by employees. In fact, construction industry employers don’t need to have any employees at all to sign a “8(f) agreement.” Thus, these agreements have become known as pre-hire agreements.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Wally Zimolong, Zimolong LLCMr. Zimolong may be contacted at
wally@zimolonglaw.com
Virginia Joins California and Nevada in Passing its Consumer Privacy Act
March 15, 2021 —
Kyle Janecek – Newmeyer DillionCalifornia tends to be on the forefront in consumer privacy laws within the United States. However, there is a growing momentum for other states to join California in legislating consumer privacy rights, as well as pushes for federal legislation. The latest state to join in and pass consumer privacy legislation is Virginia, with its Virginia Consumer Data Protection Act (VCDPA). With Virginia joining the fray, several questions arise, such as how closely does the VCDPA follow California's legislation? How, if at all, does it differ from already-existing legislation? What do businesses need to comply with the VCDPA, if at all?
WHAT IS THE VIRGINIA CONSUMER DATA PROTECTION ACT?
The VCDPA largely mimics elements from its Californian cousins, the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) as modified by the California Privacy Rights Act (CPRA). The main features of the law include: (a) issuing the right to request what information is collected; (b) the right to correct information provided; (c) the right to deletion; (d) providing notice to consumers regarding the collection of their data; and (e) protecting consumer data. Further, the consumer requests, akin to the CCPA, do require verification, and similarly phrased data security practices that rely on how "reasonable" they are, depending on the volume and type of information at issue. Though, the VCDPA does expand on this slightly, requiring "data protection assessments" to determine the security of protected information, how it is shared and used, the benefits in sharing the information and harm resulting from any breaches.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Kyle Janecek, Newmeyer DillionMr. Janecek may be contacted at
kyle.janecek@ndlf.com
Missouri Legislature Passes Bill to Drastically Change Missouri’s “Consent Judgment” Statute
August 10, 2021 —
Jason Taylor - Traub Lieberman Insurance Law BlogOn June 29, 2021, Missouri Governor Mike Parson signed SB-HB 345 into law, which will drastically change Section 537.065 of the Missouri Revised Statutes. Section 537.065 provides an insured who has been denied insurance coverage a statutory mechanism to settle certain tort claims through an agreement akin to a consent judgment. Typically referred to as a “065 Agreement,” the statute allows a plaintiff and insured-tortfeasor to settle a claim for damages and specify which assets are available to satisfy the claim, typically the tortfeasor’s available insurance policy. In the past, such agreements were often accomplished without the insurer’s participation or even its knowledge. Under such agreements, the insured-tortfeasor assigns all rights to the insurance policy to the plaintiff and agrees not to contest the issues of liability or damages. In exchange the plaintiff agrees not to execute any judgment against the insured. The parties conduct what amounts to an uncontested and often “sham” trial resulting in a judgment far in excess of any actual damages or applicable policy limits had the case been contested. In a subsequent proceeding to collect on the judgment, the tortfeasor’s insurer is bound by the determinations of liability and damages made in the underlying action.
This statutory framework presented plenty of opportunities for abuse. In 2017, the statute was amended in order to address some of those issues, including a requirement that the insured provide notice of a settlement demand under Section 065 and providing insurers a limited right to intervene in the tort action before liability and damages have been determined. Ostensibly, the intent of the 2017 amendments was to reduce the number of large and uncontested judgments and allow the insurance carrier an opportunity to continue litigating the injured party’s claim where the insured has no incentive or is contractually prohibited from doing so. Yet, creative plaintiff’s attorneys found several “loopholes” around these changes, most prominently, by moving their disputes from state court to binding arbitration and dispensing with notice to the insurer altogether, or at least until after the arbitration has concluded.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Jason Taylor, Traub LiebermanMr. Taylor may be contacted at
jtaylor@tlsslaw.com
