Andrea DeField Recognized In 2024 List of Influential Business Women By South Florida Business Journal
February 19, 2024 —
Hunton Insurance Recovery BlogWe are pleased to announce that Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP insurance coverage partner Andrea DeField was named to the
South Florida Business Journal’s 2024 list of Influential Business Women. The award celebrates 25 women who have a strong record of leadership, performance and innovation in their industry, as well as meaningful community involvement. This distinction is well-deserved given Andi’s leadership in the cyber insurance space, contribution to the firm’s pro bono efforts, and longstanding record of community involvement in South Florida.
Andi and the other honorees will be featured in the March 15 special issue of the South Florida Business Journal introducing the Influential Business Women of 2024. Congratulations Andi!
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Privacy In Pandemic: Senators Announce Covid-19 Data Privacy Bill
May 11, 2020 —
Kyle Janecek & Jeffrey Dennis – Newmeyer Dillion"Data! Data! Data!. . . I can't make bricks without clay." This classic statement from Sherlock Holmes in The Adventure of the Copper Beeches takes on a new meaning in the COVID-19 pandemic. With the plans to begin contact tracing the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic slowly moving towards the forefront, a valid and important issue presents itself: how do we treat and protect the data we so desperately need to trace, track, and address the pandemic? U.S. Senators Wicker, Thune, Moran, and Blackburn introduced a possible solution to this problem with the COVID-19 Consumer Data Protection Act, as announced on April 30, 2020. So what does the Act entail? What information is protected? What action would businesses need to take towards individuals, such as consumers or even employees, in order to comply with this new legislation?
WHAT IS THE COVID-19 CONSUMER DATA PROTECTION ACT?
The Act is meant to address the concern regarding data collection and privacy due to large companies, like Google and Apple, adjusting the software within their devices to facilitate digital contact tracing. The Act can be broken up into three parts - the treatment of information; the privacy notice requirements; and the transparency requirements.
First, the Act prohibits the collection, processing, or transfer of certain categories of data without notice and the affirmative express consent of the individual, in order to:
- Track the spread of COVID-19,
- Trace the spread of COVID-19 through contact tracing, or
- Determine compliance with social distancing guidelines without the requisite notice to individuals and their express consent.
To accomplish this, the Act also restricts entities in their ability to collect excessive information, stating that an entity cannot collect information beyond what is reasonably necessary to conduct any of the three COVID-19 related purposes listed in the statute. The entity must also provide reasonable administrative, technical, and physical data security policies and practices to protect the information collected. Furthermore, in the event that the entity stops using the information for any of the three COVID-19 purposes, it must delete or de-identify the information it has collected.
Next, the Act describes the requirements for notice to individuals. In order to legally collect, process or transfer the information, the entity needs to provide the consumer with prior notice of the purpose, processing, and transfer of the data through their privacy policy within 14 days of the enactment of the law. This policy would have to:
- Disclose the consumer's rights in a clear and conspicuous manner prior to or at the point of collection,
- Be available in a clear and conspicuous manner to the public,
- Include whether the entity will transfer any of the information it collects in order to track or trace COVID-19 or determine compliance with social distancing,
- Describe its data retention policy, and
- Generally describe its data security measures.
Notably, many of these are already requirements common to many privacy policies, including the disclosure regarding the transfer of an individual's information.
In addition, an individual must give their affirmative express consent to such collection, processing and transfer. In other words, an individual must "opt-in" to having their information collected. This would be done through a checked box or electronic signature, as the law prohibits entities from inferring consent through a failure by the individual to take an action stopping the collection. Furthermore, the individual would also need the ability to expressly withdraw their consent, with the entity then having to cease collection, processing, or transfer of the information within 14 days of the revocation. In essence, due to the restriction on transferal, this may result in businesses opting to delete or de-identify data upon a revocation.
Finally, the entity would have to abide by certain reporting and transparency requirements, namely a monthly public report stating how many individuals had information collected, processed or transferred, and describing the categories of the data collected, processed or transferred by the entity and why. This is akin to the California Consumer Privacy Act's treatment of categories of information, though it would require this information to be released on an ongoing, monthly basis.
WHAT DATA IS COVERED?
Notably, the Act only affects a very limited scope of data. The Act covers geolocation data (exact real-time locations), proximity data (approximated location data), and Personal Health Information (any genetic/diagnosis information that can identify someone). This could cover information like Bluetooth communication or real-time tracking based on a cell phone's geolocation features. Notably, Personal Health Information does not include any information that may be covered under HIPAA or the broader categorization of "Biometric" data (i.e. retinal scans, finger prints, etc). Furthermore, and more generally, "publicly available information" is excluded, which includes information from telephone books or online directories, the news media, "video, internet, or audio content" as well as "websites available to the general public on an unrestricted basis." The latter of which potentially would push any and all information made available through social media (i.e. Facebook or Twitter) into the definition of "publicly available information."
HOW IS IT ENFORCED?
Generally, the law would be enforced by the FTC, under the provisions regarding unfair or deceptive acts or practices, similar to other enforcement actions arising out of privacy policies. Notwithstanding, state attorney generals may also bring actions to enforce compliance and obtain damages, civil penalties, restitution, or other compensation on behalf of the residents of the state.
WHAT SHOULD MY COMPANY DO?
If your entity plans on collecting information for tracking COVID-19, measuring social distancing compliance, or contact tracing, it is advisable to include language in your privacy policy now. This could be as simple as adding an additional provision within your privacy policy stating that the entity will retain information to conduct one of the three COVID-19 purposes as laid out in the statute. In addition, this also means that should the entity collect and use employee information for contact tracing, tracking the spread of COVID-19 or ensuring compliance with social distancing measures, it will need to disclose some of the specifics of that process to the employees and have them opt-in for the process. Finally, for contact tracing purposes, any individual that shares their diagnosis will have to opt-in for the entity to legally collect, process, and transfer that information to others.
While the time to reach compliance is unknown, it is more important than ever to form a compliance plan for privacy legislation if you do not already have a plan in place. If you decide to prepare with us, our firm has created a 90 day California Consumer Privacy Act compliance program (which can be expedited) where our team will collaborate with you to determine a scalable, practical, and reasonable way for you to meet your needs, and we will provide a free initial consultation. For further inquiries or questions related to COVID-19, you can consult with a Task Force attorney by emailing NDCovid19Response@ndlf.com or contacting our office directly at 949-854-7000.
Kyle Janecek is an associate in the firm's Privacy & Data Security practice, and supports the team in advising clients on cyber related matters, including policies and procedures that can protect their day-to-day operations. For more information on how Kyle can help, contact him at kyle.janecek@ndlf.com.
Jeff Dennis (CIPP/US) is the Head of the firm's Privacy & Data Security practice. Jeff works with the firm's clients on cyber-related issues, including contractual and insurance opportunities to lessen their risk. For more information on how Jeff can help, contact him at jeff.dennis@ndlf.com.
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ConsensusDOCS Updates its Forms
October 21, 2015 —
Christopher G. Hill – Construction Law MusingsAs reported recently in ENR Magazine, among other publications, the ConsensusDOCS folks have updated their contract forms. Why is this news?
First of all, it’s only been around three and a half years since these documents were officially released and this release is about 18 months sooner than anticipated (the original revision cycle was to be 5 years). Why the revision? According to my friend and counsel to ConsensusDOCS, Brian Perlberg, one major rationale is that “the economics of the construction industry today looks nothing like it did [in 2007.”
Among the changes are several terminology changes (“constructor” instead of “contractor” for instance), the addition of mandatory green building design as a basic service (these forms already have a Green Building Addendum) if included in the Owner’s plan and the ability to provide for prevailing party attorney fees (before both sides of a dispute bore their own fees).
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Christopher G. Hill, Law Office of Christopher G. Hill, PCMr. Hill may be contacted at
chrisghill@constructionlawva.com
Nevada Supreme Court Clarifies the Litigation Waiver of the One-Action Rule
September 07, 2017 —
Bob L. Olson - Snell & Wilmer Real Estate Litigation BlogNevada has a one-action rule which, with limited exceptions, requires a creditor seeking to recover a debt secured by real property to proceed against the security first prior to seeking recovery from the debtor personally. In the event that a law suit is filed in violation of the one-action rule, final judgment may be entered in favor of the creditor but that judgment “releases and discharges the mortgage or other lien.” NRS 40.455(3). Nevada law further provides that, with the exception of certain guaranties, any provision in an agreement relating to the sale of real property which contains a waiver of Nevada’s anti-deficiency laws may not be enforced by a court because doing so violates Nevada’s public policy. NRS 40.453.
Nevada law also addresses when the one-action rule may be waived in litigation. In the author’s view, the governing statute, NRS 40.435 is ambiguous. Section 2 of that statute states that if the one-action rule is timely interposed as an affirmative defense, the action must either be dismissed without prejudice or continued to allow the creditor to file amended pleadings to convert the action into one which does not violate the one-action rule. This suggests that the one-action rule must be asserted as an affirmative defense in the debtor’s answer to the complaint or it is waived by the debtor. The first sentence of section 3 of the statute, however, seems to suggest that the debtor has up until the entry of a final judgment to waive the one-action rule by stating: “[t]he failure to interpose, before the entry of a final judgment, the provisions of NRS 40.430 [the one-action rule] as an affirmative defense in such a proceeding waives the defense in that proceeding.”
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Bob L. Olson, Snell & WilmerMr. Olson may be contacted at
bolson@swlaw.com
Tennessee Court: Window Openings Too Small, Judgment Too Large
November 18, 2011 —
CDJ STAFFThe Tennessee Court of Appeals has issued a ruling in the case of Dayton v. Ackerman, upholding the decision of the lower court, even as they found that the award was incorrectly computed. The Daytons purchased a house that had been designed and built by the Ackermans, who operated a construction business. The court noted that the warranty with the house promised that “for a period of 60 days, the following items will be free of defects in materials or workmanship: doors (including hardware); windows; electric switches; receptacles; and fixtures; caulking around exterior openings; pluming fixtures; and cabinet work.”
Soon, the Daytons began to experience problems with the house. Many were addressed by the Ackermans, but the Daytons continued to have problems with the windows. Neither side could specify a firm date when the Ackermans were contacted by the Daytons about the window problems. The Ackermans maintained that more than two years passed before the Daytons complained about the windows. The lower court found the Daytons more credible in this.
Initially, the Daytons included the window manufacturer in their suit, but after preliminary investigations, the Daytons dropped Martin Doors from their suit. Martin Doors concluded that the windows were improperly installed, many of them “jammed into openings that were too small for them.”
After the Daytons dismissed Martin Doors, the Ackermans sought to file a third party complaint against them. This was denied by the court, as too much time had elapsed. The Ackermans also noted that not all of the window installations were defective, however, the courts found that the Daytons ought not to have mismatched windows.
Unfortunately for the Daytons, the window repair was done incorrectly and the windows were now too small for the openings. The firm that did the repair discounted the windows and Daytons concealed the problem with plantation shutters, totalling $400 less than the original lowest estimate. However, the appeals court noted that it was here that the trial court made their computation error. Correcting this, the appeals court assessed the Ackermans $12,016.20 instead of $13,016.20.
Finally, the Ackerman’s expert was excluded as he had changed his testimony between deposition and trial. The trial reviewed the expert’s testimony and had it been admissible, it would not have changed the ruling.
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Penalty for Failure to Release Expired Liens
April 02, 2024 —
William L. Porter - Porter Law GroupI was recently contacted by a commercial building owner in the process of trying to sell his building. Two years prior to this, a subcontractor had recorded a mechanics’ lien with the local County Recorder’s office in relation to the owner’s property. The subcontractor recorded the mechanics lien after the subcontractor was not paid by a prime contractor for work the subcontractor had performed on the property. Unfortunately, the subcontractor then failed to file a lawsuit to foreclose on the lien within the requisite ninety (90) day time period for filing a lawsuit to foreclose on the mechanics’ lien. Since the subcontractor missed this 90 day deadline to file the mechanics lien foreclosure lawsuit, the mechanics lien expired and became unenforceable.
Subject to certain exceptions, under California Civil Code Section 8460, a lawsuit to foreclose on a mechanics lien must be filed within ninety (90) days after the mechanics lien is recorded or the mechanics lien expires. Although the mechanics lien had expired, the title company and intended purchaser of the building and property were perhaps understandably insistent that the mechanics lien constituted a cloud on title to the property and must be removed from the official records for the property. The prospective purchaser would not buy the property unless the mechanics’ lien was removed.
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William L. Porter, Porter Law GroupMr. Porter may be contacted at
bporter@porterlaw.com
Homeowner Has No Grounds to Avoid Mechanics Lien
September 01, 2011 —
CDJ STAFFThe California Court of Appeals has rejected a motion by a homeowner in a dispute with the contractor who built an extension to his home. In McCracken v. Pirvulete, Mr. McCracken filed a mechanics lien after Mr. Pirvulete failed to complete payment. The matter went to trial with a series of exhibits that showed “the contractual relationship was strained and the parties disagreed over performance and payment.” As a result of the trial, the court awarded Mr. McCracken, the contractor, $1,922.22.
Mr. Pirvulete appealed, contending that the court had not allowed his daughter to act as a translator, that the court had failed to give him sufficient time to present his case, that the mechanics lien should have been dismissed, and several other claims, all before a formal judgment was issued. After the court formalized its judgment and rejected the appeal, Mr. Pirvulete appealed again.
The appeals court found that Mr. Pirvulete did not provide an adequate record for review. The court dismissed Mr. Pirvulete’s claims. The court notes that Mr. Pirvulete claimed that a request for a discovery period was denied, however, he has provided neither the request nor the denial. The trial court has no record of either.
Nor was there a record of a request that Mr. Pirvulete’s daughter provide translation. The court notes, “so far as we can glean from the record provided, the Register of Actions states, ‘Trial to proceed without Romanian Interpreter for Defendant; Daughter present to interpret if needed.’” Additionally, the court found that “there has been no showing that his facility with the English language is or was impaired in any way or that there was any portion of any proceeding, which he did not understand.”
Further, the appeals court found there were no grounds for a new trial, despite Mr. Pirvulete’s filings. The court concluded, “The owner has failed to provide a record adequate for review of most, if not all, of the claims of error. Some issues are not cognizable because they relate to entirely separate proceedings, and not the trial below. To the limited extent that the claims are examinable, the owner has made no showing of error.” The court affirmed the judgment of the lower court against Mr. Pirvulete.
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Duty to Defend For Accident Exists, But Not Duty to Indeminfy
March 05, 2015 —
Tred R. Eyerly – Insurance Law HawaiiThe Seventh Circuit found there was a duty to defend the additional insured under the policy, but not a duty to indemnify. Kmart Corp. v. Footstar, Inc., 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 1775 (7th Cir. Feb. 4, 2015).
By agreement, Footstar operated the footwear department in hundreds of Kmart stores around the country. Footstar's footwear departments were in designated areas of the Kmart stores. Section 18.1 of the Master Agreement required Footstar to defend and indemnify Kmart from "all damage . . . arising out of Footstar's performance or failure to perform under this Agreement." The same section also required Footstar to obtain additional insurance coverage for Kmart.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law HawaiiMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
