Bremer Whyte Brown & O’Meara, LLP is Proud to Announce Jeannette Garcia Has Been Elected as Secretary of the Hispanic Bar Association of Orange County!
February 03, 2020 —
Bremer Whyte Brown & O'Meara LLPThe Hispanic Bar Association of Orange County is an affiliate bar of the OCBA. The OC HBA promotes education, unity, and excellence in the Hispanic legal community by expanding the business and professional opportunities available to its members, enhancing the members’ business and professional stature in the Hispanic community, increasing the participation of Hispanic leaders in civic affairs and enhancing the quality of life for the members and the community.
Associate Jeannette Garcia has been a member of the OC HBA since 2012, a board member since 2017 and an executive board member since 2018. Jeannette will now serve as Secretary of the OC HBA for the 2020 term.
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Who Says You Can’t Choose between Liquidated Damages or Actual Damages?
October 11, 2017 —
Kevin Walton - Snell & Wilmer Real Estate Litigation BlogIn Colorado, courts enforce liquidated damages provisions if three elements are satisfied: (1) the parties intended to liquidate damages; (2) the amount of liquidated damages was a reasonable estimate of the presumed actual damages caused by a breach; and (3) at the time of contracting, it was difficult to ascertain the amount of actual damages that would result from a breach. But what happens when a contract gives a party a right to choose between liquidated damages or actual damages? This seems troublesome because it allows a party to set the floor for their damages without limitation if actual damages exceed the contractual amount. As a matter of first impression, the Colorado Supreme Court addressed this issue in Ravenstar, LLC v. One Ski Hill Place, LLC, 401 P.3d 552 (Colo. 2017).
In Ravenstar, plaintiffs contracted to buy condominiums from a developer. As part of their contracts, plaintiffs deposited earnest money and construction deposits equal to 15% of each unit’s purchase price. Plaintiffs breached their contract by failing to obtain financing and failing to close by the closing date. Each contract’s damages provision provided that if a purchaser defaulted, the developer had the option to retain all or some of the deposits as liquidated damages or, alternatively, to pursue actual damages and apply the deposits to that award. After plaintiffs defaulted, the developer chose to keep plaintiffs’ deposits as liquidated damages. Plaintiffs sued for return of their deposits.
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Kevin Walton, Snell & WilmerMr. Walton may be contacted at
kwalton@swlaw.com
New York’s Highest Court Gives Insurers “an Incentive to Defend”
November 20, 2013 —
CDJ STAFFThe New York Court of Appeals, that state’s highest court, has ruled that when an insurer disclaims duty to defend, “if the disclaimer is found bad, the insurance company must indemnify its insured for the resulting judgment, even if policy exclusions would have otherwise negated the duty to indemnify.” The insurer who makes a failed claim that there was no duty to defend cannot thereafter claim exclusions.
This recent New York decision is discussed by Allen R. Wolff and Eric R. Reed of Anderson Kill in their Policyholder Advisor. They note that the decision “confirms that the estoppel rule applies in New York , as it does in at least four other states.”
But this may not be the last word. American Guarantee made a motion for reargument, which the court granted. The case will return to the court in January 2014. They note that “if paying defense costs is the only consequence an insurance company faces for breaching its duty to defend the insured, an insurance company has a financial incentive to ‘kick the can down the road.’”
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Insurer Rejecting Construction Defect Claim Must Share in Defense Costs
March 02, 2020 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiOne insurer, who accepted the tender of defense in a construction defect case, successfully moved for summary judgment against the second insurer, who denied the insured's tender. Interstate Fire & Cas. v. Aspen Ins. UK Ltd., 2019 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 5800 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 25,2019).
Standard Waterproofing Corporation was hired by the construction manager, G Builders, to perform waterproofing work as part of condominium conversion project. After the project was completed,the condominium occupants experienced water damage in their units. The Condominium Board retained an engineer who reported numerous issues of water infiltration relating to Standard's work.
The Condominium Board filed suit against the construction manager, who filed a third party complaint against Standard. Standard tendered to four different insurers, including plaintiff Interstate and defendant Aspen. Interstate agreed to defend, while Aspen and the other two insurers declined. Aspen argued there were no allegations of an occurrence resulting in property damage during its policy periods. Interstate filed for declaratory relief against Aspen and Standard.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak HastertMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Builders Beware: A New Class Of Defendants In Asbestos Lawsuits
January 06, 2016 —
David J. Byassee, Bremer Whyte Brown & O’Meara, LLP & Timothy A. Gravitt, Ulich, Ganion, Balmuth, Fisher & Feld, LLPResidential, commercial and industrial builders face new and potentially significant liability for construction activities that took place in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s: personal injury lawsuits filed by construction workers from exposure to building products containing asbestos. After emptying the pockets of manufacturers and suppliers of raw asbestos and asbestos-containing products over the last 20 years, plaintiff lawyers are beginning to set their sights on a new class of defendants in asbestos litigation: residential, commercial and industrial builders who unknowingly allowed asbestos-containing products to be incorporated into their projects.
The men and women who have been involved in the building industry for 40 years or more may remember the subject of asbestos surfacing in the 1970s with the enactment of the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA). At that point builders were just beginning to learn that asbestos was a component of some building materials, and the potential risk of cancer presented by asbestos was being debated in scientific and medical journals. Although the use of building materials containing asbestos was mostly phased out by the 1980s, the health risks associated with exposure to asbestos continue – and in fact increase – for the duration of an exposed person’s life.
Today it is generally accepted that exposure to asbestos increases the risk of developing asbestosis and certain kinds of cancer, including mesothelioma. Cancers associated with exposure to asbestos are typically diagnosed at least 15 years (and sometimes up to 50 years) after a person’s exposure to asbestos, meaning that exposures in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s might not manifest in disease until now. The class of persons who may be at risk for asbestos-related disease is long and varied: insulators, HVAC installers, pipe fitters, plumbers, drywall installers, painters, plasterers and roofers, to name a few. Long-term exposure history, coupled with the theory that “each and every” exposure during a lifetime is a substantial factor increasing the risk of developing cancer, presents potential liability to builders acting as general contractors and/or property owners, as well as the usual defendants in asbestos lawsuits, which include manufacturers, suppliers, and users of asbestos-containing materials.
In recent years, plaintiff lawyers have set their sights on builders as the financial wherewithal of traditional asbestos defendants has dried up. Plaintiff lawyers have created a new theory of liability which they use to rope builders in as defendants in asbestos lawsuits: that the builder knew – or should have known – that a deadly ingredient (asbestos) was contained in the building materials used in construction, and the builder failed to warn its subcontractors or anyone else on the project that exposure to asbestos could harm them.
Builders have unique legal defenses to claims brought by employees of subcontractors who have developed asbestos-related disease. For example, the California Supreme Court in Privette v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 689, held that an injured employee of a subcontractor cannot maintain a claim against the hirer (builder) for the employee’s injury absent affirmative contribution on the part of the builder to the injury. Thus the first line of defense in an asbestos exposure case is to argue that the developer had no direct role in the plaintiff’s exposure to asbestos and therefore the Privette doctrine precludes the plaintiff from suing the builder. But resourceful plaintiff lawyers are coming up with arguments to get around this so-called Privette defense in asbestos lawsuits by claiming that builders’ activities such as cleanup of asbestos-containing materials, or assertion of control over the work of the subcontractor, directly contributed to the plaintiff’s injuries and therefore provide exceptions to Privette and allow the claim to proceed.
A practical question is raised in asbestos cases: How is a plaintiff able to prove, decades after working on a project, what building materials contained asbestos, or that a builder knew or should have known in the 1960s, 1970s or 1980s that asbestos-containing materials were used on their project, or that asbestos presented a health risk? To answer the first part of the question (what building materials contained asbestos), plaintiff’s experts will say that during the relevant timeframe asbestos was a common ingredient in many building products, e.g., drywall joint compounds, stucco/plaster/gun cement, acoustic ceiling products, cement pipe, insulation, roofing mastic, caulk and plumber’s putty; this can be further proven by reference to product manufacturers’ disclosures made pursuant to the Asbestos Information Act. Also, through the decades of asbestos litigation against product manufacturers and suppliers, resourceful plaintiff lawyers have developed vast banks of data and documentation identifying the manufacturers of asbestos-containing building products, the end-users of those products, and the projects where those products were supplied. With this bank of knowledge, all that is necessary for them to make the claim against a builder is to have the plaintiff identify a construction project where he or she remembers working during the relevant timeframe. Once that identification is made, it is a simple matter for the lawyers to dig and find out who developed the building/project, who then becomes a defendant in an asbestos lawsuit.
The answer to the second part of the question (whether the developer knew or should have known that the products brought to their projects contained asbestos) requires a detailed investigation into the dates at which the products were supplied to the project, the manufacturer of the product, and what information was available in the market place about the material content of the particular product.
The answer to the third part of the question (knowledge that asbestos presented a health risk) is trickier. One of the first standards set by OSHA in 1972 related to permissible levels of exposure to asbestos. It is a common tactic for plaintiff lawyers to argue that the existence of OSHA standards created a presumption of knowledge in the building industry about the dangers of asbestos. But what about pre-OSHA knowledge? Here plaintiff lawyers will argue that well before OSHA, going back as far as 1936, exposure to asbestos was regulated in California under General Industry Safety Orders relating to Dusts, Fumes, Mists, Vapors and Gases. They argue that the General Industry Safety Orders put builders “on notice” of the dangers of asbestos by virtue of being regulated by the State of California, and, by extension, builders had “knowledge” of the health risks associated with asbestos.
There are defenses that skilled defense counsel can utilize to defeat asbestos claims, assuming the Privette defense is not available. The first is to thoroughly investigate and evaluate all of the plaintiff’s potential exposures to asbestos throughout his entire lifetime, and identify those sources that likely were the major contributors to his disease. Next, counsel has to properly investigate the project at which the plaintiff is alleged to have been exposed to asbestos, identify all of the possible sources of exposure, i.e., the products that were used or might have been used at the project, and finally how the plaintiff was allegedly exposed at the project. As most builders do not maintain records of what products were used in their projects dating back 15 years or more, let alone the identities of the trades that worked on the projects, knowledgeable defense counsel can be a valuable partner in unearthing the brands of products typically in use in the locale where the construction took place, and identifying the manufacturers of those products. Defense counsel must analyze the frequency, duration, proximity and intensity of the exposure, as well as the type of asbestos the plaintiff was allegedly exposed to (not all asbestos is created equal – some types are more toxic than others). This will involve careful evaluation of the levels of exposure created by the alleged activity of the builder, to determine, through experts and a thorough understanding of the scientific and medical studies on the subject, whether the levels of asbestos exposure created by the activity could be considered a “substantial factor” in contributing to the risk of the plaintiff’s development of his asbestos-related disease.
Asbestos lawsuits present a significant risk to the unsuspecting and unprepared builder. Money damages available to a plaintiff are substantial. Medical expenses for treatment of asbestos-related disease typically run into the hundreds of thousands of dollars, lost income (including retirement benefits) can also be significant, and jury awards for pain, suffering and emotional distress can be staggering - often millions of dollars. In some cases punitive damages are even awarded.
The bottom line is that a builder runs a big risk if it treats an asbestos claim like any other claim. The level of analysis and investigation to properly defend against the claim requires prompt action by knowledgeable counsel, and frequently there is no insurance coverage.
David J. Byassee is an attorney with the firm
Bremer Whyte Brown & O’Meara, LLP, and is a litigator who has devoted nearly a decade to representation of real estate developers and builders. He can be reached at: dbyassee@bremerwhyte.com.
Timothy A. Gravitt is an attorney with the firm
Ulich, Ganion, Balmuth, Fisher & Feld, LLP who is devoted to defending real estate developers and builders in a variety of litigation. He can be reached at: tgravitt@ulichlaw.com.
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OSHA Announces Expansion of “Severe Violator Enforcement Program”
November 15, 2022 —
Kip J. Adams & Steven G. Gatley - Lewis Brisbois(October 28, 2022) - Employers beware! The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) is significantly expanding its “Severe Violator Enforcement Program” (SVEP). Employers that are placed into the program by OSHA will be significantly scrutinized, with the potential for very damaging information about their failure to maintain a safe workplace being made public for customers, partners, and vendors to see.
As the name suggests, the program is meant to identify, classify, and then stringently monitor employees deemed to be “severe violators” of the OSH Act. According to the OSHA website alert, to be deemed a “severe violator”, the agency must find that the employer has demonstrated “indifference” to the regulations by committing “willful, repeated, or failure-to-abate” violations.
Reprinted courtesy of
Kip J. Adams, Lewis Brisbois and
Steven G. Gatley, Lewis Brisbois
Mr. Adams may be contacted at Kip.Adams@lewisbrisbois.com
Mr. Gatley may be contacted at Steven.Gatley@lewisbrisbois.com
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Party Loses Additional Insured Argument by Improper Pleading
September 20, 2017 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiThe Archdiocese failed to plead breach of contract against the County for failure to name the Archdiocese as an additional insured under the liability policy. Pachella v. Archdiocese of Philadelphia, 2017 Pa. Commw. Unpub. LEXIS 595 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Aug. 14, 2017).
Richard and Pachella filed a complaint against the Archdiocese, alleging that Mrs. Pachella was injured when she tripped and fell on the sidewalk outside of St. Patrick's Parish. At the time, the County was leasing St. Patrick's premises for use as an election polling place. The Archdiocese filed a third party complaint alleging negligence and breach of contract claims under a Lease Agreement between St. Patrick's and the County.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law HawaiiMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Determining the Cause of the Loss from a Named Windstorm when there is Water Damage - New Jersey
March 23, 2020 —
Anna M. Perry - Saxe Doernberger & VitaWater damage, while one of the leading causes of loss under a property policy, often results in some of the most complex claims due to the intersection of exclusions, sublimits, and complex wording within the policy. One particularly difficult issue is whether water damage caused by a storm surge is covered by the flood sublimit, or under the general policy or water limit. In New Jersey Transit Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s (“NJTC v. Lloyd’s”), the New Jersey Appeals Court found that the “flood” sublimit of the policy should not apply as the cause of the loss was a “named windstorm” and not a “flood.”
In NJTC v Lloyd's the court was asked to determine whether a flood sublimit applied to losses sustained during Superstorm Sandy. The court found that although there was “flooding,” the water damage was more closely related to the “named windstorm”, and therefore, the $400 million policy limits should apply. The court focused its analysis on the definitions for “flood” and “named windstorm” and by applying the efficient proximate cause doctrine to determine which would apply.
When reviewing the definitions within the property policies, the court determined that although the loss would qualify under the definition of “flood,” the policy also contained a definition for “named windstorm” which “more specifically encompasses the wind driven water or storm surge associated with a ‘named windstorm’”1. In addition, the policy did not specifically state that “storm surge” associated with a “named windstorm” should be considered a “flood” event and fall under the “flood” sublimit.
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Anna M. Perry, Saxe Doernberger & VitaMs. Perry may be contacted at
amp@sdvlaw.com