Blueprint for Change: How the Construction Industry Should Respond to the FTC’s Ban on Noncompetes
May 13, 2024 —
Matthew DeVries - Best Practices Construction LawIn a groundbreaking move aimed at fostering fair competition and empowering workers, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) issued a final rule last week to ban noncompete agreements nationwide. This ruling may carry profound implications for the construction industry, prompting construction businesses to reassess their practices and ensure compliance while maintaining competitiveness. Let’s explore how construction companies, large and small, can navigate this regulatory shift effectively.
Noncompete clauses have long been a staple in employment contracts within the construction sector, often used to protect proprietary information and retain skilled talent. However, the FTC’s ban on noncompetes demands a reevaluation of these practices. Employers must recognize the potential consequences of noncompliance, including legal repercussions and reputational damage, and take proactive steps to adapt to the new regulatory landscape.
Communications with Employees
The FTC rule requires employers to provide a form notice of non-enforcement to all present and former employees subject to an unexpired noncompete provisions. However, given the immediate legal challenges to the FTC’s rule and the fact that the 120-day compliance window has not yet begun, there is no reason to take immediate action or begin notifying employees. Instead, business owners should wait for at least 60 days before taking concrete action in response to the rule to see if any court temporarily enjoins the effectiveness of the rule.
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Matthew DeVries, Burr & Forman LLPMr. DeVries may be contacted at
mdevries@burr.com
Boston-area Asbestos-Abatement Firms Face Wage and Safety Complaints
January 26, 2017 —
Justin Rice - Engineering News-RecordSeveral federal and state complaints against asbestos-abatement and demolition firms operating in Massachusetts have sprouted in the wake of the region’s construction boom. Involving mostly small companies and immigrant workers, the cases allege wage and benefit violations as well as improper exposure to asbestos fibers, which contain cancer-causing carcinogens.
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Justin Rice, ENRMr. Rice may be contacted at
ricej@enr.com
Gillotti v. Stewart (2017) 2017 WL 1488711 Rejects Liberty Mutual, Holding Once Again that the Right to Repair Act is the Exclusive Remedy for Construction Defect Claims
June 05, 2017 —
Richard H. Glucksman, Esq. & Chelsea L. Zwart, Esq. - Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger BulletinBackground
In Gillotti v. Stewart (April 26, 2017) 2017 WL 1488711, which was ordered to be published on May 18, 2017, the defendant grading subcontractor added soil over tree roots to level the driveway on the plaintiff homeowner’s sloped lot. The homeowner sued the grading subcontractor under the California Right to Repair Act (Civil Code §§ 895, et seq.) claiming that the subcontractor’s work damaged the trees.
After the jury found the subcontractor was not negligent, the trial court entered judgment in favor of the subcontractor. The homeowner appealed, arguing that the trial court improperly construed the Right to Repair Act as barring a common law negligence theory against the subcontractor and erred in failing to follow Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Brookfield Crystal Cove LLC (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 98. The Third District Court of Appeal disagreed and affirmed the trial court’s judgment in favor of the subcontractor.
Impact
This is the second time the Third District Court of Appeal has held that Liberty Mutual (discussed below) was wrongly decided and held that the Right to Repair Act is the exclusive remedy for construction defect claims. The decision follows its holding in Elliott Homes, Inc. v. Superior Court (Hicks) (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 333, in which the Court of Appeal held that the Right to Repair Act’s pre-litigation procedures apply when homeowners plead construction defect claims based on common law causes of action, as opposed to violations of the building standards set forth in the Right to Repair Act. Elliott is currently on hold at the California Supreme Court, pending the decision in McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 1132, wherein Liberty Mutual was rejected for the first time by the Fifth District. CGDRB continues to follow developments regarding the much anticipated McMillin decision closely, as well as all related matters.
Discussion
The Right to Repair Act makes contractors and subcontractors not involved in home sales liable for construction defects only if the homeowner proves they negligently cause the violation in whole or part (Civil Code §§ 911(b), 936). As such, the trial court in Gillotti instructed the jury on negligence with respect to the grading subcontractor. The jury found that while the construction did violate some of the Right to Repair’s building standards alleged by the homeowner, the subcontractor was not negligent in anyway. After the jury verdict, the trial court found in favor of the grading subcontractor.
The homeowner moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial on the grounds that the trial court improperly barred a common law negligence theory against the grading subcontractor. The trial court denied the motions on the grounds that “[t]he Right to Repair Act specifically provides that no other causes of action are allowed. See Civil Code § 943.” The trial court specifically noted that its decision conflicted with Liberty Mutual, in which the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that the Right to Repair Act does not eliminate common law rights and remedies where actual damage has occurred, stating that Liberty Mutual was wrongly decided and that the Liberty Mutual court was naïve in its assumptions regarding the legislative history of the Right to Repair Act.
In Gillotti, the Third District Court of Appeal stated that the Liberty Mutual court failed to analyze the language of Civil Code § 896, which “clearly and unequivocally expresses the legislative intent that the Act apply to all action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, residential construction, except as specifically set forth in the Act. The Act does not specifically except actions arising from actual damages. To the contrary, it authorizes recovery of damages, e.g., for ‘the reasonable cost of repairing and rectifying any damages resulting from the failure of the home to meet the standards....’ ([Civil Code] § 944).”
The Court also disagreed with Liberty Mutual’s view that because Civil Code §§ 931 and 943 acknowledge exceptions to the Right to Repair Act’s statutory remedies, the Act does not preclude common law claims for damages due to defects identified in the Act. The Court stated: “Neither list of exceptions, in section 943 or in section 931, includes common law causes of action such as negligence. If the Legislature had intended to make such a wide-ranging exception to the restrictive language of the first sentence of section 943, we would have expected it to do so expressly.”
Additionally, the Court of Appeal rejected the argument that Civil Code § 897 preserves a common law negligence claims for violation of standards not listed in Civil Code § 986. It explained that the section of Civil Code § 897, which provides, “The standards set forth in this chapter are intended to address every function or component of a structure,” expresses the legislative intent that the Right to Repair Act be all-encompassing. Anything inadvertently omitted is actionable under the Act if it causes damage. Any exceptions to the Act are made expressly through Civil Code §§ 931 and 934. The Court concluded in no uncertain terms that the Right to Repair Act precludes common law claims in cases for damages covered by the Act.
The homeowner further argued that she was not precluded from bringing a common law claim because a tree is not a “structure,” and therefore the alleged tree damage did not fall within the realm of the Right to Repair. The Court of Appeal also rejected this argument, holding that while the tree damage itself was not expressly covered, the act of adding soil to make the driveway level (which caused the damage) implicated the standards covered by the Right to Repair Act. The Court explained that since under the Act a “structure” includes “improvement located upon a lot or within a common area” (Civil Code § 895(a)), as the driveway was an improvement upon the lot, the claim was within the purview of the Right to Repair Act. As the soil, a component of the driveway, caused damage (to the trees), it was actionable under the Act.
Reprinted courtesy of
Richard H. Glucksman, Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger and
Chelsea L. Zwart, Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger
Mr. Glucksman may be contacted at rglucksman@cgdrblaw.com
Ms. Zwart may be contacted at czwart@cgdrblaw.com
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Taking the Stairs to Human Wellness and Greener Buildings
June 22, 2016 —
Rob Finch – Construction Informer BlogIf taking the stairs catches on, buildings with elevators could automatically get greener. The people working in them also stand a good chance of getting healthier. However, designers and builders working for owners who want to reap these advantages, will need to learn a few new tricks when it comes to how stairs get placed and promoted. They also get a chance to unleash creativity in how they are finished.
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Rob Finch, Construction Informer Blog
Holding the Bag for Pre-Tender Defense Costs
February 02, 2017 —
John J. Kozak, Esq. - Florida Construction Law NewsFor a variety of reasons, additional insureds (and even named insureds) under commercial general liability policies will sometimes wait months, and even years, to tender the defense of a claim or lawsuit, incurring significant legal fees in the interim. When the claim finally is tendered, a dispute often arises over who should pay the pre-tender defense costs. Surprisingly, there is very little Florida legal authority specifically dealing with this issue. However, the recent federal 11th Circuit Court of Appeals case of EmbroidMe.com, Inc. v. Travelers Property Casualty Co. of America, No. 14-10616, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 368 (11th Cir. Jan. 9, 2017), applying Florida law, addresses the issue head-on and provides CGL carriers with a large hammer in refusing to pay pre-tender fees.
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John J. Kozak, Esq., Cole, Scott & Kissane, P.A.Mr. Kozak may be contacted at
john.kozak@csklegal.com
Definitions Matter in Illinois: Tenant Held Liable Only for Damage to Apartment Unit
September 09, 2024 —
Gus Sara - The Subrogation StrategistIn Phila. Indem. Ins. Co. v. Gonzalez, No. 1-23-0833, 2024 Ill. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1372, the Appellate Court of Illinois considered whether the terms of a lease agreement limited a tenant’s liability for fire damages, a fire caused by her negligence, to her apartment unit only. The plaintiff insured the subject apartment building, which incurred damage to several units as result of a fire in the tenant’s unit. The lease defined “Premises” as the specific apartment unit occupied by the tenant and held the tenant responsible for damage caused to the Premises. While the court found that the lease permitted the plaintiff to subrogate against the tenant, it held that the lease terms limited the damages to the tenant’s apartment unit only.
In Gonzalez, the plaintiff’s insured owned a multi-unit apartment building in Chicago. In September 2019, the building owner entered into a lease agreement with the defendant for apartment Unit 601. The lease stated that Unit 601 was the “Leased Address (Premises).” Another provision stated that building owner “hereby leases to Tenant(s) and Tenant(s) hereby leases from Landlord(s) for use as a private dwelling only, the Premises, together with the fixtures and appliances (if any) in the premises…” The lease also stated that “Tenant shall be liable for any damage done to the premises as a result of Tenant’s or Tenant’s invitees, guests or others authorized to reside in the Premises [sic] direct action, negligence, or failure to inform Landlord of repairs necessary to prevent damage to the Premises.”
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Gus Sara, White and WilliamsMr. Sara may be contacted at
sarag@whiteandwilliams.com
The Miller Act: More Complex than You Think
October 07, 2016 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFKeith Bremer, senior partner of Bremer Whyte Brown & O’Meara LLP, has a feature article in the Fall 2016 issue of Construction Claims Magazine, and discusses how the Miller Act has been slowly changing: “This is a complex piece of legislation that is evolving and has been decided differently depending on the federal district a case is heard in,” Bremer wrote.
Bremer explained how the courts continue to rule differently in regards to the Miller Act. “Currently it seems jurisdictions are split on the issue of whether or not subcontractors should be allowed to bring both a federal and state cause of action stemming from payment by a Miller Act bond. Therefore, any surety writing these bonds should pay strict attention to how broad or narrow the federal district that would hear the claim has interpreted the scope of a subcontractor’s remedies for Miller Act claims.”
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Know your Obligations: Colorado’s Statutory Expansions of the Implied Warranty of Habitability Are Now in Effect
November 04, 2019 —
Luke Mecklenburg - Snell & Wilmer Real Estate Litigation BlogThe Colorado legislature had a busy session this year. Among the several significant bills it enacted, HB1170 strengthens tenant protections under the implied warranty of habitability. It became effective on August 2, 2019, so landlords and tenants alike are now subject to its requirements.
The bill makes numerous changes to Colorado’s implied warranty of habitability, and interested parties should review the bill in detail. Landlords in particular may want to consider retaining legal counsel to make sure they have proper procedures in place to promptly deal with any habitability complaints within the new required timelines. This posting is not intended to provide a comprehensive guide to the changed law, but simply to highlight some of the most significant changes.
With that caveat, landlords and tenants should be aware that as of August 2, 2019:
- The following conditions are now deemed to make a residential residence uninhabitable for the purposes of the implied warranty of habitability:
- The presence of mold, which is defined as “microscopic organisms or fungi that can grow in damp conditions in the interior of a building.”
- A refrigerator, range stove, or oven (“Appliance”) included within a residential premises by a landlord for the use of the tenant that did not conform “to applicable law at the time of installation” or that is not “maintained in good working order.” Nothing in this statute requires a landlord to provide any appliances, but these requirements apply if the landlord either agreed to provide appliances in a written agreement or provided them at the inception of the tenant’s occupancy.
- Other conditions that “materially interfere with the tenant’s life, health or safety.”
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Reprinted courtesy of Luke Mcklenburg, Snell & Wilmer
Mr. Mecklenburg may be contacted at lmecklenburg@swlaw.com
