SEATTLE WASHINGTON BUILDING EXPERT
DIRECTORY AND CAPABILITIES

Ambiguity in Insurance Policy will be Interpreted in Favor of Insurance Coverage

July 19, 2017 — David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal Updates
An ambiguity in an insurance policy–after reading and interpreting the policy as a whole–will be construed against an insurer. This means an ambiguity will be construed in favor of insurance coverage (for the benefit of the insured) as opposed to against insurance coverage. This does not mean that every insurance policy contains an ambiguity. This also does not mean a court will interpret plain and ordinary words contrary to their conventional meaning or definition. But, as we all know, insurance policies are not the easiest of documents to decipher and ambiguities do exist relating to a particular issue or circumstance to the benefit of an insured. An insured that is dealing with specific insurance coverage issues should make sure they are working with counsel that looks to maximize insurance coverage, even if that means exploring ambiguities that will benefit an insured based on a particular issue or circumstance. An example of an ambiguity in an insurance policy relating to a particular issue that benefitted an insured can be found in the Florida Supreme Court decision of Government Employees Insurance Co. v. Macedo, 42 Fla. L. Weekly S731a (Fla. 2017). This case involved an automobile accident and the interpretation of an automobile liability policy. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of David Adelstein, Florida Construction Legal Updates
Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at Dadelstein@gmail.com

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Recent Developments Involving Cedell v. Farmers Insurance Company of Washington

September 05, 2022 — Donald Verfurth, Sally Kim, Stephanie Ries & Kyle Silk-Eglit - Gordon & Rees Insurance Coverage Law Blog
Ever since the Washington Supreme Court’s 2013 decision in Cedell v. Farmers Insurance Company of Washington, 176 Wn.2d 686, 295 P.3d 239 (2013), insurance coverage attorneys have been struggling to define the exact parameters of the Cedell ruling in order to safeguard the attorney-client privilege as to the communications between the insurer and its counsel. As a brief background, the Washington Supreme Court held in Cedell that there is a presumption of no attorney-client privilege in a lawsuit involving bad faith claims handling. However, an insurer can overcome the presumption of no attorney-client privilege by showing that its counsel provided legal advice regarding the insurer’s potential liability under the policy and law, and did not engage in any quasi-fiduciary activities, i.e. claims handling activities, such as investigating, evaluating, adjusting or processing the insured’s claim. Since Cedell, various trial courts have held that the following activities by an insurer’s counsel constitute quasi-fiduciary conduct that do not overcome the presumption of no attorney-client privilege, resulting in an order to produce documents and/or to permit the deposition of the insurer’s counsel:

• Insurer’s attorney being the primary or sole point of contact with the insured for the insurer;
• Insurer’s attorney requesting documents from the insured that are relevant to the investigation of the claim;
• Insurer’s attorney communicating directly with the insured or the insured’s counsel regarding claims handling issues or payments;
• Insurer’s attorney interviewing witnesses for purposes of the investigation of the claim;
• Insurer’s attorney conducting an examination under oath of the insured;
• Insurer’s attorney drafting proposed or final reservation of rights letter or denial letter to the insured; and
• Insurer’s attorney conducting settlement negotiations in an underlying litigation.

Reprinted courtesy of Donald Verfurth, Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani, Sally Kim, Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani, Stephanie Ries, Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani and Kyle Silk-Eglit, Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani Mr. Verfurth may be contacted at dverfurth@grsm.com Ms. Kim may be contacted at sallykim@grsm.com Ms. Ries may be contacted at sries@grsm.com Mr. Silk-Eglit may be contacted at ksilkeglit@grsm.com Read the court decision
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Faulty Workmanship may be an Occurrence in Indiana CGL Policies

April 07, 2011 — Beverley BevenFlorez CDJ STAFF

The question of whether construction defects can be an occurrence in Commercial General Liabilities (CGL) policies continues to find mixed answers. The United States District Court in Indiana denied the Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment in the case of General Casualty Insurance v. Compton Construction Co., Inc. and Mary Ann Zubak stating that faulty workmanship can be an occurrence in CGL policies.



Judge Theresa L. Springmann cited Sheehan Construction Co., et al. v. Continental Casualty Co., et al. for her decision, ”The Indiana Supreme Court reversed summary judgment, which had been granted in favor of the insurer in Sheehan, holding that faulty workmanship can constitute an ‘accident’ under a CGL policy, which means any damage would have been caused by an ‘occurrence’ triggering the insurance policy’s coverage provisions. The Indiana Supreme Court also held that, under identically-worded policy exclusion terms that are at issue in this case, defective subcontractor work could provide the basis for a claim under a CGL policy.”



As we reported on April 1st, South Carolina’s legislature is currently working on bill S-431 that would change the wording of CGL policies in their state to include construction defects. Ray Farmer, Southwest region vice president of the American Insurance Association spoke out against the bill. “CGL policies were never meant to cover faulty workmanship by the contractor,” he said. “The bill’s supplementary and erroneous liability provisions will only serve to unnecessarily impact construction costs in South Carolina.”

 

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Read the American Insurance Association statement...

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Practical Advice: Indemnification and Additional Insured Issues Revisited

September 08, 2016 — John P. Ahlers – Ahlers & Cressman PLLC Construction Blog
Lawyers love writing about indemnification. There are seventeen blog articles on our website alone that deal with the subject. Before you click out of this email in disgust that we are rehashing a stale topic, this post contains some practical advice for contractors and subcontractors dealing with the perplexing issues of indemnification and additional insured provisions. The concept of indemnity is based on a contractual agreement made between two parties, in which one party agrees to pay for the potential losses or damages caused by the other party. To indemnify someone means to protect that person or entity by promising to pay the cost of possible future damage, loss, or injury. When signing a contract, you should identify the indemnity obligations that could cost your business money. Finding the words “hold harmless” or “indemnify” in a proposed contract is not enough. The terms “hold harmless,” “save harmless,” or “indemnify” are a big part of the indemnification obligation. Although insurance requirements (“additional insured” clauses) accomplish virtually the same thing as very broad, unfair, or unlimited indemnity terms do, they result in an “end run” around the effort to limit the indemnification obligation. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of John P. Ahlers, Ahlers & Cressman PLLC
Mr. Ahlers may be contacted at jahlers@ac-lawyers.com

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Loaded Boom of Burning Tower Crane Collapses in Manhattan, Injuring Six

August 07, 2023 — James Leggate - Engineering News-Record
The boom of a tower crane, with its engine on fire, collapsed July 26 at a high-rise construction site in midtown Manhattan—hitting the face of the building across the street as it dropped its 16-ton load. City officials said they would investigate the mishap, which caused minor injuries to two firefighters and four others. Reprinted courtesy of James Leggate, Engineering News-Record Mr. Leggate may be contacted at leggatej@enr.com Read the full story... Read the court decision
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Missouri Legislature Passes Bill to Drastically Change Missouri’s “Consent Judgment” Statute

August 10, 2021 — Jason Taylor - Traub Lieberman Insurance Law Blog
On June 29, 2021, Missouri Governor Mike Parson signed SB-HB 345 into law, which will drastically change Section 537.065 of the Missouri Revised Statutes. Section 537.065 provides an insured who has been denied insurance coverage a statutory mechanism to settle certain tort claims through an agreement akin to a consent judgment. Typically referred to as a “065 Agreement,” the statute allows a plaintiff and insured-tortfeasor to settle a claim for damages and specify which assets are available to satisfy the claim, typically the tortfeasor’s available insurance policy. In the past, such agreements were often accomplished without the insurer’s participation or even its knowledge. Under such agreements, the insured-tortfeasor assigns all rights to the insurance policy to the plaintiff and agrees not to contest the issues of liability or damages. In exchange the plaintiff agrees not to execute any judgment against the insured. The parties conduct what amounts to an uncontested and often “sham” trial resulting in a judgment far in excess of any actual damages or applicable policy limits had the case been contested. In a subsequent proceeding to collect on the judgment, the tortfeasor’s insurer is bound by the determinations of liability and damages made in the underlying action. This statutory framework presented plenty of opportunities for abuse. In 2017, the statute was amended in order to address some of those issues, including a requirement that the insured provide notice of a settlement demand under Section 065 and providing insurers a limited right to intervene in the tort action before liability and damages have been determined. Ostensibly, the intent of the 2017 amendments was to reduce the number of large and uncontested judgments and allow the insurance carrier an opportunity to continue litigating the injured party’s claim where the insured has no incentive or is contractually prohibited from doing so. Yet, creative plaintiff’s attorneys found several “loopholes” around these changes, most prominently, by moving their disputes from state court to binding arbitration and dispensing with notice to the insurer altogether, or at least until after the arbitration has concluded. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Jason Taylor, Traub Lieberman
Mr. Taylor may be contacted at jtaylor@tlsslaw.com

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#11 CDJ Topic: Cortez Blu Community Association, Inc. v. K. Hovnanian at Cortez Hill, LLC, et al.

December 30, 2015 — Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFF
Scott Calkins and Anthony Gaeta of Collinsworth, Specht, Calkins & Giampaoli, LLP obtained a defense verdict in a breach of fiduciary duty action involving a high-rise condominium in downtown San Diego, California. The Association asked for excess of over $3 million, however, the jury returned with a 10-2 defense verdict in favor of K. Hovnanian. “While it is now becoming ever more common for attorneys representing homeowners associations to allege a breach of fiduciary duty by the developer, there has been little actual litigation of the issues surrounding those claims which test the viability of the allegations or the defenses to them,” defense attorney Anthony Gaeta stated. “A breach of a fiduciary duty by a developer, which is demonstrated to damage the viability of an HOA either to perform regularly scheduled maintenance, or replace building components from its reserves, has the potential in economic terms to surpass the damages from purported construction defects.” Read the full story... Read the court decision
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“But I didn’t know what I was signing….”

May 30, 2018 — Bobby Kethcart - Snell & Wilmer Real Estate Litigation Blog
In real estate cases—which frequently involve long purchase agreements, loan documents, personal guarantees, deeds of trust, etc.—we’ve likely all had a client or opposing party who trots out the line that they didn’t know what they were signing, or they didn’t read or understand what they were signing, so the document shouldn’t be enforced according to its terms. Most of us instinctively believe the claim is a loser: You signed the document, you’re bound by it. But is this actually right? Well, we did some digging. Here is the Arizona law on the subject: Nationwide Resources Corp. v. Massabni, 134 Ariz. 557, 658 P.2d 210 (App. 1982):

“A mistake of only one of the parties to a contract in the expression of his agreement or as to the subject matter does not affect its binding force and ordinarily affords no ground for its avoidance, or for relief, even in equity.” “A manifestation of acceptance to the offeror or his agent forms a contract regardless of the intent of the acceptor.”

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Reprinted courtesy of Bobby Kethcart, Snell & Wilmer
Mr. Kethcart may be contacted at rkethcart@swlaw.com

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