SEATTLE WASHINGTON BUILDING EXPERT
DIRECTORY AND CAPABILITIES

HOA Has No Claim to Extend Statute of Limitations in Construction Defect Case

October 28, 2011 — CDJ STAFF

The California Court of Appeals ruled on September 20, 2011 in the case of Arundel Homeowners Association v. Arundel Green Partners, a construction defect case involving a condominium conversion in San Francisco. Eight years after the Notice of Completion was filed, the homeowners association filed a lawsuit alleging a number of construction defects, including “defective cabinets, waterproofing membranes, wall-cladding, plumbing, electrical wiring, roofing (including slope, drainage and flashings), fire-rated ceilings, and chimney flues.” Three years of settlement negotiations followed.

Negotiations ended in the eleventh year with the homeowners association filing a lawsuit. Arundel Green argued that the suit should be thrown out as California’s ten-year statute of limitations had passed. The court granted judgment to Arundel Green.

The homeowners then filed for a new trial and to amend its complaint, arguing that the statute of limitations should not apply due to the doctrine of equitable estoppel as Arundel Green’s actions had lead them to believe the issues could be solved without a lawsuit. “The HOA claimed that it was not until after the statute of limitations ran that the HOA realized Arundel Green would not keep its promises; and after this realization, the HOA promptly brought its lawsuit.” The trial court denied the homeowners association’s motions, which the homeowners association appealed.

In reviewing the case, the Appeals Court compared Arundel to an earlier California Supreme Court case, Lantzy. (The homeowners also cited Lantzy as the basis of their appeal.) In Lantzy, the California Supreme Court set up a four-part test as to whether estoppel could be applied. The court applied these tests and found, as was the case in Lantzy, that there were no grounds for estoppel.

In Arundel, the court noted that “there are simply no allegations that Arundel Green made any affirmative statement or promise that would lull the HOA into a reasonable belief that its claims would be resolved without filing a lawsuit.” The court also cited Lesko v. Superior Court which included a recommendation that the plaintiffs “send a stipulation?Ķextending time.” This did not happen and the court upheld the dismissal.

Read the court’s decision…

Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of

---

ConsensusDOCS Updates its Forms

October 21, 2015 — Christopher G. Hill – Construction Law Musings
As reported recently in ENR Magazine, among other publications, the ConsensusDOCS folks have updated their contract forms. Why is this news? First of all, it’s only been around three and a half years since these documents were officially released and this release is about 18 months sooner than anticipated (the original revision cycle was to be 5 years). Why the revision? According to my friend and counsel to ConsensusDOCS, Brian Perlberg, one major rationale is that “the economics of the construction industry today looks nothing like it did [in 2007.” Among the changes are several terminology changes (“constructor” instead of “contractor” for instance), the addition of mandatory green building design as a basic service (these forms already have a Green Building Addendum) if included in the Owner’s plan and the ability to provide for prevailing party attorney fees (before both sides of a dispute bore their own fees). Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of Christopher G. Hill, Law Office of Christopher G. Hill, PC
Mr. Hill may be contacted at chrisghill@constructionlawva.com

---

New Jersey Court Rules on Statue of Repose Case

May 26, 2011 — CDJ STAFF

A three-judge panel issued a per curium ruling on May 23 in Fairview Heights Condo. v. Investors (N.J. Super., 2011), a case which the members of a condominium board argued: “that the judge erred by: 1) dismissing plaintiff’s claims against RLI based upon the statute of repose; 2) dismissing the breach of fiduciary duty claims against the Luppinos based upon a lack of expert opinion; 3) barring the testimony of Gonzalez; and 4) barring the May 23, 1989 job site report.” The court rejected all claims from the condominium board.

The court found that the building must be unsafe for the statute of repose to apply. They noted, “the judge made no findings on whether the water seepage, or the property damage caused by such seepage, in any way rendered the building, or any of the units, unsafe.” Further, “without a specific finding on the question of whether the defects had rendered the building ‘unsafe,’ defendants were not entitled to the benefit of the ten-year statute of repose.“

On the second point, the court also upheld the lower court’s findings regarding the management company:

“The report submitted by Berman establishes that the EIFS product was defective in its design and would therefore have failed from the outset. The defects in that product were, according to Berman, not prone to repair or other mitigation. Therefore, even if defendants did not appropriately inspect or repair the EIFS, their failure to do so would have had no impact on the long-term performance of the EIFS exterior cladding. As plaintiff failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact on these questions, the judge properly granted summary judgment to the Luppinos on plaintiff’s breach of fiduciary duty claim.”

On the final two points, the judges noted “plaintiff maintains that the judge committed reversible error when he excluded the Gonzalez certification and the 1989 job site report prepared by Raymond Brzuchalski.” They saw “no abuse of discretion related to the exclusion of the Gonzalez certification, and reject plaintiff’s arguments to the contrary.” Of the job site report, they found, “no abuse of discretion in the judge's finding that the Brzuchalski 1989 job site report did not satisfy the requirements of N.J.R.E.803(c)(6).”

Read the court’s decision

Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of

---

Skipping Depositions does not Constitute Failure to Cooperate in New York

March 09, 2020 — Ryan G. Nelson - Saxe Doernberger & Vita
Insurance policies typically impose, on the insured, a duty to cooperate with the insurer during investigation and litigation of a claim. Non-cooperation can be grounds for denying coverage. This begs the question: what constitutes non-cooperation? Recently, a New York appellate court affirmed a trial court’s decision that failure by an employee of the insured to show up for three court-ordered depositions did not rise to the level of “willful and avowed obstruction” and therefore, the insurer could not deny coverage on the basis of non-cooperation. See Foddrell v. Utica First Insurance Co., 178 A.D.3d 901 (N.Y. App. Div. 2019). In so holding, the Foddrell court applied the Thrasher test: “To effectively deny coverage based upon lack of cooperation, an insurance carrier must demonstrate (1) that it acted diligently in seeking to bring about the insured’s cooperation, (2) that the efforts employed by the insured were reasonably calculated to obtain the insured’s cooperation, and (3) that the attitude of the insured, after his or her cooperation was sought, was one of willful and avowed obstruction.” Id.; see Thrasher v. U. S. Liab. Ins. Co., 19 N.Y.2d 159, 167 (1967). Thomas Foddrell’s suit against Utica First Insurance Company (“Utica First”) stemmed from his personal injury suit against Janey & Rana Construction Corporation (“J&R” (Utica First’s insured). During that lawsuit, J&R’s principal, Gardeep Singh, failed to appear for two court-ordered depositions. After his failure to appear at those depositions, Utica First sent an investigator to inform Singh that he was scheduled for a third deposition. Singh responded to the investigator that he would speak with J&R’s attorneys about the matter. Ultimately, Singh did not appear for the third court-ordered deposition. In response to Singh’s repeated failure to appear for the depositions, Utica First sent Singh a letter advising him that because of his lack of cooperation, Utica would no longer agree to indemnify J&R. Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of Ryan G. Nelson, Saxe Doernberger & Vita
Mr. Nelson may be contacted at rgn@sdvlaw.com

---

Revisiting Statutory Offers to Compromise

August 28, 2023 — Kathryne Baldwin - Wilke Fleury
The fourth appellate district published an opinion earlier this year in Smalley v. Subaru of America, Inc. (2022) 87 Cal.App.5th 450 that serves as an excellent refresher on requirements of the “998 Offer,” or a statutory offer to compromise pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”) §998. In Smalley, set in the context of a Lemon Law action, Defendant Subaru made a 998 Offer for $35,001.00, together with attorneys’ fees and costs totaling either $10,000.00 or costs and reasonably incurred attorneys’ fees, in an amount to be determined by the Court. (Smalley, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at 454.) Plaintiff objected that the offer was not reasonable and the case proceeded to trial. At trial, a jury found in favor of Plaintiff and awarded him a total judgment award of $27,555.74 – far short of the $35,001.00 offer. The trial court found Plaintiff had failed to beat the 998 at trial and that Subaru’s earlier 998 offer was reasonable. Plaintiff appealed the post-judgment order awarding Plaintiff pre-offer costs and Defendant post-offer costs on the grounds that the 998 was not reasonable in that it did not specify whether Plaintiff would be deemed the prevailing party for purposes of a motion for attorneys’ fees. The fourth district affirmed the trial court’s order and engaged in a helpful review of 998 requirements. Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of Kathryne Baldwin, Wilke Fleury
Ms. Baldwin may be contacted at kbaldwin@wilkefleury.com

---

Pennsylvania Homeowner Blames Cracks on Chipolte Construction

October 14, 2013 — CDJ STAFF
“Everything was shaking, like a big bomb went off.” That’s how Hersey, Pennsylvania resident Maria Yi described the situation during construction of a Chipolte restaurant next to her home. She and other people thought it was an earthquake, but then found it came from the construction site. She told the operator of the machine to stop. Yi and her husband later found cracks in their home which they attribute to the construction activity. Township supervisors were sympathetic to Yi, with Kelly Fedeli, the Supervisor Vice Chairwoman, told Yi that she feels “very badly about what happened to you.” And Chuck Emerick, the township code officer told Yi that “we’re doing everything we can to help you.” This is not Yi’s first conflict with the proposed restaurant. Yi was involved in a lawsuit that sought to stop the restaurant from being built at all. That suit is being appealed, but even if Yi were to win at the appeal, the restaurant would go forward. Said Yi of the supervisors, “they told me there would be no problem.” Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of

---

Awarding Insurer Summary Judgment Before Discovery Completed Reversed

August 29, 2022 — Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law Hawaii
The Florida Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's awarding of summary judgment to the insurer because discovery was not completed. Sacramento v. Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp., 2022 Fla. App. LEXIS 4292 (Fla. Ct. App. June 22, 2022). The insured filed a claim under the all-risk policy for water damage caused by Hurricane Irma. Citizens denied the claim based upon a policy exclusion. The insured filed suit on March 8, 2019. On April 24, 2020, Citizens moved for summary judgment. A hearing was set for August 10, 2020. Citizens filed a notice for a deposition of a Mitigation Company representative scheduled to occur on December 1, 2020. On August 14, 2020, the insured filed an opposition to the summary judgment motion arguing that it would be premature to grant the motion because there were still pending depositions. The insured specifically requested that the trial court not enter summary judgment until the mitigation company's representative was deposed because he was a key witness who would be testifying regarding the cause of loss. Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak Hastert
Mr. Eyerly may be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com

---

Motion to Dismiss Insurer's Counterclaim for Construction Defects Is Granted

June 29, 2017 — Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law Hawaii
The court granted the insured's motion to dismiss the insurer's counterclaim arising out of construction defects. Centrex Homes v. Zurich Specialties London Limited, et al., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77212 (D. Nev. May 19, 2017). Centrex, the general contractor, was sued by homeowners in a residential development known as Liberty Hill Estates. The suit alleged that defective work had been performed by Centrex's subcontractors, one of which was Valley Concrete Company, Inc. The insurer had issued a policy to Valley and Centrex was an additional insured. The insurer agreed to defend, but only paid a portion of the defense fees and costs because the policy only covered Centrex as to liability arising from Valley's work. The insurer refused to pay defense costs incurred prior to March 28, 2012 the date of notice of claims arising from Valley's work. Centrex then filed suit against the insurer alleging breach of contract and bad faith. The insurer filed a counterclaim seeking a declaration that it had no duty to defend. The insurer claimed that Centrex failed to cooperate by unilaterally switching counsel without prior notification to the insurer. This deprived the insurer of the right to control the defense and discharged the insurer's obligations under the policy. Centrex moved to dismiss the counterclaim. Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law Hawaii
Mr. Eyerly may be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com

---