Important Environmental Insurance Ruling Issued In Protracted Insurance-Coverage Dispute
May 16, 2018 —
Anthony B. Cavender - Gravel2Gavel Construction & Real Estate Law Blog The latest ruling in the long-running environmental insurance case, Olin Corporation v. Lamorak Ins. Co., was released on April 18, 2018, by Judge Rakoff of the U.S. District Court of the Northern District of New York. Judge Rakoff granted motions for summary judgment filed by Olin Corporation (Olin) and The London Market Insurers, and awarded Olin $55M for its claims against Lamorak Insurance Company (Lamorak).
As Judge Rakoff notes, “the overall litigation, having already outlived two federal judges, is now before the unlucky undersigned.” This ruling is in response to the Second Circuit’s most recent decision in Olin Corp. v. OneBeacon Americans Ins. Co.
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Anthony B. Cavender, Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLPMr. Cavender may be contacted at
anthony.cavender@pillsburylaw.com
Florida Supreme Court Adopts Federal Summary Judgment Standard, Substantially Conforming Florida’s Rule 1.510 to Federal Rule 56
June 07, 2021 —
Lewis BrisboisEffective May 1, 2021, the Florida courts will transition to a new summary judgment standard meant to “align Florida’s summary judgment standard with that of the federal courts and of the supermajority of states that have already adopted the federal summary judgment standard.” In re Amends. to Fla. Rule of Civ. Pro. 1.510, 309 So. 3d 192, 192 (Fla. 2020). Consistent with this amendment, Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510 has been amended to adopt the federal summary judgment rule, with exceptions for timing-related issues. The Florida Supreme Court’s most recent opinion on rule 1.510 and the text of new rule 1.510 can be found here.
As background, on December 31, 2020, the Florida Supreme Court adopted the federal summary judgment standard by amending Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510(c) to include the following sentence: “The summary judgment standard provided for in this rule shall be construed and applied in accordance with the federal summary judgment standard articulated in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1976); and Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986) [(the ‘Celotex trilogy’)].” In re Amends. to Fla. Rule of Civ. Pro. 1.510, 309 So. 3d at 196. The court’s amendment was slated to take effect on May 1, 2021, subject to a public comment period. The court also sought guidance from the Florida Bar’s Civil Procedure Rules Committee. After careful consideration of numerous responses, the court ultimately chose to adopt the substance of the text from federal rule 56. Along with its amendments, the court provides substantial guidance as to how the Florida courts and practitioners should interpret the new rule. A summary of the court’s thorough discussion follows.
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Lewis Brisbois
Is Arbitration Okay Under the Miller Act? It Is if You Don’t Object
October 15, 2014 —
Christopher G. Hill – Construction Law MusingsI have discussed both payment bond claims under the Miller Act and alternate dispute resolution (ADR) here at Construction Law Musings on many an occasion. A question that is sometimes open is what to do when there is contractually mandated arbitration for claims “relating to the contract or the work.”
While here in Virginia, as in most places, the courts will almost automatically send any breach of contract case with such a clause to arbitration, a question exists whether the claim against the bond held by a surety that is not a party to the contract is subject to being referred. Well, in a recent opinion the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia in Norfolk weighed in on this question where there was no opposition or objection to a motion to stay pending arbitration.
In U.S. for Use of Harbor Construction Co. Inc. v. THR Enterprises Inc. the Court considered a fairly typical payment dispute leading to a Miller Act claim. The general contractor and surety filed a motion to dismiss or alternatively stay the litigation based upon a clause in the contract between general contractor and subcontractor allowing the general contractor to elect the type of ADR to be used to resolve the dispute.
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Christopher G. Hill, Law Office of Christopher G. Hill, PCMr. Hill may be contacted at
chrisghill@constructionlawva.com
California Court of Appeal Provides Clarity On What Triggers Supplemental Analysis Under California Environmental Quality Act
July 20, 2020 —
Kelly Alhadeff-Black & Alexander N. Knaub - Lewis BrisboisIn a recent ruling, California’s Sixth District Court of Appeal clarified the need for supplemental environmental analysis under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). Willow Glen Trestle Conservancy v. City of San Jose (6th Dist., May 18, 2020). Specifically, the court held that seeking additional discretionary approvals, such as regulatory permits, does not constitute a “new discretionary approval for the project” under the California Public Resources Code Section 21166 and the California Code of Regulations, title 14, section 15162 (the CEQA Guidelines).
In 2014, the City of San Jose approved a project that included the demolition and replacement of a wooden railroad bridge known as the Willow Glen Trestle (the Project). CEQA review for the Project was conducted via mitigated negative declaration (MND). The Project was quickly challenged by a local group called Friends of the Willow Glen Trestle, alleging that the City should have prepared an Environmental Impact Report based on the allegation that the Willow Glen Trestle constituted an historic resource for CEQA purposes. Ultimately, the City prevailed in that litigation (See Friends of the Willow Glen Trestle v. City of San Jose, et al. (6th Dist., 2016), which remanded the case to the trial court for further review consistent with the Court of Appeal’s verdict) with the court eventually finding that the City correctly analyzed and answered the question of historic resource classification and significance in reference to the Willow Glen Trestle.
Reprinted courtesy of
Kelly Alhadeff-Black, Lewis Brisbois and
Alexander N. Knaub, Lewis Brisbois
Ms. Alhadeff-Black may be contacted at Kelly.Black@lewisbrisbois.com
Mr. Knaub may be contacted at Alexander.Knaub@lewisbrisbois.com
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Hurricane Laura: Implications for Insurers in Louisiana
October 19, 2020 —
Jennifer Michel & Tabitha Durbin - Lewis BrisboisJust two days before the 15th Anniversary of Hurricane Katrina, Category 4 Hurricane Laura made landfall near Cameron, Louisiana. Although the “unsurvivable” 20-foot storm surge, which had been predicted ahead of the storm, thankfully was significantly less, the impact of Laura on the Southwest Coast of Louisiana and Southeast Coast of Texas and its neighboring parishes and counties, most notably Cameron Parish, was quite severe. Lake Charles, Louisiana suffered widespread flooding and sustained catastrophic wind damage. Although the storm moved quickly, it retained its strength longer than expected such that even areas well inland sustained considerable damage. Preliminary estimates for insured losses from storm surge, flooding, and winds range from $8 to $12 billion for residential and commercial properties. Insurers providing residential or commercial property insurance in Louisiana should keep the following statutory claims handling requirements in mind.
Louisiana Statutory Provisions
Under Louisiana law, an insurer is expected to comply with certain statutory requirements in investigating and handling claims submitted by its insureds and third-party claimants. The majority of these requirements, and the consequences of their violation, are codified by La. R.S. 22:1892, which governs the payment and adjustment of claims, and La. R.S. 22:1973, which delineates an insurer’s duty of good faith. Together, the statutes impose three requirements on insurers: timely initiation of loss adjustment, timely payment of claims, and a duty of good faith and fairness in the adjustment and payment of said claims.
Reprinted courtesy of
Jennifer Michel, Lewis Brisbois and
Tabitha Durbin, Lewis Brisbois
Ms. Michel may be contacted at Jenny.Michel@lewisbrisbois.com
Ms. Durbin may be contacted at Tabitha.Durbin@lewisbrisbois.com
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SB 939 Proposes Moratorium On Unlawful Detainer Actions For Commercial Tenants And Allows Tenants Who Can't Renegotiate Their Lease In Good Faith To Terminate Their Lease Without Liability
June 01, 2020 —
Rhonda Kreger – Newmeyer DillionSB 939 is currently working its way through the Senate Judiciary Committee. The legislation would impose new obligations on landlords, and provide protections for commercial tenants who meet specified criteria. SB 939 would impose a moratorium on eviction of those qualified commercial tenants while emergency COVID-19 orders are in effect. Any eviction actions commenced after the date of the emergency COVID-19 order, but before the adoption of SB 939, would be void and unenforceable. The Senate Judiciary Committee has scheduled a hearing for SB 939 on May 22, 2020, at 9:00 a.m.
Who qualifies as a commercial tenant under SB 939?
To qualify under this legislation, a commercial tenant must be a business that operates primarily in California. The commercial tenant must be a small business, nonprofit, an eating or drinking establishment, place of entertainment, or performance venue. Publicly traded companies or any company owned by, or affiliated with a publicly traded company, do not qualify. The commercial tenant must have experienced a decline of at least 40 percent monthly revenue, either as compared to two months before the emergency COVID-19 order, or other local government shelter-in-place orders took effect, or as compared to the same month in 2019. If the commercial tenant is an eating or drinking establishment, place of entertainment, or performance venue, the commercial tenant must also show a decline of 25 percent or more in capacity due to social or physical distancing orders or safety concerns, and show that it is subject to regulations to prevent the spread of COVID-19 that will financially impair the business when compared to the period before the emergency COVID-19 order or other local shelter-in-place orders took effect.
What eviction actions are prohibited while emergency COVID-19 orders are in effect?
If adopted, SB 939 would add Section 1951.9 to the Civil Code. This section would make it unlawful to terminate a tenancy, serve notice to terminate a tenancy, use lockout or utility shutoff actions to terminate a tenancy or otherwise evict a tenant of commercial real property, including a business or nonprofit, during the pendency of the COVID-19 emergency order proclaimed by Governor Newsome on March 4, 2020. Exceptions apply if a tenant poses a threat to the property, other tenants or a person, business or other entity. Any violations of this eviction prohibition would be against public policy and unenforceable.
Any eviction started after proclamation of the state of emergency but before the effective date is deemed void, against public policy and is unenforceable.
Does SB 939 impose new penalties or remedies?
Any landlord who harasses, mistreats or retaliates against a commercial tenant to force the tenant to abrogate the lease would be subject to a fine of $2,000 for each violation. Further, any such violation would be an unlawful business practice and an act of unfair competition under Section 17200 of the Business and Professions Code and would be subject to all available remedies or penalties for those actions under state law.
When is a commercial tenant required to pay unpaid rent due to COVID-19?
If a commercial tenant fails to pay rent during the emergency COVID-19 order, the sum total of the past due rent must be paid within 12 months following the date of the end of the emergency proclamation, unless the commercial tenant has successfully negotiated an agreement with its landlord to pay the outstanding rent at a later date. Nonpayment of rent during the state of emergency cannot be used as grounds for eviction. Notwithstanding lease terms to the contrary, landlords may not impose late charges for rent that became due during the state of emergency.
Are landlords required to provide notice of protections adopted under SB 939?
Landlords would be required to provide notice to commercial tenants of the protections offered under SB 939 within 30 days of the effective date. SB 939 does not preempt local legislation or ordinances restricting the same or similar conduct which impose a more severe penalty for the same conduct. Local legislation or ordinances may impose additional notice requirements.
Does SB 939 impose new protections for commercial tenants when negotiating lease modifications?
If enacted, SB 939 would permit commercial tenants to open negotiations for new lease terms, and provide commercial tenants the ability to terminate the lease if those negotiations fail. A commercial tenant who wishes to modify its commercial lease, may engage in good faith negotiations with its landlord to modify any rent or economic requirement regardless of the term remaining on the lease. The commercial tenant must serve a notice on the landlord certifying that it meets the required criteria, along with the desired modifications.
If the commercial tenant and landlord do not reach a mutually satisfactory agreement within 30 days, then within 10 days, the commercial tenant may terminate the lease without any liability for future rent, fees, or costs that otherwise may have been due under the lease by providing a written termination notice to the landlord. The commercial tenant would be required to pay previously due rent, in an amount no greater than the sum of the following: (1) the actual rent due during the emergency COVID-19 order, or a maximum of three months of the past due rent during that period, and (2) all rent incurred and unpaid during a time unrelated to the emergency COVID-19 order through the date of the termination notice. The payment is due within 12 months from date of the termination notice. The commercial tenant would be required to vacate the premises within 14 days of the landlord's receipt of the termination notice. Upon service of the notice, any lease, and any third party guaranties of the lease would terminate. If the landlord and commercial tenant reach an agreement to modify the lease, the commercial tenant would not have the option to later terminate the lease under this provision.
When is the next Senate Judiciary Committee Meeting for SB 939?
The Senate Judiciary Committee set a hearing for SB 939 on May 22, 2020 at 9:00 a.m. The Senate will livestream the hearing on its website at www.sen.ca.gov. Public comments or testimony may be submitted in writing to the Judiciary Committee by emailing Erica.porter@sen.ca.gov. Alternatively, the public may participate via telephone during the public comment period. Any changes to the Judicial Committee schedule may be found at: https://www.senate.ca.gov/calendar.
Newmeyer Dillion continues to follow COVID-19 and its impact on your business and our communities. Feel free to reach out to us at NDcovid19response@ndlf.com or visit us at www.newmeyerdillion.com/covid-19-multidisciplinary-task-force/.
Rhonda Kreger is Senior Counsel on Newmeyer Dillion's transactional team at our Newport Beach office. Her practice focuses on all aspects of commercial real estate law, with a particular emphasis on the representation of residential developers, merchant builders and institutional investors. You can reach Rhonda at rhonda.kreger@ndlf.com.
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Sixth Circuit Holds that Some Official Actions Taken in the “Flint Water Crisis” Could Be Constitutional Due Process Violations
March 27, 2019 —
Anthony B. Cavender - Gravel2GavelIn what the Court of Appeals describes as “the infamous government-created environmental disaster known at the Flint Water Crisis,” a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has ruled that some of the government personnel responsible for this disaster may be liable, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for monetary damages based on the Substantive Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. The case is Guertin, et al., v. State of Michigan, et al., decided on January 4, 2019.
On April 25, 2014, the City of Flint, MI, facing a financial crisis, agreed to switch its drinking water supply from the water provided by the Detroit Water and Sewerage Department to untreated water available from the Flint River that would be treated in the waterworks owned and operated by the City. However, the City waterworks could not provide the needed treatment, which resulted in the corrosive Flint River water leaching lead out of the old Flint water pipes. Soon thereafter, a public health and environmental crisis enveloped Flint. Many lawsuits have been filed against many defendants, and many civil and criminal investigations have been opened.
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Anthony B. Cavender, PillsburyMr. Cavender may be contacted at
anthony.cavender@pillsburylaw.com
An Expert’s Qualifications are Important
January 28, 2019 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesAn expert’s qualifications are important. Please remember this the next time you retain an expert to analyze documents or data and render an opinion based on that information. An expert must be qualified to render an opinion. Otherwise the expert will not be allowed to render the opinion you may be looking for or need for purposes of trial, as discussed below.
A recent personal injury case, White v. Ring Power Corp., 43 Fla.L.Weekly D2729a (Fla. 3d 2018), involved a crane operator that became severely injured when operating a leased crane. The case proceeded to trial against only the equipment lessor of the crane based on the plaintiff’s contention that there were deficiencies with the crane. The plaintiff intended on using expert witnesses to interpret the crane’s load movement indicator (referred to as LMI) and render opinions that the LMI data showed prior overloads of the crane which resulted in the injury to the operator of the crane.
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David Adelstein, Kirwin NorrisMr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
