CAMBRIDGE MASSACHUSETTS BUILDING EXPERT
DIRECTORY AND CAPABILITIES

Indirect Benefit Does Not Support Unjust Enrichment Claim Against Prime Contractor

July 05, 2023 — David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal Updates
A recent case out of the Northern District of Florida dealing with a federal project provides an interesting discussion about a sub-subcontractor asserting a claim against the prime contractor for unjust enrichment. The prime contractor argued any benefit to it was indirect which does not support an unjust enrichment claim as the actual direct benefit flowed to the owner of the project – the government. The federal district court agreed and dismissed the sub-subcontractor’s unjust enrichment claim against the prime contractor because an indirect benefit does NOT support an equitable unjust enrichment claim. See U.S.A f/u/b/o Eco Universe Contracting, LLC v. Calvary Construction Group, Inc., 2023 WL 3884642 (N.D.Fla. 2023). Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.
Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at dma@kirwinnorris.com

---

Montrose Language Interpreted: How Many Policies Are Implicated By A Construction Defect That Later Causes a Flood?

March 17, 2011 — Shaun McParland Baldwin

The Court of Appeals of Indiana recently addressed the “Montrose” language added to the CGL ISO form in 2001 in the context of a construction defect claim where a fractured storm drain caused significant flooding a year after the drain was damaged. The insuring agreement requires that “bodily injury” or “property damage” be caused by an “occurrence” and that the “bodily injury” or “property damage” occur during the policy period. The Montrose language adds that the insurance applies only if, prior to the policy period, no insured knew that the “bodily injury” or “property damage” had occurred in whole or in part. Significantly, it also states that any “bodily injury“ or “property damage” which occurs during the policy period and was not, prior to the policy period known to have occurred, includes a continuation, change or resumption of that “bodily injury” or “property damage” after the end of the policy period.



In Grange Mutual Cas. Co. v. West Bend Mut. Ins. Co., No. 29D04-0706-PL-1112 (Ct. App. IN March 15, 2011), http://www.ai.org/judiciary/opinions/pdf/03151109ehf.pdf, Sullivan was the General Contractor for a school construction project. Its subcontractor, McCurdy, installed the storm drain pipes. One of the storm pipes was fractured in 2005 while McCurdy was doing its installation work. More than a year later, the school experienced significant water damage due to flooding. It was later discovered that the flooding was due to the fractured storm drain. Sullivan’s insurer paid $146,403 for the water damage. That insurer brought a subrogation claim against McCurdy and its two insurers: West Bend and Grange. West Bend had issued CGL coverage to McCurdy while the construction was ongoing , including the date in which the storm pipe was fractured. Grange issued CGL coverage to McCurdy at the time of the flooding. Those two carriers jointly settled the subrogation claim and then litigated which insurer actually owed coverage for the loss. Significantly, the loss that was paid included only damages from the flooding, not any damages for the cost of repairing the pipe.



Read the full story...



Reprinted courtesy of Shaun McParland Baldwin of Tressler LLP. Ms Baldwin can be contacted at sbaldwin@tresslerllp.com

Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of

---

Massachusetts Federal Court Holds No Coverage for Mold and Water Damage Claim

February 11, 2019 — Brian Margolies - TLSS Insurance Law Blog
In its recent decision in Clarendon National Ins. Co. v. Philadelphia Indemnity Ins. Co., 2019 WL 134614 (D. Mass. Jan. 8, 2019), the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts had occasion to consider the application of a prior knowledge provision in the context of a claim for mold and water-related bodily injury and property damage. Philadelphia insured a condominium property management company under a general liability insurance policy for the period September 1, 2007 through September 1, 2008. In 2009, the insured was sued by a unit owner alleging bodily injury and property damage resulting from toxic mold conditions resulting from leaks that had been identified in her unit as early as 2004. Notably, the complaint alleged that mold was identified in 2006 and that repair efforts were undertaken, but that these efforts all proved unsuccessful. Plaintiff alleged that she was forced to vacate her apartment in 2008 as a result of the conditions. Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of Brian Margolies, Traub Lieberman
Mr. Margolies may be contacted at bmargolies@tlsslaw.com

---

Survey: Workers Lack Awareness of Potentially Hazardous Nanomaterials

December 11, 2018 — Scott Van Voorhis – Engineering News-Record
Microscopic nanoparticles are part of the mix in nearly 600 construction products. The particles add strength, durability and other desired characteristics. Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of Scott Van Voorhis, ENR
ENR may be contacted at ENR.com@bnpmedia.com

---

Georgia Supreme Court Addresses Anti-Indemnity Statute

October 21, 2019 — David R. Cook - AHC Construction and Procurement Blog
In prior blog posts, we addressed Georgia’s anti-indemnity statute. One of the posts addressed the statute in the context of an electric utility easement near an airport. That case made its way to the Supreme Court Georgia, which provided some additional clarity to the statute. Milliken & Co. v. Georgia Power Co., — Ga. –, 829 S.E.2d 111 (2019). When a plane crashed and several passengers and crew died or were injured, their representatives sued several defendants, including a nearby plant owner, Milliken & Company (“Milliken”), based on claims that transmission lines on Milliken’s property were too close to the runways, were too high, and encroached on the airport easements. Milliken cross claimed against Georgia Power Company (“GPC”). Milliken’s claim was based on an easement it granted to GPC, which required GPC to indemnify it for any claims arising out of GPC’s construction or maintenance of the transmission lines. On appeal, the Supreme Court considered whether the clause was unenforceable under O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2(b). In general, “a party may contract away liability to the other party for the consequences of his own negligence without contravening public policy, except when such agreement it prohibited by statute.” Id. at 113 citing Lanier at McEver v. Planners & Eng’rs Collaborative, 284 Ga. 204, 205 (2008). As one such statute, O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2(b) applies when an indemnification provision (i) “relates in some way to a contract for construction, alteration, repair, or maintenance of certain property” and (ii) “promises to indemnify a party for damages arising from that own party’s sole negligence.” Id. at 114 (internal punctuation omitted). Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of David R. Cook, Autry, Hall & Cook, LLP
Mr. Cook may be contacted at cook@ahclaw.com

---

Insurance Companies Score Win at Supreme Court

December 26, 2022 — Mason Fletcher & Ryan Sternoff - Ahlers Cressman & Sleight PLLC
In 2011, the Washington State Department of Transportation (“WSDOT”) contracted with Seattle Tunnel Partners, a joint venture of Dragados USA and Tutor Perini (“STP”) to construct a tunnel (“SR 99 Tunnel”) to replace the dilapidated Alaska Way Viaduct. STP obtained a builder’s “all-risk” insurance policy (“Policy”) from Great Lakes Reinsurance (UK) PLC and several other insurers (collectively, the “Insurers”) which insured against damage to both the project and the tunnel boring machine popularly known as Big Bertha (“Bertha”). Bertha began excavating in July 2013 but broke down a few months later when the machine stopped working. Work did not resume on the project until December 2015. WSDOT and STP tendered insurance claims for the losses associated with the delays and breakdown of Bertha but the Insurers denied coverage. Thereafter, WSDOT and STP sued.  The Insurers moved the trial court for partial summary judgment to resolve some, but not all, of the coverage disputes. In a unanimous decision, the Washington State Supreme Court affirmed the trial court and Court of Appeals, and held that insurance companies do not have to reimburse WSDOT and STP for costs accrued during a two-year Project delay, under certain provisions of the insurance policies. Reprinted courtesy of Mason Fletcher, Ahlers Cressman & Sleight PLLC and Ryan Sternoff, Ahlers Cressman & Sleight PLLC Mr. Sternoff may be contacted at ryan.sternoff@acslawyers.com Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of

---

Seattle Condos, Close to Waterfront, Construction Defects Included

February 11, 2013 — CDJ STAFF
There's a cluster of eight condominium projects in Seattle, some within easy walking distance of each other, that are either in construction defect lawsuits, arbitration, or mediation. Jeff Reynolds, contributing a Seattle PI.com reader blog, notes that as Seattle condo projects have neared the end of the four-year warranty period, condo boards are being targeted by attorneys. Reynolds writes that "once [the attorneys] are hired by the associations, they retain specialists that test for any and all construction defects with the building envelope." The problem that Reynolds sees is that that "major lending institutions stay away from condos with lawsuits." And so homeowners dealing with construction defects have apartments they can't sell to anyone who might want to use financing. This tightens Seattle's already limited inventory, leading to both frustrated sellers and frustrated buyers. Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of

---

Denial of Motion to Dissolve Lis Pendens Does Not Automatically Create Basis for Certiorari Relief

November 16, 2023 — David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal Updates
A recent appellate decision out of Florida’s Sixth District Court of Appeal holds that a trial court’s denial of motion to dissolve a lis pendens does NOT automatically give a basis for a petition for a writ of certiorari. Generalized allegations of “irreparable harm” to support the basis for the petition for writ of certiorari are insufficient. Rather, the party moving for the petition MUST clearly demonstrate the irreparable harm; otherwise, the petition for writ of certiorari will fail. A lis pendens has legal significance. It is a recorded document that notifies the world that there is a pending lawsuit dealing with the real property at issue. This is important because who wants to buy a piece of property that is subject to litigation – that would be a risky transaction! In CPPB, LLC v. Taurus Apopka City Center, LLC, 48 Fla.L.Weekly D1837a (Fla. 6th DCA 2023), a dispute arose as to a real estate transaction. The owner sold a parcel to a buyer. The owner also owned three adjacent parcels. As part of the transaction, the buyer agreed to perform certain improvements to all of the parcels including those adjacent parcels owned by the owner. The owner deposited funds in escrow for purposes of its share of the improvements. A payment dispute arose regarding the improvements and the buyer sued the seller. The seller filed a counterclaim to rescind the transaction along with a recorded lis pendens on the parcel purchased by the buyer. The buyer moved to dissolve the lis pendens which the trial court denied. This prompted the appeal – a petition for a write of certiorari based on the trial court’s denial of the motion to dissolve the lis pendens. Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.
Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at dma@kirwinnorris.com

---