Beware: Hyper-Technical Labor Code Violations May Expose Employers to Significant Claims for Penalties under the Labor Code California Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA)
May 10, 2017 —
Angela Reston-Nunez – Newmeyer & Dillion LLPMost employers know that companywide policies or practices that do not strictly comply with applicable state or federal employment laws can expose employers to class action lawsuits by large numbers of employees seeking recovery of massive sums in damages, attorneys’ fees and costs. Unfortunately, traditional class action lawsuits are not the only representative actions employers should be concerned with. Recent litigation trends have shown that California’s lesser known Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (“PAGA”) can be equally, if not more harmful to employers than class actions due to steep penalties for minor violations.
WHAT IS PAGA?
Under PAGA, “aggrieved employees” can sue employers for alleged Labor Code violations. Like class actions, a PAGA plaintiff sues on a representative basis on behalf of themselves and other workers. However, unlike class action plaintiffs, PAGA plaintiffs do not seek damages; rather, they seek civil and statutory penalties formerly recoverable solely by state agencies in enforcement actions.
The distinction between recovery of damages in class actions and recovery of penalties in PAGA actions reflects the often-insidious nature of PAGA claims. While workers have long alleged “derivative” PAGA claims for penalties in connection with more substantive underlying Labor Code violations (meal or rest break violations, for example), we have seen a recent spike in PAGA suits alleging hyper-technical Labor Code violations with no underlying substantive violation, and where the “aggrieved employees” have suffered no actual harm.
WHAT'S AT STAKE?
Equally troubling for employers is the method by which significant penalties are aggregated. With a few significant exceptions, penalties generally range from $50 to $250 per violation. At first blush, this may not seem like much, however total penalties rise rapidly when considering that calculations are made on a per-employee and a per-pay period basis.
AN EXAMPLE ON HOW PAGA WORKS
Consider the following example based on one recent case:
Issue: An employee brought a PAGA-only lawsuit on behalf of himself and 400 other “aggrieved employees” against his employer for alleged Labor Code violations.
Claim: The employee claimed the employer’s 30-year practice of paying employees 9 days after the close of the applicable payroll period violated Labor Code Section 204(d), which requires payment to be made within 7 days of the close of the payroll period. The employee claimed that, under PAGA, the employer was liable for a minimum penalty of $100 per employee, per pay period, going back at least one year (the statutory limitations period for PAGA claims).
Exposure: With 400 employees, 24 pay periods per year, and $100 per violation, the plaintiff sought a minimum of $960,000 in penalties (not including substantial attorneys’ fees, costs and interest also available under PAGA), despite offering no evidence of harm suffered by the employees or prior notice of the issue.
OTHER IMPORTANT CONSIDERATIONS
In addition to a draconian penalties scheme, there are a myriad of additional aggravating factors for employers involved in PAGA litigation, such as:
- PAGA plaintiffs are not required to meet the rigorous class certification standards required of class action plaintiffs, meaning plaintiffs’ attorneys may be more likely to bring meritless “strike suits” aimed at obtaining quick settlements based on significant alleged penalties exposure.
- 75% of PAGA penalties recovered by way of settlement or judgment are directed to the state of California, while the "aggrieved employees” only keep 25%, reinforcing the notion that PAGA claims are frequently attorneys’-fee-driven, rather than for protecting employees.
STEPS FOR EMPLOYERS TO PROTECT THEMSELVES
Fortunately, there are a number of measures employers can take prior to and during wage and hour litigation which can dramatically reduce, or even eliminate, exposure to substantial penalties and damages. This includes:
- Regular reviews. Prior to litigation, we recommend regular detailed reviews of company policies and practices in order to identify areas of possible concern and ensure compliance with California’s ever-changing labor laws.
- Take action. On receipt of a new PAGA claim, taking immediate action to remedy an alleged violation within the Labor Code’s 33-day “safe harbor” time-period may help limit an employer’s exposure, and could bar a plaintiff from filing suit at all.
- Be aggressive. Once a PAGA or class action claim is in litigation, a proactive, aggressive approach to claim evaluation, investigation and litigation is critical.
For these reasons and more, it’s in an employers’ best interest to monitor these issues closely and seek input when appropriate.
Angela Reston-Nunez is a labor and employment attorney in Newmeyer & Dillion’s Walnut Creek office. For questions regarding PAGA, class action or individual wage and hour issues, or other employment law matters, please feel free to contact Angela Reston-Nunez at (925) 988-3249 or angela.reston-nunez@ndlf.com.
About Newmeyer & Dillion
For more than 30 years, Newmeyer & Dillion has delivered creative and outstanding legal solutions and trial results for a wide array of clients. With over 70 attorneys practicing in all aspects of business, employment, real estate, construction and insurance law, Newmeyer & Dillion delivers legal services tailored to meet each client’s needs. Headquartered in Newport Beach, California, with offices in Walnut Creek, California and Las Vegas, Nevada, Newmeyer & Dillion attorneys are recognized by The Best Lawyers in America©, and Super Lawyers as top tier and some of the best lawyers in California, and have been given Martindale-Hubbell Peer Review's AV Preeminent® highest rating. For additional information, call 949-854-7000 or visit www.ndlf.com.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Yet ANOTHER Reason not to Contract without a License
October 25, 2021 —
Christopher G. Hill - Construction Law MusingsRemember when I stated that you cannot lawfully perform construction work in Virginia without a contractor’s license? Remember when I said that you risk non-payment if you do so? If you needed another reason, a relatively recent Virginia Court of Appeals decision upholding a criminal conviction for performing construction work without a license should be that reason.
In Riddel v. Commonwealth, the Court took up an appeal from the conviction of Jeff Riddel where Mr. Riddel was verbally asked by homeowners to inspect and then repair their septic system. Mr. Riddel then contracted with Fairfax Suburban Septic to pump out and repair the system. Mr. Riddel then delivered the homeowners an invoice from Fairfax Suburban Septic and instructed the homeowners to pay Fairfax Suburban Septic directly. After payment, the homeowners became aware that the work was not completed and that neither Mr. Riddel nor his subcontractor was licensed to perform septic work in Virginia.
During the trial, Mr. Riddel argued on a Motion to Strike the Commonwealth’s evidence that (1) he merely arranged for licensed contractors to perform the repairs to the septic system, arguing that Virginia Code §§
54.2-801 to 802 permitted Riddel to arrange the work without a contractor’s license and (2) no written contract to perform a septic inspection or repairs existed. The Circuit Court denied the motion and Mr. Riddel was convicted under Va. Code 54.1-111 for performing the work without a license. Needless to say, he appealed.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
The Law Office of Christopher G. HillMr. Hill may be contacted at
chrisghill@constructionlawva.com
Insurance Company’s Reservation of Rights Letter Negates its Interest in the Litigation
November 12, 2019 —
Frank Ingham - Colorado Construction LitigationThe Colorado Court of Appeals held that an insurance company, which issues a reservation of rights letter to its insured, loses its interest in the litigation, pursuant to C.R.C.P. 24(a)(2), when the insured settles the claims and assigns the bad faith action against the insurance company to the plaintiff. Bolt Factory Lofts Owners Association, Inc. v. Auto-Owners Insurance Company, 2019WL 3483901(Colo. App. 2019).
In a 2016 lawsuit in Denver District Court, 2016CV3360, the Bolt Factory Loft Owners Association, Inc. (“Association”) asserted construction defect claims against six contractors. Two of those contractors then asserted claims against other subcontractors, including Sierra Glass Co., Inc. (“Sierra Glass”). After multiple settlements, the only remaining claims were those the Association, as assignee of the two contractors, asserted against Sierra Glass.
Auto-Owners Insurance Company (“AOIC”) issued policies to Sierra Glass and defended it under a reservation of rights. The policy afforded AOIC the right to defend Sierra Glass, and it required Sierra Glass to cooperate in the defense of the legal action. The Association presented a settlement demand of $1.9 million to Sierra Glass, which AOIC refused to pay. To protect itself from an excess judgment that AOIC might not have paid, Sierra Glass entered into an agreement with the Association whereby Sierra Glass would refrain from offering a defense at trial and assign its bad faith claim against AOIC to the Association in exchange for the Association’s promise that it would not pursue recovery against Sierra Glass of any judgment entered against it at trial. Such agreements, known as Bashor or Nunn Agreements, are allowed in Colorado. Nunn v. Mid-Century Insurance Co., 244 P.3d 116 (Colo. 2010). Therefore, Sierra Glass was entitled to protect itself in the face of AOIC’s potential denial of coverage and refusal to settle. Bolt Factory Lofts, at ¶ 15.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Frank Ingham, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLCMr. Ingham may be contacted at
ingham@hhmrlaw.com
Florida Self-Insured Retention Satisfaction and Made Whole Doctrine
March 11, 2014 —
Scott Patterson – CD CoverageIntervest Construction of Jax, Inc. v. General Fidelity Insurance Co., * So.2d * (Fla. 2014), the issue was whether the insured general contractor could satisfy the SIR in its CGL policy with funds it received from the insurer of a subcontractor in settlement of the general contractor’s contractual indemnity claim against that subcontractor. ICI was the general contractor for a residence sold to Ferrin. Several years after completion, Ferrin suffered injuries in a fall while using attic stairs installed by ICI’s subcontractor Custom Cutting. Ferrin sued ICI but not Custom Cutting. ICI was insured by General Fidelity with a $1M SIR. ICI sought contractual indemnity from Custom Cutting. The Ferrin suit was ultimately settled for $1.6M. Custom Cutting’s CGL insurer paid $1M to ICI to resolve ICI’s contractual indemnity claim. Using the $1M paid on behalf of Custom Cutting and $300K of its own funds, ICI paid $1.3M to Ferrin. General Fidelity paid the remaining $300K with an agreement with ICI that each was entitled to seek reimbursement of $300K from the other. ICI filed suit in Florida state court. General Fidelity removed to federal court. The Eleventh Circuit certified the relevant questions to the Supreme Court of Florida.
The Florida Supreme Court first held that the General Fidelity SIR allowed ICI to satisfy the SIR through indemnification payments received from a third party. While the SIR provision stated that it must be satisfied by the insured, it did not include any language proscribing the source of the funds used by the insured to satisfy the SIR. The court distinguished other decisions where the SIR endorsement expressly stated that payments by others, including other insurers, could not satisfy the SIR. The court also relied on the fact that ICI “hedged its retained risk” by paying for its entitlement to contractual indemnification from its subcontractor years prior to purchasing the General Fidelity policy.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Scott Patterson, CD Coverage
Differing Site Conditions: What to Expect from the Court When You Encounter the Unexpected
September 05, 2022 —
Margarita Kutsin - Ahlers Cressman & Sleight[
1]Seattle Tunnel Partners (“STP”), a joint venture of Dragados USA and Tutor Perini, entered into a $1.4 billion contract with the Washington State Department of Transportation (“WSDOT”) to replace the Highway 99 viaduct. In December 2013, a tunnel boring machine (“TBM”) bearing the moniker “Bertha,” then the largest TBM ever built, measuring 425 feet long and 57 feet in diameter, struck an underground pipe. Shortly after the impact, Bertha overheated and eventually could no longer make forward progress. A massive repair effort ensued causing a 2.5-year delay in reaching substantial completion.
WSDOT sued STP for the delay, seeking liquidated damages of $57 million. In response, STP argued its delay was excusable because it was caused by Bertha’s impact with the pipe, and the steel well casing was a Differing Site Condition (DSC) undisclosed in the contract documents. STP asserted counterclaims against WSDOT, alleging breach of contract and seeking $300 million in damages. Ultimately, a jury found that the steel well casing on the pipe was not a DSC, foreclosing STP’s excusable delay defense and counterclaims, and resulting in a $57 million verdict, plus interest, in favor of WSDOT.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Margarita Kutsin, Ahlers Cressman & SleightMs. Kutsin may be contacted at
margarita.kutsin@acslawyers.com
Contractor Sues License Board
June 30, 2011 —
CDJ STAFFJudge Kendall J. Newman of the US District Court handed down a decision on June 24 on the case of Kent v California Department of Consumer Affairs. Mr. Kent, appearing as his own counsel, had brought the suit against the California Department of Consumer Affairs and the Contractors State Licensing Board after he was arrested in a sting operation and, as the plaintiff put it, “was absurdly arrested and uncooperatively detained for a time longer than necessary or allowed by law under the false pretense of contracting with out a license.” Mr. Kent’s alleged that Rick Lopez, one of the defendants, formed him to read allow from the California Business and Professions Code. He said he was later handcuffed and placed in an uncomfortable chair, “enduring physical pain and emotional agony.”
Although Kent was given a Notice to Appear, he alleged that a further defendant, Stuart Rind, “closed the plaintiff’s case marked citation A7773 without giving written notice to anyone.” As a result, the Placer County District Attorney’s Office had no record of his Notice to Appear.
Kent alleged that subsequently his firm was essentially shut down for two years and that he was prevented from “legally contracting or selling services for any other contractor or qualifying for any other licensed capacity governed by the CSLB.” After this, the CSLB suspended the license for his firm, DSI Construction. He was assessed a $1,500 fine, after which he claims he sent a letter to the CSLB demanding money damages. The judge noted that the letter was not included in the plaintiff’s Ninth Amended Complaint.
Judge Kendall recommended that the plaintiff’s Complaints be dismissed, although he did allow that sixth, and perhaps the eighth and ninth, could be amended with a tenth amended complaint.
Read the court’s decision…
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
New York State Trial Court Addresses “Trigger of Coverage” for Asbestos Claims and Other Coverage Issues
January 21, 2019 —
Paul Briganti - White and WilliamsOn November 21, 2018, the New York Supreme Court, Onondaga County, issued a summary-judgment ruling on a number of coverage issues arising from asbestos-related bodily injury claims against plaintiffs Carrier Corporation (Carrier) and Elliott Company (Elliott). See Carrier Corp., et al. v. Travelers Indem. Co., et al., Index No. 2005-EG-7032 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 21, 2018).
First, the court held that under New York’s “injury in fact trigger of coverage,” injury occurs from the first date of exposure to asbestos through death or the filing of suit. The court primarily relied on: (1) New York federal court decisions and the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in In re Viking Pump, Inc., 148 A.3d 633 (Del. 2016) holding that injury continues from first exposure through death or the assertion of a claim; and (2) medical and scientific evidence that the plaintiffs had submitted in support of their motion. The court specifically declined to follow Continental Cas. v. Wausau, 60 A.D.3d 128 (1st Dep’t 2008) (Keasbey), in which the New York Appellate Division found a question of fact whether injury occurs from exposure to asbestos through manifestation and that summary judgment was therefore inappropriate. The Carrier court stated that Keasbey was distinguishable because it “involved operations coverage, a non-product claim, and thus the [Keasbey] Court required a more stringent proof of injury in fact than is necessary here, in a products case.” Carrier, op. at 8. The Carrier court was also dismissive of affidavits offered by the defendant-insurer’s medical experts, finding that the affidavits did not create an issue of fact. See Op. at 2-9.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Paul Briganti, White and WilliamsMr. Briganti may be contacted at
brigantip@whiteandwilliams.com
Coverage for Faulty Workmanship Denied
June 29, 2020 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiThe court found there was no coverage for the insureds' alleged negligent failure to construct a building. Evanston Ins. Co. v. DCM Contracting, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63977 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 28, 2020).
Turning Point Church sued DCM Contracting for faulty workmanship on a construction project. Turning Point sent a demand letter to DCM on August 18, 2017 and filed suit in December. Evanston did not receive notice of Turning Point's claims and the lawsuit until May 15, 2018.
Evanston filed suit for a declaratory judgment and moved for summary judgment. The court first considered the late notice. The policy required notice "as soon as practicable" DCM was also required to provide copies of demands, notices, or legal papers to Evanston. Here, DCM did not give notice to Evanston until nine months after receipt of Turning Point's demand. A phone communication with DCM's agent between August 2017 and May 2018 was insufficient. DCM provided no documents, including the summons and complaint, to the agent. DCM waited five months to forward the underlying lawsuit. This was a breach of the policy.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak HastertMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
