Don’t Ignore a Notice of Contest of Lien
April 29, 2024 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesA recent case, Jon M. Hall Company, LLC v. Canoe Creek Investments, LLC, 49 Fla.L.Weekly D812a (Fla. 2d DCA 2024), demonstrates four important things when it comes to liens:
- An owner can shorten the time period to foreclose on the lien, whether against the real property or a lien transfer bond, to 60 days by recording a notice of contest of lien;
- An owner can transfer a lien to a lien transfer bond during litigation;
- An owner can record a notice of contest of lien to force the lienor to amend its lawsuit to sue the lien transfer bond surety within 60 days; and
- A contractors’ failure to amend its lawsuit to sue the lien transfer bond within 60 days will extinguish its rights to pursue a claim against the lien transfer bond, and will otherwise extinguish the lien, fairly or unfairly.
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David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
No Hiring Surge by Homebuilders Says Industry Group
February 14, 2013 —
CDJ STAFFLooking at data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the National Association of Home Builders found that while hiring levels in construction remain strong, there hasn’t been a surge in hiring in this particular sector. December found 92,000 open construction position, with the NAHB noting that home builders are still concerned about finding qualified workers.
While there has not been surge in hiring, home building is on the increase. The NAHB says that “this could be due to increased hours for existing workers,” which would not be “a sustainable situation.”
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First Circuit: No Coverage, No Duty to Investigate Alleged Loss Prior to Policy Period
May 18, 2020 —
Eric B. Hermanson & Austin D. Moody - White and WilliamsOn April 1, 2020, the First Circuit, applying Massachusetts law, issued a potentially useful decision addressing the Montrose “known loss” language in ISO Form CGL policies. In Clarendon National Insurance Company v. Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Company,[1] the court applied this language to allow denial of defense for claims of recurring water infiltration that began before the insurer’s policy period, and it found an insurer had no duty to investigate whether the course of property damage might have been interrupted, or whether other property damage might have occurred during the policy period, so as to trigger coverage during a later policy.
In the underlying dispute, a condominium owner (Doherty) asserted negligence claims against her association’s property management company (Lundgren) stemming from alleged water infiltration into her condominium. The complaint said leaks developed in 2004 in the roof above Doherty’s unit, and repairs were not made in a timely or appropriate manner. The following year, the complaint said, a Lundgren employee notified Doherty that the threshold leading to her condominium's deck was rotting. In February 2006, Doherty discovered a mushroom and water infiltration on the threshold and notified Lundgren. At that time, Lundgren asked its maintenance and repair contractor (CBD) to replace the rotting threshold. According to the complaint, CBD did not do this repair in a timely manner and left debris exposed in Doherty’s bedroom.
In March 2006, the complaint said, a mold testing company hired by Lundgren found hazardous mold in Doherty's unit, caused by water intrusions and chronic dampness. Lundgren’s attempts at remediation were ineffectual. In September 2008, Doherty's doctor ordered her to leave the condominium and not to return until the leaks were repaired and mold was eliminated.
Reprinted courtesy of
Eric B. Hermanson, White and Williams and
Austin D. Moody, White and Williams
Mr. Hermanson may be contacted at hermansone@whiteandwilliams.com
Mr. Moody may be contacted at moodya@whiteandwilliams.com
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Claims Litigated Under Government Claims Act Must “Fairly Reflect” Factual Claims Made in Underlying Government Claim
November 27, 2023 —
Garret Murai - California Construction Law BlogUnlike horseshoes and hand grenades, close sometimes isn’t close enough.
In the next case, Hernandez v. City of Stockton, 90 Cal.App.5th 1222 (2023), the Third District Court of appeal found that a pedestrian who sued a public entity for personal injuries caused by an “uplifted sidewalk” was barred from pursuing his claim when it was revealed that he had in fact injured himself by falling into a hole left by an “empty tree well” (i.e., a tree well that did not contain a tree”). According to the Court, the pedestrian’s claim was barred because the factual basis for recovery asserted in his complaint was not “fairly reflected” in his government claim.
The Hernandez Case
In April 2018, pedestrian Manual Sanchez Hernandez injured himself while walking on a public sidewalk in Stockton, California. He submitted a government claim with the City of Stockton claiming that his injuries, which included injuries to his knee, hands and back, was caused by a dangerous condition on public property. In his government claim, Hernandez alleged that he tripped on an “uplifted sidewalk” at or near 230 E. Charter Way in Stockton, California and that his injuries were due because the City “negligently and recklessly designed, maintained and operated the subject property so as to cause [his] injuries.”
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Garret Murai, Nomos LLPMr. Murai may be contacted at
gmurai@nomosllp.com
Hunton’s Alice Weeks Selected to the Miami Dade Bar’s Circle of Excellence for Insurance Litigation
April 25, 2023 —
Hunton Insurance Recovery BlogCongratulations to
Alice Weeks, an associate on Hunton Andrews Kurth’s insurance coverage team, for being selected to the Miami Dade Bar’s Circle of Excellence for Insurance Litigation.
The Circle of Excellence award is awarded to peer-selected attorneys in their area of practice. Alice was selected from among many highly qualified nominees and was recognized at the Miami Dade Bar’s Judicial Reception. Alice is a past board member of the Miami Dade Bar YLS, as well as past-editor of the Miami Dade Bar’s newsletter, the Bulletin. Alice’s Circle of Excellence selection follows her recent selection to the Cystic Fibrosis Foundation’s 40 Under 40 Outstanding Young Professionals of South Florida and her receipt of the Miami Dade Bar’s 40 Under 40 Award.
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Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP
The Fifth Circuit, Applying Texas Law, Strikes Down Auto Exclusion
July 11, 2022 —
Jeremy S. Macklin - Traub Lieberman Insurance Law BlogPenn-America Ins. Co. v. Tarango Trucking, LLC, 30 F.4th 440 (5th Cir. 2022), involved a coverage dispute over Penn-America Insurance Company’s (“Penn-America”) duty to defend and indemnify third-party claims against Tarango Trucking, LLC (“Tarango”) for a fatal accident on its property. At the time of the accident, Penn-America insured Tarango under a commercial general liability policy, which included an “Auto Exclusion” and “Parking Exception” provision. The Auto Exclusion stated the policy did not apply to bodily injury or property damage arising out of the use of any automobile, including the operation and loading or unloading. The Parking Exception stated the Auto Exclusion did not apply to parking an auto on Tarango’s premises. The main issues on appeal were whether the Parking Exception restored coverage otherwise precluded by the Auto Exclusion, and whether the district court prematurely decided Penn-America’s duty to indemnify. The appellate court answered yes to both.
On March 2, 2020, a truck driver employed by WS Excavation, LLC (“WS”), parked his tractor-trailer on Tarango’s property and proceeded to inspect and off-load heavy equipment. While operating the hydraulic lift, the tractor’s braking system disengaged. The tractor rolled back and struck the WS driver and his personal vehicle, resulting in his death and significant property damage. Notably, WS allegedly failed to properly maintain the tractor’s electronic and braking systems, and Tarango allegedly failed to maintain a level parking and loading facility compliant with industry standards and guidelines.
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Jeremy S. Macklin, Traub LiebermanMr. Macklin may be contacted at
jmacklin@tlsslaw.com
Life After McMillin: Do Negligence and Strict Liability Causes of Action for Construction Defects Still Exist?
January 24, 2018 —
Thomas Balestreri and Amanda Crawley - Balestreri, Potocki, & HolmesThe ruling is in but the battle will likely continue over the practical application of SB 800. On January 18, 2018 the California Supreme Court issued its decision in
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __, holding that the statutory prelitigation scheme in The Right to Repair Act (“the Act”) that provides for notice and an opportunity for the Builder to repair defects applies to all claims for construction defects in residential construction sold on or after January 1, 2003, regardless whether the claim is founded on a violation of the Act’s performance standards or a common law claim for negligence or strict liability. (
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __.) With this holding, has the Court ruled that common law causes of action for construction defect still survive? If so, what will they look like and what standards will be applied?
The short answer is that it appears that common law causes of action still survive, at least for now, but it is not clear from this decision what they will look like and what standards will apply.
Portions of the decision seem to suggest that the Act is the sole and exclusive remedy for construction defect claims: “…even in some areas where the common law had supplied a remedy for construction defects resulting in property damage but not personal injury, the text and legislative history [of the statute] reflect a
clear and unequivocal intent to supplant common law negligence and strict product liability actions under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 6].) (Italics added for emphasis) However, at the end of the decision, the Court seems to be saying that there may still be a place for common law claims for negligence and strict liability alongside the Act but that these causes of action may be subject to the performance standards in the Act.
The
McMillin case went up to the Supreme Court on a procedural issue: whether a common law action alleging construction defects resulting in both economic loss and property damage is subject to the Act’s prelitigation notice and cure procedures. The Van Tassels had dismissed their claims under the Act opting to proceed solely on their common law claims including negligence and strict liability. McMillin sought a stay to force the Van Tassels to comply with the Act’s prelitigation procedures. The Supreme Court held that the Van Tassels must comply with the statutory procedures and affirmed the stay issued by the trial court. But the question remained: now that the Van Tassels were left only with common law claims, how would they proceed under the Act?
To understand how the Court dealt with this question, one must first understand how the Court dealt with the narrow procedural question presented by the case. The Court provides a very detailed, clear explanation of the reasons why it felt the Legislature intended for all construction defect claims involving residential construction must comply with the prelitigation requirements of the Act. In summing up its conclusions the Court makes three definitive holdings.
First, for claims involving economic loss only—the kind of claims involved in
Aas—the Court holds that the Legislature intended to supersede
Aas and provide a statutory basis for recovery. (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 10].) In other words, the Court clearly agrees that the Act was meant to allow recovery of damages based solely on economic damages. No surprise there. Second, the Court held for personal injuries, the Legislature made no changes to existing law that provides common law remedies for the injured party. (Id.) Nobody has ever contested that. Finally, the Court held that for construction defect claims involving property damage and not just economic loss “the Legislature replaced the common law
methods of recovery with the new statutory scheme.” (
Id.,) (Italics added for emphasis.)
In other words, the Court is not saying that negligence and strict liability are not permitted causes of action. The Court is merely stating that these causes of action must comply with the Act’s statutory scheme just as the same as a claim for economic loss. Here the Court is focusing on the procedure that must be followed. “The Act, in effect, provides that construction defect claims not involving personal injury will be treated the same procedurally going forward whether or not the underlying claims gave rise to any property damage.” (
Id.)
Having laid out its fundamental premise, the Court then deals with Plaintiff’s arguments regarding the intent of the Legislature and makes light work of them all. In the process, the Court disapproves
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Brookfield Crystal Cove LLC (2013) 219 Cal. App. 4th 98, and
Burch v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal. App. 4th 1411, to the extent they are inconsistent with the views expressed in the
McMillin opinion.
This is where the decision gets interesting. The Court reminds us that the Van Tassels had dismissed their statutory causes of action for violation of the performance standards under Section 896. One would think at that point that Plaintiffs had to be wondering if they had any claims left given that the Court had ruled that the Act was the sole means of recovery for construction defects. Not so fast. The Court points out that the complaint still rests on allegations of defective construction and that the suit remains an “ ‘action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, the residential construction’ of the plaintiffs’ homes (§896)
and McMillin’s liability under the Van Tassels’ negligence and strict liability claims depends on the extent to which it [McMillin] violated the standards of sections 896 and 897.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Emphasis added.) WHAT DID THE COURT JUST SAY? Did the Court just say that a plaintiff could bring a common law cause of action for negligence or strict liability based on a violation of the performance standards under Section 896? What exactly would that claim look like? What would be the elements of such a cause of action?
To answer these questions, the Court states in the very next paragraph, which also happens to be the last paragraph in the decision: “In holding that claims seeking recovery for construction defect damages are subject to the Act’s prelitigation procedures regardless of how they are pleaded,
we have no occasion to address the extent to which a party might rely upon common law principles in pursuing liability under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Italics added for emphasis) Is the Court answering “No” to the questions posed above? Probably not. It is simply following the age old rule that an appellate court will
not rule on an issue that is not specifically presented by an appeal, leaving that question for another day.
All we know for sure from
McMillin is that every claim for construction defects falling within the scope of the Act must follow the prelitigation procedure. There are no hall passes for negligence and strict liability. The larger question posed by the last two paragraphs in the decision, is whether the law recognizes a cause of action for negligence and strict liability for construction defects based on the standards in Section 896. The answer will have to be worked out by judges and trial attorneys in courtrooms across the State! The parameters of this hybrid cause of action that the Court seems to have posited will need more careful consideration than can be offered on first reading of
McMillin v. Superior Court.
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Balestreri, Potocki, & Holmes
Thank You for 14 Consecutive Years of Legal Elite Elections
December 29, 2020 —
Christopher G. Hill - Construction Law MusingsThanks to the Virginia legal community that has continued to elect me to the Virginia Business Legal Elite in the Construction Law Category for 14 years running. The 14 consecutive years of election to the Legal Elite in the Construction Category spans my time as a solo construction attorney. The fact that you all have continued to elect “100%” of the lawyers at The Law Office of Christopher G. Hill, PC for the last 10 years is most gratifying and only confirms that my decision to “go solo” over 10 years ago was a good one. To be included in this list of top construction attorneys is both humbling and gratifying. For the complete list of the Virginia construction lawyers that were elected along with me, see the 2020 Virginia Business Legal Elite in Construction Law.
Reprinted courtesy of
The Law Office of Christopher G. Hill
Mr. Hill may be contacted at chrisghill@constructionlawva.com
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