District Court's Ruling Affirmed in TCD v American Family Mutual Insurance Co.
May 10, 2012 —
CDJ STAFFIn the case, TCD, Inc. v American Family Mutual Insurance Company, the district court’s summary judgment was in favor of the defendant. In response, the Plaintiff, TCD, appealed “on the ground that the insurance company had no duty to defend TCD under a commercial general liability (CGL) insurance policy.” The appeals court affirmed the decision.
The appeals ruling provides a brief history of the case: “This case arises out of a construction project in Frisco, Colorado. The developer, Frisco Gateway Center, LLC (Gateway), entered into a contract with TCD, the general contractor, to construct a building. TCD entered into a subcontract with Petra Roofing and Remodeling Company (Petra) to install the roof on the building. The subcontract required Petra to "indemnify, hold harmless, and defend" TCD against claims arising out of or resulting from the performance of Petra’s work on the project. The subcontract also required Petra to name TCD as an additional insured on its CGL policy in connection with Petra’s work under the subcontract.”
Furthermore, “TCD initiated this case against Petra and the insurance company, asserting claims for declaratory judgment, breach of insurance contract, breach of contract, and negligence. The district court entered a default judgment against Petra, and both the remaining parties moved for summary judgment. The court granted summary judgment on the entirety of the action, in favor of the insurance company, concluding that the counterclaims asserted by Gateway against TCD did not give rise to an obligation to defend or indemnify under the CGL policy.”
The appeals court rejected each contention made by TCD in turn. First, “TCD contend[ed] that Gateway’s counterclaims constitute[d] an allegation of ‘property damage,’ which is covered under the CGL policy.” The appeals court disagreed. Next, “TCD argue[d] that [the court] should broaden or extend the complaint rule, also called the ‘four corners’ rule, and allow it to offer evidence outside of the counterclaims to determine the insurance company’s duty to defend in this case.” The appeals court was not persuaded by TCD’s argument.
The judgment was affirmed. Judge Roman and Judge Miller concur.
Read the court’s decision…
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Mountain States Super Lawyers 2019 Recognizes 21 Nevada Snell & Wilmer Attorneys
June 18, 2019 —
Snell & WilmerSnell & Wilmer is pleased to announce that 21 attorneys from the Nevada offices have been selected for inclusion in the 2019 Mountain States Super Lawyers publication. Of those 21, 12 were recognized as Mountain States Rising Stars. Patrick Byrne was also named to the Top 100 list of attorneys for the Mountain States region.
Super Lawyers, part of Thomson Reuters, is a listing of lawyers from more than 70 practice areas who have attained a high degree of peer recognition and professional achievement. The annual selections are made using a patented multiphase process that includes independent research, peer nominations and peer evaluations.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Snell & Wilmer
California insured’s duty to cooperate and insurer’s right to select defense counsel
April 14, 2011 —
CDCoverage.comIn Travelers Property Casualty Co. v. Centex Homes, No. C 10-02757 (N.D. Cal. April 1, 2011), general contractor Centex was sued by homeowners for construction defects. Centex tendered its defense to Travelers as an additional insured under policies issued by Travelers to two Centex subcontractors. Travelers agreed to defend Centex under a reservation of rights and selected defense counsel to defend Centex. Centex refused to accept the defense, asserting that it was entitled to select defense counsel. Travelers filed suit against Centex seeking a declaratory judgment that Centex had breached the duty to cooperate condition in the Travelers’ policy.
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of CDCoverage.com
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Texas Supreme Court Rules That Subsequent Purchaser of Home Is Bound by Original Homeowner’s Arbitration Agreement With Builder
May 29, 2023 —
Kim Altsuler - Peckar & Abramson, P.C.In a new opinion
Lennar Homes of Texas Land and Construction, Ltd., et al. v. Kara Whiteley, Cause No. 21-0783, 66 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 8740, issued May 12, 2023, the Texas Supreme Court partially reversed two lower court decisions and held that an arbitration provision contained in the original homeowner’s contract with the builder was binding on a subsequent homeowner. In the decision, the court found that Kara Whiteley—the second owner of the home in Galveston, Texas—was bound to arbitrate her construction defect claims with Lennar by virtue of the doctrine of “direct-benefits estoppel.” The rationale was based on the fact that Whitely was seeking benefits emanating from Lennar’s contract with the original homeowner.
The residence in question was first purchased from Lennar in May 2014. Whiteley purchased the home in July 2015. The original contract documents included several arbitration provisions—one in the Purchase and Sale Agreement, one in the Limited Warranty issued by Lennar, and one in the general warranty deed. Whiteley sued Lennar in Galveston County District Court alleging mold growth and other defects at the property. Lennar moved for arbitration and its motion was granted. The parties arbitrated the case and Lennar received an award in its favor. Lennar then moved the District Court to confirm the arbitration award, and Whiteley filed a cross-motion to vacate the award, arguing that Lennar’s original motion to compel arbitration should not have been granted. The District Court agreed with Whiteley, vacating the arbitration award. Lennar appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s vacatur, and Lennar appealed to the Texas Supreme Court.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Kim Altsuler - Peckar & Abramson, P.C.Ms. Altsuler may be contacted at
kaltsuler@pecklaw.com
The Power of Team Bonding: Transforming Workplaces for the Better
June 10, 2024 —
Alexa Stephenson & Brittney Aquino - Kahana FeldThe number of civil Complaints filed in California has been steadily rising over the last few years. When employees struggle daily to make a dent in what seems as an insurmountable to-do list, taking time away from work to chat with coworkers about their weekends or the latest Netflix drop seems counterintuitive. Yet recent studies suggest that taking even 30 minutes away from your workday to engage in team bonding has lasting benefits. Investing in team bonding activities is not just about having fun; it is about creating a cohesive, motivated, and high-performing team that can drive organizational success. As the evidence suggests, the return on investment for team bonding activities is substantial, making it a vital component of any successful workplace strategy.
Enhancing Communication and Collaboration
One of the primary benefits of team bonding is improved communication among team members. Effective communication is the bedrock of any successful team, and activities designed to foster relationships can significantly enhance this aspect. A study conducted by MIT’s Human Dynamics Laboratory found that teams with higher levels of social interaction outside of formal meetings performed better than those with limited interaction. These teams were more cohesive, coordinated, and ultimately more productive.
Bonding activities, as simple as group lunches or intensive as a weekend retreat, create opportunities for employees to interact in a relaxed setting. This helps break down barriers and encourages open communication, which translates into a more collaborative work environment. When employees feel comfortable sharing ideas and feedback, it leads to better problem-solving and innovation.
Reprinted courtesy of
Alexa Stephenson, Kahana Feld and
Brittney Aquino, Kahana Feld
Ms. Stephenson may be contacted at astephenson@kahanafeld.com
Ms. Aquino may be contacted at baquino@kahanafeld.com
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Homeowner Survives Motion to Dismiss Depreciation Claims
September 23, 2024 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiThe insurer's motion to dismiss claims for improper claims handling when considering implementation of depreciation was denied. Morrison v. Indian Harbor Ins. Co, et al., 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115664 (S. D. W. Va. July 1, 2024).
Plaintiff's home suffered flood damage. The house was insured by Indian Harbor a surplus lines carrier that offered specialized and high risk property policies in West Virginia. Surplus lines policies were procured in West Virginia through a "surplus lines licensee." Here, Neptune Flood Inc. was the surplus lines licensee broker for Indian Harbor. Peninsula Insurance Bureau, Inc. was an administrator and loss adjuster involved in the claim.
After the flood, Plaintiff notified defendants of the damage and immediately cleaned and repaired the house. Plaintiff asserted that Neptune was given notice of the loss and one of its agents made recommendations regarding the coverage available and conveyed the information to Peninsula and Indian Harbour. Plaintiff claimed that defendants misrepresented his policy coverage and made incorrect adjustments for depreciation based on Neptune's statements and recommendations.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak HastertMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Arizona Court of Appeals Decision in $8.475 Million Construction Defect Class Action Suit
May 09, 2011 —
CDJ STAFFIn the case of Leflet v. Fire (Ariz. App., 2011), which involved an $8.475 million settlement in a construction defect class action suit, the question put forth to the Appeals court was “whether an insured and an insurer can join in a Morris agreement that avoids the primary insurer’s obligation to pay policy limits and passes liability in excess of those limits on to other insurers.” The Appeals court provided several reasons for their decision to affirm the validity of the settlement agreement as to the Non-Participatory Insurers (NPIs) and to vacate and remand the attorney fee awards.
First, the Appeals court stated, “The settlement agreement is not a compliant Morris agreement and provides no basis for claims against the NPIs.” They conclude, “Appellants attempt to avoid the doctrinal underpinnings of Morris by arguing that ‘the cooperation clause did not prohibit Hancock from assigning its rights to anyone, including Appellants.’ This narrow reading of the cooperation clause ignores the fact that Hancock did not merely assign its rights — it assigned its rights after stipulating to an $8.475 million judgment that neither it nor its Direct Insurers could ever be liable to pay. Neither Morris nor any other case defines such conduct as actual ‘cooperation’—rather, Morris simply defines limited circumstances in which an insured is relieved of its duty to cooperate. Because Morris agreements are fraught with risk of abuse, a settlement that mimics Morris in form but does not find support in the legal and economic realities that gave rise to that decision is both unenforceable and offensive to the policy’s cooperation clause.”
The Appeals court further concluded that “even if the agreement had qualified under Morris, plaintiffs did not provide the required notice to the NPIs.” The court continued, “Because an insurer who defends under a reservation of rights is always aware of the possibility of a Morris agreement, the mere threat of Morris in the course of settlement negotiations does not constitute sufficient notice. Instead, the insurer must be made aware that it may waive its reservation of rights and provide an unqualified defense, or defend solely on coverage and reasonableness grounds against the judgment resulting from the Morris agreement. The NPIs were not given the protections of this choice before the agreement was entered, and therefore can face no liability for the resulting stipulated judgment.”
Next, the Appeals court declared that “the trial court abused its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees under A.R.S § 12-341.” The Appeals court reasoned, “In this case, the NPIs prevailed in their attack on the settlement. But the litigation did not test the merits of their coverage defenses or the reasonableness of the settlement amount. And Plaintiffs never sued the NPIs, either in their own right or as the assignees of Hancock. Rather, the NPIs intervened to test the conceptual validity of the settlement agreement (to which they were not parties) before such an action could commence. In these circumstances, though it might be appropriate to offset a fee award against some future recovery by the Plaintiff Leflet v. Fire (Ariz. App., 2011) class, the purposes of A.R.S. § 12-341.01 would not be served by an award of fees against them jointly and severally. We therefore conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding fees against Plaintiffs ‘jointly and severally.’”
The Appeals court made the following conclusion: “we affirm the judgment of the trial court concerning the validity of the settlement agreement as to the NPIs. We vacate and remand the award of attorney’s fees. In our discretion, we decline to award the NPIs the attorney’s fees they have requested on appeal pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-341.01(A).”
Read the court’s decision…
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Top Developments March 2024
April 22, 2024 —
Complex Insurance Coverage ReporterCLAIMS-MADE COVERAGE
Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Syngenta Crop Prot. LLC, 2024 Del. LEXIS 68 (Del. Feb. 26, 2024)
Delaware Supreme Court concludes that a letter from a lawyer informing an insured of possible lawsuits without identifying potential plaintiffs or demanding payment is not a “claim for damages” within the meaning of claims-made CGL and umbrella liability policies. Citing case law from Delaware and other jurisdictions, it reasoned that, in the ordinary sense, a “claim for damages” (which the policies did not define) is “a demand or request for monetary relief by or on behalf of an identifiable claimant.” According to the court, the letter in question did not meet this definition because it did not identify any claimants “except in the vaguest terms” or request monetary relief on any claimant’s behalf, but rather communicated only a threat of future litigation. As a result, the letter was not a claim made before the policy periods at issue.
POLLUTION EXCLUSION
Wesco Ins. Co. v. Brad Ingram Constr., 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 1488 (9th Cir. Jan. 23, 2024)
A divided Ninth Circuit panel, applying California law, holds that a pollution exclusion* in a CGL policy does not preclude a duty to defend an underlying suit alleging physical injury from exposure to “clouds of toxic dust” deposited in the environment by a wildfire and released during clean up efforts. Citing MacKinnon v. Truck Ins. Exch., 73 P.3d 1205 (Cal. 2003), the majority explained that determining whether a “pollution event” (i.e., “environmental pollution”) resulting in excluded injury has occurred involves consideration of “the character of the injurious substance” and whether the exposure resulted from a “mechanism specified in the policy.” It concluded that a potential for coverage (and, therefore, a defense obligation) existed because, although wildfire debris may be considered a “pollutant” in certain circumstances, the mechanism alleged in the underlying complaint – “expos[ure] . . . to clouds of toxic dust during the loading and unloading of [the underlying plaintiff’s] truck” – did not clearly constitute an “event commonly thought of as pollution.”
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
White and Williams LLP
