Cambridge Massachusetts Building Expert Directory

WSHB Expands into the Southeast

March 18, 2019 — William Silverman – Wood Smith Henning & Berman LLP
National law firm Wood, Smith Henning & Berman LLP (WSHB) announced the opening of its North Carolina office, bringing the total number of offices nationwide to 24. Leading this office is prominent trial attorney William Silverman. Mr. Silverman enjoys a well deserved reputation for consistent results throughout the Carolinas in complex commercial litigation. His practice areas include construction and corporate disputes, insurance coverage, first and third party insurance bad faith litigation, environmental, and catastrophic injury matters. He is an “AV Preeminent” rated attorney by Martindale-Hubbell, and has been listed in Business North Carolina’s Legal Elite in the Young Guns and Construction categories. Mr. Silverman comes to the Firm from a seven year tenure at Wall Templeton, where he served as a Shareholder. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of William Silverman, Wood Smith Henning & Berman LLP
Mr. Silverman may be contacted at wsilverman@wshblaw.com

Caution to GCs! An Exception to Privette Can Leave You Open to Liability

February 01, 2023 — Nicole Whyte - Bremer Whyte Brown & O'Meara LLP
In a recent important decision, Brown v. Beach House Design & Development the Court of Appeal addressed an issue that frequently arises under the Privette doctrine—the extent to which a general contractor can be held liable for injuries to a subcontractor’s employee. The injuries in Brown arose when a window casing subcontractor’s employee fell from a scaffold erected by a plastering subcontractor at a construction site. According to evidence offered by the plaintiff in opposition to a motion for summary judgment filed by the general contractor, the scaffold was not properly secured to the building where the work was being performed. As a result the scaffold was defective and failed, causing the injuries. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Nicole Whyte, Bremer Whyte Brown & O'Meara LLP
Ms. Whyte may be contacted at nwhyte@bremerwhyte.com

Terminating Notice of Commencement Without Contractor’s Final Payment Affidavit

October 23, 2018 — David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal Updates
Prior to construction work being performed on your property, a Notice of Commencement should be recorded. Among other things, construction liens will relate back in time to an effective Notice of Commencement (meaning it has not expired). For this reason, lenders or others will want the Notice of Commencement to be terminated when the job is complete by recording in the official records a Notice of Termination of the Notice of Commencement. There is a statutory procedure to terminate a Notice of Commencement pursuant to Florida Statute 713.132. Frequently, a clerk will want the Notice of Termination of the Notice of Commencement to be accompanied with a Contractor’s Final Payment Affidavit because 713.132 says, in material part:

(2) An owner has the right to rely on a contractor’s affidavit given under s. 713.06(3)(d), except with respect to lienors who have already given notice, in connection with the execution, swearing to, and recording of a notice of termination. However, the notice of termination must be accompanied by the contractor’s affidavit.

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Reprinted courtesy of David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris
Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at dma@kirwinnorris.com

A Court-Side Seat: Waters, Walls and Pipelines

August 03, 2020 — Anthony B. Cavender - Gravel2Gavel
Several interesting decisions have recently been made by federal and state courts. FEDERAL APPELLATE COURTS The U.S. Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals – ARCO Shifts from State to Federal and No Vigor for VIM On June 18, 2020, the court decided the case of Baker, et al. v. ARCO, holding that the revised federal removal statutes authorize the removal to federal court of a state-filed complaint against several defendants by the former residents of an Indiana housing complex who contended that the defendants were responsible for the industrial pollution attributed to the operations of a now-closed industrial plant. The housing complex was constructed at the site of the former U.S. Smelter and Lead Refinery. During the Second World War, the plant produced products for the use of the government war effort, thus triggering the applicability of the federal removal statutes. On June 25, 2020, the court decided the case of Greene, et al. v. Westfield Insurance Company. As the court notes, this is a matter that “began as a case about environmental pollution and evolved into a joint garnishment action.” An Indiana wood recycling facility, VIM Recycling, was the subject of many complaints by nearby residents that its operations and waste disposal activities exposed then to dust and odors in violation of federal law and triggered state tort law claims. VIM was sued in state court, but neglected to notify its insurer, as required by its insurance policy with Westfield Insurance. One thing led to another, and a default judgment in the amount of $ 50 million was entered against VIM. Since VIM at that point had no assets, the plaintiffs and later VIM sought recovery from Westfield. When this dispute landed in federal court, the court, after reviewing the policy, concluded that there was a provision excluding coverage when the insured knew it had these liabilities when it purchased the insurance. As a result, the lower court dismissed the lawsuit, and this decision has been affirmed by the Seventh Circuit. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Anthony B. Cavender, Pillsbury
Mr. Cavender may be contacted at anthony.cavender@pillsburylaw.com

When to Withhold Retention Payments on Private or Public Projects

August 29, 2018 — Nicholas Karkazis - Gordon & Rees Construction Law Blog
To ensure that construction contractors and subcontractors receive timely progress and retention payments, the California Legislature enacted statutes that impose deadlines and penalties on owners and direct (general) contractors who delay payments. (Cal. Civ. Code, §§ 8800, 8802, 8812, 8814; Pub. Contract Code, §§ 7107, 10262.5; Bus. & Prof. Code, § 7108.5.) However, there is an exception to these deadlines and penalties on both private and public projects. The exception allows an owner or direct contractor to withhold payment1 when there is a good faith dispute between an owner and a direct contractor or between a direct contractor and a subcontractor. (Civ. Code, §§ 8800, subd. (b), 8802, subd. (b), 8812, subd. (c), 8814, subd. (c); Pub. Contract Code, §§ 7107, subds. (c), (e), 10262.5, subd. (a); Bus. & Prof. Code, § 7108.5, subd. (a).) But the term “good faith dispute” has been a source of confusion where direct contractors owe subcontractors retention payments, but want to withhold the payment because of a dispute.2 California appellate courts were split, with one court finding that any type of bona fide dispute justified withholding, and another finding that only disputes related to the payment itself justified withholding. (Compare Martin Brothers Construction, Inc. v. Thompson Pacific Construction, Inc. (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 1401 [any bona fide dispute could justify withholding] with East West Bank v. Rio School Dist. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 742 [disputes related to the payment itself may justify withholding].) In May 2018, the California Supreme Court clarified that for a direct contractor to withhold a retention payment on a private project, the good faith dispute must somehow relate to the payment itself. (United Riggers & Erectors, Inc. v. Coast Iron & Steel Co. (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1082, 1097-1098.) Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Nicholas Karkazis, Gordon & Rees Scully Mansukhani
Mr. Karkazis may be contacted at nkarkazis@grsm.com

On the Ten Year Anniversary of the JOBS Act A Look-Back at the Development of Crowdfunding

May 02, 2022 — J. Kyle Janecek & Jeffrey M. Dennis - Newmeyer Dillion
Last month marked the ten-year anniversary of the Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, which was signed into law by President Obama on April 5, 2012. On May 16, 2016, Title III of the JOBS Act was enacted, as the final piece of the JOBS Act, which gave businesses better access to crowdfunding tactics due to the ability to raise funds based on equity. Today, the JOBS Act and the impact of equity crowdfunding more generally has grown among multiple industries, from entertainment and technology to real estate and construction, and has come a long way from the non-equity crowdfunding of Kickstarter and Indiegogo. So what have been the powers that businesses gained from Title III of the JOBS Act? What has been the impact of the last ten years? Where do businesses go from here to better utilize this source of funding? WHAT ARE THE CROWDFUNDING POWERS GIVEN BY THE JOBS ACT? The main difference and change that the JOBS Act had on the field of "crowdfunding" was that for the first time, unaccredited investors could obtain equity stakes in businesses through online solicitations. However, a business was still required to go through the proper approved channels, like accredited crowdfunding portals to solicit and receive funding. Prior to this, crowdfunding had gotten more of an impact and reputation from platforms like Kickstarter and Indiegogo, platforms that benefitted creative works or could act as a "pre-order" system with no guaranty of performance or quality of goods by the party seeking funds. Reprinted courtesy of J. Kyle Janecek, Newmeyer Dillion and Jeffrey M. Dennis, Newmeyer Dillion Mr. Janecek may be contacted at kyle.janecek@ndlf.com Mr. Dennis may be contacted at jeff.dennis@ndlf.com Read the court decision
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Revisiting Statutory Offers to Compromise

August 28, 2023 — Kathryne Baldwin - Wilke Fleury
The fourth appellate district published an opinion earlier this year in Smalley v. Subaru of America, Inc. (2022) 87 Cal.App.5th 450 that serves as an excellent refresher on requirements of the “998 Offer,” or a statutory offer to compromise pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”) §998. In Smalley, set in the context of a Lemon Law action, Defendant Subaru made a 998 Offer for $35,001.00, together with attorneys’ fees and costs totaling either $10,000.00 or costs and reasonably incurred attorneys’ fees, in an amount to be determined by the Court. (Smalley, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at 454.) Plaintiff objected that the offer was not reasonable and the case proceeded to trial. At trial, a jury found in favor of Plaintiff and awarded him a total judgment award of $27,555.74 – far short of the $35,001.00 offer. The trial court found Plaintiff had failed to beat the 998 at trial and that Subaru’s earlier 998 offer was reasonable. Plaintiff appealed the post-judgment order awarding Plaintiff pre-offer costs and Defendant post-offer costs on the grounds that the 998 was not reasonable in that it did not specify whether Plaintiff would be deemed the prevailing party for purposes of a motion for attorneys’ fees. The fourth district affirmed the trial court’s order and engaged in a helpful review of 998 requirements. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Kathryne Baldwin, Wilke Fleury
Ms. Baldwin may be contacted at kbaldwin@wilkefleury.com

Carrier Has Duty to Defend Claim for Active Malfunction of Product

October 19, 2020 — Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law Hawaii
Rejecting that the underlying claim was based solely on faulty workmanship, the Third Circuit held the insurer had a duty to defend allegations of a malfunctioning product. Nautilus Ins. Co. v. 200 Christina Street Partners LLC, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 22118 (3d Cir. July 16, 2020). The insureds were sued by homeowners in two separate suits alleging defects in the construction of their homes. Nautilus defended under a reservation of rights. Nautilus filed suit in District Court and moved for judgment on the pleadings. The District Court denied the motion, finding Nautilus had a duty to defend because the underlying claims sufficiently alleged product--related tort clams that could fall within the scope of coverage under the relevant policies. The Third Circuit affirmed. There was a distinction between a claim of faulty workmanship, for which the insurer did not have a duty to defend, and a claim of "active malfunction" of a product, for which an insurer did have such a duty. An active malfunction was sufficiently fortuitous as to constitute an "occurrence." Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak Hastert
Mr. Eyerly may be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com

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