Nine ACS Lawyers Recognized by Best Lawyers®
September 02, 2024 —
Ahlers Cressman & Sleight PLLCDeparting from our blog’s typical coverage of construction related issues, Ahlers Cressman & Sleight PLLC is proud to announce that nine members of our firm have been recognized by Best Lawyers® in 2025 in America.
Recognition by Best Lawyers® is based entirely on peer review and is designed to reflect the consensus opinion of leading lawyers about the professional abilities of their colleagues. Lawyers can be nominated by clients and other lawyers. After nomination, ballots are generated and distributed to lawyers. Voters are asked how likely they would be to refer a case to the nominee and to give a rating and additional comments. Ballots are designed based on the voter’s practice area and geographic region. After feedback is analyzed, Best Lawyers® research staff ensures nominees are in good standing with the ethics committee of their state bar and selects lawyers for recognition.
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Ahlers Cressman & Sleight PLLC
Life After McMillin: Do Negligence and Strict Liability Causes of Action for Construction Defects Still Exist?
January 24, 2018 —
Thomas Balestreri and Amanda Crawley - Balestreri, Potocki, & HolmesThe ruling is in but the battle will likely continue over the practical application of SB 800. On January 18, 2018 the California Supreme Court issued its decision in
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __, holding that the statutory prelitigation scheme in The Right to Repair Act (“the Act”) that provides for notice and an opportunity for the Builder to repair defects applies to all claims for construction defects in residential construction sold on or after January 1, 2003, regardless whether the claim is founded on a violation of the Act’s performance standards or a common law claim for negligence or strict liability. (
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __.) With this holding, has the Court ruled that common law causes of action for construction defect still survive? If so, what will they look like and what standards will be applied?
The short answer is that it appears that common law causes of action still survive, at least for now, but it is not clear from this decision what they will look like and what standards will apply.
Portions of the decision seem to suggest that the Act is the sole and exclusive remedy for construction defect claims: “…even in some areas where the common law had supplied a remedy for construction defects resulting in property damage but not personal injury, the text and legislative history [of the statute] reflect a
clear and unequivocal intent to supplant common law negligence and strict product liability actions under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 6].) (Italics added for emphasis) However, at the end of the decision, the Court seems to be saying that there may still be a place for common law claims for negligence and strict liability alongside the Act but that these causes of action may be subject to the performance standards in the Act.
The
McMillin case went up to the Supreme Court on a procedural issue: whether a common law action alleging construction defects resulting in both economic loss and property damage is subject to the Act’s prelitigation notice and cure procedures. The Van Tassels had dismissed their claims under the Act opting to proceed solely on their common law claims including negligence and strict liability. McMillin sought a stay to force the Van Tassels to comply with the Act’s prelitigation procedures. The Supreme Court held that the Van Tassels must comply with the statutory procedures and affirmed the stay issued by the trial court. But the question remained: now that the Van Tassels were left only with common law claims, how would they proceed under the Act?
To understand how the Court dealt with this question, one must first understand how the Court dealt with the narrow procedural question presented by the case. The Court provides a very detailed, clear explanation of the reasons why it felt the Legislature intended for all construction defect claims involving residential construction must comply with the prelitigation requirements of the Act. In summing up its conclusions the Court makes three definitive holdings.
First, for claims involving economic loss only—the kind of claims involved in
Aas—the Court holds that the Legislature intended to supersede
Aas and provide a statutory basis for recovery. (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 10].) In other words, the Court clearly agrees that the Act was meant to allow recovery of damages based solely on economic damages. No surprise there. Second, the Court held for personal injuries, the Legislature made no changes to existing law that provides common law remedies for the injured party. (Id.) Nobody has ever contested that. Finally, the Court held that for construction defect claims involving property damage and not just economic loss “the Legislature replaced the common law
methods of recovery with the new statutory scheme.” (
Id.,) (Italics added for emphasis.)
In other words, the Court is not saying that negligence and strict liability are not permitted causes of action. The Court is merely stating that these causes of action must comply with the Act’s statutory scheme just as the same as a claim for economic loss. Here the Court is focusing on the procedure that must be followed. “The Act, in effect, provides that construction defect claims not involving personal injury will be treated the same procedurally going forward whether or not the underlying claims gave rise to any property damage.” (
Id.)
Having laid out its fundamental premise, the Court then deals with Plaintiff’s arguments regarding the intent of the Legislature and makes light work of them all. In the process, the Court disapproves
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Brookfield Crystal Cove LLC (2013) 219 Cal. App. 4th 98, and
Burch v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal. App. 4th 1411, to the extent they are inconsistent with the views expressed in the
McMillin opinion.
This is where the decision gets interesting. The Court reminds us that the Van Tassels had dismissed their statutory causes of action for violation of the performance standards under Section 896. One would think at that point that Plaintiffs had to be wondering if they had any claims left given that the Court had ruled that the Act was the sole means of recovery for construction defects. Not so fast. The Court points out that the complaint still rests on allegations of defective construction and that the suit remains an “ ‘action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, the residential construction’ of the plaintiffs’ homes (§896)
and McMillin’s liability under the Van Tassels’ negligence and strict liability claims depends on the extent to which it [McMillin] violated the standards of sections 896 and 897.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Emphasis added.) WHAT DID THE COURT JUST SAY? Did the Court just say that a plaintiff could bring a common law cause of action for negligence or strict liability based on a violation of the performance standards under Section 896? What exactly would that claim look like? What would be the elements of such a cause of action?
To answer these questions, the Court states in the very next paragraph, which also happens to be the last paragraph in the decision: “In holding that claims seeking recovery for construction defect damages are subject to the Act’s prelitigation procedures regardless of how they are pleaded,
we have no occasion to address the extent to which a party might rely upon common law principles in pursuing liability under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Italics added for emphasis) Is the Court answering “No” to the questions posed above? Probably not. It is simply following the age old rule that an appellate court will
not rule on an issue that is not specifically presented by an appeal, leaving that question for another day.
All we know for sure from
McMillin is that every claim for construction defects falling within the scope of the Act must follow the prelitigation procedure. There are no hall passes for negligence and strict liability. The larger question posed by the last two paragraphs in the decision, is whether the law recognizes a cause of action for negligence and strict liability for construction defects based on the standards in Section 896. The answer will have to be worked out by judges and trial attorneys in courtrooms across the State! The parameters of this hybrid cause of action that the Court seems to have posited will need more careful consideration than can be offered on first reading of
McMillin v. Superior Court.
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Equitable Lien Designed to Prevent Unjust Enrichment
November 09, 2020 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesThere are instances where a party does not have construction lien rights but, nevertheless, feels the need to pursue an equitable lien against the real property.
No different than a construction lien, an action to enforce an equitable lien has a one-year limitations period if it arises from the “furnishing of labor, services, or material for the improvement of real property.” Fla. Stat. s. 95.11(5)(b). In other words, an equitable lien–not nearly as powerful as a construction lien because a construction lien is recorded in the official public records whereas an equitable lien is not–is tied to an analogous one-year limitations period for those liening for construction improvements. (Notably, if the equitable lien arises outside of the construction improvement context, the one-year statute of limitations would not apply. See Gabriji, LLC v. Hollywood East, LLC, 45 Fla. L. Weekly D2251a (Fla. 4th DCA 2020) (one-year statute of limitations period does not apply to all equitable liens such as those that do not arise from furnishing labor, services, or material for the improvement of real property)).
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David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
Construction Upturn in Silicon Valley
August 17, 2011 —
CDJ STAFFWork resumed after nearly three years on an office tower in Santa Clara, according to the San Jose Mercury News. Work had stalled on the building due to the economy, but now the developer is planning a second five-story building on the site. Other dormant projects in the area are also getting restarted. Santa Clara County saw the addition of 1,800 construction jobs in June.
A spokesperson for the Operating Engineers Local 3 in Alameda told the paper, “two years ago we had five thousand folks on the out-of-work list. It’s now down to about 1,700.”
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US Attorney Alleges ADA Violations in Chicago Cubs Stadium Renovation
August 07, 2022 —
Annemarie Mannion - Engineering News-RecordThe friendly confines of Wrigley Field are not so friendly to wheelchair users, according to federal prosecutors who filed a civil lawsuit July 14 alleging that the Chicago Cubs’ multi-year renovation of the baseball stadium eliminated prime wheelchair seating and did not include other accessible features required under the Americans with Disabilities Act.
Reprinted courtesy of
Annemarie Mannion, Engineering News-Record
Ms. Mannion may be contacted at manniona@enr.com
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Surety's Settlement Without Principal's Consent Is Not Bad Faith
January 05, 2017 —
Tred R. Eyerly – Insurance Law HawaiiThe Sixth Circuit found that the surety did not act in bad faith when it settled the general contractor's claims against the State of Michigan over delays on a construction project. Great Am. Ins. Co. v. E.L. Bailey & Co., 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 20018 (6th Cir. Nov. 7, 2016).
Bailey, the general contractor, entered into a surety agreement under which Great American would issue surety bonds on behalf of Bailey in the construction of a kitchen at a State prison. Bailey, the principal, paid Great American (GAIC), the surety, to provide bonds guaranteeing contract performance to the State, the obligee or owner. GAIC provided a performance bond, guaranteeing performance of the contract work, and a payment bond, guaranteeing payments to subcontractors and suppliers. Under the agreement, Bailey would indemnify GAIC for all payments or other expenses GAIC incurred due on either bond, and would pay upon demand collateral in an amount to be determined by GAIC. In the event of an alleged breach by Bailey, the agreement assigned to GAIC all Bailey's rights under its contract with the State and well as all its claims against any party.
Bailey never finalized completion, and GAIC reached agreement with the State for another contractor to complete the project.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law HawaiiMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Sick Leave, Paid Time Off, and the Families First Coronavirus Response Act
April 20, 2020 —
Garret Murai - California Construction Law BlogUnemployment claims hit a historic high this past week as 3.3 million Americans filed for unemployment benefits. To give you some context, this is not only the highest number of unemployment claims ever filed, it is five times higher than the previous record of 695,000 unemployment claims in 1982.
Restaurants, hotels, airlines and other businesses have begun to layoff or furlough workers. According to a survey conducted by the Associated General Contractors of America this past week, 39% of respondents reported that project owners have halted or cancelled construction projects due to deteriorating economic conditions, 45% reported project delays or disruptions, and 23% reported supply chain disruptions.
While the construction industry likely won’t be impacted nearly to the same degree as the retail sector has, some involved in the construction industry may nevertheless be faced with the prospect of having to lay off or furlough workers as “shelter in place” orders are extended. If you’re faced with that situation here are a few things to remember:
Paid Sick Leave
Under California law, nearly all employers are required to provide paid sick leave to employees who work for 30 or more days in a given year. Paid sick leave can be used by an employee for illnesses, including COVID-19, the diagnosis, care, or treatment of existing health conditions, and preventative care for the employee or employee’s family member. The important thing to remember here is that use of paid sick leave is an employee’s choice. While an employer, concerned that an employee may have contracted COVID-19, may require that an employee not come to the office, the employer cannot force such an employee to use his or her paid sick leave. For more information, the California Labor Commissioner has created a webpage specific to COVID 19.
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Garret Murai, Nomos LLPMr. Murai may be contacted at
gmurai@nomosllp.com
Beyond the Flow-Down Clause: Subcontract Provisions That Can Expose General Contractors to Increased Liability and Inconsistent Outcomes
December 10, 2024 —
Phillip L. Parham III - ConsensusDocsFlow-down clauses in construction subcontracts—blanket clauses providing that some or all of the terms and conditions in the prime contract between the general contractor and the property owner apply equally between the subcontractor and general contractor—are an important component to managing risk for a general contractor and reducing the likelihood of disputes with either/both the owner and subcontractor. Put simply, flow-down provisions can provide continuity between the general contractor’s obligations to the owner and the subcontractor’s obligations to the general contractor. Properly drafted, flow-down clauses reduce the general contractor’s risk by ensuring that the subcontractor is legally bound to meet the owner’s objectives for the project in the same way as the general contractor. But relying on blanket flow-down clauses, alone, to protect the general contractor is like a soldier going into battle with nothing but a helmet, leaving significant other areas exposed and unprotected. In other words, a general contractor should look beyond just a singular, blanket flow down of terms to ensure its bases are properly covered.
Accordingly, this article goes beyond the blanket flow-down clause and highlights several key subcontract provisions where inconsistent obligations among the subcontractor, general contractor, and owner expose the general contractor to increased liability and inconsistent outcomes. Specifically, this article will examine disputes resolution clauses, liquidating provisions, notice provisions, and termination provisions. However, this article will not provide a deep examination of these clauses, nor does it highlight every potentially relevant clause. Rather, it focuses on these select clauses to highlight important issues associated with flow-down provisions.
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Phillip L. Parham III, Jones Walker LLPMr. Parham may be contacted at
pparham@joneswalker.com
