Gillotti v. Stewart (2017) 2017 WL 1488711 Rejects Liberty Mutual, Holding Once Again that the Right to Repair Act is the Exclusive Remedy for Construction Defect Claims
June 05, 2017 —
Richard H. Glucksman, Esq. & Chelsea L. Zwart, Esq. - Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger BulletinBackground
In Gillotti v. Stewart (April 26, 2017) 2017 WL 1488711, which was ordered to be published on May 18, 2017, the defendant grading subcontractor added soil over tree roots to level the driveway on the plaintiff homeowner’s sloped lot. The homeowner sued the grading subcontractor under the California Right to Repair Act (Civil Code §§ 895, et seq.) claiming that the subcontractor’s work damaged the trees.
After the jury found the subcontractor was not negligent, the trial court entered judgment in favor of the subcontractor. The homeowner appealed, arguing that the trial court improperly construed the Right to Repair Act as barring a common law negligence theory against the subcontractor and erred in failing to follow Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Brookfield Crystal Cove LLC (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 98. The Third District Court of Appeal disagreed and affirmed the trial court’s judgment in favor of the subcontractor.
Impact
This is the second time the Third District Court of Appeal has held that Liberty Mutual (discussed below) was wrongly decided and held that the Right to Repair Act is the exclusive remedy for construction defect claims. The decision follows its holding in Elliott Homes, Inc. v. Superior Court (Hicks) (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 333, in which the Court of Appeal held that the Right to Repair Act’s pre-litigation procedures apply when homeowners plead construction defect claims based on common law causes of action, as opposed to violations of the building standards set forth in the Right to Repair Act. Elliott is currently on hold at the California Supreme Court, pending the decision in McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 1132, wherein Liberty Mutual was rejected for the first time by the Fifth District. CGDRB continues to follow developments regarding the much anticipated McMillin decision closely, as well as all related matters.
Discussion
The Right to Repair Act makes contractors and subcontractors not involved in home sales liable for construction defects only if the homeowner proves they negligently cause the violation in whole or part (Civil Code §§ 911(b), 936). As such, the trial court in Gillotti instructed the jury on negligence with respect to the grading subcontractor. The jury found that while the construction did violate some of the Right to Repair’s building standards alleged by the homeowner, the subcontractor was not negligent in anyway. After the jury verdict, the trial court found in favor of the grading subcontractor.
The homeowner moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial on the grounds that the trial court improperly barred a common law negligence theory against the grading subcontractor. The trial court denied the motions on the grounds that “[t]he Right to Repair Act specifically provides that no other causes of action are allowed. See Civil Code § 943.” The trial court specifically noted that its decision conflicted with Liberty Mutual, in which the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that the Right to Repair Act does not eliminate common law rights and remedies where actual damage has occurred, stating that Liberty Mutual was wrongly decided and that the Liberty Mutual court was naïve in its assumptions regarding the legislative history of the Right to Repair Act.
In Gillotti, the Third District Court of Appeal stated that the Liberty Mutual court failed to analyze the language of Civil Code § 896, which “clearly and unequivocally expresses the legislative intent that the Act apply to all action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, residential construction, except as specifically set forth in the Act. The Act does not specifically except actions arising from actual damages. To the contrary, it authorizes recovery of damages, e.g., for ‘the reasonable cost of repairing and rectifying any damages resulting from the failure of the home to meet the standards....’ ([Civil Code] § 944).”
The Court also disagreed with Liberty Mutual’s view that because Civil Code §§ 931 and 943 acknowledge exceptions to the Right to Repair Act’s statutory remedies, the Act does not preclude common law claims for damages due to defects identified in the Act. The Court stated: “Neither list of exceptions, in section 943 or in section 931, includes common law causes of action such as negligence. If the Legislature had intended to make such a wide-ranging exception to the restrictive language of the first sentence of section 943, we would have expected it to do so expressly.”
Additionally, the Court of Appeal rejected the argument that Civil Code § 897 preserves a common law negligence claims for violation of standards not listed in Civil Code § 986. It explained that the section of Civil Code § 897, which provides, “The standards set forth in this chapter are intended to address every function or component of a structure,” expresses the legislative intent that the Right to Repair Act be all-encompassing. Anything inadvertently omitted is actionable under the Act if it causes damage. Any exceptions to the Act are made expressly through Civil Code §§ 931 and 934. The Court concluded in no uncertain terms that the Right to Repair Act precludes common law claims in cases for damages covered by the Act.
The homeowner further argued that she was not precluded from bringing a common law claim because a tree is not a “structure,” and therefore the alleged tree damage did not fall within the realm of the Right to Repair. The Court of Appeal also rejected this argument, holding that while the tree damage itself was not expressly covered, the act of adding soil to make the driveway level (which caused the damage) implicated the standards covered by the Right to Repair Act. The Court explained that since under the Act a “structure” includes “improvement located upon a lot or within a common area” (Civil Code § 895(a)), as the driveway was an improvement upon the lot, the claim was within the purview of the Right to Repair Act. As the soil, a component of the driveway, caused damage (to the trees), it was actionable under the Act.
Reprinted courtesy of
Richard H. Glucksman, Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger and
Chelsea L. Zwart, Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger
Mr. Glucksman may be contacted at rglucksman@cgdrblaw.com
Ms. Zwart may be contacted at czwart@cgdrblaw.com
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Suffolk Pauses $1.5B Boston Tower Project for Safety Audit After Fire
April 22, 2024 —
James Leggate - Engineering News-RecordThe team building the $1.5-billion, 51-story South Station Tower in Boston voluntarily shut down the jobsite April 9 for a safety stand down and audit after a small fire broke out, according to contractor Suffolk Construction. No one was injured.
Reprinted courtesy of
James Leggate, Engineering News-Record
Mr. Leggate may be contacted at leggatej@enr.com
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Fourth Circuit Confirms Scope of “Witness Litigation Privilege”
November 21, 2018 —
Anthony B. Cavender - Gravel2GavelOn October 26, in the case of Day v. Johns Hopkins Health Sys. Corp., divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s ruling that the common law “Witness Litigation Privilege” protects an expert witness in a Black Lung Benefits Act benefits proceeding against civil claims that allege a federal RICO violation and Maryland state law claims for fraud, tortious interference, negligent misrepresentation and unjust enrichment attended the testimony of the expert witness.
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Anthony B. Cavender, PillsburyMr. Cavender may be contacted at
anthony.cavender@pillsburylaw.com
Contrasting Expert Opinions Result in Denial of Cross Motions for Summary Judgment
February 27, 2023 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiGiven the opposing experts' contradictory reports, the court denied both the insured and insurer's motions for summary judgment regarding coverage for a pipe leak. Pronti v. Hanover Ins. Co., 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 222306 (W.D. N. Y. Dec. 9, 2022).
The insured had a swimming poll and spa, which functioned using a subsurface plumbing system, covered with concrete decking. A subsurface pipe began to leak, preventing the pool from properly functioning. The insureds gave notice under their homeowners' policy and contended that significant portions of the pool, spa, concrete decking and other landscaping had to be torn out to do repairs. The insurer retained an expert, Sarah G. Byer, a structural engineer, to investigate. The parties agreed that the pipe had a leak, but disputed if the location of the leak was specifically identified.
The parties also disputed the cause of the leak. Byer found that the most likely cause was deterioration incurred over the pipe's lifetime based on the age of the plumbing system and Byer's personal observation of the pipe. Byer further stated that the physical qualities of flexible PVC piping made it susceptible to damage from chlorine and water over time.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak HastertMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Insurer Need Not Pay for Rejected Defense When No Reservation of Rights Issued
November 08, 2017 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiThe Massachusetts Appeals Court reversed the trial court's order that defense costs be paid for a period during which the insured rejected the defense even though no reservation of rights was issued. OneBeacon Am. Ins. Co. v. Celanese Corp., 2017 Mass. App. LEXIS 140 (Mass. App. Ct. Oct. 16, 2017).
Celanese was sued over many years for claims of bodily injury due to asbestos and chemicals allegedly contained in its products and facilities. For many years, Celanese had an agreement with its insurer, OneBeacon, for defense cost-sharing. In April 2009, Celanese terminated this agreement and demanded that OneBeacon defend the cases under the policies previously issued. OneBeacon agreed to defend without a reservation of rights. OneBeacon also agreed to waive any issues of coverage and to indemnify Celanese from any settlements of judgments up to ts full liability limits. However, OneBeacon also sought to assume full control of the defense of claims against Celanese.
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Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
World’s Biggest Crane Gets to Work at British Nuclear Plant
October 07, 2019 —
Jeremy Hodges - BloombergThe world’s largest crane is getting ready to hoist more than 700 of the heaviest pieces of the first new nuclear plant being built in Britain in decades.
The machine, affectionately known as “Big Carl” after an executive at Belgian owner Sarens NV, is in place at Electricite de France SA’s 19.6 billion-pound ($24.1 billion) Hinkley Point C project in southwest England. It can carry as much as 5,000 tons, or the same weight as 1,600 cars, in a single lift and arrived on 280 truck loads from Belgium. It has taken about three months to build.
Nuclear power makes up about a fifth of Britain’s electricity. Most of those plants are near the end of their lives and will close in the next decade. Replacing them won’t be easy—as the scale of the project shows.
Earlier this year, EDF poured 9,000 cubic meters of cement, the biggest single biggest pour of concrete ever recorded in Britain. It was reinforced by 5,000 tons of steel built into a nest 4 meters high that’ll serve as the base of the first new reactor in the U.K. since 1995.
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Jeremy Hodges, Bloomberg
Gaps in Insurance Created by Complex Risks
January 22, 2024 —
The Hartford Staff - The Hartford InsightsFrom slips, trips and falls to extreme weather and cyberattacks, businesses are regularly confronted with risks to operations and profitability. In 2023, elevated building costs, increased flooding, and growing ransomware attacks made it compelling for business owners to make sure they had adequate insurance to stay ahead of property and liability exposures. However, if left unchecked, these trends can lead to gaps in coverage. As 2024 approaches, now is the time to assess your risk and collaborate with the right resources to fill any potential voids in insurance.
Economic inflation for example has changed property valuations, which can result in coverage gaps if policyholders have not examined their replacement costs recently.
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The Hartford Staff, The Hartford Insights
Pennsylvania Superior Court Fires up a Case-By-Case Analysis for Landlord-Tenant, Implied Co-Insured Questions
February 03, 2020 —
Gus Sara - The Subrogation StrategistIn Joella v. Cole, 2019 PA Super. 313, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania recently considered whether a tenant, alleged by the landlord’s property insurance carrier to have carelessly caused a fire, was an implied co-insured on the landlord’s policy. The court found that the tenant was an implied co-insured because the lease stated that the landlord would procure insurance for the building, which created a reasonable expectation that the tenant would be a co-insured under the policy. Since the tenant was an implied co-insured on the policy, the insurance carrier could not maintain a subrogation action against the tenant. This case confirms that Pennsylvania follows a case-by-case approach when determining whether a tenant was an implied co-insured on a landlord’s insurance policy.
The Joella case stems from a fire at an apartment building in Northampton County, Pennsylvania. The landlord’s property insurance carrier paid the landlord $180,000 to repair the damages resulting from the fire. In March 2018, the insurer brought a subrogation action against Annie Cole, a tenant in the building, alleging that Ms. Cole’s negligent use of an extension cord caused the fire. Ms. Cole raised the affirmative defense that she was an implied co-insured on the landlord’s insurance policy. The subrogating insurer filed a partial motion for summary judgment seeking to dismiss Ms. Cole’s defense. In response, Ms. Cole filed a cross motion for partial judgment, arguing that because the lease specified that the landlord would maintain fire insurance for the building, there was a reasonable expectation that she would be a co-insured on that policy. The trial court found in favor of Ms. Cole, holding that the landlord’s insurer could not maintain a subrogation action against her because she was an implied co-insured of the landlord’s insurance policy under the terms of the lease. The landlord’s insurer filed an appeal with the Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
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Gus Sara, White and WilliamsMr. Sara may be contacted at
sarag@whiteandwilliams.com
