Georgia Court of Appeals Upholds Denial of Coverage Because Insurance Broker Lacked Agency to Accept Premium Payment
December 07, 2020 —
Lawrence J. Bracken II, Michael S. Levine & Rachel E. Hudgins - Hunton Insurance Recovery BlogIn American Reliable Insurance Company v. Lancaster, the Georgia Court of Appeals reversed the denial of a property insurer’s summary judgment motion concerning the insurer’s denial of a fire loss claim. The basis of the denial was that the policyholders had failed to pay the policy premium. The policyholders, Charlie and Wanda Lancaster, claimed that they had paid their policy premiums for several years to their insurance agent, Macie Yawn. In October 2014, American Reliable mailed a renewal notice to the Lancasters notifying them that premium payments had to be made directly to the insurer. After it did not receive payment from the Lancasters, American Reliable sent them a cancellation notice in December 2014, again notifying them that payments be made directly to the insurer. The Lancasters denied having received either notice from American Reliable, but the record included a receipt for certificate of mailing.
After the Lancaster’s home burned down in 2015, American Reliable denied coverage on the grounds that the policy had been cancelled for nonpayment of premium. In the subsequent coverage action, the trial court denied American Reliable’s motion for summary judgment, ruling that a factual issue existed as to the actual and apparent agency of the insurance agent, Yawn. On appeal, the Court of Appeals found that the trial court erred in deciding that there was a factual issue concerning Yawn’s agency. Specifically, the Court of Appeals ruled that the record showed American Reliable had terminated Yawn’s agency to accept policy premiums, and that the Lancaster’s received notice of that termination in the renewal and cancellation notices. In addition to determining that Yawn was not an actual agent, the Court held that Yawn did not have apparent agency, because the notices sent to the Lancasters stated that the premium payment was to be paid to American Reliable, not to the agent.
Reprinted courtesy of
Lawrence J. Bracken II, Hunton Andrews Kurth,
Michael S. Levine, Hunton Andrews Kurth and
Rachel E. Hudgins, Hunton Andrews Kurth
Mr. Bracken may be contacted at lbracken@HuntonAK.com
Mr. Levine may be contacted at mlevine@HuntonAK.com
Ms. Hudgins may be contacted at rhudgins@HuntonAK.com
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
San Francisco House that Collapsed Not Built to Plan
February 14, 2014 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFLast December, a San Francisco, California “developer’s Twin Peaks house collapsed and slid down a hill during renovations.” The San Francisco Chronicle reported that the house “was being supported by three reinforcing towers, rather than the nine required under its approved plans, according to documents provided to city building inspectors.”
According to a report by Department of Building Inspection chief Tom Hui, developer Mel Murphy "’failed to follow and implement the approved plans and the sequence of construction’ in his permit,” as quoted by The San Francisco Chronicle. The report also stated that the work “was not independently inspected as required” though this is “vehemently disputed by Murphy.”
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
PA Superior Court Provides Clarification on Definition of CGL “Occurrence” When Property Damage Is Caused by Faulty Building Conditions
September 30, 2019 —
Anthony L. Miscioscia & Konrad R. Krebs - White and Williams LLPThe standard for an “occurrence” under a commercial general liability (CGL) insurance policy has been addressed on several occasions by Pennsylvania courts when an insured has allegedly performed faulty workmanship on a construction project. Specifically, in Pennsylvania, a claim for damages arising from an insured’s performance of faulty workmanship pursuant to a construction contract, where the only damage is to property supplied by the insured or worked on by the insured, does not constitute an “occurrence” under the standard commercial general liability insurance policy definition. But what about the circumstance when the insured has failed to perform contractual duties where the claim is for property damage to property not supplied by the insured or unrelated to the service the insured contracted to provide? The Pennsylvania Superior Court recently addressed this question in Pennsylvania Manufacturers Indemnity Co. v. Pottstown Industrial Complex LP, No. 3489 EDA 2018, 2019 Pa. Super. 223, 2019 Pa. Super. LEXIS 729* (Pa. Super. 2019).
Pottstown Industrial Complex arose out of an underlying dispute between a landlord and a commercial tenant who had leased space to store its product inventory. The tenant alleged that the landlord was responsible under the lease for keeping the roof “in serviceable condition in repair.” Notwithstanding this responsibility, the tenant alleged that the landlord failed to properly maintain and repair the roof, resulting in leaks and flooding during four separate rainstorms, destroying over $700,000 in inventory. The tenant specifically alleged that the floods were caused by poor caulking of the roof, gaps and separations in the roofing membrane, undersized drain openings, and accumulated debris and clogged drains.
The insurer filed a declaratory judgment action, seeking a determination that there was no coverage under a commercial general liability policy issued to the landlord. Following a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the trial court entered an order in favor of the insurer, holding that allegations of inadequate roof repairs were claims for faulty workmanship and were not covered under Kvaerner Metals Division of Kvaerner U.S., Inc. v. Commercial Union Insurance Co., 908 A.2d 888 (Pa. 2006) and Millers Capital Insurance Co. v. Gambone Brothers Development Co., 941 A.2d 706 (Pa. Super. 2007).
Reprinted courtesy of
Anthony Miscioscia, White and Williams LLP and
Konrad Krebs, White and Williams LLP
Mr. Miscioscia may be contacted at misciosciaa@whiteandwilliams.com
Mr. Krebs may be contacted at krebsk@whiteandwilliams.com
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
New Mandatory Bond Notice Forms in Florida
December 16, 2019 —
Brian A. Wolf & Miles D. Jolley - Smith CurrieSubcontractors and suppliers must now use new, statutory notice of nonpayment forms to preserve payment bond claims, and sign each notice of nonpayment under oath.
The State of Florida instituted changes to the statutes governing public-project payment bonds (section 255.05, Florida Statutes) and private-project payment bonds (section 713.23, Florida Statutes). The changes went into effect on October 1, 2019. Previously, notices of nonpayment were not required to be signed under oath. Now, the law requires the use of specific statutory notice forms that claimants must sign under oath. Previously, there were no statutory penalties for claimants who exaggerated the amount claimed against a payment bond. Now there are specific statutory penalties against a claimant who willfully or negligently signs a notice of nonpayment that includes a claim for work not performed or materials not furnished, or who is guilty of signing a notice prepared with willful or gross negligence.
Public construction payment bonds are governed by section 255.05, Florida Statues, also known as Florida’s Little Miller Act. This statute requires all payment bond claimants who don’t have a direct contract with the general contractor to serve both the bonding company and the general contractor with a notice of nonpayment no later than 90 days after their last date of work or last delivery of materials. The amended statute now requires that the claimant use the statutory notice form and sign the form under oath. If the claimant includes exaggerated claims, or intentionally makes a claim for work or materials not provided, or otherwise prepares a notice with gross negligence, then the bonding company and the general contractor will be able to use such as a complete defense to an otherwise valid bond claim.
Reprinted courtesy of
Brian A. Wolf, Smith Currie and
Miles D. Jolley, Smith Currie
Mr. Wolf may be contacted at bawolf@smithcurrie.com
Mr. Jolley may be contacted at mdjolley@smithcurrie.com
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Connecticut Court Clarifies a Limit on Payment Bond Claims for Public Projects
May 15, 2023 —
Bill Wilson - Construction Law ZoneIn All Seasons Landscaping, Inc. v. Travelers Casualty & Surety Co., No. DBD-CV21-6039074-S, 2022 WL 1135703 (Conn. Super. Ct. April 4, 2022) the plaintiff, a subcontractor on a state project, commenced a lawsuit against the surety who issued a payment bond on the project two years after the subcontractor last performed any original contract work on the project. The defendant surety moved to dismiss the action based on the one-year statute of limitation in Connecticut General Statute § 49-42. The plaintiff countered that it complied with that deadline because it also performed warranty inspection work after the contract was completed and within the limitation period in section 49-42. The issue of whether warranty work or minor corrective work can extend the limitations period in section 49-42 had not previously been addressed by a Connecticut court.
Section 49-42(b) governs the limitation period on payment bond claims on public projects. It provides in relevant part that “no … suit may be commenced after the expiration of one year after the last date that materials were supplied or any work was performed by the claimant.” Section 49-42 provides no guidance on what “materials were supplied or any work was performed” by the claimant means, nor is there any direct appellate-level authority in Connecticut on this issue. What is clear under well-established law in Connecticut is that the time limit within which suit on a payment bond must be commenced under Section 49-42 is not only a statute of limitation but a jurisdictional requirement establishing a condition precedent to maintenance of the action and such limit is strictly enforced. If a plaintiff cannot prove its suit was initiated within this time constraint, the matter will be dismissed by the court as untimely.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Bill Wilson, Robinson & Cole LLPMr. Wilson may be contacted at
wwilson@rc.com
Dispute Waged Over Design of San Francisco Subway Job
July 30, 2019 —
Erica Berardi - Engineering News-RecordContractor Tutor Perini Corp. is clashing with the San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency over what the firm says are alleged design flaws that may push past December the completion of the already-delayed $1.6-billion Central Subway Project.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Erica Berardi, ENRMs. Berardi may be contacted at
BerardiE@enr.com
EPA and the Corps of Engineers Repeal the 2015 “Waters of the United States” Rule
January 13, 2020 —
Anthony B. Cavender - Gravel2GavelThe pre-publication version of the final rule to be promulgated by EPA and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (ACOE) to repeal the 2015 redefinition of the Clean Water Act’s term “Waters of the United States” which is the linchpin of these agencies’ regulatory power under the CWA, was made available on September 12, 2019. The rule should be published in the Federal Register in the next few weeks, and it will be effective 60 days thereafter. Many challenges are expected to be filed in the federal courts.
The 2015 rule was very controversial, and petitions challenging the rule were filed in many federal district courts, several courts of appeal, and finally in the Supreme Court (see NAM v. Department of Defense), which held that all initial challenges must be filed in the federal district courts. The upshot of these challenges is that, at this time, the 2015 rule has been enjoined in more than half the states while the other states are bound by the 2015 rule, a situation which is frustrating for everyone.
In addition to repealing the 2015 rule, the agencies also restored the pre-2015 definition had had been in place since 1986. As a result, the pre-2015 definition of waters of the U.S. will again govern the application of the following rules: (a) the ACOE’s definition of “waters of the U.S.” at 33 CFR Section 328.3; (b) EPA’s general Oil Discharge rule at 40 CFR Section 110; (c) the SPCC rules at 40 CFR Part 112; (d) EPA’s designation of hazardous substances at 40 CFR Part 116; (e) EPA’s hazardous substance reportable quantity rule at 40 CFR Part 117; (f) the NPDES permitting rules at 40 CFR Part 122; (g) the guidelines for dredged or fill disposal sites at 40 CFR Part 230; (g) Exempt activities not requiring a CWA 404 permit (guidelines for 404 disposal sites at 40 CFR Part 232); (h) the National Contingency Plan rules at 40 CFR Part 300; (i) the designation of reportable quantities of hazardous substances at 40 CFR Part 302; and (j) EPA’s Effluent Guidelines standards at 40 CFR Part 401.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Anthony B. Cavender, PillsburyMr. Cavender may be contacted at
anthony.cavender@pillsburylaw.com
Traub Lieberman Partner Greg Pennington Wins Summary Judgment in Favor of Property Owner
September 12, 2022 —
Gregory S. Pennington - Traub LiebermanIn a case brought before the Superior Court of New Jersey, Traub Lieberman Partner Greg Pennington won a motion for summary judgment in favor of their client, the owner of a residential property (“Property Owner”) in Atlantic City, New Jersey. The Property Owner had retained a Construction Company (“Construction Company” or “Contractor”) to perform renovations to the residence, which included building a new staircase. The Plaintiff alleged that while walking down a set of temporary wooden steps on the property, the third step broke, which caused him to fall and resulted in the alleged injuries. The Plaintiff brought suit against the Property Owner and Construction Company for personal injuries as a result of the alleged fall.
In the contract between the Property Owner and the Construction Company, it is stated that “[the Contractor] shall be solely responsible for all construction methods and materials and for coordinating all portions of the Work….The Contractor warrants to [the Property Owner] that all materials and equipment incorporated are new and that all work shall be of good quality and free of defects or faults.” The contract continues to state that the Construction Company shall indemnify and hold harmless the Property Owner against all claims, which includes damages, losses, expenses, legal fees and other costs that might arise from the Construction Company’s performance of the work under the contract.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Gregory S. Pennington, Traub LiebermanMr. Pennington may be contacted at
gpennington@tlsslaw.com
