Design-Build Contracting for County Road Projects
September 19, 2022 —
David R. Cook Jr. - Autry, Hall & Cook, LLPEffective July 1, 2022, counties may execute design-build contracts for transportation-related projects that include buildings, bridges and approaches, rail corridors, technology deployments, and limited- or controlled-access project, or projects that may be constructed within existing rights of way when the work is clearly defined or when significant savings may result in project delivery time.
[1] Additionally, counties may combine any environmental services, utility-relocation services, right-of-way services, design services, and construction phases of a public road or other project into a single design-build contract.
Reprinted courtesy of
David R. Cook Jr., Autry, Hall & Cook, LLP
Mr. Cook may be contacted at cook@ahclaw.com
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Colorado Finally Corrects Thirty-Year Old Flaw in Construction Defect Statute of Repose
March 29, 2017 —
Jesse Howard Witt - The Witt Law FirmThe Colorado Supreme Court has finally settled a decades-old conundrum surrounding the state’s construction defect statute of repose.
A statute of repose is similar to a statute of limitations insofar as both restrict the time a party can bring a claim. A statute of repose period begins on a fixed date (such as the day someone finishes work on a project), while a statute of limitations period begins when someone discovers an injury (such as a defectively installed window).
In 1986, at the height of the so-called “tort reform” movement, the Colorado General Assembly voted to shorten both the statute of repose and the statute of limitations for construction defect claims. Historically, Colorado’s statute of repose had given a homeowner ten years following construction to file an action, and its statute of limitations had required that any such action be filed within three years of the date that the claimant discovered a defect. After 1986, however, these time periods changed; the new statute of repose required suits to be filed within six years of the end of construction, and the new statute of limitations gave claimants only two years following discovery of the physical manifestation of a defect to seek legal relief.[1]
Reprinted courtesy of
Jesse Howard Witt, Acerbic Witt
Mr. Witt may be contacted at www.witt.law
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Tighter Requirements and a New Penalty for Owners of Vacant or Abandoned Storefronts in San Francisco
June 18, 2019 —
Matt Olhausen - Gravel2GavelOrdinance 52-19 became effective in April 2019 and expands upon existing San Francisco Building Code registration requirements for “Vacant or Abandoned” “Commercial Storefronts.”
A storefront becomes “Vacant or Abandoned” once it has been unoccupied for 30 days (among other earlier triggers for blighted or unsecured storefronts). A “Commercial Storefront” is broadly defined as “any area within a building that may be individually leased or rented for any purpose other than Residential Use as defined in Planning Code.” (See § 103.A.5.1 of the San Francisco Building Code.) So, a building that is 97% leased could still contain a Vacant or Abandoned Commercial Storefront, which would technically require registration under the Building Code.
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Matt Olhausen, PillsburyMr. Olhausen may be contacted at
matt.olhausen@pillsburylaw.com
The Construction Project is Late—Allocation of Delay
November 17, 2016 —
David Adelstein – Florida Construction Legal UpdatesThe construction project is late. Very late. The owner is upset and notifies the contractor that it is assessing liquidated damages. The contractor, in turn, claims that the project is late because of excusable, compensable delays and, perhaps, excusable, noncompensable delays. This is a common and unfortunate story between an owner and contractor on any late construction project. Now the fun begins regarding the allocation of the delay!
Through previous articles, I discussed that in this scenario the burden really falls on the contractor to establish that the liquidated damages were improperly assessed against it and, thus, it is entitled to additional time and/or extended general conditions as a result of excusable delays. Naturally, this requires the contractor to develop a critical path analysis (time impact analysis) allocating the impacts / delays (and the reasons for the impacts/ delays) to the project completion date. The reason the burden really falls on the contractor is because the owner’s burden is relatively easy – the project was not complete on time pursuant to the contract and any approved changed orders.
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David Adelstein, Katz, Barron, Squitero, Faust, Friedberg, English & Allen, P.A.Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@katzbarron.com
Is the Issuance of a City Use Permit Referable? Not When It Is an Administrative Act
January 10, 2018 —
Adam E. Lang - Real Estate Litigation BlogArizona’s Constitution gives electors in cities, towns, and counties the ability to refer legislation that was enacted by their local elected officials to the ballot for popular vote. Ariz. Const. art. IV, Pt. 1 § 1(8). But only legislative acts are referable; administrative acts are not. In general, a legislative act makes new law and creates policy, is permanent in nature, and is generally applied. On the other hand, an administrative act is one that executes and implements a law already in place. Wennerstrom v. City of Mesa, 169 Ariz. 485, 489-90, 821 P.2d 146, 150-51 (1991).
For more than fifty years, Arizona courts have been clear: zoning and rezoning ordinances are legislative acts and therefore referable to popular vote. City of Phoenix v. Fehlner, 90 Ariz. 13, 17, 363 P.2d 607, 609 (1961) (holding that “what constitutes an appropriate zone is primarily for the legislature”); Fritz v. City of Kingman, 191 Ariz 432, 432, 957 P.2d 337, 337 (1998) (noting “we reaffirm our view that zoning decisions are legislative matters subject to referendum”); Pioneer Trust Co. of Arizona v. Pima Cty., 168 Ariz. 61, 64–65, 811 P.2d 22, 25–26 (1991) (holding “that, in Arizona, zoning decisions are legislative acts subject to referendum” and that even a “conditional approval of . . . rezoning was a legislative act”); Cottonwood Dev. v. Foothills Area Coal. of Tucson, Inc., 134 Ariz. 46, 653 P.2d 694 (1982) (analyzing whether zoning referendum complied with statutory requirements); Wait v. City of Scottsdale, 127 Ariz. 107, 108, 618 P.2d 601, 602 (1980) (noting “that the enactment and amendment of zoning ordinances constitute legislative action”); City of Phoenix v. Oglesby, 112 Ariz. 64, 65, 537 P.2d 934, 935 (1975) (“The matter of zoning is appropriately one for the legislative branch of government.”); Queen Creek Land & Cattle Corp. v. Yavapai Cty. Bd. of Sup’rs, 108 Ariz. 449, 452, 501 P.2d 391, 394 (1972) (denying an attempt to enjoin referendum on county’s zoning decision).
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Adam E. Lang, Snell & WilmerMr. Lang may be contacted at
alang@swlaw.com
The Requirement to Post Collateral Under General Agreement of Indemnity Is Real
May 16, 2022 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesIn prior postings, I have discussed the all-powerful General Agreement of Indemnity (click
here and
here). This is the document a bond-principal executes to obtain bonds (e.g., performance and payment bonds). Not only does the bond-principal execute this General Agreement of Indemnity, but typically, so do other indemnitors such as the company’s principals and their spouses, other related companies, etc. The objective is that the surety has financial comfort that if a claim is made against the bond, there are avenues where it will get reimbursed and indemnified for any cost it incurs, or payment it makes, relative to that claim against the bond. When a surety issues bonds, the objective is that all losses it incurs gets reimbursed because the bonds are NOT insurance policies.
One of the powerful tools the surety can exercise in the General Agreement of Indemnity is to demand the bond-principal and other indemnitors to post collateral in an amount the surety deems sufficient to cover any losses it may incur. This is a right in any General Agreement of Indemnity I have seen and is a right the surety can rightfully exercise.
A recent example is shown from the opinion in Philadelphia Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Quinco Electrical, Inc., 2022 WL 1230110 (M.D.Fla. 2022), which pertains to the surety’s motion for preliminary injunction.
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David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
Ortega Outbids Pros to Build $10 Billion Property Empire
March 19, 2014 —
Jesse Drucker – BloombergAmancio Ortega Gaona, already the world’s fourth-richest person based on the success of his Zara fashion retail stores, has quietly amassed a real estate empire worth as much as $10 billion and is emerging as a formidable competitor for prime properties from London to Beverly Hills.
Relying on all-cash offers, he has outbid the world’s biggest institutional funds and professional property investors, such as Tishman Speyer Properties LP.
“He’s at the very highest levels of high net worth investment and competing with some of the biggest sovereign wealth funds for the primest properties in the market,” said Joseph Kelly, director of market analysis for Real Capital Analytics in London, a real estate research firm.
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Jesse Drucker, BloombergMr. Drucker may be contacted at
jdrucker4@bloomberg.net
Final Furnishing Date is a Question of Fact
November 10, 2016 —
David Adelstein – Florida Construction Legal UpdatesConstruction liens need to be recorded within 90 days from the lienor’s final furnishing date on the project. This date is exclusive of punchlist or warranty work. The final furnishing date needs to be proven at trial to establish that the construction lien was timely recorded. If there is an evidentiary dispute as the final furnishing date (the contractor claims the date was “x” to establish the lien was timely and the owner claims the date was “y” to establish the lien was untimely), then the date is a question of fact to be determined by the jury.
For instance, in Best Drywall Services, Inc. v. Blasczyk, 2016 WL 6246701 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016), a contractor and owner entered into an oral agreement for a residential renovation project. The contractor recorded a construction lien after its final two invoices went unpaid. During trial, the contractor offered conflicting evidence as to when its final furnishing date on the project was. Numerous dates were offered in the record including dates that were more than 90 days prior to the date the contractor recorded its lien, meaning the lien was arguably untimely. As a result, the trial judge entered a directed verdict in favor of the owner and against the contractor on the contractor’s lien claim finding the lien was untimely recorded.
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David Adelstein, Katz, Barron, Squitero, Faust, Friedberg, English & Allen, P.A.Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@katzbarron.com