State Supreme Court Cases Highlight Importance of Wording in Earth Movement Exclusions
June 21, 2017 —
Hannah E. Austin - Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.In Erie Insurance Property and Casualty Company v. Chaber, the West Virginia Supreme Court recently
held that an insurance policy’s earth movement exclusion was unambiguous and applied to both manmade
and natural earth movement. The Court also found that a narrow “ensuing loss” exception to the exclusion
that provided coverage for glass breakage resulting from earth movement could not be extended to cover the
entire loss.
The Erie Insurance Property and Casualty Company (Erie) insured five commercial buildings owned by
Dmitri and Mary Chaber. One of the properties was damaged by a landslide, and the Chabers filed a claim
with Erie. Erie asserted that the loss was excluded from coverage because the policy excluded coverage for
losses caused by earth movement, which was defined to include earthquakes, landslides, subsidence of
manmade mines, and earth sinking (aside from sinkhole collapse), rising or shifting. The exclusion stated
that it applied “regardless of whether any of the above . . . is caused by an act of nature or is otherwise
caused,” and also contained an anti-concurrent causation clause. However, there was an exception for glass
breakage caused by earth movement.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Hannah E. Austin, Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.Ms. Austin may be contacted at
hea@sdvlaw.com
How Small Mistakes Can Have Serious Consequences Under California's Contractor Licensing Laws.
February 15, 2018 —
Eric Reed - Myers, Widders, Gibson, Jones & Feingold, LLPIn construction, some risks have nothing to do with how well a contractor executes a project. Licensing problems is one of these risks. Even a brief lapse caused by an unintentional administrative error can give the CSLB grounds to discipline a contractor, or enable a customer to seek disgorgement and other remedies provided by Business and Professions Code section 7031. This article discusses five tips for mitigating the liabilities associated with licensing problems.
Tip 1: Take workers' compensation insurance very seriously. Workers’ compensation insurance problems can trigger license suspension in California. Business and Professions Code section 7125.4 calls for automatic suspension if a contractor cannot provide proof of workers’ compensation insurance for any period of time. This is particularly serious for residential remodelers who claim exemption for workers’ compensation but are later discovered – usually during litigation with a homeowner – to have “off the books” workers helping them. Courts can declare the contractor retroactively unlicensed under these circumstances and order it to disgorge,
i.e., to pay back, every penny paid by the customer for the entire project (even for materials). (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 7031, subd. (b);
Wright v. Issak (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1116.) The contractor will also find itself unable to collect any amounts owed to it by the customer. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 7031, subd. (a).)
Tip 2: Watch out for licensing confusion after a merger or acquisition. The economic downturn of 2008 and 2009 resulted in consolidation throughout the building industry. The newly merged or acquired entities often allowed redundant licenses to expire, assuming they could complete all pending projects under the umbrella of the acquiring company's license. Many learned this was a mistake the hard way. Armed with the California Supreme Court's opinion in
MW Erectors, Inc. v. Niederhauser Ornamental & Metal Works Co., Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 412, customers began refusing to pay invoices and demanding disgorgement under Business and Professions Code section 7031 because the original contractor did not maintain licensure “at all times.” Many of these customers succeeded.
Tip 3: If a license suspension has occurred or is imminent, prepare to prove substantial compliance. Section 7031(a) and (b) give a disgruntled or indebted customer every incentive to capitalize on a contractor's licensing problems. Subdivision (e) is where a contractor must turn to protect its interests if this happens. It allows the contractor to prove “substantial compliance” with licensing requirements and avoid (a)’s and (b)’s sharp edges if it can show the following:
(1) The contractor “had been duly licensed as a contractor in this state prior to the performance of the act or contract”;
(2) It “acted reasonably and in good faith to maintain proper licensure”; and
(3) It “acted promptly and in good faith to remedy the failure to comply with the licensure requirements upon learning of the failure.”
The Court of Appeal confirmed in
Judicial Council of California v. Jacobs Facilities, Inc. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 882 that a contractor, upon request, is entitled to a hearing on these three factors before it is subjected to disgorgement under Section 7031(b). The legislature amended Section 7031 shortly after the Court of Appeal published this case. The Assembly’s floor analysis went so far as to directly quote the opinion’s observation that penalizing a construction firm for “technical transgressions only indirectly serves the Contractors Law’s larger purpose of preventing the delivery of services by unqualified contractors.” (Assem. Com. on Bus. and Prof., Off. of Assem. Floor Analyses, analysis of Sen. Holden's No. 1793 (2015-2016 Reg. Sess.) as amended August 2, 2016, p. 2.) This echoed an industry consensus that clarifying the law was needed to ensure that properly licensed and law-abiding construction firms were not “placed at fatal monetary risk by malicious lawsuits motivated by personal gain rather than consumer protection.” (Assem. Com. on Judiciary, com. on Assem. Bill No. 1793 (2015-2016 Reg. Sess.), pp. 6-7.)
Unfortunately, existing law does not give many examples of what it means to act “reasonably and in good faith to maintain proper licensure” or to act “promptly and in good faith” to fix license problems. A practical approach is for a contractor to work backwards by assuming it will need to prove substantial compliance at some point in the future. Designated individuals within the organization should have clear responsibility over obtaining and renewing the proper licenses and should keep good records. If necessary, these designees can testify about the contractor's internal policies and their efforts to fix licensing problems when they arose. For example, if the suspension resulted from not providing the CSLB proof of workers’ compensation insurance, the designee can testify about the cause (a broker miscommunication, transmission error,
etc.) and produce documents showing how he or she worked promptly to procure a certificate of insurance to send CSLB. Saved letters, emails, and notes from telephone calls will provide designees and their successors with an important resource months or years down the line if a dispute arises and the contractor is required to reconstruct the chronology of a licensing glitch and prove its due diligence.
Tip 4: Don't sign new contracts unless all necessary licenses are active and any problems are resolved. A recently-formed contractor should not begin soliciting and signing contracts until all required licenses are confirmed as “active.” The first requirement of substantial compliance – being “duly licensed as a contractor in this state prior to the performance of the act or contract” – cannot be met by a contractor that first obtains its license mid-project. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 7031, subd. (e)(1);
Alatriste v. Cesar’s Exterior Designs (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 656.) A licensed contractor should also consider refraining from signing new contracts if there is any reason to believe its license might be suspended in the near future – especially if the suspension will be retroactive. Having a suspension on record at the time of contracting may complicate the question of whether the contractor was “duly licensed . . . prior to performance” for the purposes of substantial compliance.
Tip 5: Any judgment against a contractor can cause license suspension if not handled promptly and correctly. The Business and Professions Code authorizes the CSLB to suspend the license of a contractor that does not pay a construction related court judgment within 90 days. The term “construction related” is interpreted to include nearly all types of disputes involving a contractor. (16 Cal. Code Reg. 868;
Pacific Caisson & Shoring, Inc. v. Bernards Bros. Inc. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1246, 1254-1255.) This means a contractor should treat a judgment against it for unpaid office rent, for example, as one carrying the same consequences as one arising from a construction defect or subcontractor claim. The contractor should also not assume that filing an appeal, or agreeing with the other side to stay enforcement, automatically excuses the 90-day deadline in the eyes of the CSLB. It does not. A contractor must notify the CSLB in writing before this period expires, then post bond for the amount of judgment, if it wishes to delay payment for any reason. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 7071.17, subd. (d).) A suspension may result if it does not. This applies even to small claims judgments.
Recent case law and the 2016 amendments to Business and Professions Code section 7031 provide some solace to those caught in the dragnet of California's licensing laws. But avoiding these problems altogether is preferable. Consider licensing the foundation of a successful business and deserving of the same attention as the structures a contractor builds.
Eric R. Reed is a business and insurance litigator in the Ventura office of Myers, Widders, Gibson, Jones & Feingold, LLP.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Eric Reed, Myers, Widders, Gibson, Jones & Feingold, LLPMr. Reed may be contacted at
ereed@mwgjlaw.com
Professional Liability Alert: California Appellate Courts In Conflict Regarding Statute of Limitations for Malicious Prosecution Suits Against Attorneys
April 28, 2014 —
David W. Evans & Stephen J. Squillario – Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLPIn conflict with an earlier decision by a different division within the same District, and with a prior decision of another District which followed the earlier case, Division Three of the Second Appellate District has concluded, contrary to established precedent, that the general two-year limitations period set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 335.1 (“Section 335.1”) applies to malicious prosecution claims against attorneys, rather than the specific one-year statute of limitations for claims against attorneys codified in Code of Civil Procedure section 340.6 (“Section 340.6”).
In Roger Cleveland Golf Co., Inc. v. Krane & Smith, APC (filed April 15, 2014, Case No. B237424, consolidated with Case No. B239375), Roger Cleveland Golf Co., Inc. (“Cleveland Golf”), filed a malicious prosecution action against Krane & Smith (“the Attorneys”), who had unsuccessfully prosecuted the underlying breach of contract matter for their client against Cleveland Golf. In that action, on April 26, 2010, the trial court entered its order granting a motion for nonsuit and dismissing the complaint in favor of Cleveland Golf. On May 24, 2011, or approximately 13 months after the trial court had dismissed the underlying complaint, Cleveland Golf commenced a malicious prosecution action against the Attorneys. In the interim, the Attorneys initiated an appeal of the underlying judgment, which was eventually dismissed approximately seven months later. In response to the complaint, the Attorneys filed a special motion to strike, commonly referred to as an anti-SLAPP motion, which included the argument that the malicious prosecution claim was time-barred under the one-year limitations period of Section 340.6. The trial court granted the Attorneys’ motion based on the statute of limitations (and Cleveland Golf’s failure to demonstrate a probability of success on the merits) and dismissed the case. Cleveland Golf’s appeal followed.
Reprinted courtesy of
David W. Evans, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and
Stephen J. Squillario, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
Mr. Evans may be contacted at devans@hbblaw.com, Mr. Squillario may be contacted at ssquillario@hbblaw.com
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Congratulations to Wilke Fleury’s 2023 Super Lawyers and Rising Stars!!
July 10, 2023 —
Wilke Fleury LLPWilke Fleury is extremely proud that 18 of its incredible attorneys have been selected as 2023 Northern California Super Lawyers or Rising Stars! Super Lawyers rates attorneys in each state using a patented selection process and publishes a yearly magazine issue that produces award-winning features on selected attorneys. Congratulations to this talented group:
Super Lawyers of 2023
David A. Frenznick
Steven J. Williamson
Matthew W. Powell
Daniel L. Egan
George A. Guthrie
Michael G. Polis
Daniel J. Foster
Stephen K. Marmaduke
Neal C. Lutterman
Trevor L. Stapleton
Ronald R. Lamb
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Wilke Fleury LLP
Brookfield Wins Disputed Bid to Manage Manhattan Marina
January 28, 2015 —
Martin Z Braun – Bloomberg(Bloomberg) -- Brookfield Property Partners won a bid to run a marina in New York’s Battery Park City neighborhood over the objections of residents backing a local businessman who operated the facility and a popular sailing club and school.
The state’s Battery Park City Authority voted Thursday to approve a 10-year agreement with Brookfield, which owns an adjacent 8 million-square-foot office and retail complex. Brookfield is bringing in billionaire real estate investor Andrew Farkas’s Island Global Yachting to manage the North Cove Marina.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Martin Z Braun, BloombergMr. Braun may be contacted at
mbraun6@bloomberg.net
Tenth Circuit Finds Appraisal Can Decide Causation of Loss Under Colorado Law
November 29, 2021 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiThe Tenth Circuit determined that the Colorado Supreme Court would agree with other state courts that appraisers can decide the causation of a loss. Bonbeck Parker, LLC v. The Travelers Indem. Co. of Am., 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 29607 (10th Cir. Oct. 1, 2021).
A hailstorm damaged three buildings owned by BonBeck. A claim was submitted to Travelers under BonBeck's commercial property policy. Travelers acknowledged that some hail damage occurred to all the buildings except for the roofs. Travelers paid $34,200 for damage to the buildings. Coverage for the roof damage was denied because it resulted not from the hail damage but from uncovered events like wear and tear, deterioration, and improperly installation.
BonBeck requested an appraisal. Travelers insisted that the appraisal would only determine the amount of loss of covered claims. BonBeck rejected these conditions and Travelers filed suit.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak HastertMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Illinois Court Determines Insurer Must Defend Property Damage Caused by Faulty Workmanship
July 11, 2011 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiThe Illinois Court of Appeals determined the insurer must defend allegations of property damage arising from faulty workmanship. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co. v. J.P. Larsen, Inc., 2011 Ill. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1443 (Ill. Ct. App. June, 20, 2011).
Larsen was a subcontractor for Weather-Tite in a condominium building. Weather-Tite installed windows on the project and hired Larsen to apply sealant to the windows. The windows subsequently leaked and caused water damage within the complex.
The homeowner’s association sued Weather-Tite for breach of express and implied warranties. Weather-Tite filed a third-party complaint against Larsen, seeking contribution and alleging that Larsen was in breach of contract by failing to add Weather-Tite as an additional insured under Larsen’s CGL policy.
Both Weather-Tite and Larsen tendered to Larsen’s insurer. Both tenders were denied because the insurer contended the complaints alleged only construction defects, and not “property damage” or an “occurrence” within the terms of the policy.
The insurer filed suit for a declaratory judgment. The trial court granted the insurer’s motion as to Weather-Tite, but granted Larsen’s cross-motion for summary judgment.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Insurers Subrogating in Arkansas Must Expend Energy to Prove That Their Insureds Have Been Made Whole
July 30, 2019 —
Michael J. Ciamaichelo - The Subrogation StrategistArkansas employs the “made whole” doctrine, which requires an insured to be fully compensated for damages (i.e., to be “made whole”) before the insurer is entitled to recover in subrogation.[1] As the Riley court established, an insurer cannot unilaterally determine that its insured has been made whole (in order to establish a right of subrogation). Rather, in Arkansas, an insurer must establish that the insured has been made whole in one of two ways. First, the insurer and insured can reach an agreement that the insured has been made whole. Second, if the insurer and insured disagree on the issue, the insurer can ask a court to make a legal determination that the insured has been made whole.[2] If an insured has been made whole, the insurer is the real party in interest and must file the subrogation action in its own name.[3] However, when both the insured and an insurer have claims against the same tortfeasor (i.e., when there are both uninsured damages and subrogation damages), the insured is the real party in interest.[4]
In EMC Ins. Cos. v. Entergy Ark., Inc., 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 14251 (8th Cir. May 14, 2019), EMC Insurance Companies (EMC) filed a subrogation action in the District Court for the Western District of Arkansas alleging that its insureds’ home was damaged by a fire caused by an electric company’s equipment. EMC never obtained an agreement from the insureds or a judicial determination that its insureds had been made whole. In addition, EMC did not allege in the complaint that its insureds had been made whole and did not present any evidence or testimony at trial that its insureds had been made whole. After EMC presented its case-in-chief, the District Court ruled that EMC lacked standing to pursue its subrogation claim because “EMC failed to obtain a legal determination that its insureds had been made whole . . . prior to initiating this subrogation action.” Thus, the District Court granted Entergy Ark., Inc.’s motion for judgment as a matter of law and EMC appealed the decision.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Michael J. Ciamaichelo, White and Williams LLPMr. Ciamaichelo may be contacted at
ciamaichelom@whiteandwilliams.com
