United States Supreme Court Upholds Class Action Waivers in Arbitration Agreements
May 24, 2018 —
Amy R. Patton, Jason I. Bluver, & Jeffrey K. Brown - Payne & Fears LLPOn May 21, 2018, the United States Supreme Court held, in a 5-4 decision, that arbitration agreements which mandate individualized resolution of claims (as opposed to class or collective resolution) are enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"). In doing so, the Court rejected the argument that such "class action waivers" violate Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), which generally protects employees' rights to act "in concert" with one another.
The Court addressed a split created by decisions from three Federal Circuit Courts of Appeal: Epic Systems Corp v. Lewis (7th Circuit), Ernst & Young v. Morris (9th Circuit) and National Labor Relations Board v. Murphy Oil USA (5th Circuit). All three cases involved employees who sought to bring collective or class actions under the Fair Labor Standards Act (the "FLSA"), and their respective employers who sought to enforce pre-dispute arbitration agreements which waived such collective actions and mandated "one-on-one" arbitration of wage disputes. In support of their position, the employees argued that the class and collective action waivers were illegal because they violated the NLRA's prohibition on barring employees from engaging in "concerted activities."
Reprinted courtesy of Payne & Fears LLP attorneys
Amy R. Patton,
Jason I. Bluver and
Jeffrey K. Brown
Ms. Patton may be contacted at arp@paynefears.com
Mr. Bluver may be contacted at jib@paynefears.com
Mr. Brown may be contacted at jkb@paynefears.com
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Unlicensed Contracting and Florida Statute S. 489.128
February 03, 2025 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesFlorida Statute s. 489.128 is a statute that provides a remedy against unlicensed contracting. However, keep in mind that this argument—the unlicensed contractor argument—is a technical statutory argument. In other words, it’s not so much of a fact-based merits argument, but an argument that’s solely based on the technicality of the statute. This, by no means, is not a recommendation that the argument should not be raised. In instances, it absolutely should be and could have legitimate traction. However, when deciding whether to or how to pursue a dispute, including settlement, you want to keep in mind whether this is an argument you want to bank your outcome on because there are always costs (attorney’s fees, court costs, etc.) that should get factored into any business decision regarding a dispute.
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David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
Blackstone to Buy Apartments From Greystar in $2 Billion Deal
December 10, 2015 —
Sarah Mulholland – BloombergBlackstone Group LP agreed to buy 32 multifamily properties for about $2 billion from Greystar Real Estate Partners LLC as the private equity giant expands its push into the U.S. apartment market.
The buildings, with a total of 10,399 units, are spread throughout the country in states such as California, Florida, Washington and New York, Greystar said in a statement Tuesday. The Charleston, South Carolina-based company, the largest U.S. apartment manager, will continue to oversee the properties. Peter Rose, a Blackstone spokesman, declined to comment on the transaction.
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Sarah Mulholland, Bloomberg
Uniform Rules Governing New York’s Supreme and County Courts Get An Overhaul
February 08, 2021 —
Andrew I. Hamelsky, Jenifer A. Scarcella & Monica Doss - White and Williams LLPBy Administrative Order effective February 1, 2021, New York’s Uniform Civil Rules for the Supreme Court will incorporate a number of changes to the general part that reflect many of New York’s Commercial Division Rules, in an effort to streamline court processes. The general part rule changes are a step forward for improving the efficiency, modernization and cost-effectiveness of the New York Courts, and will require practitioners to be more conscientious of court appearances and deadlines. Judges will likely be strict on adherence to the new Uniform Rules. Some notable changes to the rules are highlighted below.
Court Appearances and Scheduling Orders
Uniform Rule 202.1 has been revised to require that counsel who appear before the court must be familiar with the case they are appearing for, and be fully prepared and authorized to discuss and resolve the issues that are the subject of the appearance.
Reprinted courtesy of
Andrew I. Hamelsky, White and Williams LLP,
Jenifer A. Scarcella, White and Williams LLP and
Monica Doss, White and Williams LLP
Mr. Hamelsky may be contacted at hamelskya@whiteandwilliams.com
Ms. Scarcella may be contacted at scarcellaj@whiteandwilliams.com
Ms. Doss may be contacted at dossm@whiteandwilliams.com
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Court’s Ruling on SB800 “Surprising to Some”
October 16, 2013 —
CDJ STAFFDescribing it as “surprising to many in the residential home building industry,” Jay Drake of Reuben, Junius & Rose LLP has a piece discussing the recent California Court of Appeals decision that SB800 is not a homeowner’s only remedy for construction defects. The court found, according to Mr. Drake that “the primary purpose of the Act was to provide a property owner with remedies for repair of construction defects before the defects caused actual damages.” In the case before the court, the construction defects had already lead to further damages.
Mr. Drake notes that the legislative history of SB800 puts the bill in response to an earlier California court case in which the courts determined that without actual damage to property, a homeowner could not file a construction defect lawsuit. The court concluded that SB800 was not intended to limit the homeowner’s rights after a construction defect situation has lead to damage.
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Subcontractor Entitled to Defense for Defective Work Causing Property Damage Beyond Its Scope of Work
May 27, 2019 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiThe Illinois Court of Appeals found the subcontractor was owed a defense for alleged property damage caused by its faulty workmanship, but outside its scope of work. Acuity Ins. Co. v. 950 W. Huron Condo. Ass'n, 2019 Ill. App. LEXIS 208 (Ill. Ct. App. March 29, 2019).
The condominium association sued its general contractor, Belgravia, for alleged defects allowing water to infiltrate and cause damage. Belgravia filed a third-party complaint against its subcontractors, including the carpentry subcontractor Denk & Roche. Denk & Roche held a CGL policy with two insurers during the relevant period, one with Cincinnati Insurance Company for the period January 1, 2000 through June 1, 2007, and another with Acuity Insurance Company, effective June 1, 2007, through December 31, 2013.
Denk & Roche tendered its defense to both insurers. Cincinnati agreed to defend and contributed to a settlement of the AOAO's claims. Acuity denied a defense, contending that the underlying claims did not trigger a duty to defend. Acuity's declaratory judgment suit sought a determination that it had no duty to defend. Cincinnati intervened and argued it was entitled to equitable contribution from Acuity.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak HastertMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Skipping Depositions does not Constitute Failure to Cooperate in New York
March 09, 2020 —
Ryan G. Nelson - Saxe Doernberger & VitaInsurance policies typically impose, on the insured, a duty to cooperate with the insurer during investigation and litigation of a claim. Non-cooperation can be grounds for denying coverage. This begs the question: what constitutes non-cooperation?
Recently, a New York appellate court affirmed a trial court’s decision that failure by an employee of the insured to show up for three court-ordered depositions did not rise to the level of “willful and avowed obstruction” and therefore, the insurer could not deny coverage on the basis of non-cooperation. See Foddrell v. Utica First Insurance Co., 178 A.D.3d 901 (N.Y. App. Div. 2019). In so holding, the Foddrell court applied the Thrasher test: “To effectively deny coverage based upon lack of cooperation, an insurance carrier must demonstrate (1) that it acted diligently in seeking to bring about the insured’s cooperation, (2) that the efforts employed by the insured were reasonably calculated to obtain the insured’s cooperation, and (3) that the attitude of the insured, after his or her cooperation was sought, was one of willful and avowed obstruction.” Id.; see Thrasher v. U. S. Liab. Ins. Co., 19 N.Y.2d 159, 167 (1967).
Thomas Foddrell’s suit against Utica First Insurance Company (“Utica First”) stemmed from his personal injury suit against Janey & Rana Construction Corporation (“J&R” (Utica First’s insured). During that lawsuit, J&R’s principal, Gardeep Singh, failed to appear for two court-ordered depositions. After his failure to appear at those depositions, Utica First sent an investigator to inform Singh that he was scheduled for a third deposition. Singh responded to the investigator that he would speak with J&R’s attorneys about the matter. Ultimately, Singh did not appear for the third court-ordered deposition. In response to Singh’s repeated failure to appear for the depositions, Utica First sent Singh a letter advising him that because of his lack of cooperation, Utica would no longer agree to indemnify J&R.
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Ryan G. Nelson, Saxe Doernberger & VitaMr. Nelson may be contacted at
rgn@sdvlaw.com
New Jersey Court Rules on Statue of Repose Case
May 26, 2011 —
CDJ STAFFA three-judge panel issued a per curium ruling on May 23 in Fairview Heights Condo. v. Investors (N.J. Super., 2011), a case which the members of a condominium board argued: “that the judge erred by: 1) dismissing plaintiff’s claims against RLI based upon the statute of repose; 2) dismissing the breach of fiduciary duty claims against the Luppinos based upon a lack of expert opinion; 3) barring the testimony of Gonzalez; and 4) barring the May 23, 1989 job site report.” The court rejected all claims from the condominium board.
The court found that the building must be unsafe for the statute of repose to apply. They noted, “the judge made no findings on whether the water seepage, or the property damage caused by such seepage, in any way rendered the building, or any of the units, unsafe.” Further, “without a specific finding on the question of whether the defects had rendered the building ‘unsafe,’ defendants were not entitled to the benefit of the ten-year statute of repose.“
On the second point, the court also upheld the lower court’s findings regarding the management company:
“The report submitted by Berman establishes that the EIFS product was defective in its design and would therefore have failed from the outset. The defects in that product were, according to Berman, not prone to repair or other mitigation. Therefore, even if defendants did not appropriately inspect or repair the EIFS, their failure to do so would have had no impact on the long-term performance of the EIFS exterior cladding. As plaintiff failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact on these questions, the judge properly granted summary judgment to the Luppinos on plaintiff’s breach of fiduciary duty claim.”
On the final two points, the judges noted “plaintiff maintains that the judge committed reversible error when he excluded the Gonzalez certification and the 1989 job site report prepared by Raymond Brzuchalski.” They saw “no abuse of discretion related to the exclusion of the Gonzalez certification, and reject plaintiff’s arguments to the contrary.” Of the job site report, they found, “no abuse of discretion in the judge's finding that the Brzuchalski 1989 job site report did not satisfy the requirements of N.J.R.E.803(c)(6).”
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