Fairfield Connecticut Building Expert Directory

The General Assembly Seems Ready to Provide Some Consistency in Mechanic’s Lien Waiver

March 14, 2018 — Christopher G. Hill – Construction Law Musings
Back in 2015, the Virginia General Assembly amended the mechanic’s lien statute (Va. Code 43-3) here in Virginia to preclude any contractual provision that diminishes a subcontractor or supplier’s “lien rights in a contract in advance of furnishing any labor, services, or materials.” However, this amendment was only applicable to subcontractors and suppliers. For political and other reasons, general contractors in Virginia were left out of this change. This omission by the legislature put Virginia general contractors in the position of potentially being forced by project owners to waive their mechanic’s lien rights without the ability to run that risk downstream to their subcontractors and suppliers. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Christopher G. Hill, The Law Office of Christopher G. Hill
Mr. Hill may be contacted at chrisghill@constructionlawva.com

You Are Your Brother’s Keeper. Direct Contractors in California Now Responsible for Wage Obligations of Subcontractors

January 31, 2018 — Garret Murai – California Construction Law Blog
If there’s one law from the 2017 Legislative Session that’s garnered a lot of attention in the construction press, it’s AB 1701. Under AB 1701, beginning January 1, 2018, for contracts entered into on or after January 1, 2018, direct contractors may be found liable for unpaid wages, fringe or other benefit payments or contributions, including interest, but excluding penalties or liquidated damages, owed by a subcontractor of any tier to their workers. Here’s what you need to know about AB 1701. What code section did AB 1701 amend? AB 1701 added a a new section 218.7 to the Labor Code. To whom does AB 1701 apply? AB 1701 applies to direct contractors only. A direct contractor is defined as a “contractor that has a direct contractual relationship with an owner.” On what types of projects does AB 1701 apply? AB 1701 applies to private works projects only. When does AB 1701 take effect? AB 1701 took effect on January 1, 2018 and applies to all contracts entered into on or after January 1, 2018. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Garret, Murai, Wendel, Rosen, Black, Dean, LLP
Mr. Murai may be contacted at gmurai@wendel.com

California Supreme Court Holds that Prevailing Wages are Not Required for Mobilization Work, for Now

October 18, 2021 — Garret Murai - California Construction Law Blog
In the midst of the Great Depression the federal government enacted the Davis-Bacon Act (40 U.S.C. section 32141 et seq.) to help workers on federal construction projects. Under the Davis-Bacon Act, minimum wages must be paid to workers on federal public works projects based on local “prevailing” wages. At the time, the goal of the law was to help curb the displacement of families by employers who were recruiting lower-wage workers from outside local areas. A darker history suggests that it was also intended to discourage minority workers from competing with unionized white workers. Fast forward to today. Many states, including California, adopted “Little Davis-Bacon” laws applying similar requirements on state and local public works projects. California’s prevailing wage law (Labor Code section 1720 et seq.) requires contractors on state and local public works projects pay their workers the general prevailing rate of per diem wages based on the classification or type of work performed by the employee in the locality where the project is located. Over the years, labor unions have sought to expand the definition of what constitutes a “public works project” from private residential developments receiving public funding (generally, prevailing wages required) to off-site fabrication of materials at permanent facility for a public works project (no prevailing wages required) to enforcement mechanisms such as making a general contractor liable for prevailing wage violations of its subcontractors (yes, indeedy, see Labor Code section 1775). Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Garret Murai, Nomos LLP
Mr. Murai may be contacted at gmurai@nomosllp.com

6 Ways to Reduce Fire Safety Hazards in BESS

January 02, 2024 — The Hartford Staff - The Hartford Insights
Renewable energy sources, such as solar and wind, are projected to generate 44% of all power in the U.S. by 2050, which is increasing the need for battery energy storage systems (BESS).1 BESS are electrochemical devices that collect energy from a power grid, power plant or renewable source, hold it, and then discharge that energy later to provide electricity on demand. “A BESS does not itself create or produce energy, it is a storage system. The energy is produced by other means, including different types of renewable sources. Think of a cellphone – you charge it overnight and then it runs throughout the day off that battery power,” says Stacie Prescott, head of energy for middle and large commercial at The Hartford. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of The Hartford Staff, The Hartford Insights

The New York Lien Law - Top Ten Things You Ought to Know

December 23, 2023 — Ralph E. Arpajian - White and Williams LLP
Over the course of my career, I have had the privilege of working with and representing numerous construction lenders (and borrowers/developers) in the financing of some of the largest commercial projects in the United States. A number of these projects have been in New York, where one encounters the New York Lien Law (the “Lien Law”). Many of my clients, particularly those lenders, borrowers, and their counsel, located outside of New York, are often perplexed by my advice regarding the Lien Law and the loan structuring requirements which result. In the hope that it would be helpful (especially for non-New York counsel), I have compiled a “top ten” list outlining, in my view, the most critical (and most perplexing) aspects of structuring New York construction loans under the Lien Law. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Ralph E. Arpajian, White and Williams LLP
Mr. Arpajian may be contacted at arpajianr@whiteandwilliams.com

One Word Makes All The Difference – The Distinction Between “Pay If Paid” and “Pay When Paid” Clauses

April 06, 2016 — David A. Harris – Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
Payment clauses in California construction contracts are often complex and multi-layered. This is especially true in contracts between general contractors and their subcontractors. The general does not want to pay the subs until it receives funding from the owners. The subs, of course, want their progress and final payments as soon as possible. Up until 1997, two different payment provisions were used in California contracts to manage payments by a general to its subcontractors. The first was called a “pay if paid” clause, and provided a contractor did not have to pay its subcontractors for work performed unless the subcontractor was first paid by the owner of the project. The second was the “pay when paid clause.” It required subcontractors to be paid for their work after the general was paid by the owner, or within “a reasonable time” after the subcontractors finished their work if the owner did not pay the general. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of David A. Harris, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
Mr. Harris may be contacted at dharris@hbblaw.com

Consolidated Case With Covered and Uncovered Allegations Triggers Duty to Defend

May 20, 2015 — Tred R. Eyerly – Insurance Law Hawaii
The Illinois Court of Appeals held that the insurer had a duty to defend a consolidated case that included one complaint alleging intentional acts and another complaint alleging negligence. Farmers Auto. Ins. Ass'n v. Neumann, 2015 Il. App. 140026 (Ill. Ct. App. March 24, 2015, reh'g denied March 24, 2015). Neumann allegedly hit Bitner with his automobile as Bitner, a police offier, was directing traffic. Bitner sued Neumann, alleging intentional assault and intentional battery. Farmers rejected Neumann's tender because the policy did not cover intentional acts. Farmers filed for a declaratory judgment. In his answer, Neumann included an affidavit stating that he did not intend to strike or cause bodily harm to Bitner. The trial court granted the motion to strike the affidavit. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
Mr. Eyerly may be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com

CA Supreme Court Permits Insurers to Bring Direct Actions Seeking Reimbursement of Excessive Fees Against Cumis Counsel Under Limited Circumstances

August 19, 2015 — David W. Evans & Valerie A. Moore – Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
The California Supreme Court held in Hartford Casualty Insurance Company v. J.R. Marketing, L.L.C. (Squire Sanders) (8/10/2015 - #S211645) that if Cumis counsel, operating under a court order which such counsel drafted and which expressly provided that the insurer would be able to recover excessive fees, sought and received fee payments from the insurer that were fraudulent or otherwise manifestly and objectively useless and wasteful when incurred, Cumis counsel have been unjustly enriched at the insurer’s expense and the insurer will be permitted under such limited circumstances to seek reimbursement directly from Cumis counsel. Certain Hartford insureds who had been issued commercial general liability policies were sued in multiple proceedings for a variety of claims, including unfair competition, defamation and intentional misrepresentation. Hartford disclaimed a duty to defend or to indemnify the defendants on the grounds that the acts complained of occurred prior to Hartford’s policy, and that some of the defendants were not Hartford insureds. A coverage action was filed by some of the insureds against Hartford; they were represented by the Squire Sanders law firm. Although Hartford subsequently agreed to defend several of the defendants subject to a reservation of rights, it declined to pay defense expenses incurred prior to the date of such agreement. Some months later, the trial court entered a summary adjudication order, finding that Hartford had a duty to have defended the liability action on the date it was originally tendered; the order required Hartford to fund the insured’s defense with independent counsel (i.e., so-called “Cumis” counsel; see San Diego Federal Credit Union v. Cumis Insurance Society, Inc. (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 358). The insureds retained Squire Sanders as their Cumis counsel. Reprinted courtesy of David W. Evans, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and Valerie A. Moore, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP Mr. Evans may be contacted at devans@hbblaw.com Ms. Moore may be contacted at vmoore@hbblaw.com Read the court decision
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