Insurance Coverage for COVID-19? Two N.J. Courts Allow Litigation to Proceed
March 06, 2022 —
Bethany L. Barrese - Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.Courts across the nation have struggled to determine whether insurance policies that provide coverage for “direct physical loss or damage” insure losses stemming from COVID-19. Many courts have been applying an overly stringent pleading standard, inappropriately granting insurers’ motions to dismiss as a result of the insureds’ purported failure to allege that COVID-19 caused damages covered by their policies or because certain exclusions supposedly barred coverage. However, two New Jersey state courts recently decided these issues in favor of the insureds in well-reasoned opinions that give proper deference to procedural pleading standards and substantive insurance coverage law.
A. COVID-19 causes “direct physical loss or damage”
In AC Ocean Walk, LLC v. American Guarantee and Liability Ins. Co., the New Jersey Superior Court held that physical alteration to an insured’s property is not a prerequisite to coverage for losses due to COVID-19. The insured, Ocean Casino, sued multiple insurers for COVID-19 losses, alleging that the virus caused Ocean Casino to shut down and suffer a loss of use of its property. Looking at the language of the policies, the court explained that each policy’s insuring agreement substantially read the same:
“This policy insures against direct physical loss of, or damage caused by, a covered cause of loss to covered property, at an insured location [the casino] … subject to the terms, conditions, and exclusions stated in this policy.”
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Bethany L. Barrese, Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.Ms. Barrese may be contacted at
BBarrese@sdvlaw.com
A Look at Business and Professions Code Section 7031
July 09, 2014 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFGarret Murai, on his California Construction Law Blog, stated that California’s Business and Professions Code Section 7031 has often been described as draconian, harsh, and unjust—but still enforceable. The section does two things: first, it “prohibits unlicensed or improperly licensed contractors from suing to recover compensation for construction work requiring a license,” and second, it “permits property owners to sue such contractors for disgorgement of all compensation paid for such work.”
According to Murai, the “strict enforcement of Section 7031” is thought to ensure “that contractors meet the minimum qualifications necessary for licensure.”
Murai analyzed the case E. J. Franks Construction, Inc. v Sahota, which “carved out a limited exception to Section 7031 for contractors who form business entities and transfer their existing contractor’s license to such entities.”
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School District Settles Construction Lawsuit with Additional Million
April 03, 2013 —
CDJ STAFFThe southern New York town of Liberty has settled a lawsuit filed by the contractor with an agreement that the school district will pay an additional $1.1 million. Darlind Construction of LaGrangeville, New York had alleged that “errors, omissions, and other defects” in the plans provided to them required additional work. The school project had previously cost the town about $36 million. Darlind Construction’s initial claim had been for $1.6 million. Funds for the settlement will come from monies appropriated for the project, most of which were contributed by the State of New York.
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Ohio Court of Appeals: Absolution Pollution Exclusion Bars Coverage for Workplace Coal-Tar Pitch Exposure Claims
January 10, 2018 —
Complex Insurance Coverage ReporterOn December 28, 2017, the Ohio Court of Appeals (Eighth District) held in GrafTech International, Ltd., et al. v. Pacific Employers Ins. Co., et al., No. 105258 that coverage for alleged injurious exposures to coal tar pitch was barred by a liability insurance policy’s absolute pollution exclusion. Applying Ohio law, the court concluded that Pacific Employers had no duty to defend GrafTech or pay defense costs in connection with claims by dozens of workers at Alcoa smelting plants that they were exposed to hazardous substances in GrafTech products supplied to Alcoa as early as 1942.
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White and Williams LLP
Pool Contractor’s Assets Frozen over Construction Claims
October 22, 2013 —
CDJ STAFFThe State of Florida has frozen the assets of Nationwide Pools over claims of deceptive practices. Nationwide will be allowed to engage in pool construction during the lawsuit. The Florida Attorney General’s office alleges that Nationwide Pools failed to pay subcontractors, misrepresented warranties, and left customers with unfinished pools. The State of Florida is seeking restitution to consumers who did business with Nationwide Pools.
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Significant Victory for the Building Industry: Liberty Mutual is Rejected Once Again, This Time by the Third Appellate District in Holding SB800 is the Exclusive Remedy
December 15, 2016 —
Richard H. Glucksman & Ravi R. Mehta – Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger Bulletin I. Elliott Homes, Inc. v. Superior Court (Certified for Publication, Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 2, 2016
The California Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District recently elaborated on the scope of the Right to Repair Act, commonly known as SB-800 (“Act”). In
Elliott Homes, Inc. v. Superior Court of Sacramento County (Kevin Hicks, et al.) (certified for publication, Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 2, 2016), the Court considered whether the Act (and specifically the Act’s pre-litigation procedure) applies, when homeowners plead construction defect claims based only on common law causes of action, as opposed to violations of the building standards set forth in the Act (
Civil Code §896). The Court answered this question affirmatively.
The homeowners of seventeen (17) single-family homes filed a Complaint against the builder of their homes, Elliott Homes, Inc. (“Elliott”), alleging common law causes of action for construction defects. Elliott filed a motion to stay the litigation on the ground that the homeowners failed to comply with the pre-litigation procedure set forth in the Act. The trial court denied the motion, agreeing with the homeowners that this pre-litigation procedure did not apply because the homeowners had not alleged a statutory violation of the Act. Elliott appealed. The Court of Appeal purely considered the question of whether the Act, including its pre-litigation procedure, applies when a homeowner pleads construction defect claims based on common law causes of action, and not on statutory violations of the Act’s building standards.
To answer this question, the Court analyzed a recent case decided by the Court of Appeal for the Fourth Appellate District:
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Brookfield Crystal Cove, LLC (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 98. In this subrogation case, a builder’s insurer asserted common law causes of action (but not statutory building standard violations) alleging construction defects against the builder to recover amounts paid to the homeowner after a sprinkler system failure caused extensive damage to the subject property. The trial court sustained the builder’s demurrer to the Complaint on the ground that it was time-barred under the Act. The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order, holding that common law construction defect claims arising from actual damages are not covered by the Act because “the Act does not provide the exclusive remedy in cases where actual damage has occurred.” (
Liberty Mutual, 219 Cal.App.4th 98, 109).
The
Elliott Court declined to follow
Liberty Mutual, finding that that Court failed to properly analyze the language of the Act. The
Elliott Court analyzed both the statutory scheme and the legislative history of the Act to arrive at the conclusion that common law causes of action for construction defects do indeed fall within the purview of the Act.
According to the
Elliott Court, the Act “broadly applies to
any action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in…residential construction and in such an action, a homeowner’s claims or causes of action shall be limited to violation of the standards set forth in the Act, except as specified.” Further, the Act expressly provides that “no other cause of action for a claim covered by this title or for damages recoverable under Section 944 is allowed.”
Civil Code §943(a). In turn,
Civil Code §944 allows for a recovery for the cost of repairing a building standard violation, or for the cost of repairing any damage caused by such a violation, among other things.
The limited exceptions to the Act’s applicability concern the enforcement of a contract, or any action for fraud, personal injury, or violation of a statute. Civil Code §943(a). Additionally, the Act does not apply to condominium conversions. Civil Code §896.
The Elliott Court explains that apart from these exceptions, the Legislature intended the Act to apply to all construction defect claims (regardless of damage) relating to the construction of residential properties whose sales contracts are signed after January 1, 2003. There is no exception in the Act, express or implied, for common law causes of action.
Next, the Court turns to the Act’s legislative history to buttress this conclusion. This history makes clear that the Act is a legislative response to the California Supreme Court’s holding in
Aas v. Superior Court (2000) 24 Cal.4th 627, that construction defects in residential properties are only actionable in tort when actual property damage manifests. Senate Judiciary Committee hearings indicate that the Act was the product of protracted negotiations between varying interested parties, including construction industry trade groups and consumer protection groups. The Legislature intended (1) to promulgate building standards, violations of which would be actionable, even without damage, and (2) to allow homeowners to recover for actual damage caused by construction defects not covered by the building standards. In other words, the Act was intended to provide homeowners redress regardless of whether damage had manifested.
Therefore, the Court concluded that common law causes of action for construction defects, regardless of damage, are subject to the pre-litigation procedure set forth in the Act. The Court issued a writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its earlier order, and to enter a new order granting Elliott’s motion to stay the litigation until the homeowners (and Elliott) have satisfied the pre-litigation procedure of the Act.
II. McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 1132
Similar to the Third Appellate District Court’s ruling in
Elliott, the Fifth Appellate District Court also rejected the holding of
Liberty Mutual in a matter now pending before the California Supreme Court:
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 1132 (review granted and opinion superseded sub nom.
Albany v. Superior Court 360 P.3d 1022). Also similar to
Elliott, in
McMillin a group of homeowners filed common law construction defect claims against the builder of their homes. The builder,
McMillin, moved to stay the litigation pending compliance with the Act’s pre-litigation procedure. The trial court denied the motion, holding that the Act does not apply because the homeowners have not asserted statutory building standard violations contained within the Act.
In reasoning substantially similar to that of
Elliott, the
McMillin Court rejected Liberty Mutual’s holding that the Act is not the exclusive remedy for pursuing construction defect claims, with or without damage. Thus, the
McMillin Court issued a writ of mandate to vacate the trial court’s earlier order and to enter a new order granting McMillin’s motion to stay.
On November 24, 2015, the California Supreme Court granted the homeowners’ petition for review. In August of 2016, briefing was completed and the matter is now awaiting the scheduling of arguments. CGDRB will continue to closely monitor the pending appeal of this matter to the California Supreme Court, as well as all related developments.
Reprinted courtesy of
Richard H. Glucksman, Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger and
Ravi R. Mehta, Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger
Mr. Glucksman may be contacted at rglucksman@cgdrblaw.com
Mr. Mehta may be contacted at rmehta@cgdrblaw.com
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Liability Coverage for Claims of Publishing Secret Data Does Not Require Access by Others
April 20, 2016 —
Sean Mahoney and Laura Schmidt – White and Williams LLPOn April 11, 2016, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit concluded that general liability insurance covered claims alleging that an insured was negligent in securing private medical records, even where there was no evidence that any third parties had actually viewed the underlying plaintiffs’ medical records. This “unpublished” decision was issued in Travelers Indemnity Company of America v. Portal Healthcare Solutions, LLC less than three weeks after the court heard oral argument. Portal Healthcare accordingly stands for the proposition that “publication” within the meaning of the standard commercial general liability coverage for “personal and advertising injury” only requires that claims against an insured allege that confidential information was made available to the public, without allegations that any third party actually accessed it, to trigger the insurer’s duty to defend.
Reprinted courtesy of
Sean Mahoney, White & Williams LLP and
Laura Schmidt, White & Williams LLP
Mr. Mahoney may be contacted at mahoneys@whiteandwilliams.com
Ms. Schmidt may be contacted at schmidtl@whiteandwilliams.com
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Prevailing Payment Bond Surety Entitled to Statutory Attorneys’ Fees Even if Defended by Principal
January 09, 2023 —
Garret Murai - California Construction Law BlogFor contractors involved in California public works projects the scenario is not uncommon: The general contractor awarded the public works project is required to obtain a payment bond for the benefit of subcontractors and suppliers and the payment bond surety issuing the payment bond requires the general contractor to defend and indemnify the surety from and against any claims against the payment bond.
In Cell-Crete Corporation v. Federal Insurance Company, 82 Cal.App.5th 1090 (2022), the 4th District Court of Appeal examined whether a payment bond surety, who prevails in a claim against the payment bond, is entitled to statutory attorneys’ fees when the party actually incurring the attorneys’ fees was the general contractor, pursuant to its defense and indemnity obligations, as opposed to the surety itself.
The Cell-Crete Case
General contractor Granite Construction Company was awarded a public works contract issued by the City of Thermal known as the Airport Boulevard at Grapefruit Boulevard and Union Pacific Railroad Grade Separation Project. We’ll just call it the “Project.” Subcontractor Cell-Crete Corporation entered into a subcontract with Granite for lightweight concrete and related work.
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Garret Murai, Nomos LLPMr. Murai may be contacted at
gmurai@nomosllp.com
