Hold on Just One Second: Texas Clarifies Starting Point for Negligence Statute of Limitations
July 11, 2022 —
Lian Skaf - The Subrogation StrategistIn construction or similar ongoing projects, problems often pop up. Sometimes they can pop up again and again. Making things even more complicated, one problem may affect another, seemingly new problem. When these construction problems result in property damage, timelines tend to overlap and determining when a statute of limitation begins to run for a particular claim can be difficult. Especially in states with short statute of limitations for tort claims like Texas, knowing when a statute begins to run is crucial for a subrogation professional.
In Hussion St. Bldgs., LLC v. TRW Eng’rs, Inc., No. 14-20-00641-CV, 2022 Tex. App. LEXIS 2193, 2022 WL 1010313, the Court of Appeals of Texas provided clarity on when the two-year statute of limitations for tort claims begins to run. Reversing the judgment from the lower court, the appellate court denied summary judgment to the defendant, holding that, despite there being existing issues with the ongoing construction project, the negligence cause of action for Hussion Street Buildings, LLC (Hussion) did not begin to run more than two years prior to filing suit.
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Lian Skaf, White and Williams LLPMr. Skaf may be contacted at
skafl@whiteandwilliams.com
Dallas Condo Project to Expand
November 20, 2013 —
CDJ STAFFCooper & Stebbins has announced that they are building additional units at Southlake Town Square. One set of additions will expand the Garden District Brownstones, which were built in 2006. There will additionally be a five-story building to be called The Residences.
Southlake Town Square is a mixed-use development, combining retail and residences.
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Jury Trials and Mediation in Philadelphia County: Virtually in Person
July 27, 2020 —
Andrew F. Susko, Robert G. Devine & Daniel J. Ferhat - White and Williams LLPWhen will the trial court in Philadelphia County be open for jury trials in civil actions? While a precise prediction, given the current state of our trial courts in the middle of the COVID-19 pandemic, is difficult to make, what is known is that the use of virtual technology is likely permanently changing the landscape of civil litigation, including depositions, mediation, and other forms of alternative dispute resolution. Even civil jury trials, at least in the near term and during the pandemic, are being conducted virtually, either by private agreement, or through the courts, as is occurring in Texas and most recently in Florida with its pilot virtual trial program in five of its trial courts. While it is necessary at present for the parties to consent to a virtual trial, courts may ultimately compel the parties’ participation. Regardless, litigants and their counsel are well advised to understand the complexities and manner of a virtual trial.
Seasoned trial attorneys have long experienced and are comfortable with virtual depositions bringing distant counsel, parties and witnesses together through technology to present testimony. The use of virtual technology as a means for court arguments and hearings, mediation, and alternative dispute resolution, while novel and emerging as the new normal, is territory where a comfort level can be achieved. And while distinctions most assuredly exist, recent experience has demonstrated that court arguments, mediations and depositions can be conducted effectively remotely and virtually. Legal issues certainly do remain in the context of the deposition of parties to a civil action regarding whether a lawyer’s physical presence in the same room with a party-witness can be demanded, and whether courts would compel a virtual deposition during the COVID-19 pandemic where such physical presence of a party and their attorney could not be achieved. Undoubtedly these issues will be resolved, likely sooner than later, given the scope of the pandemic in certain areas.
Reprinted courtesy of White and Williams LLP attorneys
Andrew F. Susko,
Robert G. Devine and
Daniel J. Ferhat
Mr. Susko may be contacted at suskoa@whiteandwilliams.com
Mr. Devine may be contacted at deviner@whiteandwilliams.com
Mr. Ferhat may be contacted at ferhatd@whiteandwilliams.com
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Plaintiffs’ Claims in Barry v. Weyerhaeuser Company are Likely to Proceed after Initial Hurdle
January 28, 2019 —
Frank Ingham - Colorado Construction LitigationOn December 18, 2018, Federal Magistrate Judge Scott T. Varholak recommended in a written opinion that the Motion of Defendant Weyerhaeuser Company (“Weyerhaeuser”) to Dismiss Amended Complaint Pursuant to F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) be denied. Barry v. Weyerhaeuser Company, 2018WL6589786 (D. Colo. 2018). As such, we believe District Court Judge Christine M. Arguello will accept this recommendation and the lawsuit will proceed.
At interest in this lawsuit are TJI joists designed, manufactured, and sold by Weyerhaeuser for residential construction. Headquartered in Seattle, Washington, Weyerhaeuser is one of the world’s largest private owners of timberlands, owning or controlling nearly 12.4 million acres in the United States and managing 14 million acres in Canada. It is a public company that trades on the New York Stock Exchange with revenues of $7.2 billion in 2017.[1] In addition to managing forests, Weyerhaeuser has interests in energy, minerals, and wood products.
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Frank Ingham, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & RoswellMr. Ingham may be contacted at
ingham@hhmrlaw.com
10 Haight Lawyers Recognized in Best Lawyers in America© 2022 and The Best Lawyers: Ones to Watch 2022
September 20, 2021 —
Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLPThree Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP attorneys were selected for Best Lawyers in America© 2022.
Seven Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP attorneys were selected for Best Lawyers®: Ones to Watch 2022.
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Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
Florida’s Construction Defect Statute of Repose
August 24, 2017 —
David Suggs – Bert L. Howe & Associates, Inc.Butler Weihmuller of Katz Craig LLP discussed Florida’s 10-year statute of repose law: “Under § 95.11(3)(c), the action must commence within 10 years after the date of actual possession by the owner, the date of the issuance of a certificate of occupancy, the date of abandonment of construction if not completed, or the date of completion or termination of the contract between the professional engineer, registered architect, or licensed contractor and his or her employer, whichever date is latest.”
However, Weihmuller explains that parties may disagree on the specific date For instance, in Busch v. Lennar Homes, LLC, Florida’s 5th DCA recently “reversed a trial court’s dismissal of a homeowner’s construction defect claim that was filed just beyond 10 years after the closing date on the property.” The previous decision had been based on the notion that the contract had been completed upon the date of closing. The 5th DCA declared that “a contract is not completed until both sides of a contract have been performed” and “pointed to the ‘inspection and punch-list clause’ of the contract.” The clause indicated that “[a]ny remaining items that Seller has agreed to correct will be corrected by Seller at Seller’s sole cost and expense prior to closing or at Seller’s option within a reasonable time after closing.” Since not all punch-list items had been completed prior to closing, the 5th DCA held that the contract had not been completed at closing, and therefore the statute of repose did not begin until the punch-items had been accomplished.
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Limiting Plaintiffs’ Claims to a Cause of Action for Violation of SB-800
November 18, 2011 —
Samir R. Patel, Esq., Lorber, Greenfield, & Polito, LLPThere has been a fair share of publicity about the SB-800 amendments to the Civil Code (Civil Code section 896, et seq.) that codified construction defect litigation in 2002. Most of the publicity is geared toward the pre-litigation standards allowing a builder the right to repair before litigation is commenced by a homeowner. Less focus and attention has been given to the fact that violation of the SB-800 performance standards is being used by plaintiff’s counsel as an additional tool in the plaintiff’s pleading tool box against builders. Closer scrutiny to SB-800 reveals that those provisions should in fact act as a limitation to the pleading tools available to plaintiffs and an additional tool for builders in the defense of cases governed by SB-800.
The typical construction defect complaint contains the boiler plate versions of numerous causes of action. These causes of action include Strict Liability, Negligence, Negligence Per Se, Breach of Contract, Breach of Contract – Third-Party Beneficiary, Breach of Express Warranties, Breach of Implied Warranties, among others. The wide array of causes of action leave a defendant “pinned to the wall” because they require a complex defense on a multitude of contract and tort related causes of action. Furthermore, the statutes of limitations as to these claims widely differ depending upon if the particular defect is considered latent or patent. The truth of the matter remains, no matter what the circumstances, if a construction defect matter ultimately goes to trial, it is inevitable that plaintiffs will obtain a judgment on at least one of these causes of action.
On its own, the Strict Liability cause of action can be a thorn in a defendant’s side. A builder is obviously placing a product into the stream of commerce and strict liability is a tough standard to defend against, particularly when it concerns intricate homes comprised of multiple components that originally sold for hundreds of thousands of dollars. A Negligence cause of action can also be difficult to defend because the duty of care for a builder is what a “reasonable” builder would have done under the circumstances. An interpretation of this duty of care can easily sway a jury that will almost always consist of sympathetic homeowners. A Negligence Per Se cause of action can also leave a defendant vulnerable to accusations that a builder violated the Uniform Building Code or a multitude of other obscure municipal construction-related code provisions during the construction of the home. Lastly, the Breach of Contract cause of action leaves a builder relying on dense and intricate purchase and sale agreements with dozens of addenda which leave the skeptical jurors turned off by what they view as one-side, boilerplate provisions. Ultimately, when a matter is about to go to trial, the complexity of these complaints can benefit a plaintiff and increase a plaintiff’s bargaining power against a defendant who is attempting to avoid a potentially large judgment.
Enter the SB-800 statutes. The SB-800 statutes apply to all homes sold after January 1, 2003. Civil Code section 938 specifically states that “[t]his title applies only to new residential units where the purchase agreements with the buyer was signed by the seller on or after January 1, 2003.” (Civil Code §, 938.) As time progresses, more residential construction defect cases will exclusively fall under the purview of SB-800. Slowly but surely more SB-800 governed litigation is being filed, and its exclusive application is looming on the horizon.
On its surface, this “right to repair” regime has left builders with a lot to be desired despite the fact that it is supposed to allow the builder the opportunity to cure any deficiencies in their product before litigation can be filed by potential plaintiffs. However, the application of the time line for repair has shown to be impractical for anything but the most minor problems involving only small numbers of residential units. Moreover, the fact that the fruits of the builder’s investigation into the claimed defects in the pre-litigation context can freely be used as evidence against it in litigation makes builders proceed with trepidation in responding with a repair. For these reasons, more SB-800 litigation can be expected to result due to the shortcomings of the pre-litigation procedures, and savvy defense counsel should anticipate the issues to be dealt with in presenting the defense of such cases at trial.
This fact should not necessarily be met with fear or disdain. Within the SB-800 statutes, the legislature made it clear that they were creating a new cause of action for construction defect claims, but it further made it clear that this cause of action is a plaintiff’s exclusive remedy. The legislature giveth, but at the same time, the legislature taketh away. Throughout numerous provisions within the SB-800 statutes, the Civil Code states that claims for construction defects as to residential construction are exclusively governed by the Civil Code, and that the Civil Code governs any and all litigation arising under breaches of these provisions. Civil Code section 896 specifically states:
In any action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, the residential construction … the claimant’s claims or causes of action shall be limited to violation of, the following standards, except as specifically set forth in this title. (Civil Code §, 896.)
Civil Code section 896 then provides approximately fifty-plus standards by which a construction defect claim is assessed under that provision. Civil Code section 896 covers everything from plumbing to windows, and from foundations to decks, and in several instances expressly dictates statutes of limitations as to specific areas of construction that severely truncate the 10-year latent damage limitations period. As for any construction deficiencies that are not enumerated within Civil Code section 896, Civil Code section 897 explicitly defines the intent of the standards and provides a method to assess deficiencies that are not addressed in Civil Code section 896. Civil Code section 897 states:
Intent of Standards
The standards set forth in this chapter are intended to address every function or component of a structure. To the extent that a function or component of a structure is not addressed by these standards, it shall be actionable if it causes damage. (Civil Code §, 897.)
Therefore, Civil Code section 897 acts as a catch-all by which defects that are not covered within Civil Code section 896 can be evaluated on a damage standard mirroring the Aas case (damages must be present and actual). The result of sections 896 and 897 being read in combination is a comprehensive, all-inclusive set of performance standards by which any defect raised by Plaintiffs can be evaluated and resolved under a single SB-800 based cause of action.
Civil Code section 943 makes clear that a cause of action for violation of SB-800 performance standards is a plaintiff’s sole remedy for a residential construction defect action. Specifically, Civil Code section 943 states:
Except as provided in this title, no other cause of action for a claim covered by this title or for damages recoverable under 944 is allowed. In addition to the rights under this title, this title does not apply to any action by a claimant to enforce a contract or express contractual provision, or any action for fraud, personal injury, or violation of a statute. (Civil Code §, 943.)
Civil Code section 944 provides the method for computing damages within a construction defect action, as follows:
If a claim for damages is made under this title, the homeowner is only entitled to damages for the reasonable value of repairing any violation of the standards set forth in this title, [and] the reasonable cost of repairing any damages caused by the repair efforts… . (Civil Code §, 944.)
A cursory review of these statutes yields the conclusion that the legislature was attempting to create an exclusive cause of action that trumps all other causes of action where SB-800 applies. The remedy available to plaintiffs is limited to that allowed by the Civil Code. As noted above, “[n]o other cause of action for a claim covered by this title…is allowed.” (Civil Code §, 943.) Therefore, Civil Code sections 896, 897, 943, and 944 specifically prohibit the contract-based and tort-based causes of action typically pled by plaintiffs.
Plaintiff’s counsel has seized upon the language of section 943 to advance the argument that SB-800 still allows a plaintiff to advance typical contract and tort based causes of action. On the surface, this argument may seem compelling, but a minimum of scrutiny of the express language of section 943 dispels this notion. Section 943 says that it provides rights “[i]n addition” to those under the SB-800 Civil Code provisions. Clearly, the language in section 943 is intended to expressly underscore the fact that a plaintiff is not precluded from seeking relief in addition to that allowed under SB-800 for damages not arising from a breach of the SB-800 standards or for damages in addition to those recoverable under Section 944. This language does not provide an unfettered license to bring a Strict Liability, Negligence or other cause of action against a builder where SB-800 applies.
In fact, this language only keeps the door open for plaintiffs to pursue such causes of action not arising from a breach of the SB-800 standards should there be such supporting allegations. For example, if a plaintiff alleges that a builder breached an “express contractual provision” related to the timing of the completion of the home and close of escrow, and the contract specifies damages in this regard, a plaintiff may have a viable separate cause of action for Breach of Contract for recovery of those damages precisely because that is not an issue expressly dealt with in SB-800 in the performance standards under sections 896 and 897, or in the damage recovery terms under 944. As it stands, the vast majority of complaints are seeking redress for violation of the same primary right; that is, defects specifically outlined in Section 896 and 897 or which result in damages as stated in Section 944.
So, how does a builder defend against a complaint that contains multiple causes of action regarding construction defects for a home sold after January 1, 2003? There are numerous ways to approach this. First and foremost, these superfluous and improper causes of action can be attacked by demurrer seeking dismissal of all causes of action other than the cause of action alleging violation of SB-800. If the the time period within which to file a demurrer has passed already, a motion for judgment on the pleadings can be utilized to attack the improper causes of action in the same way as a demurrer can be used for this purpose.
The limitation to a demurrer or motion for judgment on the pleadings is that the judge is restricted to viewing only the four corners of the pleading when making a ruling. It is typical for plaintiffs’ counsel to cleverly (or one might even say, disingenuously) leave the complaint purposely vague to avoid a successful defense attack on the pleadings by not including the original date the residence was sold. In that instance, a motion for summary adjudication can be used to attack a plaintiff’s complaint. By simply providing evidence that the homes were originally sold after January 1, 2003, the improper causes of action should be subject to dismissal by summary adjudication. If the plaintiff is a subsequent purchaser, the builder still has recourse to enforce the pleading limitations under SB-800. Civil Code section 945 states that “[t]he provisions, standards, rights, and obligations set forth in this title are binding upon all original purchasers and their successors-in-interest.” (Civil Code §, 945.)
Attacking a plaintiff’s complaint to eliminate multiple causes of action can have numerous benefits. The practical result is that a plaintiff will only have one viable cause of action. The advantage is that the SB-800 performance standards include the defined performance standards and shortened statutes of limitations periods with regard to specific issues. Furthermore, as to defects which are not specifically provided for in Civil Code section 896, Civil Code section 897 requires a proof of actual damages. Therefore, a plaintiff must provide evidence of current damages and not simply conditions that may potentially cause damage in the future.
The Appellate Courts have yet to directly address and interpret these SB-800 provisions. The time for that is undoubtedly drawing near. For now, however, plaintiffs will have to find ways to accurately plead construction defect claims within the confines of one cause of action for breach of the performance standards enumerated within the Civil Code.
Printed courtesy of Lorber, Greenfield & Polito, LLP. Mr. Patel can be contacted at spatel@lorberlaw.com and Mr. Verbick at tverbick@lorberlaw.com.
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What are the Potential Damages when a House is a Lemon?
September 01, 2016 —
Haldon L. Greenberg, Esq. – Florida Construction Law NewsIt seems that lemons are front page news these days. Beyonce just released a chart-topping[1] album all about what to do when life hands you lemons. In today’s vernacular, we use the term “Lemon” to describe a person or thing that is unsatisfactory, disappointing, or feeble.[2] In Florida, there is a “Lemon Law” that provides a way for consumers to receive a replacement or full refund for vehicles found to have defects which may affect the vehicle’s safety, value or use.[3] While there is no “Lemon Law” for construction projects, in Gray v. Mark Hall Homes, Inc.,[4] Florida’s Second District Court of Appeal cited to Florida Supreme Court precedent in holding that a home builder was on the hook for the entire contract value of a home he contracted to build for the Plaintiff, when it was revealed the home was a “Lemon”, or as the evidence at trial showed, “valueless.”
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Haldon L. Greenberg, Esq., Cole, Scott & Kissane, P.A.Mr. Greenberg may be contacted at
haldon.greenburg@csklegal.com
