Ruling Closes the Loop on Restrictive Additional Insured Endorsement – Reasonable Expectations of Insured Builder Prevails Over Intent of Insurer
July 31, 2019 —
Theodore L. Senet, Esq., Jason M. Adams, Esq. and Clayton Calvin - Gibbs GiddenOn June 5, 2019, the Court of Appeal in
McMillin Homes Construction, Inc. v. National Fire & Marine Insurance Company, 35 Cal. App. 5th 1042 (Cal. Ct. App. 2019) issued an important opinion on the scope of additional insured insurance coverage for developers and general contractors in California. Specifically, the “care, custody and control” (“CCC”) exclusion will be read to only exclude coverage for additional insureds who exercised exclusive control over the damaged property. Thus, general contractors who share control of the property with their subcontractors, as is typical on most projects, will not be denied coverage under this exclusion.
I. Facts & Procedural History
McMillin Homes Construction, Inc. was a Southern California developer and general contractor. In 2014, homeowners sued McMillin for roofing defects in a case called
Galvan v. McMillin Auburn Lane II, LLC. Pursuant to a subcontract, the roofer, Martin Roofing Company, Inc., provided McMillin with additional insured coverage under Martin’s general liability insurance policy. The insurer, National Fire and Marine Insurance Company, covered McMillin under an ISO Form CG 20 09 03 97 Additional Insured (“AI”) endorsement. After McMillin tendered its defense of the Galvan lawsuit under the AI endorsement, National Fire declined to provide McMillin with a defense to the homeowners’ lawsuit, relying on a CCC exclusion contained in the AI endorsement for property in the care, custody or control of the additional insured. McMillin then sued National Fire for breach of the policy, bad faith and declaratory relief in
McMillin Homes Construction, Inc. v. National Fire & Marine Insurance Company.
In
McMillin Homes, the trial court found the CCC exclusion in the AI endorsement applied and held in favor of the insurer, National Fire. The trial court found the exclusion for damage to property in McMillin’s “care, custody, or control” precluded coverage for the roofing defect claims, as well as any duty on the part of the insurer to defend the home builder, McMillin. McMillin filed an appeal from the trial court’s ruling.
II. Case Holding
The Court of Appeal reversed to hold in favor of McMillin, interpreting the CCC exclusion narrowly and finding a duty on the part of the insurer to defend the general contractor pursuant to the AI endorsement on the roofer’s insurance policy. It held that for the CCC exclusion to attach, it would require the general contractor’s exclusive control over the damaged property, but here, the general contractor shared control with the roofer. The Court of Appeal noted that where there is ambiguity as to whether a duty to defend exists, the court favors the reasonable belief of the insured over the intent of the insurer. Here, that reasonable belief was that the coverage applied and the exclusion was narrow.
The Court of Appeal relied upon
Home Indemnity Co. v. Leo L. Davis, Inc., 79 Cal. App. 3d 863 (Ct. App. 1978) (“Davis”), as a judicial interpretation of the CCC exclusion. That case synthesized a string of case law into a single conclusion: that courts may hold the exclusion inapplicable where the insured’s control is not exclusive. In the opinion in McMillin Homes, coverage turned upon whether control was exclusive: “[t]he exclusion is inapplicable where the facts at best suggest shared control.” The Court of Appeal stated the “need for painstaking evaluation of the specific facts of each case. Here, McMillin coordinated the project’s scheduling, but Martin furnished the materials and labor and oversaw the work; they therefore shared control.
Even if the rule in Davis did not apply and the exclusion was found to be ambiguous, the court stated that “control” requires a higher threshold than merely acting as a general contractor. Liability policies are presumed to include defense duties and exclusions must be “conspicuous, plain, and clear.” Furthermore, because “construction defect litigation is typically complex and expensive, a key motivation [for the endorsement] is to offset the cost of defending lawsuits where the general contractor’s liability is claimed to be derivative.” This is especially true because the duty to defend is triggered by a mere potential of coverage. Under the insurer’s construction of the exclusion, coverage would be so restrictive under the AI endorsement that it was nearly worthless to the additional insured.
III. Reasonable Expectation of the Insured Prevails over the Intent of the Insurer
Like most commercial general liability policies, National Fire’s policy excluded coverage for property damage Martin was contractually obliged to pay, with an exception for “insured contracts.” Typically, “insured contracts” include prospective indemnification agreements for third party claims. The National Fire policy contained a form CG 21 39 Contractual Liability Limitation endorsement, which deleted indemnity agreements from the definition of “insured contracts” to effectively preclude coverage for the indemnity provision between McMillin and Martin. National Fire argued that this endorsement demonstrated its intent to exclude coverage to McMillin for the homeowners’ defect lawsuit. The Court of Appeal stated that the insurer’s intent is not controlling and that the insureds reasonable expectation under the AI endorsement would control. As a result of its ruling, the Court also dealt a significant blow to the argument that the CG 21 39 endorsement is effective as a total bar to additional insured coverage for all construction defect claims.
IV. Conclusion
The decision is good news for developers and general contractors who rely on subcontractors to provide additional insured coverage. Unless the general contractor exercises exclusive control over a given project, the CCC exclusion in the CG 20 09 03 97 additional insured endorsement may not preclude the duty to defend. Demonstrating that a general contractor exercised exclusive control over the project would be extremely difficult to show under normal project circumstances because the any subcontractor participation appears to eliminate the general contractor’s exclusive control.
The case also highlights the need for construction professionals to regularly review their insurance programs with their risk management team (lawyers, brokers, and risk managers). As is often the case, a basic insurance policy review at the outset of the McMillin project could likely have avoided the entire dispute. For owners and general contractors, CG 20 10 (ongoing operations) and CG 20 37 (completed operations) additional insured forms are preferable to the CG 20 09 form at issue in the McMillin case because they do not contain the CCC exclusion. The CG 20 10 and 20 37 forms are readily available in the marketplace and are commonly added to most policies upon request. Had those forms been added, AI coverage likely would have been extended to McMillin without the need for litigation. Similarly, carriers will routinely delete the CG 21 39 Contractual Liability Limitation endorsement upon request. Deletion of the CG 21 39 would have circumvented National Fire’s second argument in its entirety.
Additionally, insurance policies, endorsements, and exclusions are subject to revision and are not always issued on standard forms. As a result, it is incumbent upon developers, contractors, and subcontractors to specify the precise overage requirements for construction projects and to review all endorsements, certificates, and policies carefully. Due to the difficulty in monitoring compliance with insurance requirements, project owners and general contractors are finding that it is better to insure projects under project specific wrap-up insurance programs which eliminate many of the issues pertaining to additional insured coverage. Wrap-up programs vary greatly as to their terms and conditions, so however a project is insured, insurance requirements and evidence of coverage should be carefully reviewed by experienced and qualified risk managers, brokers, and legal counsel to assure that projects and parties are sufficiently covered.
Gibbs Giden is nationally and locally recognized by U. S. News and Best Lawyers as among the “Best Law Firms” in both Construction Law and Construction Litigation. Chambers USA Directory of Leading Lawyers has consistently recognized Gibbs Giden as among California’s elite construction law firms. The authors can be reached at tsenet@gibbsgiden.com (Theodore Senet); jadams@gibbsgiden.com (Jason Adams) and ccalvin@gibbsgiden.com (Clayton Calvin). Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Nevada’s Changing Liability Insurance Landscape—State Insurance Regulator Issues Emergency Regulation and Guidance Addressing Controversial “Defense-Within-Limits” Legislation
August 28, 2023 —
Geoffrey B. Fehling & Andrew S. Koelz - Hunton Insurance Recovery BlogWe
recently posted about Nevada becoming the first state to prohibit defense-within-limits provisions in liability insurance policies. Defense-within-limits provisions—resulting in what is called “eroding” or “wasting” policies—reduce the policy’s applicable limit of insurance by amounts the insurer pays to defend the policyholder against a claim or suit.
In response to uncertainty and industry concern about the potential effects the new law may have on the state’s insurance marketplace, Nevada’s Division of Insurance issued an Emergency Regulation and Guidance to Insurers on the new law to minimize disruption to the marketplace. After noting that the new law “has the potential to eliminate or greatly reduce the availability of certain policies of liability insurance and significantly increase their costs, which will affect all types of Nevada businesses, non-profit entities, and state and local governments,” Nevada’s Division of Insurance addressed three issues relating to the new law in the Emergency Regulation:
- The meaning of the term “policy of liability insurance,” as used in the new law.
- The insurers to which the new law does not apply.
- How defense coverage is required to be made available.
Reprinted courtesy of
Geoffrey B. Fehling, Hunton Andrews Kurth and
Andrew S. Koelz, Hunton Andrews Kurth
Mr. Fehling may be contacted at gfehling@HuntonAK.com
Mr. Koelz may be contacted at akoelz@HuntonAK.com
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Remodel Leads to Construction Defect Lawsuit
October 16, 2013 —
CDJ STAFFThe Sacramento, California law firm Anderson Shoech has announced that it will be filing a construction defect lawsuit concerning a single-family home in Sonora, California. The remodel is alleged to have lead to roof leaks and mold growth. Anderson Schoech will have the home inspected by a general contractor who will be retained as an expert witness.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Construction Defect Coverage Summary 2013: The Business Risks Shift To Insurers
January 13, 2014 —
John Husmann and Adam Fleischer, BatesCarey LLP, Chicago, ILIn 2013, courts examining insurance coverage for construction defect claims departed from earlier precedent and trended toward allowing construction companies to shift the costs of their faulty workmanship to their insurers, thereby reversing the previous public policy trend against coverage for such claims.
The tension in all construction defect insurance disputes is typically over which party—the insured or insurer—should bear the cost of the repair and replacement work to fix or complete the job that the insured was hired to do. For some time, courts have recognized that there is a public policy against allowing construction companies to get paid to perform faulty workmanship, and then to force their insurers to be the financers for the repair and replacement costs. Such courts issued landmark decisions precluding insurance coverage for construction defects in these situations. This trend against allowing insurance coverage for the repair of faulty workmanship was alive and well in 2012.
However, in 2013, court decisions focused more on the hyper-technical interpretation of policy wording and strayed from those public policy considerations upon which previous decisions relied. This 2013 trend was seen in three areas of construction defect insurance decisions in particular:
1. Decisions addressing whether an insured’s faulty workmanship can be considered a covered “occurrence.”
2. Even when faulty workmanship may not be an “occurrence” as it relates to the insured’s work, some decisions found that the same faulty workmanship to one part of the insured’s project could be an “occurrence” if it caused damage to other non-defective parts of the insured’s project.
3. Decisions addressing whether a policy’s exclusion for damage to the particular part of property on which the insured was working can be applied as intended to prevent coverage for the repair and replacement costs resulting from the insured’s faulty work.
The 2013 decisions in each of these areas are addressed in the three sections below. The overall trend to be derived from these cases is that courts have gotten away from analyzing the common sense public policy considerations behind earlier precedent and have instead seized on the technical application of policy wording to allow insureds to shift more of their business risk and increase insurers’ overall exposure.
I. IS FAULTY WORKMANSHIP AN “OCCURRENCE”? SEVERAL MORE STATES SAY YES.
In 2013, while the Supreme Court of Alabama adhered to the idea that an insured cannot obtain insurance to pay the cost of repairing its own work, the highest courts in West Virginia and North Dakota went the opposite direction, even overturning their own recent precedent to make the insurance company responsible for bearing the cost to repair and replace its insured’s faulty work. In order to transfer the risk of faulty construction from builder to insurer, these courts ruled that, if the defective construction was not expected or intended by the insured, then the “occurrence” requirement of the policy’s insuring agreement is satisfied. Of course, the practical failing of these rulings is that it gives construction companies a “double recovery”: they get paid once by the consumer to build the project, and then the cost of repairing the project gets paid by insurance. This very economic disincentive was at the heart of the early legal trend precluding coverage for such construction defects; a trend that is now slowly being reversed with almost no discussion of the economic and business havoc that will result.
A. Cherrington v. Erie Ins. Prop. & Cas. Co., 231 W. Va. 470, 745 S.E.2d 508 (March 27, 2013)
The Supreme Court of West Virginia overturned previous precedent to find that defective workmanship causing the need to repair the construction itself constitutes an “occurrence” under a CGL policy.
In Cherrington, a homeowner sued a builder for the costs to repair defects in a newly-constructed residence. There was no damage alleged to anything but the project itself. The builder’s insurer denied coverage arguing, among other reasons, allegations of defective construction do not constitute an “occurrence.” The insurer’s position was grounded in several West Virginia Supreme Court decisions that found that poor workmanship, standing alone, does not constitute an occurrence. Webster Cnty. Solid Waste Auth. v. Brackenrich & Associates, Inc., 217 W. Va. 304, 617 S.E.2d 851 (2005); Corder v. William W. Smith Excavating Co., 210 W. Va. 110, 556 S.E.2d 77 (2001); Erie Ins. Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Pioneer Home Improvement, Inc., 206 W. Va. 506, 526 S.E.2d 28 (1999).
In an about-face, the West Virginia Supreme Court overruled its prior decisions and found that faulty workmanship can constitute an occurrence if it was not intended or expected by the insured. The court observed that a majority of other jurisdictions found that faulty workmanship is covered by a CGL policy, either in judicial decisions or by legislative amendments to state insurance codes. On this point, we note that on November 25, 2013 a bill was introduced before the New Jersey Assembly that would require CGL policies issued to construction professionals to define “occurrence” so as to include claims for faulty workmanship.
The court reasoned that, by defining occurrence, in part, as “an accident,” the policy must be interpreted to provide coverage for damages or injuries that were not deliberately or intentionally caused by the insured. The court also noted that the policy contained an exclusion property damage to “your work” (exclusion l.), which implies that damage to the insured’s work must be within the policy’s basic insuring agreement, or there would not have been the need for the exclusion. Thus, the court reasoned that a finding that faulty workmanship is not an occurrence would be inconsistent with the “your work” exception. Therefore, the court expressly overruled its prior decisions and found that the builder’s insurer had a duty to defend.
B. K & L Homes, Inc. v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2013 ND 57, 829 N.W.2d 724 (April 5, 2013)
The Supreme Court of North Dakota changed course and held that faulty workmanship may constitute an “occurrence” so long as the faulty work and the resulting damage was not anticipated, intended, or expected.
Homeowners sued the insured homebuilder alleging that their house suffered damage because of substantial shifting caused by improper footings and inadequately compacted soil under the footings and foundation that had been constructed by a subcontractor of the insured.
The main issue before the North Dakota Supreme Court was whether inadvertent faulty workmanship constitutes an accidental “occurrence” potentially covered under the CGL policy. The court examined the drafting history of the standard ISO CGL form and surveyed cases nationwide. The court concluded that faulty workmanship may constitute an “occurrence” if the faulty work was “unexpected” and not intended by the insured, and the property damage was not anticipated or intentional, so that neither the cause nor the harm was anticipated, intended, or expected.
In reaching its conclusion, the North Dakota Supreme Court specifically rejected its own prior decision in ACUITY v. Burd & Smith Constr., Inc., 721 N.W.2d 33, 2006 ND 187 (N.D. 2006), which held that faulty or defective workmanship, standing alone, is not an accidental “occurrence.” The court explained that the prior decision incorrectly drew a distinction between faulty workmanship that damages the insured’s work or product and faulty workmanship that damages a third party’s work or property. The court found that there is nothing in the definition of “occurrence” that supports the notion that faulty workmanship that damages the own work of the insured contractor is not an “occurrence.” The North Dakota Supreme Court’s change in approach, like the decision of the West Virginia Supreme Court in Cherrington, is marked by a narrow focus on whether the faulty work was purposeful, without regard to the broader concepts that insurance coverage is not meant to satisfy the insured’s contractual business obligations.
C. Capstone Building Corp. v. American Motorists Insurance Co., 308 Conn. 760, 67 A.3d 961 (June 11, 2013)
The Supreme Court of Connecticut found as a matter of first impression that defective workmanship causing defects in the insured’s own project can constitute an “occurrence.”
The insureds, a general contractor and project developer, settled construction defect claims against them brought by the University of Connecticut involving the allegedly negligent construction of a dormitory building. The settlement was for repairs necessary to correct the insured’s own work and not for any other incidental property damage. After the settlement, the insured sought coverage for the settlement amount from the insurer that had issued an Owner Controlled Insurance Program policy for the dormitory project. In a matter of first impression in Connecticut, the Supreme Court of Connecticut held that defective workmanship necessitating repairs can indeed constitute an insured “occurrence,” reasoning that, because the negligent work was unintentional from the point of view of the insured, such negligent work may constitute an accident or occurrence. Similar to the approach in Cherrington and K & L Homes, the court reasoned that insurance policies are designed to cover foreseeable risks, and that a deliberate act of constructing a project, when performed negligently, does indeed constitute a covered accidental “occurrence” if the effect is not intended or expected.
D. Taylor Morrison Servs., Inc. v. HDI-Gerling Am. Ins. Co., 746 S.E.2d 587 (Ga., July 12, 2013)
The Supreme Court of Georgia ruled that an “occurrence” does not require damage to the property or work of someone other than the insured.
A class of 400 homeowners in California sued the insured homebuilder for negligently constructing the foundation of their homes, resulting in damage to the homes due to the cracked and buckling foundations. The homebuilder’s insurer defended the class action and filed a declaratory judgment action in Georgia federal court, arguing that the claims against the insured did not allege an “occurrence” because the damages at issue were simply the repairs to the insured’s faulty work. The Eleventh Circuit certified the question of whether Georgia law requires there to be damage to property other than the insured’s own work for an “occurrence” to exist under a CGL policy.
The Supreme Court of Georgia found that negligent construction which damages only the insured’s own work can indeed constitute an accidental “occurrence.” Like the recent decisions discussed above, the court observed that the term “accident” meant an unexpected or unintended event, and, therefore, the identity of the person whose interests were damaged is irrelevant. However, in a lengthy series of footnotes, the court further observed in dicta that defectively constructed property cannot be said to be physically injured by the work that brought it into existence. However, the court did not attempt to define the precise line of demarcation between defective and non-defective work when both are a part of the same project.
E. Owners Ins. Co. v. Jim Carr Homebuilder, LLC, 1120764, 2013 WL 5298575 (Ala., Sept. 20, 2013)
The Supreme Court of Alabama confirmed that faulty workmanship, standing alone, does not constitute an “occurrence.”
The insured homebuilder sought coverage for an adverse arbitration award wherein it was determined that the insured had defectively constructed a home resulting in damages due to water infiltration, causing “significant mental anguish” to the homeowner. The insurer defended the insured in the arbitration, but denied indemnity coverage for the award.
The Supreme Court of Alabama agreed with the insurer, finding that, because the insured was hired to build the entire house, any property damage or bodily injury (mental anguish) that resulted from the insured’s faulty workmanship was not caused by an “occurrence.” The court indicated only damage to something other than the insured’s own work (which was not present in this case) can be considered damage caused by an “occurrence.” The implication of this case is that either property damage or bodily injury that results from faulty workmanship is not caused by an “occurrence,” although the court did not expressly discuss this issue it its holding.
II. AN INSURED’S FAULTY WORKMANSHIP TO ONE PART OF A PROJECT MAY BE AN “OCCURRENCE” IF IT CAUSES DAMAGE TO OTHER NON-DEFECTIVE PARTS OF THE INSURED’S PROJECT.
Even in jurisdictions where the costs to repair faulty workmanship is typically not an “occurrence,” courts do recognize that, if the same faulty workmanship of the insured damages another part of the insured’s project which was not otherwise defective, then this does qualify as an occurrence. See French v. Assurance Co. of Am., 448 F.3d 693, 706 (4th Cir. 2006) (holding that a CGL policy does not provide coverage to correct defective workmanship but that the policy provides coverage for the cost to remedy property damage to the contractor's otherwise non-defective work-product).
Examining the issue of how to treat one part of the insured’s project that was damaged by a different, defective part of the same insured’s project, the Sixth Circuit, predicting Kentucky law, found in 2013 that the insured subcontract’s faulty workmanship that damages otherwise non-defective part of the project is not an “occurrence” if the damage was of the type the insured was hired to prevent or control. However, the Colorado U.S. District Court went the opposite direction in ruling that the insured’s faulty workmanship to one part of the project that damages other non-defective parts of the same project does indeed qualify as an occurrence.
A. Liberty Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Kay & Kay Contracting, LLC, Case No. 12-5791 (C.A.6 (Ky.) Nov. 19, 2013)
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals predicted that, under Kentucky law, faulty workmanship that results in damage to other parts of a project is not an “occurrence” if the kind of damage that results is what the insured was hired to control or prevent.
The insured, a foundation subcontractor, performed site preparation and constructed a building pad for a Wal-Mart store. After the store was built, cracks in the building’s walls were noticed. Wal-Mart alleged that the fill under one corner of the building had settled, resulting in the structural problems. Wal-Mart demanded that the general contractor remedy the problem, who in turn demanded the same from the insured. The insured subcontractor sought coverage from its CGL carrier, which denied coverage and filed a declaratory judgment action based, in part, on basis that there was no “occurrence” because there was only faulty workmanship in need of repair.
The court observed that under Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 306
S.W.3d 69, 73 (Ky. 2010) the faulty construction of the building pad (the insured’s own work) was not an “occurrence.” However, the court observed that the claimed damage included more than just the building pad. The court noted that the Kentucky Supreme Court had not decided the issue of whether damage to parts of a construction project other than the insured’s faulty work constitutes an “occurrence.” The court reasoned that even if the Kentucky Supreme Court would determine that collateral damage to property other than the insured’s work is an “occurrence,” it would not adopt a version of such a rule that would apply when the damage at issue was the obviously and foreseeable consequence of the insured’s faulty work.
The court observed that in Cincinnati, the Kentucky Supreme Court emphasized the significance of the insured’s control over the work in analyzing the whether an “occurrence” took place. Specifically, in Cincinnati, the Kentucky Supreme Court opined that events that are within the control of the insured are not truly accidental or fortuitous. The court reasoned that the alleged damage to the Wal-Mart was due solely to the soil settlement—work that was within the insured’s control. The entire reason the insured was hired was to prevent the soil from settling in a manner that would cause damage to the structure. Thus, the court predicted that the Kentucky Supreme Court would not find that an “occurrence” takes place when the damage to a project that is allegedly caused by the defective workmanship of a subcontractor hired to control against that very damage from happening. Therefore, the court ordered that summary judgment be granted in favor of the insurer.
We also note that an opinion earlier this year, McBride v. ACUITY, 510 Fed.Appx. 451, 2013 WL 69358 (C.A.6 (Ky.) Jan. 7, 2013), The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals predicted that, under Kentucky law, the insured’s faulty workmanship to any parts (including non-defective parts) of the insured’s own project does not qualify as an “occurrence.”
B. Mt. Hawley Ins. Co. v. Creek Side at Parker Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., 2013 WL 104795 (D. Colo. Jan. 8, 2013)
Colorado U.S. District Court found faulty workmanship of a subcontractor potentially qualified as an “occurrence” where the subcontractor’s faulty workmanship caused damage to other, non-faulty parts of the project.
A homeowners association sued the developer/builder of a residential development project seeking damages allegedly caused by construction defects. The homeowners association alleged that the developer/builder’s subcontractors performed defective work that caused consequential damage to other, non-faulty parts of the project.
The district court found that the underlying lawsuit alleged an “occurrence.” Citing Greystone Constr., Inc. v. Nat’l Fire & Mar. Ins. Co., 661 F.3d 1272 (10th Cir. 2011) (Colo. law), the district court explained that “[f]aulty workmanship can constitute an occurrence that triggers coverage under a CGL policy if … the damage was to non-defective portions of the contractor’s or subcontractor’s work.” The district court also found that at least some of the alleged property damage was to non-defective portions of its or its subcontractors’ work on the same project. Accordingly, the district court held that there was at least a genuine issue of material fact as to whether there had been an “occurrence.”
III. EXCLUSION FOR DAMAGES TO PART OF PROPERTY ON WHICH INSURED IS WORKING.
One frequently discussed exclusion with regard to coverage for construction defect claims, is the exclusion for property damage to that part of real property on which the insured or any subcontractors are performing operations. This exclusion (along with several other “business risk” exclusions) embodies the notion that the cost of repairing or replacing the consequences of shoddy workmanship or paying for the fulfillment of a contractual commitment is not covered. In standard general liability forms, this provision appears as exclusion j(5) and states that the insurance does not apply to property damage to:
"That particular part of real property on which you or any contractors or subcontractors working directly or indirectly on your behalf are performing operations, if the "property damage" arises out of those operations."
In 2013, the South Carolina Supreme Court held that the exclusion applies if the insured’s subcontractor is still performing operations—even though the insured’s own operations are complete. However, in a different case, the U.S. District Court in Massachusetts held that exclusion j(5) only applies if there is a sufficient connection between the scope of the insured’s work and the damaged property. Finally, the South Dakota Supreme Court confirmed that the exclusion applies to damage while the insured’s subcontractor is working, but does not bar coverage to construction materials not yet incorporated into a project. These cases illustrate the varied applicability and interpretation of exclusion j(5) reached by different courts.
A. Bennett & Bennett Const., Inc. v. Auto Owners Ins. Co., 405 S.C. 1, 747 S.E.2d 426 (2013)
The Supreme Court of South Carolina found that exclusion j(5) applies if the property damage takes place while the insured’s subcontractor’s operations are ongoing.
A general contractor hired a masonry subcontractor to construct a brick wall. After completion of the wall, the general contractor observed mortar and slurry dried on the face of the wall and instructed the subcontractor to correct the appearance of the wall. The subcontractor hired a power washing company to clean the bricks, which resulted in discoloration and removal of the decorative finish on the bricks. The general contractor was forced to replace the damaged wall on its own, after which the general contractor sued and obtained a default judgment against the subcontractor. The general contractor then sued the subcontractor’s insurer in a declaratory judgment action.
The insurer relied in part on exclusion j(5) to deny coverage, arguing that there was no coverage for the damage to the wall because it was damage “to that part of the real property on which the insured was performing operations.” The general contractor argued that the exclusion did not apply because the damage took place after the insured’s operations (the construction of the brick wall) were over. The court held that whether the brick wall installation (work performed by the insured itself) was completed was irrelevant to the applicability of exclusion j(5) because the insured’s operations for the purposes of the exclusion include work performed by any of the insured’s subcontractors. That is, the exclusion barred coverage so long as the power washing company hired by the insured was still performing operations on the insured’s behalf at the time the damage took place. Because the damage occurred during the insured’s operations, exclusion j(5) barred coverage for the damage to the bricks.
B. Gen. Cas. Co. of Wisconsin v. Five Star Bldg. Corp., CIV.A. 11-30254-DJC, 2013 WL 5297095 (D. Mass. Sept. 19, 2013)
U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts determined that exclusion j(5) only applies to damage to “that particular part of real property” that was within the scope of the insured’s work, and not other portions of the overall structure.
An insurer filed a declaratory judgment action against its insured relating to a claim for damages at a university science center that arose from the insured’s work in upgrading the center’s HVAC system. The insured’s work included puncturing the weather membrane in the roof and installing temporary patches at the puncture sites until the new HVAC system was complete. Heavy rain caused some of the patches to fail and water to enter the building. The insurer agreed to pay for the damage caused to the interior of the center, but refused to pay for damage to the roof, in part based on exclusion j(5), arguing that the entire roof was the “particular part” of the building on which the insured was performing operations.
The court rejected the insurer’s argument, reasoning that puncturing the roof was incidental to the ventilation system upgrade. The court noted that the roof accounted for only a small part of the total work on the project and that there was an insufficient nexus between the scope of the insured’s HVAC work and the damage to the roof. Unfortunately, the court seemed to ignore the fact that the temporary roof patches which failed were clearly part of the insured’s work and, presumably, a necessary part of the HVAC upgrade. Nevertheless, the court concluded that exclusion j(5) was not a bar to coverage for the damage to the roof as well as the rest of the structure damaged by water intrusion.
C. Swenson v. Auto Owners Ins. Co., 2013 S.D. 38, 831 N.W.2d 402 (May 15, 2013)
The South Dakota Supreme Court found that building material yet to be installed at a project is not “real property” and exclusion j(5) did not apply.
Finally, in a 2013 decision of the South Dakota Supreme Court, the court held that a “your work” exclusion in a homebuilder’s policy did not bar coverage for damage to building materials that were negligently left exposed to the elements because the materials were not installed and, therefore, not yet “real property.” However, the court applied the exclusion to completed parts of the structure damaged because they were left open to rain and snow. Consistent with the decision in Bennett (part A. above), the court observed that the exclusion applies because the insured or its subcontractor(s) were actively performing the construction work when the damage took place. As the entire structure (a new home) was the insured’s work, the court was not faced with the issue in Five Star (part B. above).
CONCLUSION
There is a single insurance issue at the heart of most construction defect coverage disputes: when construction work is performed negligently, is the resulting defect simply part of the business risk that the insured must pay to repair, or is the resulting defect true damage to a third party’s property that may be insured under a general liability policy? During 2013, legal rulings in different states continue to demonstrate the evolution of the answer to this question. An increasing number of states appear to be ignoring the economic reality surrounding insured’s responsibility for its faulty workmanship. In these states, courts focused on the term “accident” to find coverage for the repair and replacement costs arising from defective construction claims. Furthermore, even in cases where the insured’s faulty workmanship itself does not constitute an “occurrence,” some courts are creating an exception where the insured’s negligence on one part of the project caused damage to a different non-faulty part of the same insured’s project.
The legal landscape for construction defect claims appears to be shifting rapidly and posing new challenges to insurers and claims professionals, who are faced with an increasing number of lawsuits and claims alleging faulty workmanship. Perhaps 2014 may bring a renewed legal focus on the public policy and intent behind the construction defect insurance provisions, and thereby shift the risk of correcting faulty construction away from insurers and back onto the insured parties that contracted for, controlled and were compensated for the work itself.
FOOTNOTES:
1. Weedo v. Stone-E-Brick, Inc., 81 N.J. 233, 405 A.2d 788 (N.J. 1979) (finding that a liability policy “does not cover an accident of faulty workmanship but rather faulty workmanship which causes an accident”); Bor-Son Bldg. Corp. v. Employers Commercial Union Ins. Co. of Am., 323 N.W.2d 58 (Minn. 1982) (reasoning that CGL is meant to cover tort liability for damage to others, and not for the insured’s contractual liability for economic loss because the insured’s work is less than that for which the damaged person bargained); Monticello Ins. Co. v. Wil-Freds Const., Inc., 277 Ill. App. 3d 697, 661 N.E.2d 451 (Ill.App.Ct. 1996) (construction defects that are the natural and ordinary consequences of faulty workmanship are not an “occurrence” unless there has been damage to third party property.)
2. Amerisure Mut. Ins. Co. v. Auchter Co., 673 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2012); Nautilus Ins. Co. v. JDL Dev., IX, LLC, 10 C 3435, 2012 WL 1156917 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 4, 2012), appeal dismissed (June 12, 2012); Aquatectonics, Inc. v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 10-CV-2935 DRH ARL, 2012 WL 1020313 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2012)
3. See Colorado Revised Statutes Section 13-20-808, effective May 21, 2010 (requires courts to presume that work resulting in property damage, including to the work itself, is accidental and an “occurrence”); Arkansas Code Annotated Section 23-79-155, effective July 27, 2011 (requires general liability policies to have a definition of “occurrence” that includes property damage or bodily injury resulting from faulty workmanship); South Carolina Code Annotated Section 38-61-70, effective May 17, 2011 (mandates that property damage resulting from faulty workmanship meeting the policy’s definition of “occurrence”); Hawaii Revised Statutes Section 431:1-217, effective June 3, 2011 (after a 2010 Hawaii appellate court ruling holding that construction defect claims do not constitute an occurrence, this statute was effectuated which requires courts to apply case law that was in effect at the time a policy was placed—such that pre-2010 policies may cover construction defects whereas post-2010 policies may not.)
You may contact Mr. Husmann at jhusmann@batescarey.com. Mr. Fleischer can be contacted at afleischer@batescarey.com
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Florida’s New Civil Remedies Act – Bulletpoints As to How It Impacts Construction
April 10, 2023 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesThere has been much talk about Florida’s new Civil Remedies Act (
House Bill 837) that Governor DeSantis approved on March 24, 2023. As it pertains to construction, here is how I see it with key bulletpoints on the impact this new Act has on the construction industry:
- New Florida Statute s. 86.121 – This is an attorney’s fees statute for declaratory relief actions to the prevailing insured to determine insurance coverage after TOTAL COVERAGE DENIAL. (Note: A defense offered pursuant to a reservation of rights is not a total coverage denial.) This right only belongs to the insured and cannot be transferred or assigned. And the parties are entitled to the summary procedure set forth in Florida Statute s. 51.011 requiring the court to advance the cause on the calendar. The new statute does say it does NOT apply to any action arising under a residential or commercial property insurance policy. (Thus, since builder’s risk coverage is a form of property insurance, the strong presumption is this new statute would not apply to it.) Rather, the recent changes to Florida Statute s. 626.9373 would apply which provides, “In any suit arising under a residential or commercial property insurance policy, there is no right to attorney fees under this section.”
- Florida Statute s. 95.11 – The statute of limitations for negligence causes of action are two years instead of four years. This applies to “causes of action accruing after the effective date of this act.”
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David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
The Fifth Circuit, Applying Texas Law, Strikes Down Auto Exclusion
July 11, 2022 —
Jeremy S. Macklin - Traub Lieberman Insurance Law BlogPenn-America Ins. Co. v. Tarango Trucking, LLC, 30 F.4th 440 (5th Cir. 2022), involved a coverage dispute over Penn-America Insurance Company’s (“Penn-America”) duty to defend and indemnify third-party claims against Tarango Trucking, LLC (“Tarango”) for a fatal accident on its property. At the time of the accident, Penn-America insured Tarango under a commercial general liability policy, which included an “Auto Exclusion” and “Parking Exception” provision. The Auto Exclusion stated the policy did not apply to bodily injury or property damage arising out of the use of any automobile, including the operation and loading or unloading. The Parking Exception stated the Auto Exclusion did not apply to parking an auto on Tarango’s premises. The main issues on appeal were whether the Parking Exception restored coverage otherwise precluded by the Auto Exclusion, and whether the district court prematurely decided Penn-America’s duty to indemnify. The appellate court answered yes to both.
On March 2, 2020, a truck driver employed by WS Excavation, LLC (“WS”), parked his tractor-trailer on Tarango’s property and proceeded to inspect and off-load heavy equipment. While operating the hydraulic lift, the tractor’s braking system disengaged. The tractor rolled back and struck the WS driver and his personal vehicle, resulting in his death and significant property damage. Notably, WS allegedly failed to properly maintain the tractor’s electronic and braking systems, and Tarango allegedly failed to maintain a level parking and loading facility compliant with industry standards and guidelines.
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Jeremy S. Macklin, Traub LiebermanMr. Macklin may be contacted at
jmacklin@tlsslaw.com
Close Enough Only Counts in Horseshoes and Hand Grenades
March 08, 2021 —
Garret Murai - California Construction Law BlogIn
State Farm General Insurance Company v. Oetiker, Inc., Case No. B302348 (December 18, 2020), a manufacturer sued in subrogation action under the Right to Repair Act almost got away. Almost.
The Oetiker Case
James and Jennifer Philson’s home was substantially completed, and a notice of completion was recorded, in 2004. In 2016, the Philsons tendered a claim to their homeowner’s insurance carrier, State Farm General Insurance Company, after their home experienced significant water damage due to a defective stainless steel ear clamp.
In 2018, after paying the Philson’s claim, State Farm filed a subrogation action against the manufacturer of the ear clamp, Oetiker, Inc. State Farm’s complaint, which included causes of action for negligence, strict products liability and breach of implied warranty, alleged that the home was “damaged by a water leak from the failure of a defective stainless steel ear claim on a water PEX fitting” and that the ear clamp was “defective when it left the control of [Oetiker].”
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Garret Murai, Nomos LLPMr. Murai may be contacted at
gmurai@nomosllp.com
California Pipeline Disaster Brings More Scandal for PG&E
September 17, 2014 —
Mark Chediak – BloombergA deadly pipeline explosion that shattered a California town four years ago continues to rip through the state agency weighing a record penalty for the disaster.
The president of the California Public Utilities Commission asked his chief of staff to resign and recused himself from the case after “inappropriate e-mail exchanges” with PG&E Corp. (PCG) raised questions about bias, according to a statement from the commission yesterday. The CPUC may decide within weeks whether to levy a proposed $1.4 billion penalty -- the biggest safety fine in the state’s history -- against PG&E for the 2010 explosion of a natural gas pipeline that killed eight people in San Bruno.
Commission President Michael Peevey, who has been accused by San Bruno officials and consumer advocates of being too close to the utility, said in the statement he would not take part in penalty deliberations to eliminate any appearance of impropriety. The move is a step toward regaining credibility for the CPUC after two years of political infighting has created an ongoing climate of scandal.
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Mark Chediak, BloombergMr. Chediak may be contacted at
mchediak@bloomberg.net
