Cambridge Massachusetts Building Expert Directory

A Court-Side Seat: A Poultry Defense, a Houston Highway and a CERCLA Consent Decree that Won’t Budge

March 22, 2021 — Anthony B. Cavender - Gravel2Gavel
February saw the usual array of significant environmental decisions and federal regulatory notices. THE FEDERAL COURTS U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Luminant Generation v. EPA The court will be grappling with a difficult venue case governed by the Clean Air Act (42 USC Section 7607(b)). In 2013, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit decided the case of Luminant Generation v. EPA (714 F. 3d 841), in which the court upheld the affirmative defenses that were made part of the Texas State Implementation Plan (SIP) and which applied to certain unpermitted emissions from regulated sources during periods of startup, shutdown or malfunction. These defenses were challenged in the Fifth Circuit and were rejected. On the national stage, EPA has been involved in litigation over these affirmative defenses and recently excluded from a “SIP Call” the Texas program, which was carved out. This EPA decision is being challenged in the DC Circuit (see Case number 20-1115),with the State of Texas arguing as an intervenor that any issues involving Texas belong in the Fifth Circuit, and not in the DC Circuit because the Act allows regional issues to be decided in the regional federal courts. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Anthony B. Cavender, Pillsbury
Mr. Cavender may be contacted at anthony.cavender@pillsburylaw.com

Freddie Mac Eases Mortgage Rules to Limit Putbacks

May 13, 2014 — Clea Benson and Jody Shenn - Bloomberg
Freddie Mac, which along with Fannie Mae has forced home lenders to buy back tens of billions of dollars of flawed mortgages, said the companies are loosening rules that made banks more cautious about extending credit. The government-backed companies will expand the pool of loans that become exempt from putback requests, Freddie Mac (FMCC) said in a memo to lenders today. Under the new rules, loans will typically be spared from such demands if borrowers make 34 of their first 36 scheduled monthly payments. Previously, borrowers needed to avoid delinquency for the first three years. Ms. Benson may be contacted at cbenson20@bloomberg.net; Ms. Shenn may be contacted at jshenn@bloomberg.net Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Clea Benson and Jody Shenn, Bloomberg

A Relatively Small Exception to Fraud and Contract Don’t Mix

April 01, 2015 — Christopher G. Hill – Construction Law Musings
Remember all of my posts about how fraud and contract claims don’t usually play well in litigation? Well, as always with the law, there are exceptions. For instance, a well plead Virginia Consumer Protection Act claim will survive a dismissal challenge. A recent opinion out of the Alexandria division of the U. S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia sets out another exception, namely so called fraudulent inducement. In XL Specialty Ins. Co. v. Truland et al, the Court considered the question of whether both a tort and contract claim can coexist in the same lawsuit when the tort claim is based upon the information provided to the plaintiff when that information proves false. As the courts of Virginia have held for years, only certain information and statements made pre-contract can be the basis for a fraud claim in the face of a contractual duty to perform. One type of statement that is not properly the subject of a fraud in the inducement type claim is sales talk or opinion. Such sales talk (for example claiming that your company is the best for the job) is not the subject of a fraud claim because it is not meant to be relied upon and that such talk is an opinion about future performance, not a false statement of present fact or intent. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Christopher G. Hill, Law Office of Christopher G. Hill, PC
Mr. Hill may be contacted at chrisghill@constructionlawva.com

Montana Court Finds Duty to Defend over Construction Defect Allegation

February 14, 2013 — CDJ STAFF
The U.S. District Court for Montana recently ruled on a case with underlying construction defect issues. Brian Margolies discussed Lukes v. Mid-Continent on the blog run by his firm, Traub Lieverman Straus & Shrewsberry LLP. In the construction defect case, the homeowner “alleged that the siding warped and pulled away from the house, which allowed for water intrusion and resulting exterior and interior damage.” Further, there were claims that “the insured or its subcontractor failed to install proper flashing, which also allowed for water intrusion.” The insured was Bernie Rubio, who had a general liability policy from Mid-Continent. Mid-Continent disclaimed coverage, citing sections of the business risk exclusions. The court did not find the clauses ambiguous, but concluded that they didn’t apply to the facts of the case. While the court concluded that Mid-Continent had a duty to defend, they did not determine if there was a duty to indemnify. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of

Federal Magistrate Judge Recommends Rescission of Policies

February 12, 2024 — Craig Rokuson - Traub Lieberman
In the recent case of Union Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. 142 Driggs LLC, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 220393, Magistrate Judge Lois Bloom of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York recommended granting the insurer's default judgment and holding that of three policies issued to 142 Driggs LLC ("Driggs") be rescinded ab initio. Driggs had represented on its insurance applications that it did not provide parking to anyone other than itself, tenants, and its guests at the subject insured premises. However, Union Mutual learned that Driggs had been renting out three garages to non-tenants. Second, Driggs represented that the mercantile square footage was around 1,000 square feet, when in actuality, it was larger than allowed under the policies. Union Mutual provided underwriting guidelines in connection with its default motion, which state that "parking provided for anyone other than the insured, tenants and their guests," presents an "unacceptable risk." The guidelines also state that answering yes to any "preliminary application questions (which presumably included those regarding mercantile square footage and parking) is an "unacceptable risk." The court held that these guidelines supported a finding that Driggs made material misrepresentation and that Union Mutual relied on these misrepresentations in issuing the policies. The court, as such, recommended that the policies at issue be rescinded from inception. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Craig Rokuson, Traub Lieberman
Mr. Rokuson may be contacted at crokuson@tlsslaw.com

What Counts as Adequate Opportunity to Cure?

June 13, 2022 — Christopher G. Hill - Construction Law Musings
qimono @ PixabayHere at Musings, we like to discuss (likely more than readers would like) the fact that in Virginia, the contract is king and its terms will be looked at carefully by the courts. One of those provisions that will be looked at carefully is the so-called “cure period.” The “cure period” is the time that a subcontractor has to fix any non-compliant construction after receiving notice of any deviation from the contract documents that must be fixed. In United States ex rel Allan Myers VA, Inc. v. Ocean Construction Services, Inc. the federal court for the Eastern District of Virginia examined what it means to grant a proper opportunity to cure. The Ocean Construction Services case arises from a contractual dispute between Allan Myers VA Inc. and Ocean Construction Services Inc., or OCS, involving renovation work performed in sections of Arlington National Cemetery. Presently before the court is Myers’ motion for partial summary judgment, arguing that the undisputed facts demonstrate that it was not provided with a three-day cure period, a contractual prerequisite to OCS terminating the subcontract for default. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of The Law Office of Christopher G. Hill
Mr. Hill may be contacted at chrisghill@constructionlawva.com

Background Owner of Property Cannot Be Compelled to Arbitrate Construction Defects

November 07, 2012 — CDJ STAFF
In Truppi v. Pasco Engineering, John Quattro sued Property Management Contractors, Inc. over construction defects in William Truppi’s home. All parties are named in the suit. The California Court of Appeals ruled that Property Management Contractors, Inc. (PMCI) could not compel Mr. Quattro to arbitration. The background of the case involves two houses built in Encinitas, California by PCMI: one for Mr. Truppi at 560 Neptune, and one for Mr. Quattro at 566 Neptune. Both contracts contained an arbitration provision. Mr. Quattro signed the contract for his residence and Mr. Truppi signed the other. Mr. Quattro then sued PCMI and its principal, William Gregory. Mr. Quattro claimed to be the true contracting party for the 560 Neptune residence and a third party beneficiary of the contract Mr. Truppi signed, and stated that PCMI was aware of this. PCMI in a demurrer stated that Quattro “had only a ‘prospective beneficial interest in the property upon its eventual sale or lease.’” Mr. Quattro amended his complaint to account for the issues raised by PCMI. The court rejected PCMI’s demurrer to the amended complaint. Finally, PCMI and Gregory asserted that Quattro was “not the real party in interest” and could not sue. PCMI continues to assert that Quattro lacks standing, but their attorney sent Quattro an e-mail stating, “While my client disputes that you are a party, and that you lack standing to assert the claim, to the extent you do so I believe you are obligated to proceed by way of arbitration.” The court did not cover the issue of Quattro’s standing in the case, only if he could be compelled to arbitration. The court affirmed the lower court’s finding that Quattro could not be compelled to arbitrate the construction defect claim as neither he nor Gregory signed the contract in an individual capacity. Further, the court noted that PCMI and Gregory “denied the existence of an agreement between themselves and Quattro on the 560 contract,” and cannot compel arbitration on a non-existent agreement. And while non-signatories can, in some situations be compelled to arbitrate, the court found that “these cases are inapplicable because here they seek to have the alleged third party beneficiary (Quattro) compelled by a nonsignatory (Gregory).” The arbitration clause in question “expressly limited its application to persons or entities that signed the 560 contract.” As Mr. Quattro was not a signatory to that agreement, the court found that he could not be held to its arbitration provision. Read the court decision
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Part I: Key Provisions of School Facility Construction & Design Contracts

May 16, 2018 — David R. Cook Jr. - Autry, Hall & Cook, LLP
We all expect our school construction projects will go smoothly, on time and under budget. But despite our best efforts, some projects will encounter speed bumps, detours or outright roadblocks. While there are many precautions a school facility manager may take, one of the best precautions is to have solid construction and design contracts. A good contract will account for the known risks and specify an outcome in favor of the school authority. School construction risks can be categorized into a few categories: performance risk, time risk, cost risk and political risk. Some risks are typical to all construction projects, while others are peculiar to the unique needs of school authorities. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of David R. Cook Jr., Autry, Hall & Cook, LLP
Mr. Cook may be contacted at cook@ahclaw.com

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