DC Circuit Upholds EPA’s Latest RCRA Recycling Rule
September 23, 2019 —
Anthony B. Cavender - Gravel2GavelOn July 2, 2019, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit decided the case of California Communities Against Toxics, et al. v. EPA. In this decision, the court rejected the latest petition to strike or vacate EPA’s 2018 revisions to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) hazardous waste recycling rules. In 1985, EPA promulgated a new regulatory definition of “solid waste,” which is the linchpin of the agency’s very stringent hazardous waste management rules. (See the rules located at 40 CFR Sections 260-268.) Unless a material is a “solid waste” as defined by the rules, it cannot also be a hazardous waste.
The 1985 rules grappled with the challenges posed by recycling practices, and attempted to distinguish between legitimate recycling which is not subject to hazardous waste regulation, and other more suspect forms of recycling. The rules are complex and replete with nuance. In doing so, EPA was adhering to RCRA’s statutory mandate that it develop appropriate rules to govern the treatment, storage and disposal of hazardous waste, while also promoting “properly conducted recycling and reuse.” The DC Circuit reviewed the 1985 rules in the seminal case of American Mining Congress v EPA, 824 F.2d 1177 (1987), (AMC) and stressed that only those materials that were truly discarded could be regulated as solid waste; for instance, those materials that were destined for immediate recycling or recovery in an ongoing production process were not discarded and hence were not solid waste. Over the years, the court has struggled to clarify the basic holding of AMC in numerous cases while EPA has frequently revised and amended the RCRA rules, and in particular the definition of solid waste, in an attempt to balance the policies mandated by the statute.
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Anthony B. Cavender, PillsburyMr. Cavender may be contacted at
anthony.cavender@pillsburylaw.com
Law Firm Fails to Survive Insurer's and Agent's Motions to Dismiss
May 08, 2023 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiInterpreting New Jersey law, the federal district court dismissed without prejudice the law firm's complaint against its insurer and agent. Law Office of Drew J. Bauman v. Hanover Ins. Co., 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31844 (D. N. J. Feb. 27, 2023).
The law firm had a professional liability policy issued by Hanover. The law firm was sued in the underlying case involving a real estate transaction. The law firm tendered the defense and indemnity of the underlying complaint, but coverage was denied. The law firm sued, contending Hanover breached the policy by refusing to abide by its obligations under the policy.
In the alternative, the law firm alleged that its agent, USI Insurance Services, LLC, was liable if the policy did not require Hanover to defend and indemnify in the underlying case. It was further alleged that USI was responsible for procuring coverage for the law firm and knew of its insurance needs. USI was negligent in securing a policy with inadequate coverage.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak HastertMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Distinguishing Hawaii Law, New Jersey Finds Anti-Assignment Clause Ineffective
March 22, 2017 —
Tred R. Eyerly – Insurance Law HawaiiThe New Jersey Supreme Court found that an anti-assignment provision could not be applied to bar a post-loss claim assignment. Givaudan Fragrances Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 2017 N.J. LEXIS 121 (N.J. Feb. 1, 2017). In reaching its decision, the court distinguished a decision from the Hawaii Supreme Court enforcing consent-to-assignment clauses and failing to recognize any post-loss exception to such clauses. See Del Monte Fresh Produce (Hawaii), Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 183 P.3d 734 (Haw. 2007).
Plaintiff Givaudan Fragrances Corporation (Fragrances) was sued for environmental contamination at a manufacturing site. A related corporate entity had operated the facility from the 1960s to 1990. Fragrances sought coverage under policies issued to its predecessor. The predecessor attempted to assign to Fragrances post-loss rights under the policies. The insurers resisted, claiming the predecessor was the named insured, not Fragrances, and that the insurers did not consent to an assignment of the predecessor's policies.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law HawaiiMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Contractual “Pay if Paid” and “Pay when Paid” Clauses? What is a California Construction Subcontractor to Do?
November 29, 2021 —
William L. Porter - Porter Law GroupThe Situation California Construction Subcontractors Face in Obtaining Payment:
California construction subcontractors find themselves faced with a significant payment issue every time they are asked to sign a subcontract on a major project. Invariably, the subcontract the prime contractor presents to the subcontractor for signature will contain a clause by which the prime contractor imposes a condition on payment from the prime contractor to the subcontractor. The condition will be either one or the other of two general types. Either the prime contractor will specify that it never has to pay the subcontractor if the prime contractor itself is not paid by the owner (a “pay-if-paid” clause), or the prime contractor will pay the subcontractor only after the prime contractor has first exhausted all its efforts to obtain payment from the owner through litigation, arbitration or otherwise, possibly delaying payment to subcontractors by months or even years (a “pay-when-paid” clause).
Goal of the Article:
The goal of this article is to draw a distinction between the pay-if-paid and pay-when-paid clauses, discuss the legality of these clauses in California, the problems these clauses create for subcontractors, advise the reader of helpful recent legal developments in this area of law, address the possibility of a further legislative remedy to address the issue, and discuss what the subcontractor might do to protect itself while awaiting a legislative remedy that may or may not ever arrive.
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William L. Porter, Porter Law GroupMr. Porter may be contacted at
bporter@porterlaw.com
Where Parched California Is Finding New Water Sources
June 13, 2022 —
Pam McFarland - Engineering News-RecordAs drought-plagued western states watch their water sources literally dry up, California is digging deeper to tap the most basic source of all: groundwater.
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Pam McFarland, Engineering News-Record
Ms. McFarland may be contacted at mcfarlandp@enr.com
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Colorado Court of Appeals Confirms Senior Living Communities as “Residential Properties” for Purposes of the Homeowner Protection Act
November 06, 2023 —
Hal Baker - Colorado Construction Litigation BlogThe Third Division of the Colorado Court of Appeals recently interpreted the Homeowner Protection Act of 2007 (the “HPA”) in Heights Healthcare v. BCER, 2023 COA 44, decided on May 25, 2023. The Court held that a senior living community that is located on a parcel zoned “commercial” or “mixed use” constitutes “residential property” that is protected by the HPA, regardless of the zoning designation.
The claims in Heights Healthcare arose from a contract between BCER and Heights Healthcare for BCER to provide mechanical and electrical services relating to the installation of Packaged Terminal Air Conditioner units at the senior living community. The contract between the parties included a limitation of liability clause, limiting BCER’s liability to a total of $22,500 for the total cost of services rendered. After the installation, Heights Healthcare discovered that the air conditioner units were malfunctioning, causing too few of the eighty-four units to run and tripping the breaker—shutting down the entire system—when the outdoor temperature dropped too low. Following the discovery of the malfunction, Heights Healthcare filed suit against BCER for breach of contract under the Construction Defect Action Reform Act (“CDARA”).
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Hal Baker, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLCMr. Baker may be contacted at
baker@hhmrlaw.com
Be Careful With Construction Fraud Allegations
April 06, 2016 —
Christopher G. Hill – Construction Law MusingsHere at Construction Law Musings we have discussed the intersection of contracts, construction and fraud on several occasions. We’ve even discussed how such fraud can bleed over from the civil to the criminal.
Recently, the Virginia Supreme Court weighed in again on the question of construction fraud and criminal allegations. In O’Connor v. Tice, the Court discussed a malicious prosecution action brought by a contractor against owners of a commercial building. In O’Connor, the owners and the contractor got into a disagreement over alleged damage to the roof of the owners’ building and who was responsible. In response to this disagreement, the owners contacted the local sheriff’s office, accusing the contractor of construction fraud, and then wrote a “15 day letter” to the contractor outlining the criminal consequences should he fail to pay the damages sought in the owners civil lawsuit. Subsequently, a criminal warrant was issued against the contractor based solely upon the word of the owners. This last occurred at the insistence of the owners (who did not inform the sheriff’s deputy or the Commonwealth Attorney that they’d had this conversation or that the contractor had partially performed) after they discussed the matter with the contractor’s attorney and were informed that any claim that they may have had was civil in nature.
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Christopher G. Hill, Construction Law MusingsMr. Hill may be contacted at
chrisghill@constructionlawva.com
Carrier Has Duty to Defend Claim for Active Malfunction of Product
October 19, 2020 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiRejecting that the underlying claim was based solely on faulty workmanship, the Third Circuit held the insurer had a duty to defend allegations of a malfunctioning product. Nautilus Ins. Co. v. 200 Christina Street Partners LLC, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 22118 (3d Cir. July 16, 2020).
The insureds were sued by homeowners in two separate suits alleging defects in the construction of their homes. Nautilus defended under a reservation of rights. Nautilus filed suit in District Court and moved for judgment on the pleadings. The District Court denied the motion, finding Nautilus had a duty to defend because the underlying claims sufficiently alleged product--related tort clams that could fall within the scope of coverage under the relevant policies.
The Third Circuit affirmed. There was a distinction between a claim of faulty workmanship, for which the insurer did not have a duty to defend, and a claim of "active malfunction" of a product, for which an insurer did have such a duty. An active malfunction was sufficiently fortuitous as to constitute an "occurrence."
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Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak HastertMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com