Superior Court Of Pennsylvania Holds That CASPA Does Not Allow For Individual Claims Against A Property Owner’s Principals Or Shareholders
January 07, 2015 —
William J. Taylor and Michael Jervis – White and Williams LLPIn Scungio Borst Assocs. v. 410 Shurs Lane Developers, LLC, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania held that an individual principal/shareholder of a property owner could not be held personally liable as an “agent of the owner” for unpaid invoices, penalties, and attorneys fees under the Pennsylvania Contractor and Subcontractor Payment Act (CASPA), 73 P.S. §§ 501-516, even though the property owner itself had failed to make payments allegedly due under a construction contract.
CASPA is a Pennsylvania statute which is designed to protect contractors and subcontractors from nonpayment and which, to that end, establishes rules and deadlines for payment under construction contracts between property owners, contractors, and subcontractors. An owner or contractor who does not adhere to the Act’s payment requirements is subject to the imposition of interest, penalties, and attorneys’ fees. In this recent case, the property owner, a limited liability company, had retained the plaintiff contractor to perform construction services on a condominium project. Upon completion of the work, the contractor was not paid approximately $1.5 million that it was owed under the contract. The contractor filed suit under CASPA to obtain the payment it was owed plus interest, penalties and fees, and named both the property owner and its individual principal as defendants. The trial court granted summary judgment to the individual principal on all claims asserted against him, and the contractor appealed, arguing that CASPA allows for claims against both a property owner and its principal when the principal is an “agent of the owner acting with the owner’s authority.”
Reprinted courtesy of
Michael Jervis, White and Williams LLP and
William J. Taylor, White and Williams LLP
Mr. Jervis may be contacted at jervism@whiteandwilliams.com; Mr. Taylor may be contacted at taylorw@whiteandwilliams.com
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Real Property Alert: Recording Notice of Default as Trustee Before Being Formally Made the Trustee Does Not Make Foreclosure Sale Void
February 18, 2015 —
Krsto Mijanovic and Annette F. Mijanovic – Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLPIn Ram, et al. v. OneWest Bank, FSB, et al. (filed 2/6/15, No. A139055), the California Court of Appeal held that a nonjudicial foreclosure sale is not void merely because the notice of default was recorded by an entity who had not yet been substituted as trustee. The court also held that because the sale was voidable, rather than void, the plaintiffs were required to allege an ability and willingness to tender their debt in addition to alleging that they were prejudiced by the irregularity in the foreclosure process.
Plaintiffs were borrowers who purchased a home subject to a deed of trust. After they defaulted on their loan, nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings were initiated, and the beneficiary of the deed of trust, OneWest Bank, FSB ("OneWest"), purchased the property at the foreclosure sale. Plaintiffs sued OneWest and other entities for wrongful foreclosure, alleging that the sale was void because the entity identified as the trustee on the notice of default, Aztec Foreclosure Corporation ("Aztec"), had not been formally substituted as trustee until after the notice of default was recorded. The trial court sustained OneWest's demurrer and plaintiff appealed.
Reprinted courtesy of
Krsto Mijanovic, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and
Annette F. Mijanovic, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
Mr. Mijanovic may be contacted at kmijanovic@hbblaw.com
Ms. Mijanovic may be contacted at amijanovic@hbblaw.com
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The Importance of Engaging Design Professional Experts Early, with a Focus on Massachusetts Law
June 27, 2022 —
Jay Gregory - Gordon & Rees Construction Law BlogIn any Massachusetts case alleging negligence against a design professional, an expert witness on the topic of liability is a critical, early consideration. Given the expense of expert witnesses, counsel representing design professionals are wise to evaluate (1) the need for an expert, (2) the timing of the engagement of an expert, and (3) the scope of the expert’s services.
To begin, not every allegation of negligence against a design professional necessitates an expert opinion. “The test for determining whether a particular a particular matter is a proper one for expert testimony is whether the testimony will assist the jury in understanding issues of fact beyond their common experience.” Herbert A. Sullivan, Inc. v. Utica Mutual Insurance Co., 439 Mass. 387, 402 (2003) (addressing duties of an insurer). For instance, in its ruling in Parent v. Stone & Webster Engineering Corp., the Massachusetts Supreme Court noted no expert would be necessary to prove professional negligence where an electrician was injured by a mislabeled distribution box carrying 2,300 volts. 408 Mass. 108 (1990). It is reasonable to expect lay jurors to comprehend the duty of an electrician to properly label a distribution box carrying potentially fatal quantities of voltage. To the extent liability is readily recognizable to the average juror (i.e. “within the ken of the average juror”), significant cost savings are achievable by forgoing the use of an expert witness. That, however, is the exception.
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Jay S. Gregory, Gordon Rees Scully MansukhaniMr. Gregory may be contacted at
jgregory@grsm.com
Michael Baker Intl. Settles Federal Pay Bias Allegations
February 26, 2024 —
James Leggate - Engineering News-RecordMichael Baker International Inc. agreed to pay $122,299 in back wages as part of an agreement with the U.S. Dept. of Labor to resolve allegations that the engineer-consultant paid women in four job titles less than their male counterparts.
Reprinted courtesy of
James Leggate, Engineering News-Record
Mr. Leggate may be contacted at leggatej@enr.com
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Ten Firm Members Recognized as Super Lawyers or Rising Stars
July 13, 2017 —
Ceslie Blass - Ahlers & Cressman PLLCWhile we avoid using this blog as a platform for self-promotion, we recently received share-worthy distinctions, which both flatter and humble us. We invite you, our loyal readers, to celebrate in our success, which in great measure is due to you.
John P. Ahlers, one of the firm's founding partners, was ranked third overall across all practicing industries in Washington 2017 Super Lawyers and founding partner Paul R. Cressman, Jr. was ranked in the Top 100. The following other firm members were also recognized as Super Lawyers: Founding partner Scott R. Sleight, Bruce A. Cohen (Partner), Brett M. Hill (Partner), and Lawrence Glosser (Partner). In addition, Ryan W. Sternoff (Partner), James R. Lynch (Partner), Tymon Berger (Associate), and Lindsay (Taft) Watkins (Associate) were selected as Super Lawyers Rising Stars. Over half of the firm's lawyers received Super Lawyers distinction.
Super Lawyers selects attorneys using a patented multiphase selection process. Peer nominations and evaluations are combined with third party research. Each attorney candidate is evaluated on 12 indicators of peer recognition and professional achievement. Only five percent of the total lawyers in Washington State are selected for the honor of Super Lawyers and no more than 2.5 percent are selected for the honor of Super Lawyers Rising Stars.
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Ceslie Blass, Ahlers & Cressman PLLCMs. Blass may be contacted at
cblass@ac-lawyers.com
Court Rules on a Long List of Motions in Illinois National Insurance Co v Nordic PCL
May 10, 2012 —
CDJ STAFFThe case Illinois National Insurance Co. v Nordic PCL, et al. “involves a dispute about whether insurance benefits are available to a general contractor who built structures that allegedly have construction defects. Plaintiffs Illinois National Insurance Company (‘Illinois National’) and National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA (‘National Union’) (collectively, the ‘Insurers’), commenced this action for declaratory relief against Defendant Nordic PCL Construction, Inc., f/k/a Nordic Construction, Ltd. ("Nordic"), on August 23, 2011.”
The court was asked to rule on a long list of motions: “Counterclaim Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice in Support of Their (1) Motion to Dismiss the Counterclaim and (2) Motion to Strike Portions of the Counterclaim, ECF No. 16 (‘Request for Judicial Notice’); Counterclaim Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim Filed October 24, 2011, ECF No. 14 (‘Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim’); Counterclaim Defendants’ Motion to Strike Portions of the Counterclaim Filed October 24, 2011, ECF No. 15 (‘Motion to Strike’); Third-Party Defendant Marsh USA, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Stay Proceedings in Favor of Pending State Action, ECF No. 33 (‘Marsh’s Motion To Dismiss Or Stay’); Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff Nordic PCL Construction, Inc., f/k/a Nordic Construction Ltd.’s Substantive Joinder to Third-Party Defendant Marsh USA Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Stay Proceedings in Favor of Pending State Action, ECF No. 36 (‘Nordic’s Joinder’); and Third-Party Defendant Marsh USA, Inc.’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on Counts V and VI of Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff Nordic PCL Construction, Inc.’s Third-Party Complaint, ECF No. 29 (‘Marsh’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings’).”
In result, the court reached the following decisions: “The court GRANTS IN RELEVANT PART the Insurers’ Request for Judicial Notice to the extent it covers matters relevant to these motions; GRANTS IN PART the Insurers’ Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim, but gives Nordic leave to amend the Counterclaim in certain respects; DENIES the Insurers’ Motion to Strike; DENIES Marsh’s Motion To Dismiss Or Stay and Nordic’s Joinder; and GRANTS Marsh’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.”
The court provides a bit of background on the case: “This action arises out of alleged construction defects involving two projects on which Nordic acted as the general contractor. Nordic is a defendant in a pending state court action with respect to one of the projects and says it spent more than $400,000 on repairs with respect to the other project. Nordic tendered the defense of the pending state court action to the Insurers and sought reimbursement of the cost of repairs already performed. The Insurers responded by filing this action to determine their rights under the insurance policies issued to Nordic.”
Furthermore, the court presented a brief procedural history: “The Insurers commenced this declaratory action in this court on August 23, 2011. The Complaint asserts two claims, one seeking a declaration that the Insurers have no duty to provide a defense or indemnification regarding the Safeway Action, the other seeking such a declaration regarding the Moanalua Claims. Along with its Answer, Nordic filed a Counterclaim against the Insurers. The Counterclaim asserts breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, misrepresentations and omissions of material fact, and bad faith, and seeks declaratory relief against the Insurers.”
The procedural history continues: “Nordic also filed a Third-Party Complaint against Marsh, the broker that had procured the Policies from the Insurers for Nordic. Nordic alleges that it reasonably believed that the Policies would provide completed operations insurance coverage for the types of construction defects alleged in the Safeway Action and Moanalua Claims. The Third-Party Complaint asserts breach of contract, negligence, promissory estoppel, breach of fiduciary duties, implied indemnity, and contribution and equitable subrogation.”
In conclusion, “The court GRANTS IN RELEVANT PART the Insurers’ Request for Judicial Notice. With regard to the Insurers’ Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim, the court GRANTS the motion as to Count I (breach of contract), Count II (duty of good faith and fair dealing), Count III (fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation), the portion of Count IV (bad faith) premised on fraud, and Count IV (declaratory relief). The court DENIES the motion as to Count IV (bad faith) that is not premised on fraud. Except with respect to the "occurrence" issue, which the court disposes of here on the merits, and Count V, which concerns only a form of relief, Nordic is given leave to amend its Counterclaim within three weeks of the date of this order. The court DENIES the Insurers’ Motion to Strike, DENIES Marsh’s Motion to Dismiss or Stay and Nordic’s Joinder, and GRANTS Marsh’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings with respect to Counts V and VI of the Third-Party Complaint.”
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Developer’s Fraudulent Statements Are His Responsibility Alone in Construction Defect Case
February 10, 2012 —
CDJ STAFFThe Texas Court of Appeals ruled on December 21 in the case of Helm v Kingston, a construction defect case. After purchasing what was described as “an extremely well-built” two-bedroom townhouse, Mr. Kingston made complaints of construction defects. Greenway Development did not repair the defects to Kingston’s satisfaction, and he filed notice of suit. In his suit, he claimed that GDI and its president, John Helm, had committed fraud and negligent misrepresentation. Kingston claimed that Helm “fraudulently induced Kingston to believe that the townhouse evidenced the highest quality of workmanship when in fact the quality of workmanship was atrocious.” Helms brought a counterclaim that Kingston’s suit was frivolous.
About four years after Kingston purchased the townhome, the suit proceeded to trial. The trial court determined that Helm was not “liable in his individual capacity,” but this was reversed at appeal.
A second trial was held ten years later on the question of whether Kingston’s unit was a townhome or an apartment. A jury found that Helm “engaged in a false, misleading or deceptive act or practice that Kingston relied on to his detriment.” Kingston was awarded $75,862.29 and an additional $95,000 in attorney fees by the jury. Helms made an unsuccessful appeal to the Appeals Court, after which Kingston was awarded an additional $10,000. Helms then made an unsuccessful appeal to the Texas Supreme Court, which lead to an additional $3,000 for Kingston. There was also a verdict of $48,770.09 in pre-judgment interest and “five percent post-judgment interest accruing from the date of the judgment until the time the judgment is paid. Helm appealed.
In his appeal, Helm raised seven issues, which the court reorganized into five Kingston raised one issue on cross-appeal.
Helms’ first claim was that Kingston “failed to satisfy the requirement of” Texas’s Residential Construction Liability Act and that by not filing under the RCLA, Kingston’s fraud and misrepresentation claims were preempted. Further Helms claimed that the RCLA limited Kingston’s damages. The court rejected this, as the RCLA deals with complaints made to a contractor and not only did Helm fail to “conclusively establish” his “status as a ‘contractor’ under the statutory definition,” Helm testified that he was “not a contactor” at the pre-trial hearing.
Helms’s second claim was that Kingston’s later claim of a misconstructed firewall should be barred, claiming that Kingston “‘had knowledge of a defect in the firewall’ as early as 1997 but did not assert them until 2007.” The court rejected this because Kingston’s claim was that “Helm ‘fraudulently induced Kingston to believe that the townhouse evidenced the highest quality of workmanship when in fact the quality of the workmanship was atrocious.’”
Helms also challenged whether his statements that the residence was of “good quality” constituted fraud and misrepresentation under Texas’s Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act. The court concluded that Helm was in a position to make knowledgeable statements and further that “residential housing units are not artistic works for which quality is inherently a matter of subjective judgment.” Helm also claimed that Kingston could have avoided certain repair expenses through the “exercise of reasonable care.” Helms argued that the repairs could have been made for $6,400. The court disagreed, as these claims were cited only to invoke the DTPA, and that later petitions established additional defects.
Helms’s next claim was that he was not allowed to designate responsible third parties. The court rejected this because there GDI represented matters concerning the residence only through Helm’s statements. The court noted that “Helm is correct that?third parties may be liable for fraud if they ‘participated in the fraudulent transactions and reaped the benefits,’” but they note that “Helm never specifically alleged that GDI or CREIC participated in Helm’s alleged fraudulent transactions.
The final issue in the decision was about court costs, and here the court denied claims on both sides. Helm argued that the award of legal fees were excessive, as they exceeded the actual damages. The court noted that they “may not substitute our judgment for that of the jury,” and also that “the ratio between the actual damages awarded and the attorney’s fees is not a factor that determines the reasonableness of the fees.” But the court also rejected Kingston’s claim for post-judgment interest on $10,312.30 that Helm had deposited in the trial court’s registry. The court noted that the monies were to be paid out upon final judgment, but the mandate did not include any reference to interest.
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Have the Feds Taken Over Arbitration?
September 25, 2023 —
Christopher G. Hill - Construction Law MusingsAll of us in construction have run into mandatory arbitration clauses in our contracts. These clauses are more or less desirable based upon the size of project and other factors that will provide a topic for another post here at Musings or in my class at Solo Practice University (and likely both).
In drafting and considering the usefulness of these clauses, make sure that you keep in mind that the Federal Arbitration Act applies to actions in federal court. In short, the FAA gives parties to a contract containing an arbitration clause the absolute right to a stay of a law suit pending arbitration.
While this seems obvious, a recent U. S. Supreme Court decision expanded the universe of people that can demand such a stay. In Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, et. al., the Court stated that any person who is allowed to enforce a contract under state law can obtain such a stay. In short, if a person can make an argument that they have some sort of right to enforce a contract’s terms, that person can get a stay, at least until a court says otherwise.
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The Law Office of Christopher G. HillMr. Hill may be contacted at
chrisghill@constructionlawva.com
