High-Rise Condominium Construction Design Defects, A Maryland Construction Lawyer’s Perspective
July 15, 2015 —
Nicholas D. Cowie – Maryland Condo Construction Defect Law BlogThe increased migration from suburbs to metropolitan areas has accompanied an increase in high-rise construction, including the development of high-rise condominium buildings. The resulting metamorphosis of urban skylines, such as seen from Maryland’s Baltimore harbor, has also brought with it many complex construction law and construction litigation issues. Our law firm’s Maryland condominium construction law practice is increasingly called upon to resolve disputes involving high-rise condominium construction design defects between condominium associations, developers, contractors, builders, and design professionals arising out of the construction of high-rise buildings.
A condominium building is typically considered to be a high-rise when it is approximately seven or more stories above grade according to the National Fire Protection Association Life Safety Code, which defines a high-rise as being 75 feet (23 meters) measured from the lowest level accessible to fire department vehicles up to the floor level of the highest occupiable story. High-rise buildings may be residential (e.g., condominiums or multifamily apartment buildings), commercial (e.g., commercial office or retail space), or mixed-use structures. A mixed-use high-rise development might contain retail space, office space, a parking garage, apartments, and condominiums, each owned or maintained by separate entities and each sharing common expenses for the building.
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Nicholas D. Cowie, Cowie & Mott, P.A.Mr. Cowie may be contacted at
ndc@cowiemott.com
Insurer Not Required to Show Prejudice from an Insured’s Late Notice When the Parties Contract for a Specific Reporting Period
September 09, 2019 —
Christopher Raney - Gordon & Rees Insurance Coverage Law BlogThe Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals recently affirmed an order granting summary judgment in favor of the Firm’s insurer client on an issue of first impression in Texas. The issue before the trial court was whether, under Texas law, an insurer is required to demonstrate prejudice resulting from an insured’s failure to comply with an agreed term set in an endorsement to the parties’ insurance contract establishing a specific time limit for an insured to give the insurer notice of a claim.
The case involved alleged damage to an insured’s commercial property from a hailstorm. The insured did not report the alleged loss to its insurer until approximately 17 months after the date of loss. The insurer denied the claim based on a one-year notice requirement in a policy endorsement. The Texas Windstorm or Hail Loss Conditions Amendment Endorsement stated that:
In addition to your obligation to provide us with prompt notice of loss or damage, with respect to any claim where notice of the claim is reported to us more than one year after the reported date of loss or damage, this policy shall not provide coverage for such claims.
The insured sued the insurer in Houston federal court, alleging causes of action for breach of contract and violations of the Texas Insurance Code. The insured argued the insurer was required to show prejudice from the insured’s late notice; the insurer argued that a showing of prejudice was not required. The trial court recognized that this issue had not been decided by the Texas Supreme Court of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.
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Christopher Raney, Gordon & Rees Scully MansukhaniMr. Raney may be contacted at
craney@grsm.com
Arbitration: For Whom the Statute of Limitations Does Not Toll in Pennsylvania
June 03, 2019 —
Gus Sara - The Subrogation StrategistIn Morse v. Fisher Asset Management, LLC, 2019 Pa. Super. 78, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania considered whether the plaintiff’s action was stayed when the trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint after sustaining the defendants’ preliminary objections seeking enforcement of an arbitration clause in the contract at issue. The Superior Court—distinguishing between a defendant who files a motion to compel arbitration and a defendant who files preliminary objections based on an arbitration clause—held that, in the latter scenario, if the defendant’s preliminary objections are sustained, the statute of limitations is not tolled. This case establishes that, in Pennsylvania, plaintiffs seeking to defeat a challenge to a lawsuit based on a purported agreement to arbitrate need to pay close attention to the type of motion the defendant files to defeat the plaintiff’s lawsuit.
In Morse, the plaintiff entered into a contract with Fisher Asset Management (Fisher) in 2008 for investment-advisor services. The contract included a provision stating that any dispute, claim or controversy arising out of the agreement between the parties shall be determined by arbitration. In June 2009, the plaintiff filed a complaint against Fisher and two of its employees in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, alleging breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, negligence, and other claims. The defendants filed preliminary objections to the complaint seeking dismissal on grounds that the contract between the plaintiff and Fisher required that the dispute be determined by arbitration. The court sustained the preliminary objections and dismissed the complaint. The plaintiff did not appeal the court’s ruling.
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Gus Sara, White and WilliamsMr. Sara may be contacted at
sarag@whiteandwilliams.com
Court Strikes Expert Opinion That Surety Acted as a “De Facto Contractor”
November 27, 2023 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesDesignating and admitting experts is a vital component of any construction dispute. Many construction disputes require experts. Many construction disputes can only be won with the role of an expert. Thus, experts and construction disputes go hand-in-hand. No doubt about it! Time needs to be spent on developing the right expert opinions to support your burden of proof. This means you want to designate the right expert that can credibly and reliably render an expert opinion.
It is common for one party to move to strike the testimony and expert opinions of another party. This is referred to as a Daubert motion. Sometimes the motion is about gamesmanship. Sometimes it is to see how the judge rules on the issue. Sometimes there is a legitimate reason associated with the expert opinion. And, sometimes, it is a combination of the above. Regardless of the reason, parties know the weight expert opinions can have and, therefore, treat the opinions seriously prompting the Daubert motion.
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David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
First-Party Statutory Bad Faith – 60 Days to Cure Means 60 Days to Cure
October 19, 2020 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesIn a first party bad-faith lawsuit, such as a bad faith claim against an insured’s property insurer, there are three requirements that must be met before the bad faith lawsuit is filed: “‘(1) determination of the insurer’s liability for coverage; (2) determination of the extent of the insured’s damages; and (3) the required notice must be filed under section 624.155(3)(a).’” Fortune v. First Protective Ins. Co., 45 Fla. L. Weekly D2092a (Fla. 2d DCA 2020) (citation omitted).
The third requirement is for the insured to file a Civil Remedy Notice (known as a “CRN”) as a condition precedent to filing a statutory bad faith lawsuit giving the insurer 60 days’ notice of the bad faith violation and to cure the violation, i.e., pay the claim if the violation is payment.
A very common bad faith payment violation is the assertion that the insurer did NOT attempt “in good faith to settle claims when, under the circumstances, it could and should have done so, had it acted fairly and honestly towards its insured and with due regard for his or her interests.” Fla. Stat. s. 624.155(1)(b)(1).
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David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
Nine ACS Lawyers Recognized as Super Lawyers
August 15, 2022 —
Cassidy Ingram - Ahlers Cressman & SleightACS is very honored and pleased to announce nine members of our firm were awarded the distinction of top attorneys in Washington. Our blog articles usually cover Construction Legal News, but we feel this is a newsworthy accolade to be shared with friends and clients.
To become candidates to receiving the Super Lawyer nomination, lawyers are nominated by a peer or identified by research. After completing this first step in the process, Super Lawyers’ research department analyzes 12 indicators, such as experience, honors/awards, verdicts/settlements, and others. As for the third step, there is a peer evaluation by practice area. Finally, for step four, candidates are grouped into four firm-size categories. In other words, solo and small firm lawyers are compared only with other solo and small firm lawyers, and large firm lawyers are compared with other large firm lawyers. The process is very selective and only 5 percent of the total lawyers in Washington are nominated as Super Lawyers.
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Cassidy Ingram, Ahlers Cressman & SleightMs. Ingram may be contacted at
cassidy.ingram@acslawyers.com
Dispute Over Exhaustion of Primary Policy
May 20, 2015 —
Tred R. Eyerly – Insurance Law HawaiiIn a dispute between the excess and primary carriers, the Fifth Circuit determined the primary policy was exhausted, triggering coverage under the excess policy. Amerisure Mut. Ins. Co. v. Arch Spec. Ins. Co., 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 6627 (5th Cir. April 21, 2015).
Amerisure issued a CGL policy to Admiral Glass & Mirror Co. The policy provided excess over any coverage under a controlled insurance program policy. Arch issued an Owner Controlled Insurance Program (OCIP) policy to Endeavor Highrise, LP and to its contrators and subcontractors for bodily injury and property damage arising out of the construction of the Endeavor Highrise. Admiral was a subcontractor insured under the OCIP.
The OCIP had combined bodily injury and property damage limits of $2,000,000 per occurrence, a general aggregate limit of $2,000,000 and a products-completed operations aggregate limit of $2,000,000. The OCIP contained a Supplementary Payments provision which provided that Arch would pay "[a]ll expenses we incur" in connection with any covered claim, and that "[t]hese payments will not reduce the limits of insurance." Endorsement 16, however, expressly deleted and replaced this statement with: "[supplementary payments] will reduce the limits of insurance." The OCIP also provided that Arch's duty to defend ended "when we have used up the applicable limit of insurance in the payment of judgments or settlements."
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Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law HawaiiMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
SCOTUS, Having Received Views of Solicitor General, Will Decide Whether CWA Regulates Indirect Discharge of Pollutants Into Navigable Water Via Groundwater
April 17, 2019 —
Anthony B. Cavender - Gravel2GavelPrior to deciding whether to review an important February 1, 2018, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decision involving the jurisdictional reach of the Clean Water Act (CWA), Hawai’i Wildlife Fund, et al., v. County of Maui, the Supreme Court asked the Solicitor General for the views of the U.S. on the holdings of this case and the April 12, 2018 U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit decision, Upstate Forever, et al., v. Kinder Morgan Energy Partners, L.P., et al.
On February 19, the Supreme Court confirmed that certiorari was granted to Question 1 presented by the Petition,
Whether the CWA requires a permit when pollutants originate from a point source but are conveyed to navigable waters by a nonpoint source, such as groundwater. (33 U.S.C. § 1362 (12)
In County of Maui , the Ninth Circuit held that indirect discharges to navigable waters through groundwater may be subject to the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) CWA the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permitting authority, and in Kinder Morgan, the Fourth Circuit held that such an indirect discharge may be subject to regulation under the CWA when there is a direct hydrological connection between the discharge into groundwater and the direct discharge into navigable, surface waters.
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Anthony B. Cavender, PillsburyMr. Cavender may be contacted at
anthony.cavender@pillsburylaw.com
