Ohio Court of Appeals Affirms Judgment in Landis v. Fannin Builders
April 20, 2011 —
Beverley BevenFlorez CDJ STAFFThe Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment in Landis v. William Fannin Builders. Landis contracted Fannin Builders to build their home. The case involved staining problems on the T1-11 siding chosen by the plaintiffs.
After a year and a half of discussion on how to resolve the problem of uneven staining on the siding, Landis filed suit “against Fannin Builders, alleging claims for breach of contract, breach of the express limited warranty, and violation of the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act (“OCSPA”). Fannin Builders, in turn, filed a third-party complaint against 84 Lumber, alleging claims for breach of contract and indemnification. With the trial court’s leave, Fannin Builders also later amended its answer to add a counterclaim against appellees for breach of contract and unjust enrichment. In the counterclaim, Fannin Builders alleged that appellees still owed it $3,908.98 for the construction of appellees’ home.”
“In its decision, the trial court found in appellees’ favor on their breach of contract claim and against appellees on their claims for breach of the express limited warranty and violation of the OCSPA. Additionally, the trial court found in Fannin Builders’ favor on its counterclaim for breach of contract and against Fannin Builders on its third-party claims for breach of contract and indemnity. The trial court determined that appellees’ damages amounted to $66,906.24, and after setting off the $3,908.98 that appellees owed Fannin Builders under the construction contract, the trial court awarded appellees $62,997.26. The trial court reduced its decision to judgment on May 18, 2010.”
Fannin Builders appealed this judgment and assigned the following errors:
[1.] The Trial Court Erred as a Matter of Law by Concluding that Appellant Breached its Contract with Appellees when it provided a Semi-Transparent Oil-Based Stain that Simply did not Meet their Approval.
[a.] The Contract does not Contain a Satisfaction Clause.
[b.] Even if the Court Implies a Satisfaction Clause, the Court Should Apply an Objective Standard.
[2.] The Trial Court Erred as a Matter of Law by Failing to Consider Appellant’s Right to Cure.
[3.] The Trial Court committed Reversible Error by not Assessing Damages Using “Diminished Value Standard,” and by Creating a Remedy that Constitutes Economic Waste.
[4.] The Trial Court Erred as a Matter of Law by Concluding that Appellant is Barred from Seeking Indemnification When 84 [Lumber] Never Fulfilled its Obligations Pursuant to the Settlement Agreement Entered on August 2, 2005.
In response to the first assigned error, the Court of Appeals stated: “Because the failure to provide siding of a uniform color, not appellees’ displeasure, breached the contract, we reject Fannin Builders’ contention that the trial court implied a satisfaction clause into the contract and found a breach of that clause. Accordingly, we overrule Fannin Builders’ first assignment of error.”
The Court of Appeals overruled the second assignment of error and provided the following reasoning: “Although Fannin Builders depends upon a term of the limited warranty for its right to cure, the trial court concluded that no breach of the limited warranty occurred. Fannin Builders breached the duty of workmanlike conduct implicit in the construction contract, not the limited warranty requiring it to satisfy the BIA’s Quality Standards. Consequently, the limited warranty does not apply to this case, and thus, it does not prevent appellees’ recovery of damages.”
The Appeals Court found “the trial court’s award of damages” was “both reasonable and supported by competent, credible evidence,” and therefore concluded “that the trial court did not err in setting appellees’ damages at $62,997.26.” The Fannin Builders third assignment of error was overruled.
The fourth and final assignment of error was also overruled by the Court of Appeals. “While Fannin Builders correctly asserts that 84 Lumber never installed the replacement siding, it ignores the fact that it ordered 84 Lumber to remove the replacement siding from appellees’ property. Thus, Fannin Builders precluded 84 Lumber from completely performing under the August 2, 2005 letter agreement. […] Consequently, Fannin Builders cannot now claim that the letter agreement is unenforceable or that it is entitled to indemnification from 84 Lumber. Because Fannin Builders assumed all liability for the defective siding in the letter agreement, it is responsible for appellees’ damages.”
James A. Zitesman, Columbus, Ohio Business Attorney, compared the case to Jones v. Centex (Ohio App. 2010), which had a different verdict:
“The common thread is the implied warranty of good workmanship. In the Jones case, the Court found that the buyers had in fact waived all implied warranties, including the implied warranty of good workmanship. In the contract between Jones and Centex, the builder stated that it “…would not sell the property to Purchasers without this waiver.” Probably should have been a sign to the buyers.
In the Landis case, the Court stated, “Contracts for the future construction of a residence include a duty, implied by law, that the builder must perform its work in a workmanlike manner.” The Court gave significant weight to the concept of the implied warranty of good workmanship. The builder relied upon the BIA Warranty which limits builders’ liability and exposure to legal issues. The trial court concluded there was no breach of the limited warranty, rather the builder “breached the duty of workmanlike conduct implicit in the construction contract, not the limited warranty requiring it to satisfy the BIAs Quality Standards.”
The Supreme Court of Ohio has accepted the Jones v. Centex Homes case for review.
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Real Estate & Construction News Roundup (10/04/23) – NFL Star Gets into Real Estate, DOJ Focuses on “Buyer-Broker Commissions”, and the Auto Workers’ Strike Continues
November 13, 2023 —
Pillsbury's Construction & Real Estate Law Team - Gravel2Gavel Construction & Real Estate Law BlogIn our latest roundup, seller impersonation fraud becomes an issue in the United States, major retailers are closing over 3,000 stores nationwide, the Tampa Rays are set to construct a new $1.3 billion stadium, and more!
- NFL star Tyler Lockett is preparing for his life and career after football by becoming a real estate broker in both Washington state and Texas. (Brady Henderson, ESPN)
- Seller impersonation fraud has become a major scam in the United States with 73% of real estate firms reporting an increase in these schemes since the beginning of the year. (Diane Tomb, Fortune)
- “Buyer-broker commissions” are a focus for the U.S. Justice Department as they have filed a “statement of interest” in one case in Massachusetts while there are several other pending lawsuits in U.S. courts. (Mike Scarcella, Reuters)
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Pillsbury's Construction & Real Estate Law Team
New Jersey Firm’s Fee Action Tossed for not Filing Substitution of Counsel
August 13, 2014 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFEven though their client had terminated their services by email, a “New Jersey appeals court has tossed out a firm’s fee action” finding that the firm had “remained counsel of record because it did not file a substitution of counsel until almost a year later,” the New Jersey Law Journal reported.
In Arturi, D’Argenio, Guagliardi & Meliti v. Sadej, Jesse and Carla Sadej had retained the firm, Arturi, D’Argenio, Guagliardi & Meliti, “to defend them in the underlying land use litigation brought in 2002 by the borough of Seaside Park, N.J.” The case had been dismissed, but was reinstated in 2009 by an appeals court.
At that time, Arturi D’Argenio told the Sadejs that they would need to sign a new retainer agreement in order to continue representation. On July 18, 2010, the Sadejs emailed the firm stating that they were “officially terminated,” according to the opinion as quoted by the New Jersey Law Journal.
The firm sued the Sadejs “for about $100,000 in fees it was allegedly owed from the Seaside Park case and other matters on behalf of Jesse Sadej.” However, a substitution of attorney wasn’t filed until months later.
The case went to the appeals court, which stated that the firm should have withdrawn immediately after receiving the email notification from their client: “Because it failed to do so, it remained counsel of record and therefore was precluded from initiating the collection action at that point,” the judges said, as quoted by the New Jersey Law Journal.
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Avoid Drowning in Data: Keep Afloat with ESI in Construction Litigation
May 15, 2023 —
Steve Swart - The Dispute ResolverMaybe it is another lawyer on your team, a client, the Court. Maybe it is you. Almost every lawyer has heard (or thought, felt, or anguished over) the following: Wait — What? Discovery is going to cost how much?
The concern is real. Per a 2019 Southern District of New York opinion:
- The average case can involve collection, review and production of 100 gigabytes of data (or 6.5 million pages of Word documents).
- At a typical rate of review of 40-60 documents per hour, assuming 100,000 documents are collected, that is about 2,000 hours of attorney review time.
- Adding in fees for forensic collection, storage, and processing to maintain metadata can result in a bill totaling $500,000.
Brown v. Barnes & Noble, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 3d 637, 645 & n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 2019).
What's counsel to do? The following four points can help counsel streamline and reduce costs in discovery: (1) know your case, (2) know your data — understand it and document collection, (3) cooperate with counsel, and (4) implement a protocol for electronically-stored information ("ESI").
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Steve Swart, Williams MullenMr. Swart may be contacted at
sswart@williamsmullen.com
“Good Faith” May Not Be Good Enough: California Supreme Court to Decide When General Contractors Can Withhold Retention
March 22, 2018 —
Erinn Contreras and Joy O. Siu – Construction & Infrastructure Law BlogIt is industry standard in California for owners of a construction project to make monthly payments to a contractor for work it has completed, less a certain percentage that is withheld as a guarantee of future satisfactory performance. This withholding is called a retention. Contractors generally pass these withholdings on to their subcontractors via a retention clause in the subcontract. Under such clause, if a subcontractor fails to complete its work or correct deficiencies in its work, the owner and the general contractor may use the retention to bring the subcontractor’s work into conformance with the requirements of the contract.
When and how retention payments must be released are governed by, among other statutes, Civil Code section 8800
et seq. Specifically, Civil Code section 8814, subdivision (a), states that a direct contractor must pay each subcontractor its share of a retention payment within ten days after the general contractor receives all or part of a retention payment. Failure to make payments in accordance with Section 8814 can subject an owner or a contractor to a (1) two percent penalty per a month on the amount wrongfully withheld, and (2) claim for attorney’s fees for any litigation required to collect the wrongfully withheld retention payments. (Civ. Code, § 8818.)
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Erinn Contreras, Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP and
Joy Siu, Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP
Ms. Contreras may be contacted at econtreras@sheppardmullin.com
Ms. Siu may be contacted at jsiu@sheppardmullin.com
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Subcontract Should Flow Down Delay Caused by Subcontractors
December 21, 2020 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesA general contractor’s subcontract with its subcontractor should include a provision that entitles it to flow down liquidated damages assessed by the owner stemming from delays caused by the subcontractor. Such a provision does not mean the general contractor does not have to prove delays caused by the subcontractor or can arbitrarily allocate the amount or days it claims the subcontractor is liable. The general contractor still will need to reasonably establish the delays the subcontractor caused the critical path of the schedule, i.e., delayed the job. In addition to the right to flow down liquidated damages, the subcontract should also entitle the general contractor to recover its actual extended general conditions caused by the subcontractor’s delays (regardless of whether the owner assesses liquidated damages). The objective is that if the subcontractor delays the job, the subcontractor is liable for liquidated damages the general contractor is liable to the owner for in addition to the general contractor’s own delay damages. This is an important subcontractual provision so that the risk of delay caused by subcontractors is clearly flowed down to them in the subcontract.
In a 1987 case, Hall Construction Co., Inc. v. Beynon, 507 So.2d 1225 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987), the subcontract at-issue contained language that stated, “The parties hereto agree that a supplier who delays performance beyond the time agreed upon in this Purchase Order shall have caused [general contractor] liquidated damages in the amount required of [general contractor] by their contract per day for each day such delay continues which sum the supplier hereby agrees to pay.”
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David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
What If Your CCP 998 Offer is Silent on Costs?
March 18, 2019 —
Tony Carucci - Snell & Wilmer Real Estate Litigation BlogIn California, the “prevailing party” in litigation is generally entitled to recover its costs as a matter of law. See Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 1032. But under California Code of Civil Procedure section 998, a party may make a so-called “offer to compromise,” which can reverse the parties’ entitlement to costs after the date of the offer, depending on the outcome of the litigation. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 998. The potential payoff of a 998 offer is that “If an offer made by a defendant is not accepted and the plaintiff fails to obtain a more favorable judgment or award, the plaintiff shall not recover his or her postoffer costs and shall pay the defendant’s costs from the time of the offer.” Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 998(c)(1) (emphasis added).
But how do you determine whether a plaintiff obtained a more favorable judgment when the 998 offer is silent with respect to whether it includes costs?
In Martinez v. Eatlite One, Inc. (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 1181, 1182–83, the defendant made a 998 offer of $12,001 that was silent regarding the treatment of attorneys’ fees and costs. Plaintiff did not respond to the offer, and the jury ultimately awarded plaintiff damages of $11,490. Id. In resolving the parties’ competing memoranda of costs and plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees, the trial court awarded plaintiff her costs and attorneys’ fees. Id. at 1182. The trial court reasoned that plaintiff had obtained a more favorable judgment than the 998 offer because she was entitled to pre-offer costs and attorneys’ fees under the statute, which meant plaintiff’s ultimate recovery exceeded the 998 offer when added to the judgment. Id. at 1183. In other words, the court added plaintiff’s pre-offer costs and attorneys’ fees to the $11,490 verdict for the purposes of determining whether the “judgment” was greater than the 998 offer of $12,001. Id.
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Tony Carucci, Snell & WilmerMr. Carucci may be contacted at
acarucci@swlaw.com
Breach of Contract Exclusion Bars Coverage for Construction Defect Claim
March 19, 2024 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiThe court determined the policy's breach of contract exclusion precluded coverage for a claim against the general contractor insured for construction defects. Mt. Hawley Ins. Co. v. McAtamncy, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 497 (N. D. Cal. Jan. 2, 2024).
McAtamney, a general contractor dong business as Kilrea Construction, was hired by Jeffrey Horowitz for a home-renovation project. After completion of the project, Horowitz discovered defects in the work. He filed a complaint alleging that Kilrea breached obligations to construct and complete the work in an expeditious and workmanlike manner, free from any faults and defects. He brought claims for breach of contract, breach of implied warranty, negligence, neglignet supervision, and declaratory relief.
Kilrea's insurer, Mt. Hawley, agreed to defend, but reserved the right to later deny coverage for any uncovered claims. The breach of contract exclusion provided there was no duty to defend a claim for property damage arising from breach of an express or implied contract or warranty.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak HastertMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
