A Matter Judged: Subrogating Insurers Should Beware of Prior Suits Involving the Insured
March 25, 2024 —
Gus Sara - The Subrogation StrategistIn New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co. v. Lallygone LLC, No. A-2607-22, 2024 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 120, the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey (Appellate Division) considered whether New Jersey Manufacturers Insurance Company (the carrier) could bring a subrogation action after its insured, Efmorfopo Panagiotou (the insured), litigated and tried claims related to the same underlying incident with the same defendant, Lallygone LLC (the defendant). The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s finding that the prior lawsuit extinguished the carrier’s claims.
In Lallygone LLC, the insured hired the defendant to renovate a detached garage on his property. In March 2022, while the defendant’s employees were removing existing concrete slabs, the garage collapsed. After the incident, the insured stopped paying the defendant. In addition, the insured filed a claim with the carrier, which ultimately paid the insured over $180,000 for the damage under its property policy. The carrier sent a subrogation notice letter to the defendant.
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Gus Sara, White and WilliamsMr. Sara may be contacted at
sarag@whiteandwilliams.com
Fifth Circuit Asks Texas Supreme Court to Clarify Construction Defect Decision
November 07, 2012 —
CDJ STAFFThe Fifth Circuit Court has withdrawn its decision in Ewing Construction Company v. Amerisure Insurance Company, pending clarification from the Texas Supreme Court of its decision in Gilbert Texas Construction, L.P. v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s London. The Fifth Circuit had applied the Gilbert case in determining that a contractual liability exclusion barred coverage for faulty workmanship. The Insurance Journal reports that this decision was both applauded and criticized, with a concern noted that “an insurer would now have its pick of either the ‘your work’ exclusion or the contractual liability exclusion without the exception for subcontracted work.”
The Fifth Circuit is now asking the Texas Supreme Court two questions to clarify Gilbert, which Brian S. Martin and Suzanne M. Patrick see as a sign that the Court has realized that it overly expanded the scope of the earlier ruling. A response is expected from the Texas Supreme Court by spring 2013.
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Why Should Businesses Seek Legal Help Early On?
December 03, 2024 —
Scott L. Baker - Los Angeles Litigation BlogMost business owners are natural problem solvers. They assess the issue that lies before them and develop a strategy to overcome it. It’s a critical mindset to have, but do all business owners have the skillset to solve every issue?
While it is understandable that business owners may want to attempt to resolve issues on their own, it is invariably beneficial to obtain guidance for legal issues earlier rather than later.
3 Reasons to Consult an Attorney Sooner than Later
Many people might consider working with an attorney to be a last resort. Typically, this is not the case; rather, getting knowledgeable legal counsel sooner than later can help business owners because:
- It’s Cheaper: Early legal intervention can often prevent disputes from leading to litigation, which can be expensive. Working with an attorney to resolve a conflict before it escalates into a larger issue is often a good business decision and wise investment.
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Scott L. Baker, Baker & AssociatesMr. Baker may be contacted at
slb@bakerslaw.com
CC&Rs Not the Place for Arbitration Agreement, Court Rules
May 24, 2011 —
CDJ STAFFIn January, the California Court of Appeals ruled that an arbitration clause inserted in a development’s CC&Rs by the developer could not be enforced. The case, Villa Vicenza Homeowners Association v. Noble Court Development, involved a case in which, according to the opinion, “following the first sale Nobel controlled the board of directors of the Association and because the initial condominium buyers noticed defects in common areas and common facilities and did not believe Nobel had provided a reserve fund sufficient to repair the defects, the condominium owners brought a derivative action on behalf of the Association against Nobel.”
The court concluded, “The use of CC&R's as a means of providing contractual rights to parties with no interest in or responsibility for a common interest development is also problematic from the standpoint of determining what if any consideration would support such third-party agreements. By their terms the CC&R's bind all successors, even those with whom a third party such as Nobel has never had any contractual relationship and to whom Nobel has not provided any consideration.” The court determined that “the trial court did not err in denying Nobel's motion to compel arbitration.”
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Receiving a $0 Verdict and Still Being Deemed the Prevailing Party for Purposes of Attorney’s Fees
May 24, 2018 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesLow and behold, a party can be the prevailing party for purposes of attorney’s fees even if that party is awarded $0. That’s right, even if the party is awarded a big fat zero, they can still be the prevailing party for purposes of being entitled to attorney’s fees. This is because a party is the prevailing party if they prevail on the significant issues in the case. A party can prevail on the significant issues even if that party is awarded $0. Whoa!
For example, in Coconut Key Homeowner’s Association, Inc. v. Gonzalez, 43 Fla.L.Weekly D1045a (Fla. 4th DCA 2018), a homeowner sued her homeowner’s association claiming the association breached its governing documents. There was a basis for fees under Florida’s homeowner’s association law (and there likely was a basis under the governing documents). At trial, the jury held that the association breached its governing documents, but awarded the homeowner nothing ($0). The trial court also issued injunctive relief in favor of the homeowner. The homeowner claimed she should be deemed the prevailing party for purposes of attorney’s fees; however, this was denied by the trial court based on the $0 verdict and no fees were awarded to the homeowner.
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David Adelstein, Florida Construction Legal UpdatesMr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dadelstein@gmail.com
Pennsylvania Supreme Court Rules in Builder’s Implied Warranty of Habitability Case
September 03, 2014 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFAccording to an article in JD Supra Business Advisor (written by Mark S. DePillis, Carl G. Roberts, Benjamin M. Schmidt, and Matthew White of Ballard Spahr LLP), “The Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that a builder’s implied warranty of habitability extends only to the initial buyer of a home, and not to subsequent purchasers.” This reversed an earlier ruling in Conway v. The Cutler Group, Inc. “that created more expansive liability for home builders.”
DePillis, Roberts, Schmidt, and White suggested that “builders should monitor possible future legislation addressing the public policy issues that the Supreme Court identified as falling squarely within the legislature’s domain.”
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Manhattan Condos at Half Price Reshape New York’s Harlem
August 20, 2014 —
Jonathan LaMantia – BloombergJason and Robyn Turetsky watched from their window as, brick by brick, a new condominium development rose across 116th Street in New York’s Harlem.
The Turetskys, who married in December, decided to buy a three-bedroom, 1,500-square-foot (140-square-meter) unit at the Adeline, right across from their current rental. Staying in the neighborhood presented a better value than anywhere else they’d considered, including the Upper East Side and Upper West Side, where Robyn lived before moving in with Jason, the couple said.
“For the amenities that were going to be provided at the Adeline and the size of the apartment, we could just get much more for our money in Harlem,” said Robyn Turetsky, a 28-year-old clinical dietitian.
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Jonathan LaMantia, BloombergMr. Lamantia may be contacted at
jlamantia1@bloomberg.net
Life After McMillin: Do Negligence and Strict Liability Causes of Action for Construction Defects Still Exist?
January 24, 2018 —
Thomas Balestreri and Amanda Crawley - Balestreri, Potocki, & HolmesThe ruling is in but the battle will likely continue over the practical application of SB 800. On January 18, 2018 the California Supreme Court issued its decision in
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __, holding that the statutory prelitigation scheme in The Right to Repair Act (“the Act”) that provides for notice and an opportunity for the Builder to repair defects applies to all claims for construction defects in residential construction sold on or after January 1, 2003, regardless whether the claim is founded on a violation of the Act’s performance standards or a common law claim for negligence or strict liability. (
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __.) With this holding, has the Court ruled that common law causes of action for construction defect still survive? If so, what will they look like and what standards will be applied?
The short answer is that it appears that common law causes of action still survive, at least for now, but it is not clear from this decision what they will look like and what standards will apply.
Portions of the decision seem to suggest that the Act is the sole and exclusive remedy for construction defect claims: “…even in some areas where the common law had supplied a remedy for construction defects resulting in property damage but not personal injury, the text and legislative history [of the statute] reflect a
clear and unequivocal intent to supplant common law negligence and strict product liability actions under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 6].) (Italics added for emphasis) However, at the end of the decision, the Court seems to be saying that there may still be a place for common law claims for negligence and strict liability alongside the Act but that these causes of action may be subject to the performance standards in the Act.
The
McMillin case went up to the Supreme Court on a procedural issue: whether a common law action alleging construction defects resulting in both economic loss and property damage is subject to the Act’s prelitigation notice and cure procedures. The Van Tassels had dismissed their claims under the Act opting to proceed solely on their common law claims including negligence and strict liability. McMillin sought a stay to force the Van Tassels to comply with the Act’s prelitigation procedures. The Supreme Court held that the Van Tassels must comply with the statutory procedures and affirmed the stay issued by the trial court. But the question remained: now that the Van Tassels were left only with common law claims, how would they proceed under the Act?
To understand how the Court dealt with this question, one must first understand how the Court dealt with the narrow procedural question presented by the case. The Court provides a very detailed, clear explanation of the reasons why it felt the Legislature intended for all construction defect claims involving residential construction must comply with the prelitigation requirements of the Act. In summing up its conclusions the Court makes three definitive holdings.
First, for claims involving economic loss only—the kind of claims involved in
Aas—the Court holds that the Legislature intended to supersede
Aas and provide a statutory basis for recovery. (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 10].) In other words, the Court clearly agrees that the Act was meant to allow recovery of damages based solely on economic damages. No surprise there. Second, the Court held for personal injuries, the Legislature made no changes to existing law that provides common law remedies for the injured party. (Id.) Nobody has ever contested that. Finally, the Court held that for construction defect claims involving property damage and not just economic loss “the Legislature replaced the common law
methods of recovery with the new statutory scheme.” (
Id.,) (Italics added for emphasis.)
In other words, the Court is not saying that negligence and strict liability are not permitted causes of action. The Court is merely stating that these causes of action must comply with the Act’s statutory scheme just as the same as a claim for economic loss. Here the Court is focusing on the procedure that must be followed. “The Act, in effect, provides that construction defect claims not involving personal injury will be treated the same procedurally going forward whether or not the underlying claims gave rise to any property damage.” (
Id.)
Having laid out its fundamental premise, the Court then deals with Plaintiff’s arguments regarding the intent of the Legislature and makes light work of them all. In the process, the Court disapproves
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Brookfield Crystal Cove LLC (2013) 219 Cal. App. 4th 98, and
Burch v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal. App. 4th 1411, to the extent they are inconsistent with the views expressed in the
McMillin opinion.
This is where the decision gets interesting. The Court reminds us that the Van Tassels had dismissed their statutory causes of action for violation of the performance standards under Section 896. One would think at that point that Plaintiffs had to be wondering if they had any claims left given that the Court had ruled that the Act was the sole means of recovery for construction defects. Not so fast. The Court points out that the complaint still rests on allegations of defective construction and that the suit remains an “ ‘action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, the residential construction’ of the plaintiffs’ homes (§896)
and McMillin’s liability under the Van Tassels’ negligence and strict liability claims depends on the extent to which it [McMillin] violated the standards of sections 896 and 897.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Emphasis added.) WHAT DID THE COURT JUST SAY? Did the Court just say that a plaintiff could bring a common law cause of action for negligence or strict liability based on a violation of the performance standards under Section 896? What exactly would that claim look like? What would be the elements of such a cause of action?
To answer these questions, the Court states in the very next paragraph, which also happens to be the last paragraph in the decision: “In holding that claims seeking recovery for construction defect damages are subject to the Act’s prelitigation procedures regardless of how they are pleaded,
we have no occasion to address the extent to which a party might rely upon common law principles in pursuing liability under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Italics added for emphasis) Is the Court answering “No” to the questions posed above? Probably not. It is simply following the age old rule that an appellate court will
not rule on an issue that is not specifically presented by an appeal, leaving that question for another day.
All we know for sure from
McMillin is that every claim for construction defects falling within the scope of the Act must follow the prelitigation procedure. There are no hall passes for negligence and strict liability. The larger question posed by the last two paragraphs in the decision, is whether the law recognizes a cause of action for negligence and strict liability for construction defects based on the standards in Section 896. The answer will have to be worked out by judges and trial attorneys in courtrooms across the State! The parameters of this hybrid cause of action that the Court seems to have posited will need more careful consideration than can be offered on first reading of
McMillin v. Superior Court.
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Balestreri, Potocki, & Holmes
