Construction Insurance Costs for New York Schools is Going Up
December 11, 2013 —
CDJ STAFFThe cost of construction insurance for New York City’s School Construction Authority is about to go up and the city’s scaffold law is to blame. As the cost of possible injuries has gone up, so has the cost of covering the insurance. The SCA’s current policy ends at the end of the year, and it’s expected that its insurance costs will triple, with the next two years costing about $650 million. The rising cost of insurance was compared by authority officials to the cost of 10 new schools.
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Portions of Policyholder's Expert's Opinions Excluded
November 13, 2023 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiThe federal district court granted, in part, the insurer's motion to exclude portions of expert testimony. Tundra M. Holdings, LLC v. Markel Ins. Co., 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139952 (D. Alaska Aug. 10, 2023).
Plaintiff alleged a building it owned suffered damages consisting of building roof failure due to snow load. Plaintiff submitted a claim to Markel for its loss.
Plaintiff hired an engineering firm to conduct an inspection. The recommendation was to install snow guards and that 28 rafters be replaced with new beams. The evaluation did not state that the recommendation was required by law or ordinance. Nor did the evaluation make mention of replacing the metal roof on the building or anything about the water system or sprinkler system. Plaintiff then obtained an estimate of $687,500 for roof repair/replacement, store front repair, a sprinkler system installer and a water system upgrade.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak HastertMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Coverage for Construction Defects Barred By Exclusion j (5)
April 15, 2015 —
Tred R. Eyerly – Insurance Law HawaiiThe Texas Court Appeal reversed a trial court judgment which found coverage in favor of the contractor based upon exclusion j(5). Dallas Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Calitex Corp., 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 2002 (Tex. Ct. App. March 3, 2015).
Turnkey Residential Group, Inc., was the contractor to construct a twelve-unit townhome complex in Dallas. The owner of the project was Calitex Corporation. Construction began on November 2006. The project was to be completed by Turnkey by October 27, 2007.
Calitex filed suit against Turnkey and some of its subcontractors in February 2008. Calitex alleged problems with Turnkey's work included: (1) the stone exterior was not properly treated and leaked, and some areas were left uncovered with stone; and (2) windows leaked. It was further alleged that the quality of materials, labor and craftsmanship did not meet the standards of the contract and resulted in damages. Turnkey submitted a notice of claim to its insurer, Dallas National Insurance Company (DNIC). Coverage was denied.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law HawaiiMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
The (Jurisdictional) Rebranding of The CDA’s Sum Certain Requirement
April 15, 2024 —
Jordan A. Hutcheson and Stephanie Rolfsness - Watt TiederThe Contract Disputes Act (the “CDA”), 41 U.S.C.A. §§ 7101 et seq., which has provided the statutory framework for resolution of most contract disputes between the federal government and its contractors since 1978, has recently been the subject of changes in judicial interpretation, despite no corresponding statutory changes. The CDA’s implementing provisions in the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR), require that contractors submit a claim to the government in the form of written demand to a contracting officer requesting a final decision and seeking the payment of money in a sum certain prior to pursuing resolution via board or court. However, with respect to the sum certain requirement, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit issued an opinion in late 2023 determining that this requirement “should not be given the jurisdictional brand” as it has categorically received in the past. Rather, the court concluded that the sum certain requirement is merely an element of a claim for relief under the CDA that a contractor must satisfy to recover. This rebranding does not debase the sum certain requirement, but it does indicate a renewed focus on what constitutes “jurisdictional” in government contracts litigation.
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Jordan A. Hutcheson, Watt Tieder and
Stephanie Rolfsness, Watt Tieder
Ms. Hutcheson may be contacted at jhutcheson@watttieder.com
Ms. Rolfsness may be contacted at srolfsness@watttieder.com
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Jobs Machine in U.S. Created More Than Burger Flippers Last Year
January 14, 2015 —
Carlos Torres – BloombergThe biggest private employment increase in 17 years was driven by gains among above-average paying jobs, dispelling the popular notion that the U.S. is turning into a nation of fast-food workers.
Industries that pay employees more than the average for all workers accounted for 66 percent of total jobs created in 2014, based on data compiled by Bloomberg from Labor Department records. Business services -- staffing agencies, accountants, consultants and computer-system designers -- and goods producers, including construction firms and manufacturers, were among those hiring the most.
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Carlos Torres, BloombergMr. Torres may be contacted at t
ctorres2@bloomberg.net
Life After McMillin: Do Negligence and Strict Liability Causes of Action for Construction Defects Still Exist?
January 24, 2018 —
Thomas Balestreri and Amanda Crawley - Balestreri, Potocki, & HolmesThe ruling is in but the battle will likely continue over the practical application of SB 800. On January 18, 2018 the California Supreme Court issued its decision in
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __, holding that the statutory prelitigation scheme in The Right to Repair Act (“the Act”) that provides for notice and an opportunity for the Builder to repair defects applies to all claims for construction defects in residential construction sold on or after January 1, 2003, regardless whether the claim is founded on a violation of the Act’s performance standards or a common law claim for negligence or strict liability. (
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __.) With this holding, has the Court ruled that common law causes of action for construction defect still survive? If so, what will they look like and what standards will be applied?
The short answer is that it appears that common law causes of action still survive, at least for now, but it is not clear from this decision what they will look like and what standards will apply.
Portions of the decision seem to suggest that the Act is the sole and exclusive remedy for construction defect claims: “…even in some areas where the common law had supplied a remedy for construction defects resulting in property damage but not personal injury, the text and legislative history [of the statute] reflect a
clear and unequivocal intent to supplant common law negligence and strict product liability actions under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 6].) (Italics added for emphasis) However, at the end of the decision, the Court seems to be saying that there may still be a place for common law claims for negligence and strict liability alongside the Act but that these causes of action may be subject to the performance standards in the Act.
The
McMillin case went up to the Supreme Court on a procedural issue: whether a common law action alleging construction defects resulting in both economic loss and property damage is subject to the Act’s prelitigation notice and cure procedures. The Van Tassels had dismissed their claims under the Act opting to proceed solely on their common law claims including negligence and strict liability. McMillin sought a stay to force the Van Tassels to comply with the Act’s prelitigation procedures. The Supreme Court held that the Van Tassels must comply with the statutory procedures and affirmed the stay issued by the trial court. But the question remained: now that the Van Tassels were left only with common law claims, how would they proceed under the Act?
To understand how the Court dealt with this question, one must first understand how the Court dealt with the narrow procedural question presented by the case. The Court provides a very detailed, clear explanation of the reasons why it felt the Legislature intended for all construction defect claims involving residential construction must comply with the prelitigation requirements of the Act. In summing up its conclusions the Court makes three definitive holdings.
First, for claims involving economic loss only—the kind of claims involved in
Aas—the Court holds that the Legislature intended to supersede
Aas and provide a statutory basis for recovery. (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 10].) In other words, the Court clearly agrees that the Act was meant to allow recovery of damages based solely on economic damages. No surprise there. Second, the Court held for personal injuries, the Legislature made no changes to existing law that provides common law remedies for the injured party. (Id.) Nobody has ever contested that. Finally, the Court held that for construction defect claims involving property damage and not just economic loss “the Legislature replaced the common law
methods of recovery with the new statutory scheme.” (
Id.,) (Italics added for emphasis.)
In other words, the Court is not saying that negligence and strict liability are not permitted causes of action. The Court is merely stating that these causes of action must comply with the Act’s statutory scheme just as the same as a claim for economic loss. Here the Court is focusing on the procedure that must be followed. “The Act, in effect, provides that construction defect claims not involving personal injury will be treated the same procedurally going forward whether or not the underlying claims gave rise to any property damage.” (
Id.)
Having laid out its fundamental premise, the Court then deals with Plaintiff’s arguments regarding the intent of the Legislature and makes light work of them all. In the process, the Court disapproves
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Brookfield Crystal Cove LLC (2013) 219 Cal. App. 4th 98, and
Burch v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal. App. 4th 1411, to the extent they are inconsistent with the views expressed in the
McMillin opinion.
This is where the decision gets interesting. The Court reminds us that the Van Tassels had dismissed their statutory causes of action for violation of the performance standards under Section 896. One would think at that point that Plaintiffs had to be wondering if they had any claims left given that the Court had ruled that the Act was the sole means of recovery for construction defects. Not so fast. The Court points out that the complaint still rests on allegations of defective construction and that the suit remains an “ ‘action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, the residential construction’ of the plaintiffs’ homes (§896)
and McMillin’s liability under the Van Tassels’ negligence and strict liability claims depends on the extent to which it [McMillin] violated the standards of sections 896 and 897.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Emphasis added.) WHAT DID THE COURT JUST SAY? Did the Court just say that a plaintiff could bring a common law cause of action for negligence or strict liability based on a violation of the performance standards under Section 896? What exactly would that claim look like? What would be the elements of such a cause of action?
To answer these questions, the Court states in the very next paragraph, which also happens to be the last paragraph in the decision: “In holding that claims seeking recovery for construction defect damages are subject to the Act’s prelitigation procedures regardless of how they are pleaded,
we have no occasion to address the extent to which a party might rely upon common law principles in pursuing liability under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Italics added for emphasis) Is the Court answering “No” to the questions posed above? Probably not. It is simply following the age old rule that an appellate court will
not rule on an issue that is not specifically presented by an appeal, leaving that question for another day.
All we know for sure from
McMillin is that every claim for construction defects falling within the scope of the Act must follow the prelitigation procedure. There are no hall passes for negligence and strict liability. The larger question posed by the last two paragraphs in the decision, is whether the law recognizes a cause of action for negligence and strict liability for construction defects based on the standards in Section 896. The answer will have to be worked out by judges and trial attorneys in courtrooms across the State! The parameters of this hybrid cause of action that the Court seems to have posited will need more careful consideration than can be offered on first reading of
McMillin v. Superior Court.
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Denver Parking Garage Roof Collapses Crushing Vehicles
February 12, 2014 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFOn Monday night, a parking garage ceiling collapsed at the Park Mayfair Condos in Denver, Colorado, according to KKTV News. Residents claim that “between five and ten vehicles were completely destroyed after the ceiling of the underground garage caved in.” No one was injured from the incident. Structural engineers have not commented “yet on how the collapse occurred, but residents told sister station KCNC that the ceiling fell after a cement beam holding up one side of the roof collapsed.”
According to KWGN News, FOX31 interviewed a “passerby” who alleged that he lived in the condominium five years ago, but moved out “because inspectors repeatedly sent notices to fix problems with the garage, but, to his knowledge, no action was taken by the condo complex.”
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Lost Rental Income not a Construction Defect
November 27, 2013 —
CDJ STAFFA judge in Colorado has ruled that although the homeowner’s policy excluded construction defects from coverage, lost rental income and the cost of deck repair involved in fixing a defective drainage system were.
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