Pennsylvania Supreme Court Reaffirms Validity of Statutory Employer Defense
March 31, 2014 —
Michelle Coburn and Michael Jervis – White and Williams LLPIn Patton v. Worthington Associates, Inc., the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reaffirmed the continuing validity of the longstanding statutory employer doctrine and related five-part test of McDonald v. Levinson Steel Co. In doing so, the court overruled the Superior Court and held that Worthington was immune from tort liability as the statutory employer of plaintiff Earl Patton.
Worthington was the general contractor for a project to construct an addition to a church. Worthington subcontracted with Patton Construction, Inc. to perform carpentry work. Earl Patton was an employee and the sole owner of Patton Construction, Inc. He was injured in a scissor lift accident while performing work on the church. Patton sued Worthington alleging failure to maintain safe conditions at the worksite. After a trial, a jury awarded Patton and his wife a little more than $1.5 million in damages.
Before trial, Worthington had moved for summary judgment arguing that it was Patton’s statutory employer and thus immune from tort liability under Pennsylvania’s Workers’ Compensation Act. Under that law, general contractors are secondarily liable for payment of workers’ compensation benefits to employees of subcontractors. Like traditional employers, statutory employers are immune from tort liability for work-related injuries in situations where they are secondarily liable for workers’ compensation payments.
Reprinted courtesy of
Michelle Coburn, White and Williams LLP and
Michael Jervis, White and Williams LLP
Ms. Coburn may be contacted at coburnm@whiteandwilliams.com; Mr. Jervis may be contacted at jervism@whiteandwilliams.com
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N.J. Appellate Court Confirms that AIA Construction Contract Bars Insurer's Subrogation Claim
September 10, 2019 —
Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.On April 4, 2019, the Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court confirmed that the waiver of subrogation provision in a commonly used form construction contract, American Institute of Architects (AIA) form A201 — 2007 General Conditions of the Contract for Construction, precluded an insurer’s claims against a subcontractor.
In Ace American Ins. Co. v. American Medical Plumbing, Inc., the court considered Ace American Insurance Company’s (Ace) subrogation claim against a plumbing subcontractor who was allegedly responsible for a water main leak that caused approximately $1.2 million in damages to Ace’s insured, Equinox Development Corporation (Equinox).
In March 2012, Equinox entered into a contract with Grace Construction Management Company, LLC (Grace) to build the “core and shell” of a new health club. Equinox and Grace used AIA form A201 for their contract. Grace then hired American Medical Plumbing, Inc. (American) as a plumbing subcontractor for the project. In April 2013, the water main failed, flooding the health club.
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Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C. may be contacted at
coverage@sdvlaw.com
NY Attorney General to Propose Bill Requiring Climate Adaptation for Utilities
May 21, 2014 —
Gerald B. Silverman – BloombergBloomberg BNA — New York Attorney General Eric T. Schneiderman (D) has proposed legislation to require that New York's electricity and gas utilities assess their vulnerability to the impacts of climate change and prepare a plan for adapting to severe weather.
Schneiderman May 19 said the proposed legislation would build on a February decision by the state Public Service Commission (PSC), which approved a plan by Consolidated Edison to spend $1 billion over the next four years for storm hardening and resiliency projects.
A spokeswoman for the attorney general told Bloomberg BNA that he is working with members of the Legislature to have the bill formally introduced.
The PSC decision also required that all New York utilities integrate the potential impacts of climate change into their system planning and construction forecasts and budgets.
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Gerald B. Silverman, Bloomberg
Connecticut Supreme Court Finds Duty to Defend When Case Law is Uncertain
October 12, 2020 —
Eric B. Hermanson & Austin D. Moody - White and WilliamsThe Connecticut Supreme Court recently addressed whether an insurer has a duty to defend when faced with legal uncertainty as to whether coverage is owed: for example, when there is no Connecticut case law on point, and courts outside of the state have reached conflicting decisions.
The Court suggested that an insurer, in these circumstances, should defend the insured, and should seek a declaratory judgment from a court as to whether coverage is owed.
The issue in Nash St., LLC v. Main St. Am. Assurance Co.,[1] arose out of a home collapse in Milford, Connecticut. The owner of the home (Nash) hired a contractor (New Beginnings) to renovate the home. New Beginnings, in turn, retained a subcontractor to lift the house and to do concrete work on the foundation. While the subcontractor was lifting the house, the house shifted off the supporting cribbing and collapsed.
Reprinted courtesy of
Eric B. Hermanson, White and Williams and
Austin D. Moody, White and Williams
Mr. Hermanson may be contacted at hermansone@whiteandwilliams.com
Mr. Moody may be contacted at moodya@whiteandwiliams.com
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San Diego County Considering Updates to Green Building Code
August 06, 2014 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFThe San Diego County Board of Supervisors is meeting today to discuss “proposed building code amendments designed to promote energy efficiency in new homes,” according to Times of San Diego.
Possible recommendations include “install electrical panels large enough to accommodate future improvements; put in a conduit that could be used for future roof-mounted solar panels; reserve space on south-facing roofs where solar panels might be added later;” and others.
If the recommendations are approved, the “staff would draft detailed building code amendments and return early next year to get them adopted.”
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New Becker & Poliakoff Attorney to Expand Morristown Construction Litigation Practice
September 10, 2014 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFAccording to New Jersey On-Line, Matthew Meyers has joined the Becker & Poliakoff firm at its Morristown office. Meyers “specializes in commercial litigation, with an emphasis on complex construction defects and real estate disputes.”
“This is an exciting move for me,” Meyers stated, as quoted by New Jersey On-Line. “I was attracted to Becker by the firm’s depth of construction litigation talent and the additional resources available for these claims. My new firm will not only enhance my practice but will elevate the level of services I provide to clients, which has always been my top priority.“
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Endorsements Do Not Exclude Coverage for Wrongful Death Claim
August 30, 2017 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiThe insurer's motion for summary judgment, attempting to bar coverage under two endorsements for a wrongful death suit, was denied. Essex Ins. Co. v. FD Event Co., LLC, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124400 (C.D. Calif. July 25, 2017).
FD Event owned an amusement attraction known as Free Drop, which was operated at county fairs and festivals. Participants paid an admission fee to FD Event in order to jump from a scaffold structure onto an inflatable airbag below.
FD Event had a policy with Essex. When securing the policy, FD Event understood that there was no coverage for amusement devices, inflatables, rides or animals. 28th Event, who ran the San Bernardino County Fair, was an additional insured on the policy.
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Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Gillotti v. Stewart (2017) 2017 WL 1488711 Rejects Liberty Mutual, Holding Once Again that the Right to Repair Act is the Exclusive Remedy for Construction Defect Claims
June 05, 2017 —
Richard H. Glucksman, Esq. & Chelsea L. Zwart, Esq. - Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger BulletinBackground
In Gillotti v. Stewart (April 26, 2017) 2017 WL 1488711, which was ordered to be published on May 18, 2017, the defendant grading subcontractor added soil over tree roots to level the driveway on the plaintiff homeowner’s sloped lot. The homeowner sued the grading subcontractor under the California Right to Repair Act (Civil Code §§ 895, et seq.) claiming that the subcontractor’s work damaged the trees.
After the jury found the subcontractor was not negligent, the trial court entered judgment in favor of the subcontractor. The homeowner appealed, arguing that the trial court improperly construed the Right to Repair Act as barring a common law negligence theory against the subcontractor and erred in failing to follow Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Brookfield Crystal Cove LLC (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 98. The Third District Court of Appeal disagreed and affirmed the trial court’s judgment in favor of the subcontractor.
Impact
This is the second time the Third District Court of Appeal has held that Liberty Mutual (discussed below) was wrongly decided and held that the Right to Repair Act is the exclusive remedy for construction defect claims. The decision follows its holding in Elliott Homes, Inc. v. Superior Court (Hicks) (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 333, in which the Court of Appeal held that the Right to Repair Act’s pre-litigation procedures apply when homeowners plead construction defect claims based on common law causes of action, as opposed to violations of the building standards set forth in the Right to Repair Act. Elliott is currently on hold at the California Supreme Court, pending the decision in McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 1132, wherein Liberty Mutual was rejected for the first time by the Fifth District. CGDRB continues to follow developments regarding the much anticipated McMillin decision closely, as well as all related matters.
Discussion
The Right to Repair Act makes contractors and subcontractors not involved in home sales liable for construction defects only if the homeowner proves they negligently cause the violation in whole or part (Civil Code §§ 911(b), 936). As such, the trial court in Gillotti instructed the jury on negligence with respect to the grading subcontractor. The jury found that while the construction did violate some of the Right to Repair’s building standards alleged by the homeowner, the subcontractor was not negligent in anyway. After the jury verdict, the trial court found in favor of the grading subcontractor.
The homeowner moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial on the grounds that the trial court improperly barred a common law negligence theory against the grading subcontractor. The trial court denied the motions on the grounds that “[t]he Right to Repair Act specifically provides that no other causes of action are allowed. See Civil Code § 943.” The trial court specifically noted that its decision conflicted with Liberty Mutual, in which the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that the Right to Repair Act does not eliminate common law rights and remedies where actual damage has occurred, stating that Liberty Mutual was wrongly decided and that the Liberty Mutual court was naïve in its assumptions regarding the legislative history of the Right to Repair Act.
In Gillotti, the Third District Court of Appeal stated that the Liberty Mutual court failed to analyze the language of Civil Code § 896, which “clearly and unequivocally expresses the legislative intent that the Act apply to all action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, residential construction, except as specifically set forth in the Act. The Act does not specifically except actions arising from actual damages. To the contrary, it authorizes recovery of damages, e.g., for ‘the reasonable cost of repairing and rectifying any damages resulting from the failure of the home to meet the standards....’ ([Civil Code] § 944).”
The Court also disagreed with Liberty Mutual’s view that because Civil Code §§ 931 and 943 acknowledge exceptions to the Right to Repair Act’s statutory remedies, the Act does not preclude common law claims for damages due to defects identified in the Act. The Court stated: “Neither list of exceptions, in section 943 or in section 931, includes common law causes of action such as negligence. If the Legislature had intended to make such a wide-ranging exception to the restrictive language of the first sentence of section 943, we would have expected it to do so expressly.”
Additionally, the Court of Appeal rejected the argument that Civil Code § 897 preserves a common law negligence claims for violation of standards not listed in Civil Code § 986. It explained that the section of Civil Code § 897, which provides, “The standards set forth in this chapter are intended to address every function or component of a structure,” expresses the legislative intent that the Right to Repair Act be all-encompassing. Anything inadvertently omitted is actionable under the Act if it causes damage. Any exceptions to the Act are made expressly through Civil Code §§ 931 and 934. The Court concluded in no uncertain terms that the Right to Repair Act precludes common law claims in cases for damages covered by the Act.
The homeowner further argued that she was not precluded from bringing a common law claim because a tree is not a “structure,” and therefore the alleged tree damage did not fall within the realm of the Right to Repair. The Court of Appeal also rejected this argument, holding that while the tree damage itself was not expressly covered, the act of adding soil to make the driveway level (which caused the damage) implicated the standards covered by the Right to Repair Act. The Court explained that since under the Act a “structure” includes “improvement located upon a lot or within a common area” (Civil Code § 895(a)), as the driveway was an improvement upon the lot, the claim was within the purview of the Right to Repair Act. As the soil, a component of the driveway, caused damage (to the trees), it was actionable under the Act.
Reprinted courtesy of
Richard H. Glucksman, Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger and
Chelsea L. Zwart, Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger
Mr. Glucksman may be contacted at rglucksman@cgdrblaw.com
Ms. Zwart may be contacted at czwart@cgdrblaw.com
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