April Rise in Construction Spending Not That Much
June 28, 2013 —
CDJ STAFFApril saw an increase in construction spending that didn’t even break a half of a percent with just a 0.4% increase, although that’s better than March’s slight decrease of 0.8%, Both government and residential construction spending dropped, although government spending dropped only 1.2% and residential a miniscule 0.1%. This was slightly more than offset by the modest 2.2% increase in residential spending.
Although the April gains were modest, they come after the first year to increase after five years of decline.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
It’s a Bird, It’s a Plane . . . No, It’s a Drone. Long Awaited FAA Drone Regulations Finally Take Flight
September 22, 2016 —
Garret Murai – California Construction Law BlogIt’s a bird.
It’s a plane.
No, it’s a drone. Also known as an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) or unmanned aircraft (UA).
And, technically, they’ve been around a long time, since at least 1849 when the Australians attacked Italy with unmanned balloons loaded with explosives. Even a young Marilyn Monroe, when she was known simply as “Norma Jean,” worked at a company called Radioplane making unmanned aircrafts during World War II.
Since then, as technology has advanced, which, in turn, has made the cost of older technology go down, what was once old, is now new again. Drones are making regular appearances in the movies (think the Divergent Series: Allegiant). The paparazzi (who are apparently tired of getting punched in the face) are using them. And some day, perhaps very soon, they may just be delivering your packages (think Amazon Prime Air).
One of the earliest adopters of drones outside the military, however, has been the construction industry which has used drones to track the progress of construction projects and conduct site surveys such as this one showing the progress of Apple’s new campus in Cupertino[.]
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Garret Murai, Wendel, Rosen, Black & Dean LLPMr. Murai may be contacted at
gmurai@wendel.com
New York Appellate Court Affirms 1966 Insurance Policy Continues to Cover WTC Asbestos Claims
January 02, 2019 —
Michael S. Levine & Joshua S. Paster - Hunton Andrews KurthIn a prior post, we discussed a New York trial-court decision that found an insurance policy issued in 1966, to insure the construction of the World Trade Center, continues to cover modern-day asbestos claims, with each claim constituting an individual occurrence. Last week, in American Home Assurance Co. v. The Port Authority of N.Y. and N.J., 7628-7628A (1st Dep’t Nov. 15, 2018), an intermediate appellate court affirmed that decision, agreeing that coverage is triggered for claims tied to alleged asbestos exposure at the WTC site in the 1960s and ’70s.
Reprinted courtesy of
Michael S. Levine, Hunton Andrews Kurth and
Joshua S. Paster, Hunton Andrews Kurth
Mr. Levine may be contacted at mlevine@HuntonAK.com
Mr. Paster may be contacted at jpaster@HuntonAK.com
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
A Homeowner’s Subsequent Action is Barred as a Matter of Law by way of a Prior “Right to Repair Act” Claim Resolved by Cash Settlement for Waiver of all Known or Unknown Claims
February 26, 2015 —
Richard H. Glucksman, Esq., Jon A. Turigliatto, Esq., and David A. Napper, Esq. – Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger BulletinDavid Belasco v. Gary Loren Wells et al. (2015) B254525
OVERVIEW
In a decision published on February 17, 2015, the Second District Court of Appeal made clear that settlement agreements containing waivers of unknown claims in connection with a construction of a property, absent fraud or misrepresentation, will be upheld. In brief, the homeowner plaintiff had made a claim against the builder pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure Section 896 (“Right to Repair”) and settled for a cash payment and obtained a Release of all Claims including for all known and unknown claims. The court held that homeowner’s subsequent construction defect claim was barred pursuant to the terms and conditions of the earlier release.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff and Appellant, David Belasco ("Belasco"), purchased a newly construction home in Manhattan Beach from builder Gary Loren Wells ("Wells"). Two years after purchasing the property, Belasco filed a Complaint for construction defects, which eventually resulted in settlement between the parties. The settlement agreement included a California Civil Code Section 1524 waiver of all known or unknown claims with the word "claims" defined in part as “any and all known and unknown construction defects." Six years later in 2012, Belasco filed a Complaint alleging a claim, amongst others, that the defective and leaky roof breached the statutory warranty on new construction under California Civil Code section 896 ("Right to Repair Act").
Relying on San Diego Hospice v. County of San Diego (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1048, Wells and Wells' surety, American Contractors Indemnity Company (collectively "Wells"), filed a motion for summary judgment contending that the 2012 action was barred by the settlement of Belasco’s prior Complaint against Wells for construction defects to his home. When the trial court ruled in favor of Wells, Belasco appealed. Belasco, a patent attorney, made the following contentions:(1) the general release and section 1542 wavier in the settlement agreement for patent construction defects is not a "reasonable release" of a subsequent claim for latent construction defects within the meaning of section 929 and the “Right to Repair” Act; (2) a reasonable release can only apply to a "particular violation" and not to a latest defect under the language of section945.5, subdivision (f), and the settlement was too vague to be valid because it does not reference a "particular violation;" (3) section 932 of the California Civil Code specifically authorizes an action on "[s]subsequently discovered claims of unmet standards;" (4) public policy prohibits use of a general release and section 1542 waiver to bar a subsequent claim for latent residential construction defects; and (5) a genuine issue of material fact exists concerning Belasco's fraud and negligence claims that would have voided the settlement pursuant to section 1668.
Pursuant to the "Right to Repair Act" Section 929 subsection (a), a builder can make a cash offer in lieu of a repair and the homeowner is free to accept or reject such offer. Section 929subsection (b) goes on to state that
"[t]he builder may obtain a reasonable release in exchange for the cash payment. The builder may negotiate the terms and conditions of any reasonable release in terms of scope and consideration in conjunction with a cash payment under this chapter."
The Second District Court of Appeal ruled that the prior cash settlement, with a release and section 1524 wavier, was a "reasonable release" under the language of California Civil Code Section 929.
On multiple occasions, the Court noted that Belasco is an attorney and was represented by an attorney during the negotiation of the settlement agreement. By executing the agreement with express language regarding what claims were to be release, Belasco released Wells of "any and all claims" due to "any and all known and unknown construction defects." The Court reasoned that because Belasco is an attorney in his own right, he should have understood the import of the Section 1542 waiver and had the opportunity to reject or revise the settlement agreement prior to binding himself to it. The Court further found that the agreement "could not have been more clear" regarding the waiver of all unknown and known construction defect claims and therefore was not vague. Belasco's additional contentions were found to be without merit because Belasco availed himself of the statutory remedy of a cash settlement in lieu of repairs and voluntarily entered into a negotiated settlement agreement. Lastly, Belasco failed to present any evidence regarding his misrepresentation claim.
When a homeowner files a "Right to Repair Act" claim, often it seems that only two options exist: either repair the alleged defects or go to court. However, Belasco is a reminder to builders that the "Right to Repair Act" does offer an avenue for settlement. The Second District Court of Appeal presented a clear, unqualified opinion regarding the validity and enforceability of settlement agreements releasing all known or unknown construction defects in a single family home case. The Court will hold parties to the settlements they agree to. This is especially so when one of the parties is an attorney and provides deposition testimony expressly acknowledging that he understood the scope of the agreement. Attorneys for builders should always include a waiver of all known and unknown claims, which pursuant to Belasco and San Diego Hospice, will ensure that any future claims at the property will be effectively barred by the terms of the settlement agreement.
Reprinted courtesy of Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger attorneys
Richard H. Glucksman,
Jon A. Turigliatto and
David A. Napper
Mr. Glucksman may be contacted at rglucksman@cgdrblaw.com
Mr. Turigliatto may be contacted at jturigliatto@cgdrblaw.com
Mr. Napper may be contacted at dnapper@cgdrblaw.com
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Back Posting with Thoughts on Lien Waivers
May 20, 2015 —
Christopher G. Hill – Construction Law MusingsAfter a week of being unable to post due to the rigors of my solo construction practice, I’m back on the blogging train. For those of you that missed my new musings this past week, I hope that you had a chance to look through some of the past Guest Post Friday posts for some good stuff to read.
During the course of my busy week last week, a question came up regarding the mechanic’s lien waivers that commercial construction companies routinely execute as part of the payment process. The waiver forms vary, but each essentially states that in exchange for payment the payee, whether a subcontractor or supplier (or even general contractor) waives its future rights to record a mechanic’s lien for the work that is covered by the payment received. Most if not all of these forms further require a certification that the funds paid will either be used to pay suppliers or that suppliers have already been paid. This general description is not the reason for this post.
As is always the case in the Commonwealth of Virginia where the contract is king and a court is unlikely to reinterpret any written contractual document, the devil is in how that waiver is worded. Some waivers are worded in such a way that they essentially require a payee to certify receipt of the funds prior to payment being received. These same forms require the same pre-payment certification that all suppliers and subcontractors of the payee have already been paid. In short they require a payee to both place complete trust in the payor that the check will be paid and that the check will not bounce while in many cases (often with an unstated “wink and nod”) claiming payment was already made when all know the likelihood is that it has not.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Christopher G. Hill, Law Office of Christopher G. Hill, PCMr. Hill may be contacted at
chrisghill@constructionlawva.com
Statute of Limitations and Bad Faith Claims: Factors to Consider
May 16, 2022 —
Anastasiya Collins - Saxe Doernberger & Vita How much time do our clients have to bring a bad faith action against an insurer? Although we are not frequently asked this question, it is one that we constantly analyze before asserting a bad faith claim.
To answer this question, we look to the statute of limitations, which is a law passed by a state legislative body that sets the maximum amount of time for a party to bring a claim based upon a particular cause of action. For policyholders, knowing which statute of limitations applies to their bad faith claim is critical because it indicates whether it is possible to initiate legal proceedings. In addition, it determines the amount in damages available in case of a successful resolution.
Statute of Limitations in Breach of Contract vs. Tort Claims
One key determinant of a statute of limitations for bad faith is whether the claim is brought as a tort or a breach of contract action. The consequence of framing bad faith as a tort is that a policyholder is not just limited to contract damages. The policyholder can also receive recourse for emotional distress, pain, suffering, punitive damages, attorney’s fees, and other damages that the court may consider appropriate. Unfortunately, however, not every jurisdiction allows plaintiffs to bring bad faith actions as tort claims. While, for example, courts in California, Colorado, and Connecticut allow bad faith claims sounding in tort, courts in jurisdictions such as Tennessee do not.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Anastasiya Collins, Saxe Doernberger & VitaMs. Collins may be contacted at
ACollins@sdvlaw.com
Construction Defect Coverage Barred Under Business Risk Exclusion in Colorado
February 14, 2013 —
CDJ STAFFA federal court in Colorado recently applied the business risk exclusion to a construction defect case. Aaron Mandel and Stevi Raab of Sedgwick Law discuss this in Construction Defect Coverage Quarterly. The court found that the business risk exclusion barred coverage for an underlying construction defect. In the construction defect case, the Creek Side at Parker homeowners association sued the developer and builder. One such alleged defect was that “the plumbing contractor’s faulty installation of sewer and water lines damaged the lines themselves, caused surrounding asphalt and concrete to crack and deteriorate, and resulted in water intrusion.”
The court concluded that this damage to non-defective work was an occurrence, but the exclusion in the contract covered only property damage that occurred “while the work is ongoing.” The court concluded that the business risk exclusion barred coverage.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Turning Back the Clock: DOL Proposes Previous Davis-Bacon Prevailing Wage Definition
April 19, 2022 —
David Chidlaw & Carina Novell - Sheppard Mullin Construction & Infrastructure Law BlogOn March 11, 2022, the Department of Labor (“DOL”) proposed reverting the definition of “prevailing wage” under the Davis-Bacon Act to a definition used over 40 years ago. According to the DOL, the proposal is meant to modernize the law and “reflect better the needs of workers in the construction industry and planned federal construction investments.”
[1]
Brief History Lesson
The Davis-Bacon Act was enacted in 1931 and requires the payment of locally prevailing wages and fringe benefits on federal construction contracts. The law applies to workers on contracts in excess of $2,000 entered into by federal agencies and the District of Columbia for the construction, alteration, or repair of public buildings or public works.[2]
From the 1930s to the early 1980s, the DOL used the following three-step process to define prevailing wage:
- Any wage rate paid to a majority of workers.
- If there was no wage rate paid to a majority of workers, then the wage rate paid to the greatest number of workers, provided it was paid to at least 30 percent of workers (i.e., the “30 percent rule”).
- If the 30 percent rule was not met, the weighted average rate.
Reprinted courtesy of
David Chidlaw, Sheppard Mullin and
Carina Novell, Sheppard Mullin
Mr. Chidlaw may be contacted at dchidlaw@sheppardmullin.com
Ms. Novell may be contacted at cnovell@sheppardmullin.com
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
