Certificates as Evidence of Additional Insured Coverage Are All the Rage, But You Deserve Better
August 30, 2021 —
Joseph L. Cohen, W. Mason & Sean Milani-nia - ConsensusDocsConsider the following scenario: the construction project is ready to proceed. The deal is done. The agreements have all been carefully crafted, with detailed provisions on insurance dedicated to reducing risk. Those provisions require the downstream trade contractors to furnish certificates of insurance listing the owner and prime contractor as additional insureds on the downstream contractor’s policies of insurance. A provision in the prime contract further requires the prime contractor to provide the owner with a certificate of insurance showing the owner as an additional insured on the prime contractor’s policies. At the ceremonial ground-breaking and right before work commences, the downstream contractors deliver their insurance certificates to the prime contractor and the prime contractor delivers its certificate plus the downstream certificates to the owner. From there, each insurance certificate will begin its final destination to the project file (either electronic or physical) where, with any luck, it will serve the regular stint before being discarded after the project’s successful conclusion. Otherwise, it will be retrieved under much stress and heavy scrutiny. The acceptance of insurance certificates is often viewed as standard industry practice, but should it be?
The answer is a resounding “no.” There are many form development and construction agreements in circulation that deem insurance certificates to be acceptable evidence of insurance. But, a certificate of insurance should not be relied upon because it does not mean that insurance has been placed. You deserve real evidence that the requisite additional insured coverage is in place (in the form of a policy endorsement), and here is why.
Reprinted courtesy of
Joseph L. Cohen, Fox Rothschild,
W. Mason, Fox Rothschild and
Sean Milani-nia, Fox Rothschild
Mr. Cohen may be contacted at jlcohen@foxrothschild.com
Mr. Mason may be contacted at wmason@foxrothschild.com
Mr. Milani-nia may be contacted at smilani@foxrothschild.com
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Tall Mass Timber Buildings Now Possible Under 2021 IBC Code Changes
February 03, 2020 —
Kenneth Bland - Construction ExecutiveThe International Code Council (ICC) has approved 17 changes to the 2021 editions of the International Building Code (IBC) and International Fire Code, allowing for mass timber buildings up to 18 stories. With the addition of three new mass timber construction types (Type IV-A, IV-B, and IV-C), this is the first time in the history of the modern building code that significantly new construction types have been added to the code.
Building Materials
The primary building material that makes tall mass timber (TMT) buildings possible is cross-laminated timber (CLT). CLT is manufactured from dimension lumber (nominal 2x lumber) laid side-by-side or mass plywood panels of a specified width. Laminations of lumber are typically laid perpendicular to each other to form panels of various thicknesses that are bonded together using heat resistant adhesives that cure in large hydraulic presses. CLT commonly consists of an odd number of laminations.
These solid wood panels can be anywhere from 6 inches to 20 inches nominal thickness and 60 feet long. Typical CLT panels will be 6 inches to 14 inches nominal thickness. The panels are fabricated off site, transported onto the construction site and assembled in a manner that is efficient and remarkably fast. CLT panels can be used as floor, wall, or roof building elements supported by glued-laminated beams and columns.
Reprinted courtesy of
Kenneth Bland, Construction Executive, a publication of Associated Builders and Contractors. All rights reserved.
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Insurer’s Broad Duty to Defend in Oregon, and the Recent Ruling in State of Oregon v. Pacific Indemnity Company
January 02, 2024 —
Keith Sparks - Ahlers Cressman & Sleight PLLCOregon law mandates a broad duty to defend, requiring insurers to provide legal representation to their policyholders whenever there is a potential for coverage under the policy. The significance of this broad interpretation means that an insurer has a duty to defend an insured even in situations where the alleged facts only imply a covered claim, and even in situations where the underlying claim is ultimately not covered by the policy. The insurer’s duty to defend is triggered if the allegations of the complaint, reasonably interpreted, could result in the insured being held liable for damages covered by the policy. This is referred to as the “four-corners” rule; it is also sometimes referred to as the eight-corners rule (for the four corners of the complaint plus the four corners of the policy). Oregon’s adoption of a broad interpretation of the duty to defend affirmatively places the onus on insurers to err on the side of coverage.
This broad duty to defend is based on the principle that an insured should not have to bear the expense of defending a lawsuit that the insurer may ultimately have to pay for. The duty to defend is also important because it helps ensure that insureds have access to legal representation when faced with a lawsuit.
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Keith Sparks, Ahlers Cressman & Sleight PLLCMr. Sparks may be contacted at
keith.sparks@acslawyers.com
That’s Common Knowledge! Failure to Designate an Expert Witness in a Professional Negligence Case is Not Fatal Where “Common Knowledge” Exception Applies
June 03, 2019 —
Lyndsey Torp - Snell & Wilmer Real Estate Litigation BlogIn reversing summary judgment for defendants, the California Fourth District Court of Appeal recently held that homeowners suing their real estate broker for negligence did not need an expert witness to establish the elements of their causes of action. Ryan v. Real Estate of the Pacific, Inc. (2019) 32 Cal. App. 5th 637. Typically, expert witnesses are required to establish the standard of care in professional negligence cases. But in Ryan, the court of appeal held that the “common knowledge” exception applied despite this general rule, because the conduct required by the particular circumstance of the case was within the common knowledge of a layman. The conduct in question here? The broker’s failure to disclose to his client that the client’s neighbor told him that she planned extensive renovations that would obstruct the client’s property’s ocean views.
Ryan and Patricia Ryan (the Ryans) hired defendant Real Estate of the Pacific, Inc., doing business as Pacific Sotheby’s International Realty (Sotheby’s) and defendant real estate broker to sell their residence in La Jolla, California. During an open house at the residence, a neighbor informed the Ryan’s real estate broker that she planned extensive renovations at her home that would, among other things, permanently obstruct the Ryan’s westerly ocean views and take several years to complete. The real estate broker never informed the Ryans of this, nor the subsequent buyer. The subsequent buyer purchased the property for $3.86 million, and defendants received $96,500 as commission for the sale. The day after escrow closed, the buyers learned of the renovations, and sought to rescind the purchase. Based on advice of defendants, the Ryans refused, and the dispute proceeded to arbitration. The buyer obtained a rescission of the purchase, with the Ryans order to pay damages, interest, and attorneys’ fees and costs in excess of $1 million. The Ryans then sued Sotheby’s and the real estate broker to recover these amounts and damages caused by defendants’ alleged negligence.
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Lyndsey Torp, Snell & WilmerMs. Torp may be contacted at
ltorp@swlaw.com
Rhode Island District Court Dismisses Plaintiff’s Case for Spoliation Due to Potential Unfair Prejudice to Defendant
September 04, 2018 —
Lian Skaf - The Subrogation StrategistIn Amica Mutual Ins. Co. v. BrassCraft Mfg., Co., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88986 (D.R.I. May 29, 2018), the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island addressed the question of whether the defendant was so unfairly prejudiced by the subrogating insurer’s spoliation of evidence that dismissal of the plaintiff’s case was the appropriate Rule 37(b)(2)(a)(i)-(vi) sanction. The court, focusing on the potential for undue prejudice to the defendant, granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss.
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Lian Skaf, White and Williams, LLPMr. Skaf may be contacted at
skafl@whiteandwilliams.com
Business Risk Exclusions Bar Faulty Workmanship Claim
December 21, 2020 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiThe manufacturer of roofing and waterproofing systems was unsuccessful in securing coverage for alleged faulty workmanship due to the "your work" and "your product" exclusions. Siplast, Inc. v. Emplrs Mut. Cas. Co., 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 176539 (N.D. Texas Sept. 25, 2020).
Siplast was sued in New York by the Archdiocese for work done at Cardinal Spellman High School. The Archdiocese purchased a Siplast Roof System for the high school. Vema Enterprises installed the roof system. The roof system was covered by a guarantee.
After completion, school officials noticed water damage in the ceiling tiles throughout the school. A consultant hired by the Archdiocese concluded that the leaks were caused by the workmanship and the materials that were compromising the entire roof membrane and system. Siplast determined the guarantee was not applicable. The Archdiocese informed Siplast that it would repair the roof and hold Siplast liable for the costs. Siplast gave notice of the claim to Employers, but coverage was denied.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak HastertMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Back Posting with Thoughts on Lien Waivers
May 20, 2015 —
Christopher G. Hill – Construction Law MusingsAfter a week of being unable to post due to the rigors of my solo construction practice, I’m back on the blogging train. For those of you that missed my new musings this past week, I hope that you had a chance to look through some of the past Guest Post Friday posts for some good stuff to read.
During the course of my busy week last week, a question came up regarding the mechanic’s lien waivers that commercial construction companies routinely execute as part of the payment process. The waiver forms vary, but each essentially states that in exchange for payment the payee, whether a subcontractor or supplier (or even general contractor) waives its future rights to record a mechanic’s lien for the work that is covered by the payment received. Most if not all of these forms further require a certification that the funds paid will either be used to pay suppliers or that suppliers have already been paid. This general description is not the reason for this post.
As is always the case in the Commonwealth of Virginia where the contract is king and a court is unlikely to reinterpret any written contractual document, the devil is in how that waiver is worded. Some waivers are worded in such a way that they essentially require a payee to certify receipt of the funds prior to payment being received. These same forms require the same pre-payment certification that all suppliers and subcontractors of the payee have already been paid. In short they require a payee to both place complete trust in the payor that the check will be paid and that the check will not bounce while in many cases (often with an unstated “wink and nod”) claiming payment was already made when all know the likelihood is that it has not.
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Christopher G. Hill, Law Office of Christopher G. Hill, PCMr. Hill may be contacted at
chrisghill@constructionlawva.com
Construction Defects and Second Buyers in Pennsylvania
February 07, 2013 —
CDJ STAFFThe ability to sue over construction defects has typically been limited to the initial purchaser of a home. But as Kevin F. McKeegan writes in the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, the Pennsylvania Superior Court recently expanded that to subsequent purchasers. As Mr. Keegan notes, "not only can the first buyer of a new home bring a lawsuit against a builder, but now any subsequent buyer within 12 years of the home's construction can file a claim."
Mr. Keegan, a lawyer with Meyer, Unkovic & Scott, notes that in the underlying case, the second owners of a home in Jamison, Pennsylvania filed a claim that the water infiltration violated the "implied warranty of habitability."
There are still limitations on construction defects in Pennsylvania. The suit must be filed within twelve years of completion of the construction, and a breach of implied warranty must be proven. Mr. Keegan notes that "the homeowner must show that a defect is hidden and non-obvious, that it is the result of the builder's design or construction, and that it affects the habitability of the residence."
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